Perception in waking and dream states

Kārikās 61-62 of the alātaśānti prakaraṇa correlate perfectly with kārikās 29 -30 of the advaita prakaraṇa, except for small substitutions. Kārikā 61 is the same as 3: 29, with the difference that “cittaṃcalati, māyayā”, is substituted for ‘spandante māyayāmanaḥ’. It twice substitutes calati for the corresponding ‘spandate’; Kārikā 62 is also the same as 3:30, only substituting ‘cittaṃ’ for ‘manaḥ’.

Kārikās 61-62 are extremely significant from the philosophical point of view because they unambiguously establish the oneness of wakeful and dream states.

These kārikās read:

‘As in dream, the mind through illusion (māyā) presents the appearance of duality (i.e. perceiver and perceived), so also in the waking state, the mind through illusion presents the appearance of duality (i.e. perceiver and perceived)’.

There is no doubt that in dream, the mind (though non-dual) has the appearance of duality. Similarly there is no doubt that in the waking state, the non-dual mind has the appearance of duality.

According to Śaṅkara the meaning of these two kārikās is the same as that of the two (3:29-30) kārikās of the chapter on non-duality. He says that the pure Consciousness, which is non-dual from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality, is described by words due to the activity of the mind (citta spandana) through ignorance. But from the absolute standpoint, ātman is beyond such description.

The duality in the form of subject-object relationship (grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva) is due to ignorance. It is not the ātman, which is described by words but the vibration of the mind (citta spandana) which is the experience of the phenomenal world is due to ignorance. This subject-object division and thereby the relation are common to both the wakeful and dream states. The kārikā 62 asserts the truth that the mind (citta) is fundamentally not characterized by the dual structure of subject (perceiver) and object (perceived) division (advayam), and that the non-dual nature of mind persists in the wakeful and dream states regardless of the appearance of duality (i.e. subject and object).

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 63 says,

‘The dreamer while moving in about (in his dream) in all the ten directions sees various jīvas, born of eggs, moisture etc. (But these creatures/ jīvas have no existence apart from the mind of the dreamer)’.

According to Śaṅkara, for this further reason, duality describable by words, does not really exist. The dreamer moves about in all the ten directions in dreams, and perceives therein the variety of jīvas, whatever born of eggs, born of moisture etc. Thus, while moving in the dream, everything that the dreamer perceives has no separate existence apart from the mind of the dreamer.

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 64 says,

‘These (beings) which are objects of the mind of the dreamer have no existence apart from his mind. Similarly, this mind of the dreamer is admitted to be the object of perception of the dreamer only. (Therefore the mind of the dreamer is not separate from the dreamer himself)’.

As Śaṅkara explains these beings have no existence apart from the mind of the dreamer. The mind itself is imagined as taking diverse forms of a variety of beings/ jīvas. And that mind of the dreamer also is the object of perception of that dreamer alone. Therefore, apart from the dreamer there is no such distinct thing called the mind. In the dream, the dream objects are nothing but the mind of the dreamer. And the mind seeing the dream objects, has also no separate existence from the dreamer. Thus, the dreamer, his mind and the objects perceived in dream are all one and the same.

Gauḍapāda in kārikās 65-66 maintain that the condition in the wakeful state is exactly the same as in the dream state. The dreamer moves about in dream in various directions and perceives beings of many varieties which are really non-different from the dreamer’s mind. So also, in the wakeful state, the different things that are experienced are non-different from the waking mind. The variety that is seen in these two states is illusory, as it is conditioned by illusion.

The non-dual ātman is the only reality. Gauḍapāda says:

‘The wakeful perceiver goes about in the waking state in all the ten directions and always perceives the variety of beings, like those born of eggs, born of moisture etc. These beings etc. are the objects of perception of the waking mind. These beings have no existence apart from that waking mind. Similarly, the mind exists only for the perceiver in the wakeful state. Therefore the perceiver, the object seen by that perceiver and the instrument (his waking mind) are all one and the same’.

According to Śaṅkara, the jīvas, perceived in the wakeful state do not exist apart from the mind of the perceiver, as these beings/jīvas appear to the mind in the same way that they appear to the mind of the dreamer. The mind that engaged in the perception of jīvas, does not exist independent of the perceiver. This is also similar to the case in the dream, where the seer and the seen are one.

The main purport of these two kārikās is to prove that the experiences of the waker are in no way different from the experiences of the dreamer. Only duality is describable by words. The phrase “jīvas seen in the dream” in these kārikās mean objects having subject-object relation. It has already been stated in kārikā 28 that the mind (citta) is not originated really into external objects. Objects seen have no separate existence from the mind and the mind has no separate existence from the Self/ ātman. When the ātman is characterised by the perception of the subject-object ideas through ignorance it is called the mind. And when it remains free from any such idea, it is called ātman. When there is vibration of the mind (citta spandana), there is duality which does not really exist. When there is no vibration of the mind, it is all ātman. From the absolute standpoint both the wakeful and dream state are unreal.

Continuing with the interdependence of the mind and the objects perceived by the mind, Gauḍapāda in kārikā 67 proceeds to show that it is not possible to establish their independent existence. This is because there is no epistemological means to establish the independent existence of the mind and the objects of perception because they are dependent on one another.

He explicates this kārikā thus:

‘They both (the mind and the jīva) are the objects of perception to each other. Which of the two exists independently of the other? The wise reply of this question and say “none of them”. Both of them are devoid of characteristics which are the means to correct knowledge. The reason is that the one is cognised only through the other. They are seen as thought of by the citta itself (cittatayāeva)’.

Śaṅkara explains that the mind (citta) and the objects perceived by the mind (caitya) are mutually dependent on and in relation to each other. Neither has an independent existence. Each one of them is perceived through the other. It is therefore said that neither of them exists really. The decision of the wise is that in dream neither the external objects like an elephant etc. nor the mind that perceives them really exists. The same is the case with the waking state.

He says that the word lakṣaṇā in this kārikā means pramāṇa, “means of valid knowledge”. Both the mind and object are devoid of characteristics which are the means to the correct knowledge. The meaning is that they have no proof of their real independent existence.

Both the mind and the jīvas are objects of perception for each other. For no object is perceived without the thought of the object, nor is the thought of an object possible without the existence of the object. For instance one cannot have the cognition of the jar without the thought of the jar nor can he have the thought of the jar without the cognition of the jar. So in this respect they are interdependent on one another. Owing to this interdependence neither of them is established as a real thing. It means that it is not possible to distinguish between them as to which is the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and which is the object of knowledge (prameya).

Both the mind and the objects are interdependent. They are correlatives. No object can be perceived without the cognition of the object; and there cannot be the cognition of an object without the existence of the object. Both are dṛśyai. e. what are cognized. There is no pramāṇa which can validate their cognition. There is no proof that they exist. They are perceived only when they are both together. If there are no objects, there is no mind. So also, if there is no mind, there are no objects: They exist only when they are together. They have no independent existence. The men of discrimination therefore say that they are not real. They say, nothing really exists if it does not exist independently. ‘The knower’ and ‘the known’ do not exist separately. According to Advaita Vedānta ‘the knower’, ‘the known’ and ‘the knowledge’ are not separate entities. They are one and the same. Gauḍapāda holds the view that the mind which perceives the object is not the highest reality. The Vijñānavādins seem to regard the mind as capable of producing (dharmas), giving them with some sort of reality.

Gauḍapāda in kārikās 68-70 compares the passing into and passing out of living beings to the birth and death of a dream being (svapnamayojīvo), a being conjured by the illusion of magic (māyāmayo jīvo), and a being created by supernatural power (nirmitako jīvo).

The objector asks if both the mind and its object have no independent existence, then what exists? The reply is nothing dependent exists. The objector again may question, how can the object seen by the mind (citta-dṛśya) be unreal and seen (dṛśya) at the same time? The reply is given by three illustrations of jīvas. According to Gauḍapāda the object in the dream, the object created by the magician, the object created by a yogin possessed of supernatural powers–all these are manifestly unreal as the common man understands the expression. But do these not undergo the process of origination and annihilation before us? Therefore, there is nothing surprising if the unreal cittadṛśya comes into being and dies.

Gauḍapāda in the following kārikās (68-70) declares thus:

‘Just as a jīva seen in a dream is born and also dies, so also all jīvas (perceived in the wakeful state) appear (born) and then disappear (cease to be)’.

‘Just as a jīva created by a magician (or imagined to exist through māyā/illusion) is born and dies, so also jīvas (perceived in the wakeful state) become born (appear) and cease to be/disappear’.

‘Just as a jīva created through medicines and charms is born and also dies, so also all the jīvas (perceived in the wakeful state) become born and cease to be i.e. appear and then disappear’.

Here Śaṅkara explains that māyāmaya jīva is a jīva created by a magician through the feat of magic. Nirmitaka jīva is a jīva created with the aid of incantations, medicines herbs etc. This is an artificial creation. All creatures like those born of eggs etc. and such as those seen in a dream or created by a magician or created by the power of mantras, herbs etc. are born and die. Similarly the jīvas such as human beings etc. (experienced in the wakeful state) have no real existence and are mere imagination of the mind. The creatures seen in dream originating from eggs etc., the creatures created through magical feat and artificial creatures generated by incantation etc. have a birth and death. They are actually unsubstantial having no real existence. Gauḍapāda daringly compares the creatures seen in the wakeful state to the above mentioned beings seen in dream etc., saying that they lack any independent existence. They too appear and disappear like dream objects etc. They are all mere fanciful thought of the mind.

It is a well-known fact that even though there is no real existence of mind and its object in dream, we find births and deaths there. The three kārikās show that from the point of view of the Ultimate Reality, births and deaths etc. have no real existence. It is mere outward manifestations of the mind, perceiving imaginary projected appearances. The mind (citta) also is not anything apart from the ātman (Cit).

Gauḍapāda in kārikā 71 concludes the above kārikās by asserting that no jīva of any kind takes birth. This kārikā is similar to the kārikā 48 of the chapter on non-duality.

The kārikā reads as follows:

‘No jīva (living being) is ever born, no origination (of any jīva) ever takes place. There is no source for any such creation. This is the highest truth where nothing whatsoever is born’.

Śaṅkara says that in the realm of empirical reality, births and deaths of jīvas are like the births and deaths of jīvas in dream etc. But the highest truth is that no jīva is ever

born. The doctrine of ajātivāda is the most significant teaching propounded by Gauḍapāda. This kārikā clearly states that in actuality nothing comes into being or nothing perishes. A person may see many objects in dream taking birth and also undergoing destruction. But on waking a person realises that the objects he perceived in the dream were just his own thought, appearing as external and tangible objects. Nothing was created or there is no distinct cause–effect relation operating here. Hence the declaration that ultimately nothing comes into being is made.

According to Gauḍapāda, the world of duality consisting of minds and objects is but a projection of mind. The mind is never in contact with any object.

In itself the mind is without object, as it is of the nature of ātman. In kārikā 72 he say:

‘The duality consisting of the perceived and the perceiver, is due to the activity (vibration) of the mind. The mind, again, (from the ultimate point of view) is unrelated to any object and is therefore declared to be eternal and unattached’.

According to Śaṅkara from the standpoint of Reality, the mind is ātman, devoid of relations with objects (nirviṣayam) and is consequently described as eternal (nityam) and unattached, unrelated (asaṅga). The scripture says ‘’this person is not attached to anything’ (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.3.15-16.)^[1] When there are objects external to oneself, there may be attachment to them. In other words when there are no external objects, the mind will be unattached i.e. free from all relations.

Bhattacharya mentions in this context the asaṅgalakṣaṇa vijñānam of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra: “Viṣayavaicitryasaṅga -lakṣaṇaṃ vijñānam”.^[2]

Concerning the technical use of the term dvayam we read in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra III.121:

cittamātram idaṃ sarvaṃ dvidhācittaṃ pravartate grāhyagrāhakabhāvenaātmātmiyaṃ na vidyate.^[3]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣad, 260.

[2]:

Bhattacharya, Āgama śāstra, 172.

[3]:

Ibid.