Further analysis of waking and dream experiences

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 33, reiterates what he discussed about the dream and waking states in the second chapter (i.e. Vaitathya Prakaraṇa) by including ‘enclosedness in the body’ as the character of dream phenomena which marks them as unreal. In the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa, the terms for this were antaḥsthāna and saṃvṛtatva (2:1). In the present kārikā the terms used are “kāyasyāntar nidarśanāt,” meaning “on account of being seen within the body” and samvṛta (on account of narrow space). The kārikā 33 reads as:

‘All objects cognised in a dream are unreal, because they are seen within the body. How is it possible for things, that are perceived to exist, to be really in Brahman which is indivisible and homogeneous. In such a limited space, how could objects exist and be seen? In other words how is it possible to really perceive those things that are seen to exist, within this limited space’?

Śaṅkara says that this and the following kārikās (33-34) are intended to expand the meaning of what is stated in kārikā 25. This kārikā asserts that the cause of the existence of external objects is in fact not really a cause; thereafter denying that the real existence of external objects from the ultimate point of view.

According to the siddhāntin the waking state is as unreal as the dream state for reasons which are common to both. Both the states have a beginning and an end.

Further the dream objects are seen within the limited space of the body are unreal as things like a mountain etc. cannot exist within the enclosed space of the body. Similarly objects in the waking state are just in one small part of the body of the Virāṭ (totality of gross bodies). Hence, both the states namely the waking and the dream are illusory from the standpoint of ultimate reality. The only reality is Brahman i.e., the Self (samvid or vijñāna) which is indivisible and homogeneous. Ānandagiri in his Tīkā clarifies the above kārikā thus:

According to him this kārikā indirectly aims at proving the falsity of both the states. If falsity of dream objects follow from the fact of their being seen within a place that is not adequate for them, then things of the waking state also must be false since they, though naturally associated with space and time, are still seen in Brahman that has no space and time.

It must be pointed out that Gauḍapāda systematically uses the space and time constructs to prove that the wakeful and dream states are mithyā or illusory. In the above kārika the notion of space has been utilized to demonstrate the non-reality of two states. In the following kārikās, he advances arguments using also the time construct to show the nature of the two states.

The second line of kārikā 34 is identical with that of kārikā 2:2. The first line of these two kārikās express the same thought i.e. the unreality of the dream state. Gaudapāda says:

‘It is not possible for a dreamer to go out in order to experience the dream objects on account of the discrepancy of the time involved in such journey. Again, on being awake, the dreamer does not find himself in the place (where he dreamt himself to be)’.

As Śaṅkara explains, the time requires for going and coming back from a destination in the waking state has definite and fixed time order. But in dream such definite and fixed time and space is absent. This is however from the standpoint of the waking state. Thus from the standpoint of the waking state, the dream movement in dream space and time is unreal.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 35 reiterates what was said in kārikā 3 of the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa. In that kārikā he authenticates his view by stating that the Śruti itself declares the illusoriness of dream state. Gauḍapāda quotes from (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. IV.3.14) where this is explained in detail. Gauḍapāda in kārikā 35 brings out the common experience to prove the illusoriness of both the states.

The dreamer on waking does not see any of his friends with whom he may have been conversing, during the dream state. Also, on waking, he does not find with him anything that he may have acquired in the state of dream. Gauḍapāda drawing from one’s common experience of dream says that a person might dream about meeting friends and having a discussion. But when he wakes up he does not continue with the talks etc. he had with his friends etc. It would make no sense for him to presume that the friends present in the waking state know all about the conversation that he had with them. There is no continuity here with the action he performs in the dream. One also notices that the possession one acquires in the dream is not found with the person when he wakes up.

Śaṅkara explains that the gifts of gold and other things the dreamer may have acquired in the dream, is not found with him when he is awake. Therefore, there is no question of his going to the place he dreamt of. Śaṅkara further points out that even though the dreamer might have visited places but from the waking point of view he has not visited anywhere. This kārikā is important for it draws from day to day experience and is different from kārikā 2:3 quoted from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śruti.

Continuing from the earlier kārikā Gauḍapāda adduces an extra reason for showing the falsity of dream which is also extendable to wakeful state in this kārikā 36. A similar point is made by him in the second chapter kārikā 3 but with minor terminological differences. These terms namely like kāya, cittadṛśyam [cittadṛśya], avastukaṃ [avastuka] etc. are added in this kārikā.

The entire argument which begins with an examination of the nature of dream objects and culminates with the proof of the unreality of the objects of wakeful state is given in kārikā 36. There it is said,

‘The body active in dream is unreal as the other body, quite distinct from it, is perceived. Like the body, everything, cognised by the mind, is unreal’.

The commentator substantiates this kārikā as follows: The body which is seen wandering in dream is unreal for another different body is seen in the place where the dreamer lies. On waking up one sees one’s own body distinct from the dream body and also from the space where one saw the dream body. Just as the body that is seen in the dream is unreal so also all that is seen in thought is unreal, even in the waking state. The reason is that it is seen by the mind. The meaning of this karika is that the waking experience is also unreal because it is the same as dream experience.

When a person dreams he seem to possess a body different from the body lying on the cot. When he wakes up, he realises that the dreamt body is but unsubstantial or avastukaṃ [avastuka]. Gauḍapāda extends this notion of avastukaṃ to all objects ‘seen’ the dream. He calls them a mere cittadṛśyam [cittadṛśya]/a perception of the mind. The point that is highlighted here is that all things ‘perceived’ are unsubstantial and mere perception generated by the mind. This not only true to the dream objects but also to the wakeful world.

In our common experience of passing between the waking and the dream states, Gauḍapāda has given a clue that the objects that we see are not really what they appear to be. In dream we see the dream body and think that it is real. But when we pass from the dream to the waking state, we see the waking body and we know that the dream body was not real and was only an imaginary creation of the mind of the dreamer. This shows us that we are capable of seeing an unreal object as real and that we are also capable of being completely convinced by this misperception.

Again, the kārikā 36 continues, “Like the dream body, all things seen in thought are unreal.” All objects, even objects of the waking state are seen in the same way that dream objects are seen. They are all seen as objects of perception. Objects of the waking state may appear to be seen through the senses because the same object is seen again in memory and dream, where the senses do not function, we know that the object is actually seen within the thought of the perceiver. Any object can only be known as it is perceived. Both dream and waking objects appear to be external, but we know that this is only an appearance because the perception of an external object is not possible.Thus, it is concluded that the objects of both waking and the dream states are equally illusory.

In kārikās 37-38, Gauḍapāda raises the point of the essential equality between dream and waking states which has already been discussed in the second chapter (on unreality) kārikās 4-5 which seems much more explicit.

The kārikā 37 reads as,

‘Since the experiences of objects in the dream are similar to the experiences of objects in the waking state, it is thought that the waking experiences are the cause of the dream experiences. On account of this reason, the waking experiences, which are supposed to be the cause for the dream, appear as real to the dreamer alone’.

Śaṅkara says that for this additional reason the objects experienced in the waking state are unreal. Both in the dream and in the wakeful state, experiences are possible when the perceiver comes in contact with the objects. As the experience of the dreamer is similar to his own experience when awake, consisting of a perceiver, the act of perception, the object perceived, the experience of the dream is said to be the effect of waking experience. For this reason of similarity of nature the waking state is imagined as the cause of the dream state (or dream is considered the effect of the waking state). But for this very reason that the waking state is the cause of the dream state, the waking experiences appear real to the dreamer only and not to others. The meaning is that the waking state is as real as the dream state.

When you have a dream, your experience is similar to what you had when you were awake. This is why it is said that your waking experience is the cause of your dream experience. Your dream experience is your own; others do not share it. Since the dream experience is a reflection of the waking experience, the waking experinece is also your own and is not shared by others. If it is real, it is real only for you and not for others. Since it is not real for all it is not real at all.

Just as to the dreamer, the phenomena of dream appear as real as the objects of ordinary experience in the state of dream, the existing objects of waking experience, being the imagined causes of dream experience, appear to be real to the person in the waking state. The purport of this kārikā is that the objects of wakeful experience have no more reality than those of a dream.

Gauḍapada in kārikā 38 says:

‘All these are known as unborn, as their creation or evolution cannot be established as a fact. It is ever impossible for the unreal to be born of the real’.

It may be contended that the similarity between dream objects and waking objects, in so far as both are equally objects of consciousness, does not prove that the waking world is unreal. Again, the waking world, though the cause of the dream, is not unreal like dream. Dream state is transitory but the waking world is seen to be permanent.

Śaṅkara answers this objection by denying the logical possibility of a real causal relation between wakeful and dream states. He says that the enlightened (viveki) people do not recognise the origination of anything. Since origination remains unestablished, all is ātman, all is unborn (aja). For this reason, the Śruti declares all to be unborn. “The unborn within and without..” (Muṇḍ U II.1.2).

It cannot be argued that from the real waking state, the illusory dream state is originated, for a non-existent thing cannot be produced from an existent thing. It is against worldly experience. The horns of the hare, does not ever come into existence, from a real cause like rabbit. Hence the Vedāntins have proclaimed that all is ātman, that is unborn.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 39 says:

‘Being deeply impressed with the (reality of the) unreal objects which a man sees in the waking state, he sees those very things in dream as well. Moreover the unreal objects cognised in the dream are not seen again in the waking state’.

In this kārikā, the author accepts the empirical evidence that the wakeful state exerts a causal influence on the dream. But he is also saying that since we can experience unreal things from the waking state during dream, we cannot therefore conclude that our dream experience is based upon a real waking experience. According to Gauḍapāda both the wakeful and dream states are ontologically unreal.

It may be objected that there is no truth in causality is an obvious contradiction after saying that the wakeful experience is the cause of dream. Śaṅkara, however, maintains that there is no causality of transformative nature operate here. What according to him appears as causality is indeed an illusory happening. One may see a snake on a rope, but the snake has no causal connection with the rope. Snake, is but an appearance on the rope making no transformation to the substratum namely the rope on which it appears. Similarly the common sense view might be that there is a causal connection between the waking and the dream. It may be construed that the waking indeed produces in some sense the dream state. This is unacceptable to the Vedantins for the following reason as stated by Śaṅkara.

All the objects experienced in the waking condition are not always seen in the dream. Therefore, it is from the empirical point of view that the waking experience is said to be the cause of dream like rope causing the perception of snake (i.e as an unreal cause of an unreal effect) and not from the absolute point of view.

According to Bhattacharya^[1] kārikās 38, 39, 40 and 41 are not in the proper sequence. He says that after the kārikā 37, the proper order is kārikās 39 and 41 which concludes the discussion of wakeful and dream states, and then kārikās 38 and 40 which raise the subject of non-origination. The kārikās 39 and 41 with 32-37 form the same subject of discussion, i.e., the similarity of the states of dream and wakeful, while the kārikās 38 and 40 are meant for showing the impossibility of origination directly.

I concede with Bhattacharya because thematically there is a discussion of similarity between the wakeful and dream state to conclude that both are illusory. Since 38 and 40 deal with the doctrine of non-origination they may be bracketed together.

In kārikā 22, it is stated that nothing is born either from itself or from another. In kārikā 40, Gauḍapāda stated the same thing with absolute impossibility of the doctrine of causality.

He says that,

‘The unreal cannot be the cause of the unreal nor can unreal be the cause of the real. The real cannot be the cause of the real and how can the real be the cause of the unreal’?

In the above kārikā Gauḍapāda seems to be stating the position of the classical schools like Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, class of Vedāntins and the Buddhist Śunyavādins who believe in causality.

Śaṅkara explains that the causal relationship of the wakeful and dream state is stated from the phenomenal point of view. But from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality causality cannot be established. The four views are as follows:

(i) the nonexistent cannot be the cause of a non-existent. The unreal/non-existent, like the horns of a hare, cannot be the cause of a non-existent entity like a flower in the sky. The Buddhist Nihilist position is refuted in the first alternative,

(ii) jars etc. which are supposed to be real, cannot be the effect of an unreal cause such as the horns of a hare. Hence, the existent/real, cannot have the non-existent in its cause.The Nyā ya position is that the effect is real and is not already present in the cause, which means that the cause does not have the potency to generate that effect. In other words the cause is unreal in the context of effect which is regarded as real. This is referred to as asatkāryavāda. Gauḍapāda refers to this position as the second alternative in this kārikā maintains that it is illogical to maintain a real product which can be generated from unreal source,

(iii) further, the existent cannot have the existent for its cause–an existing jar cannot arise out of another existing jar. The Sāṅkhya school tenaciously argues for the position of both the cause and effect, being real. In other words the real cause (Prakṛti) evolves and generates the real material world (Mahat etc.) This is refuted in this third alternative presented by Gauḍapāda.The point that is made here is that if something is real it cannot transform and generate an effect which is real,

(iv) The final position stated in Gauḍapāda’s kārikā is the refutation of the view held possibly by some Vedāntins as quoted by Swami Nikhilananda.^[2]

According to this class of Vedāntins the real existent Brahman is the cause of the unreal phenomenal world. Gauḍapāda points out absurdity to this position of real object or a real cause that cannot transform and generate an unreal effect. Existence cannot generate nonexistence. Thus Gauḍapāda cancels out the possibility of any function of causality. This kārikā highlights the point that there is no causal relation between the wakeful and dream and vice versa. The existent being the cause of the non-existent is purely impossible. All these views are rejected as ātman is catuskoṭi varjita.

Apart from these, there is no possibility of any other kind of cause and effect relationship. The meaning is that, to the discriminating (vivekināḥ) people any kind of causal relationship is really an unestablished fact.

Bhattacharya quotes Nāgārguna’s Madhyamakārikā XXI:12, where the same four views as stated by Gauḍapāda but in a different order and language^[3].

This is as follows:

(iii) na bhāvāj jāyate bhāvo
An existing thing does not arise from what exists.

(ii) bhāvo’bhāvān na jāyate
An existing thing does not arise from what does not exist (abhāva).

(i) nābhāvāj jāyate’bhāvo
What does not exist does not arise from what does not exist.

(iv) bhāvo bhāvān na jāyate
What does not exist does not arise from what does exist.

According to Gauḍapāda the wakeful and the dream are two independent states. Due to lack of discrimination one considers an erroneous perception as true in wakeful state. The nature of erroneously perceived object is indescribable. Similarly the objects seen in dream have limited existence in the dream world alone.

Thus Gaudapāda asserts the following in kārikā 41:

‘As one in the waking state, through false knowledge, handles, as real, objects whose nature cannot be described, similarly, in dream also, one perceives, through false knowledge, objects whose existence is possible in that condition alone’.

Śaṅkara says that this kārikā is intended to remove any possibility of causal relationship between the wakeful (jāgarita) and dream (svapna) states, though both the states are unreal. Just as one imagines in the waking state through ignorance inconceivable objects like the snake on a rope as though they are real objects. Similarly, one through ignorance imagines and as if perceives objects like elephant etc., but such objects are seen in the dream only. These dream objects are not effects of waking state.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

, 146.

[2]:

Nikhilananda Swami, The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, 257. fn.

[3]:

, 148.