Cognition and the problem of objective reference

Gauḍapāda, after criticising the views of the Sāṅkhyas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas theory of causation, now takes up Buddhist thought for discussion. The word ‘paratantra’ means ‘another śāstṛa, another school of philosophy’. He introduces the Bāhyārthavādi Bauddhas and then raises an objection against it in order to establish his own doctrine of non-origination (ajātavāda).

In kārikā 24 he presents the realists position. He says:

‘Subjective cognition (prajñapti) must have an objective cause (nimitta) in the form of external objects: otherwise both subjective cognition and its cause would cease to exist. There would be then no diversity (dvaya) of cognitions. Experience of pain too postulates the existence of objects. For these reasons, we accept the view of other philosophical systems that the existences of external objects are real’.

The word ‘prajñapti’ means knowledge of things such as sound, taste, touch etc. Prajñapti means prajñāna,^[1] subjective cognition. This subjective cognition has an external cause (nimitta) or object which is distinct and separate from the subjective cognition itself. This view is asserted by the Bāhyārthavādin Buddhists (realists). No subjective cognition (i.e. perception) of ideas like sound etc. can be without external objects, as all cognitions have corresponding external objects. In the absence of external objects the diversity and manifoldness (dvaya) in cognition would be unintelligible. The experience of sound, touch, colour viz. blue, yellow, red etc., would not occur in the absence of objects. But such experience of distinctions does exist is being directly experienced. The meaning is there is experience of duality. Therefore, because of the perception of this diversity and manifoldness, there is assertion of the existence of external objects as distinct and apart from subjective cognition in the system of philosophy of other school (paratantra i.e. Bāhyārthavādin).

Śaṅkara says that the appearance of various colours, like blue, yellow etc., depending on external objects, cannot be attributed to the inherent powers of consciousness, capable of bringing about the variety of cognition. The clear crystal cannot show blue or other colours, unless flowers etc. having the colours are placed beside it. The appearance of these colours in a crystal must be due to coloured objects which it reflects. Similarly, cognition which is the same all through cannot produce variety out of itself. The variety is really conditioned by the manifold objects which it makes known. The lamp-light which illumines things does not, verily, create them. Hence, it follows that apart from the cognising subject, there are real external objects, as maintained by other schools of thought.

There is another reason for supporting the views of realists who assert the existence of external objects as independent of consciousness. There is the experience of pain/misery (saṃkleśa). The word ‘saṃkleśa’, suffering, really means ‘causing suffering’. Experience of pain thus is experience of something causing pain. In other words, if there were no causes of pain, there would not be the experience thereof. If consciousness alone existed, how could the fact of misery/pain be accounted for? If there were no fire or other agencies of heat, there would be no burns and no pain. But we do experience such pain. We therefore assert the existence of external objects. We cannot explain pain etc., by merely accepting the existence of subjective cognition alone.

Therefore, the realists assert the existence of external objects, on these two grounds, viz., (1) the diversity and manifoldness of cognition and (2) the experience of pain due to burns etc. from external causes like fire, heat etc.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 25 continues the analysis of earlier kārikā by further distinguishing between the two different levels of truth. In this kārikā he refutes the realists position.

This kārikā reads as follows:

‘From the point of view of logical reason (yuktidarśanāt), a cause for the subjective impression must be assigned. But from the standpoint of the highest Reality (bhūtadarśanāt) or the true nature of things, we find that the (so-called) cause of the subjective impression is, after all, no cause’.

The realists assert that the jars etc. are the objective cause, the substratum for subjective cognitions. Śaṅkara, the commentator denies the existence of that cause, like the pot/jars etc. He emphasises that from the absolute point of view when the real nature of clay is known, the jar does not exist apart from the clay–unlike a horse has a separate existence from a buffalo. The meaning is the jar is perceived as nothing else than clay itself when one knows the clay well. We do not then see it existing apart from clay as we would see, for example, for a buffalo existing apart from a horse. In the similar manner the cloth does not exist independently apart from the threads or the thread from the fibres.

In this way, if one continues with the process of investigation into the very nature of reality and moves from transformation to the material cause (from the pot to the clay), a state will come where words and external objects denoted by them cease to exist. We do not find the existence of external objects to be the cause/effect of anything.

The second line of the kārikā may be read in a different way: The phrase in the kārikā may be abhūtadarśanāt and not bhūtadarśanāt in which case the meaning is that since there is no external object (animittatvam isyate), it cannot be accepted as the cause of cognition. This is like the erroneous perception of a snake on a rope, since, it is the content of an erroneous perception. There is no reason to accept the existence of the external world. When the error gets corrected, the appearance of object as external ceases to exist.

In the deep sleep state, or in samādhi or in the state of liberation, there is absence of erroneous perception. There is no illusion. And consequently there is no experience of the existence of external object independent of ātman.

According to Śaṅkara the Bāhyārthavādin Buddhist is a dualist, believes a logical reasoning, and relies on only what apparently appears to him. He says that only from the phenomenal (vyavahāra) point of view, like dream (even in dream one experiences diversity and pain), there is diversity and manifoldness of cognitions and experience of pain etc..

According to the realists mind is created by the objects. According to the Vijñānavadins the external world-of-objects have no reality and as such they cannot create a mind.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 26 continues speaking from the absolute standpoint. He gives the argument of the Vijñānavādins of the Buddhist school. He says that the realists argue that the external world of objects must be real since we are having the experience of the objects and also because we are having the experience of misery. Vijñanavādins break this idea of realists. According to the Vijñāanavādins the external world-of-objects are unreal. They (external objects) cannot be superimposed upon the mind. The mental impressions/ideas are nothing other than the mind itself. The ideas are not different from the mind itself. A mind without ideas is no mind at all. If at all there is a justification for the external world of plurality, it is to be sought in the mind. They argue that the world is nothing but the mind.

Thus, the kārikā 26 reads as follows:

‘The mind does not touch or come into contact with an object (cittaṃ na saṃspṛśatyartham). Nor are the ideas which appear as external objects (nārthābhāsam), reflections upon the mind. It is so because the object does not exist and the appearance of the object is not separate from it (or perhaps, not separate form the mind)’.

Śaṅkara comments on this kārikā as: The mind does not touch the external object (causes) because the absence of external object itself. Similarly, the mind also does not touch the reflection/appearance of external object. In other words, the appearances are not other than the mind (citta). The (so called) objects are unreal. The mind (citta / vijñāna) alone exists and appears as an external object (bāhyārtha). According to Śaṅkara this is like the function of the mind in the dream state. This is the same as we see objects as though external in our dreams. In the waking state also, the external objects like sound etc. are as unreal as those of a dream, which is established by the author in the second chapter (Vaitathya Prakaraṇa). The reflections of objects (arthābhāsa) in mind are not something different from the mind. As in the dream state, even in the waking state, it is mind alone that appears as objects like the jar etc. Hence, there cannot be any causal relation between the mind and the external objects which do not really exist.

To explain this point further Gauḍapāda asserts in kārikā 27 that,

‘The mind does not enter into causal relation in any of the three periods of time. How can the mind be ever subject to delusion, as there is no cause for any such delusion’?

According to Śaṅkara, the objectionist points out that if the mind appears as a jar etc., in the absence of such objects, there must exist ‘false knowledge’ of a jar etc.. If this is the case, how can one speak of right knowledge? The false knowledge always presupposes a true/right knowledge. In reply to this objection Śaṅkara says that, the mind is never in contact with any objects that may be thought of as causes, in the three divisions of time. If it does relate itself at any time to any objects that would form the truth or reality in relation to which, the cognition of non-existent jars and their reflections may be described as false cognition. But there is no contact of mind with any object at any time. Therefore, without a cause i.e. the external objects, how can the mind come to have any delusion (false knowledge). It means that there can never be any illusory knowledge.

It is the nature of the mind to appear as jars and other external objects. Śaṅkara says that it is the very nature of the mind i.e. ignorance (avidyā) by which the mind appears as different objects. In other words, the mind does not come into contact either with an external object (which does not exist) or its reflected appearance (avabhāsa). It is just the nature (svabhāva) of the mind or avidyā by which the mind itself appease like external objects. In reality there is no external object at all.

Gauḍapāda, in the following verse adeptly uses those arguments proposed by the Vijñānavādins to refute the opponents who maintain that external world exists. Gauḍapāda approves the arguments posited by the Vijñāvadins and in an interesting way uses the very same argument as the ground/ hetu for rebutting the subjective idealists position.

The kārikā 28 reads:

‘Therefore neither the mind (citta), nor that which is perceived by it (cittadṛsya) is originated. Those who see its (i.e. of the citta and cittadṛsya) origination see the foot prints of birds in the sky’.

From kārikās 24-27, beginning with ‘prajñapteḥ sanimittatvam’, Gauḍapāda has approved the arguments of Vijñānavādin Buddhsits (or subjective idealists) as against the realist who asserts the existence of external objects. Gauḍapāda, from the standpoint of reality accepts the argument of the Vijñānavadins in two respects (i) there are no external objects such as jars/pots, etc., and (ii) the mind appears in the form of an external object e.g., a pot/a jar.

Hence it also stands to reason that the mind also appears to be born even though there is no such thing as birth. Śaṅkara while commenting on this above kārikā says that there is no real birth of the mind, as the things perceived by the mind have no birth.

The Vijñānavādins believe that what is perceived by the mind as an object in actuality is not produced and yet they would admit the birth of the mind. They perceive the mind as momentary, inflicted with suffering, non-entity and non-ātman. They try to understand the mind by the nature of the mind itself, which is incapable of any perception, cannot be understood. Śaṅkara says they are like those who believe in the origination of things which is as absurd as trying to see (paśyanti) the foot-prints (padam) of birds flying in the sky.^[2] Therefore, they appear to be more enterprising than the dualists, who are their opponents.

Śaṅkara here takes an opportunity to critique the Śunyavādins by calling them more audacious than Vijñānavādins. According to him the Nihilists (Madhyamika Buddhists) who believe in the absolute non-existence of everything including the subject and though aware of themselves and their existence all the time, are more audacious than the Vijñānavādins. They are like those who trying to squeeze the whole sky in their fists.

The doctrine of non-origination is elucidated in kārikā 29 by the argument that there can be no essential change (prakṛter anyathābhāvo) in that which is unborn. The same argument is used in kārikā 4:7. The second lines of kārikās 4:29 and 4:7 are identical. Gauḍapāda, after establishing the non-origination of mind itself, comes to his central doctrine of non-origination (ajātivāda).

He says that,

‘In the opinion of the disputants that which is unborn is said to be born. For, its very nature is to be ever unborn. It is never possible for a thing to be other than what it is’.

For reasons already stated, it has been established conclusively that Brahman is one and unborn. According to Śaṅkara, this kārikā is the conclusion of what has been discussed in the earlier kārikās. The unborn mind, which is nothing other than the Brahman, is imagined by the disputants to have been born. Therefore, according to them the ever unborn has taken birth. By saying ‘unborn is born’, is contradicting its very nature. Hence the non-origination (ajāti) is the nature (prakṛti) of that unborn Brahman. This nature of Brahman in the form of birthlessness strictly undergoes no change. Origination never accrues to a thing which is of the nature of ever being nonoriginated/unborn.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 30 deals with the philosophical problem that the world (saṃsāra) though beginningless, has an end (i.e., liberation or mokṣa) yet endless mokṣa cannot really be said to have a beginning.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on this kārikā points out another defect in the arguments of those who maintain that the atman is, in reality, subject to both bondage and liberation. If the world (i.e. the state of the bondage of the atman) is beginningless, then its end cannot be established by any logical reasoning. He says that if something is without a beginning, then, it must be without an end; and if anything that has a beginning must have an end also. For, in common experience, a beginningless entity is never known to have an end.

According to Śaṅkara if you instance the break in the continuity of the relation of seed and sprout (as cause and effect), as against this thesis, we say it is not reasonable. For, the continuity as a flow has never been recognised as constituting a single unit. Therefore, all seeds and sprouts are with a beginning and therefore with an end.

In support of the argument, the dualists cite the example of the seed and tree series. The seed produces the tree and the tree produces the seed and this process goes on and on. No one knows when it began, and the process will continue until there is a break when the tree dies without leaving a seed. Śaṅkara says this argument is not valid because each time there is a tree, it is a new tree, and each time there is a seed, it is a new seed. So the process can never be said to be without a beginning.

In the same manner, if liberation is attained after the acquisition of knowledge and has thus a beginning then it can never be eternal. For, a jar which has a beginning has also an end. Wherever there is a beginning there is an end. Illustration of utter destruction of a pot (pradhvaṃsābhāva) which has a beginning but no end is not applicable in the case of liberation. Liberation has a positive existence from the standpoint of ultimate reality. If liberation has no positive existence, it can never have any beginning like the horns of a hare. For the non-existence cannot have any beginning.

Therefore Śaṅkara concludes that the ātman is unborn and ever free. The bondage (of ātman) is never existed. There is no question of its coming to an end. At the same time, liberation is not a product produced. It is always there. The beginning and end, birth and death, bondage and liberation are but modes of empirical usage without any corresponding substance/reality.

That which does not exist in the beginning and the end, is also non-existent in the present. Such objects even though similar to illusions are regarded as if they are real.

The utility of objects of waking experience is contradicted in dream. Therefore, they indeed considered as illusory because of their having a beginning and an end. Kārikās 31 and 32 are doublets of kārikās 6 and 7 of chapter two i.e. chapter ‘on unreality’. According to Śaṅkara these kārikās are repeated here in connection with the subject of transmigration (bondage of saṃsāra) and liberation. I have (already) clearly explained the two kārikās in the Vaitathya Prakaraṇa.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Prajñapti is not Brahman here which is also called praj‹ ñ āna.

[2]:

Bhattacharya quotes Dharmapada, 92: āk āśe’ va sakuntānaṃ gati tesaṃ durannyā. He says that this is a Buddhist analogy. Bhattacharya, Āgamaśāstra, 138.