Consciousness in Gaudapada’s Mandukya-karika

by V. Sujata Raju | 2013 | 126,917 words

This page relates ‘existence of mind is only from empirical (samvriti) standpoint’ of the study on Consciousness as presented by Gaudapada in his Mandukya-karika. Being a commentary on the Mandukya Upanishad, it investigates the nature of consciousness and the three states of experience (i.e., wakeful, dream and deep sleep) which it pervades. This essay shows how the Gaudapadakarika establishes the nature of Consciousness as the ultimate self-luminous principle.

The existence of mind is only from empirical (samvṛti) standpoint

Having shown that the world of duality consisting of the subject and the object (the perceiver and the perceived) is only the vibration of the mind, Gauḍapāda now in kārikā 73 proclaims the existence of mind is only from empirical (samvṛti) standpoint and not from the absolute (parmārtha) truth. For a thing which is dependent (paratantra) for its existence may exist in empirical realm and not in absolute truth.

This kārikā includes a discussion of samvṛti, because here the technical discussion of absolute and relative truth is emphasised by establishing that whatever imagination (kalpita) exist from the standpoint of conventional truth (samvṛti) cannot exist from the standpoint of Ultimate Truth (parmārtha).

Gauḍapāda says in kārikā 73:

‘That which is believed to exist as a result of illusory experience has no real existence. That, which is believed to exist according to other schools of thought like Vaiśeṣikas, when considered from the point of view of Reality, has also no real existence’.

It may be urged that if the mind is unattached due to the absence of external objects then the distinction about the teacher, student etc. is not possible. Śaṅkara explains that the scripture, the teacher, and the taught are not absolutely real. They have an empirical validity. The objects such as the scripture etc. are of the nature of illusory phenomenal experience and imagined only as a means (upāya) for realizing the Ultimate Reality. They have no real existence. It has already been stated that when the Ultimate Reality is known, duality does not exist (1:18). Again, anything or any reality that may be accepted to exist on the ground of being propounded by other schools of philosophy (paratantrābhisaṃvṛtyā) like Sāṅkhya or Vaiśeṣika etc. is not valid. They may have an empirical perspective and also some utility but from the absolute standpoint they do not really exist. Therefore in kārikā 72 the mind has been aptly described as unattached/non-relational.

Bhattacharya reads “paratantraḥ abhiṣaṃvṛtyā” and further interprets paratantra as such kind of truth which depends on another[1]. Śaṅkara explains the term ‘paratantra’ as other schools of thought/philosophy. Karmarkar, accepting Śaṅkara’s interpretation, says that the term ‘paratantra’ is used in Nyāyasūtra (I.1-29) for another school of philosophy and there is no need to resort to the technical Buddhist meaning as suggested by Bhattacharya.[2]

Bhattacharya points out that Buddhists accept two kinds of truth-empirical (samvṛti) and absolute (paramārtha). According to Śaṅkara truth is one and the phenomenal experience (saṃvṛti) is illusory or imagined (kalpita). Saṅkara interprets kalpita, in kalpitābhisaṃvṛtyā as imagined as a means to ultimately lead the seekers to the highest Reality.

In the other schools of philosophy e.g. the Vaiśeṣika school accepts six categories (padārthas) viz. from substance (dravya) to inherence (samavāya). But when analysed from the (absolute point of view), the definitions of these categories indicate that there is mutual dependence (parasparāśrayatva) on each other. Their independent existence is not established. Hence, they are illusory. In reality, mind is unrelated to an object (nirviṣaya). Ātman alone is real and without attachment. The scripture etc. include the distinctions of knower, knowledge and the object of knowledge. They are in the realm of empirical experience due to ignorance (avidyā).

The following kārikā adopts the famous method of adhyāropa and apaḥvāda. Gauḍapāda having propounded the doctrine of ajātivāda now does the apavāda of the notion of (aja) or being unborn. The postulation springs from the common sense belief that the Self is born; here the Self is seeing to be identical with the gross body that takes birth. Therefore, it is believed when the body is born, the Self is also born. Such a view is not only a common sense view but also world-wide religious view. In the context of this view ajātivāda is pertinent, meaning that it is important to talk about the birthlessness of the Self which is the witness of the three bodies gross, subtle and causal and also the three states wakeful, dream and deep sleep. The

significant apavāda is now to negate the notion of ‘birthlessness’ itself. The notion of birthlessness or aja is correlative with the notion of birth. When birth itself is illusory, its correlative notion of birthlessness is meaningless. Following the traditional methodology of Vedānta, Gauḍapāda does the subsequent retraction (apavāda) of the notion of aja.

Herein lays the importance of the kārikā 74 where he declares the following:

Ātman is called unborn (aja) from the standpoint of the illusory empirical experiences. It is, truly speaking, not even unborn. That unborn ātman appears to be born from the standpoint of the belief of the other schools of thought’.

It may be contended that if the scriptural teaching are in the realm of phenomenal experience, then the description of ātman is unborn (aja) is also a part of the phenomenal experience (saṃvṛti).

Śaṅkara begins his commentary by accepting the truth of this contention and says that from the ultimate point of view, ātman cannot be described even as unborn (aja). The other schools of thought e.g. Sāṅkhyas establish the ātman as born because their philosophical position conceals the truth. It is in relation to their false notion of the ātman that the view of the ātman as unborn is advanced to highlight the point that these schools falsely attribute birth to the birthless. Hence, the idea that ātman is unborn cannot encompass the Absolute, as the idea itself is part of the illusory phenomenal experience. Strictly speaking, no statement at all can be made from the (parmārtha) absolute point of view[3].

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Bhattacharya, Āgama śāstra, 174.

[2]:

Karmarkar, Gauḍapāda Kārikā, 131.

[3]:

Saccidānandendra Saraswati in his Māṇḍūkya Rahasya Vivṛiti (406 and 419) says Lokasaṃvṛti or Laukikasaṃvṛti is due to avidyā while Kalpitasaṃvrti is an upāya–imagined for paramārtha -darśana like a teacher.

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