Sūtra 2.23

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 2.23:

स्वस्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः ॥ २.२३ ॥

svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṃyogaḥ || 2.23 ||

sva—of being owned, svāmi—of owning. śaktyoḥ—of the powers of both, svarūpa—of the natures, upalabdhi—the recognition. hetuḥ—that brings about, saṃyogaḥ—conjunction.

23. Conjunction is that which brings about the recognition of the natures of the power of owning and the capacity of being owned.—74.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

This aphorism was composed for the purpose of explaining the nature of conjunction. ‘Conjunction is that which brings about the recognition of the natures of the power of owning and the capacity of being owned.’ The Puruṣa is the owner. ‘The knowable’ is whatever is owned. The former is conjoined to the latter for the purpose of knowing. The cognition of the knowable which follows from that conjunction is enjoyment. The knowledge, however, of the nature of the knower is emancipation. Conjunction, therefore, ends when it has caused knowledge. Knowledge is, therefore, called the cause of separation. Knowledge is the contracditory of ignorance. Therefore, ignorance is said to be the reason for conjunction. Here knowledge is not the cause of freedom (mokṣa); because the absence of Ignorance itself, meaning as it does the absence of bondage, is freedom (mokṣa). When knowledge comes into existence, ignorance which is the cause of bondage disappears, and with it the bondage which is caused thereby. It is for this reason that knowledge, the seeing of the true nature of things, is said to be the cause of Kaivalya (absolute independence, standing alone.)

And now what is this Ignorance (adarśana), this absence of knowledge? Is it a function of the qualities? Or, is it the non-reproduction of the mind which after having shown all the objects to the Puruṣa has become latent? That there should be absence of knowledge notwithstanding the presence of the knowable or the thing owned, is also unreasonable. Is it again the purposefulness of the qualities? Or, is it Nescience which has passed into the state of latency with its own appropriate mental state, and has become the seed which produces the mind appropriate to its own manifestation? Is it again the manifestation of the potency of motion, on the potency of rest having expended itself. It has been said on this subject, that the Pradhāna, the material cause of all manifestation, would become what it is not, if it tended only to rest, because in that case there would not be any manifestation into phenomena; nor would it be what it is, if it were to remain in constant motion, because in that case, the phenomena would become eternal and never disappear. It is only when it tends to both these states, that it can be called the Pradhāna (the cause of manifestation) not otherwise. The same considerations apply to any other causes that might be imagined.

Some say that Ignorance (adarśana) is nothing but the power which manifests as knowing (darśana). As the text says, ‘The activity of the Pradhāna is for the sake of showing herself.’

Others say that Ignorance (adarśana) is the characteristic of both the knower (Puruṣa) and the knowable, because the Puruṣa possesses only the power of knowing all that may be known, but does not know, before the setting in of manifestation; and the knowable possesses only the capacity of causing all effects, but is not known at the time. Here this knowledge, though of the very nature of the knowable, stands in need of the incoming of the Puruṣa for its achievement, and is therefore a characteristic of the knowable. Again although it is not of the nature of the Puruṣa, yet depending as it does for its completion upon the illumination of the knowable, Ignorance looks as if it were a characteristic of the Puruṣa.

Some again say that Ignorance is seeing or knowing (darśana) only.

These are alternative conceptions of the teaching only. This manifoldness of alternative conceptions is the common ground for the conjunction of the qualities with all the Puruṣas.—74.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

Thus then having described the cause of conjunction to be the achievement of the objects of the Puruṣa and having further described the concomitant eternity of the Pradhāna as well as the cause of the conjunction common to all the Puruṣas, this aphorism was composed to explain the nature of the conjunction which is not common to all the Puruṣas but pertains only to the individual * Conjunction is the cause of the recognition of the nature of the power of owning and the capacity of being owned? Inasmuch as the knowledge is for his sake, the Puruṣa enjoying the benefits conferred by it, becomes its owner, and the knowable becomes its own (possession). This correlation of theirs being determined as it is by the nature of the powers themselves, becomes the cause of the recognition of their natures. It is this that is illuminated by the Commentary “The Puruṣa is the owner.” On account of fitness only as such, he is conjoined with the knowable as its own by virtue of its fitness again. The rest is easy.

Very well. The recognition of the nature of the seer is called emancipation (apavarga) because by the instrumentality thereof one is drawn away from the conjunction. Perfect freedom (Mokṣa), however, is not a thing which can be brought about by means of anything. It would, therefore, certainly fall-short of perfect freedom. For this reason he says:—Conjunction, therefore, ends when it has caused knowledge; the conjunction that is to say, of the individual Puruṣa with the individual Will-to-be. Therefore, knowledge is called the cause of separation.

But then how is it that the conjunction ceases with the attainment of knowledge. He says that:—‘Knowledge is the contradictory of ignorance, &c.’ What then? For this reason he says:—‘Ignorance, i.e., Nescience is said to be the reason for conjunction.’ Further he illuminates the same meaning:—‘Here knowledge is not the cause of freedom (Mokṣa), &c.’

Well, but knowledge may remove ignorance being contradictory thereto; how can bondage be removed? For this reason he says:—‘When knowledge comes into existence &c.’ The meaning is that perfect freedom (mokṣa) is the establishment of the self ill its own nature, quite independent as he is of the Will-to-be; and that the means whereby it is brought about is not knowledge, but the removal of ignorance.

In order to establish the particular ignorance which is the cause of the conjunction to all the Puruṣas, he now sets out the alternative forms of ignorance as such ‘And now what is, &c.’ He suggests a theory:—‘Is it a function of the qualities, &c.’ The function of the qualities is their power of bringing about effects. It is by virtue of that that conjunction becomes the cause of creation (saṃsāra).

Taking up the form of denying what seems to be implied, he states the second alternative:—‘Or is it, &c.’ The meaning is that the mind by whom the objects, such as sound, &c., and the mental manifestation of the distinction between the Puruṣa and the Objective Existence are shown, is not born along with these states. He explains the same:—‘In its own knowability, that is, sound, &c., and the manifestation in the mind of the distinctive natures of the Puruṣa and the essence of matter, the Pradhāna is active only so long as the two-fold knowledge has not been brought about. When the two-fold knowledge has been brought about it ceases to act.’ This is another suggestion thrown out.

Now he mentions the third alternative:—‘Is it again the purposefulness of the qualities.’ The meaning is that inasmuch as the effect always exists, enjoyment and emancipation which have to manifest in the future, exist though not predicable in the present.

He suggests the fourth alternative in the same form of suggestive interrogation:—‘Or is it Nescience, &c.’ The suggestion is that it may be Nescience which at the time of every creation goes into the state of latency of the Pradhāna having been drawn in along with its own mind and then becomes the seed for the production of the same mind by its own potentiality. For this reason it is the residual potency of Nescience which is different from knowledge that is called Ignorance.

He states the fifth alternative in the same form of a suggestive question:—‘Is it that the potency of motion of the Pradhāna, the potency, that is to say, which is responsible for inclining the Pradhāna, towards the manifestation of effects, is essentialized on the potentiality of rest which lives in the Pradhāna and which consists in the continued successive manifestation of the modification of equipoise, coming to an end? He states the teaching of another school in support of the existence of both these potencies:—‘It has been said on this subject,’ by those who deny the existence of the one only. The Pradhāna is that by which the world of modifications is created. If that Pradhāna always tend towards rest and never towards motion, then it cannot create any modification and must, therefore, become the contradiction of itself. If again it go on always moving and never tend to rest, then he says:—‘If it were to remain in constant motion, &c.’

In some places the reading of both the words ‘sthiti’ and ‘gati,’ is in the dative case. In that case the dative case and the word ‘eva’ are to be read as meaning the same thing. If it did not go into the state of rest, then no modification would disappear; and if a thing which exists does not disappear, it can never also re-appear; and thus there would be no modifications. In this view nothing would ever be created, and thus there would be no Pradhāna. It is by motion and rest, both alternating, that this cause becomes Pradhāna, not otherwise. If only one of these alternative states were admitted then not only in the case of Pradhāna, but in the case of other First Causes, such as Parabrahma, Māyā, atoms, &c., also the same discussion would be relevant. These causes too would be no causes, if they were to remain in constant rest, because in that case they would not produce effects. They would similarly be no causes, if they were to remain in constant motion, because in that case, the modifications themselves becoming eternal, no necessity would remain for a cause.

He states the sixth alternative again as a suggestive interrogation. “Some say that ignorance is nothing but the power which manifests as knowing (darśana). It is said in the case of the Prajāpati vow, ‘Do not see the rising sun.’ This signifies the mental mood which co-exists with and is responsible for the act of seeing not. So also in the case of ignorance too the denial of knowledge means that, co-existent with the absence of knowledge, there is a power which takes its origin therein and which with the object of bringing about the knowledge termed enjoyment, &c., joins the knower to the knowable.

He cites a Vedic text in support of the same subject:—‘The activity of the Pradhāna is, &c.’ Grant that the Pradhāna becomes active for the purpose of showing herself as the Vedic text says; but it is not the power of knowing the nature of the self that becomes active. For this reason he says:—‘The Puruṣa possessing the power of knowing all that may be known, &c.’ It is not the object of showing herself that only sets the Pradhāna into activity, because before the setting in of activity, it could not be said whether it possessed the power of being seen. Hence it is the capacity of being seen that sets in activity. This the Vedic text says by implication.

This is the sixth alternative, that the power of seeing (knowing) Appends upon the Pradhāna. Now he states the seventh alternative, which takes up the position that the power of knowing depends upon both. ‘Ignorance depends upon both, &c.’ Ignorance, i.e., the power of seeing is the characteristic of both the Puruṣa and the knowable. Such is the position of some (thinkers.)

This may be allowed with regard to the knowable, because all the powers have it as their substratum. We cannot, however, allow it with regard to the Puruṣa. The power of knowing has not the Puruṣa for its substratum, because knowledge does not enter into the Puruṣa to make a part of him. If it did, the Puruṣa would become changeable. (He would not remain the constant factor which he is always found to be in all mental phenomena). For this reason he says:—‘Here this knowledge, &c.’

Let it then be of the nature of the ‘knowable.’ In that case knowledge, being a modification of the constituent energy of the ‘knowable’ must also be un-intelligent by nature. It could not, therefore, perform the function of the knowing as a characteristic of the knowable. The non-intelligent is not self-illuminating. For this reason knowledge becomes a characteristic of the ‘knowable,’ only with reference to the incoming of the knower, the self, the reflection of consciousness therein. This is known by the act indicating the actor.

Well but this too makes knowledge to be a characteristic of the knowable, not at the same time a characteristic of the Puruṣa too. For this reason he says:—‘Again although it is not of the nature of the Puruṣa, &c.’ The essence of matter is certainly not of the nature of the Puruṣa. Still'the incoming of the Puruṣa, i.e., the reflection of consciousness on which the act of knowing the knowable essence of the Will-to-be depends, makes it possible that the act of knowing be spoken of as it were to be an act of the Puruṣa, although not really so. This is the meaning. The characteristics of the Will-to-be shine forth as the characteristics of consciousness, because consciousness and the Will-to-be appear to be one, on account of the Will-to-be always carrying the reflection of consciousness along with itself.

He now mentions the eighth alternative:—‘Some say that the seeing, i.e., the knowing of sound, &c. is itself ignorance, not that of the distinction between the Puruṣa and the Objective Essence. This is the same as that the power of seeing, although an authority for the perception of colour, is no authority for the perception of taste, &c. This is the meaning. The cognitions of sound, &c., as pleasurable appearances, &c., point to the conjunction of the knower and the knowable, because it is necessary for their achievement.

All the alternative theories have been described. In order to accept the fourth alternative, he rejects all the others, because all the other alternative conceptions of the teaching of the Sānkhya, being common to all the Puruṣas lead to the absence of variety of experience:—“These are the alternative conceptions of the teaching, &c.”—23.