Sūtra 9.2.5 (Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition...)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 9.2.5:

अस्येदमिति बुद्ध्यपेक्षितत्वात् ॥ ९.२.५ ॥

asyedamiti buddhyapekṣitatvāt || 9.2.5 ||

asya—its; idaṃ—it; iti—such; This; buddhi-apekṣitevāt—because of the cognition or notion being needed.

5. (Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition are all included in Inference by marks), because they depend, for their origin, upon the cognition, namely, “It is its.”—346.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

[Full title: Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition are all included in Inference]

For the purpose of showing that comparison, etc., also, recognised of others (as so many independent means of proof) and which proceed on the strength of inseparable existence or universal concomitance, are merely different forms of inferential cognition, he says:

[Read sūtra 9.2.5 above]

The words “of comparison, presumption, comprehension or subsumption and privation” complete the aphorism. ‘Asya,’ of the pervader, ‘idaṃ’ (it is) the pervaded,—the cognition is in this form. They are dependent upon it, by which it is depended upon as their originator. ‘Buddhi-apekṣitatva’ means the state of being so dependent. In consequence of such dependence,—this is the meaning of the term, it being a relative compound formed similarly to āhita-āgniḥ (by whom fire has been deposited), or formed with the affix ita (which signifies that something, e.g., dependence upon the cognition, has been produced in the something else, e.g., comparison, etc.), according to the rule that it is applied to the words star, etc., (so that tārakā + ita = tārakita = starry, heaven).

Upamāna, comparison or analogy, is in every respect nothing but anumāna, or inference, by means of words. Now the sentence, “A gavaeus or gayal looks like a cow,” is spoken by a forester in reply to the enquiry by a townsman, viz., “What does a gayal look like to?” Here immediately after hearing the above sentence at distant place, the townsman determines the meaning of the name, gayal, of the strength of the community of substratum, namely that which is like a cow is the object of reference by, or designate of, the word, gayal. Then when he goes to the forest and meets an animal body of that description, he recognises that that is that which is the designate of the word, gayal.

Objection.—At the time of hearing the sentence at a distant place, the generic nature of the gayal, which is condition or occasion of the recognition or application of the name, is not known. How then can there be such determination by, or application of, the name?

Answer.—There can be such determination, as the cognition thereof (i.e., of the generic nature) is possible by means of suggestion or metaphorically.

Objection.—But where is the room for suggestion, when in the sentence, “A gayal looks like a cow,” there is no want of proof of the agreement or position of the subject and predicate?

Answer.—There is room for suggestion, inasmuch as complete equivalence of the two terms still remains to be proved. For it is not proper to hold up before one, who desires to be enlightened Tn the matter, likeness to a cow as the condition or occasion of partial application of the name. Therefore, it (the name) refers to a particular genus or class in its entirety. Hence arises the possibility of suggestion. Or, the word, gayal, is denotative of the animal, gayal, being applied thereto by the elect, and there existing no other application of it. Other applications being non-existent, whatever word is applied by the elect to a certain object, the same is denotative of that, as the word, cow, is of the cow. It is from this inference that the application of the name, gayal, comes to be determined.

And the reasoning which you may set forth as being auxiliary to upamāna, comparison, would better go with anumāna, inference, which has been established as a method of proof. What is the use of upamāna which, as a method of proof, is yet to be supposed?

More detailed consideration on this subject may be sought in the Anumāna-Mayūkha.

Arthāpatti, Presumption or Explanation, also is nothing but inference. Thus, (1) presumption from the observed, arises where by means of the non-existence of Caitra who is living, in the house, ascertained by stronger evidence, (e.g., perception), his existence outside it is presumed. Here the cognition of Caitra’s existence outside the house is wholly dependent upon the ascertainment of the relation of the pervader between the demonstrable and the demonstrator. For, as a matter of fact, the non-existence of a living person in the house is accompanied with this existence outside it, or there arises the cognition that the non-existence of a living person in the house is impossible without his existence outside it. In the first case, there is apprehension of positive pervasion or concomitance, and, in the last, of negativepervasion.

Objection.—Pervasion does exist, but the apprehension thereof doesnot here take place.

Answer.—Were this the case, then, in the absence of the apprehension of pervasion, there would be no scope or occasion for the manifestation of presumption, and there would consequently be supposition of only that which, as an entity, would demonstrate pervasion existing in its proper form or as such. This is the direction or point.

The inclusion of presumption due to the instrumentality of doubt or uncertainty as well as of that due to the instrumentality contradiction or contrast or opposition, in inference, should be also understood or inferred; for contrast or opposition, characterised as uniformity of non-co-existence, also is constituted by pervasion or (negative) concomitance.

(2) Presumption from what is heard, is also inference by means of the inferred. “Deva-datta, who is stout, does not eat by day”—By this proposition, stoutness is inferred, and, by means of that stoutness, there takes place inference of eating at night in this way that Deva-datta eats at night, because, as he does not eat by day, stoutness cannot otherwise appear in him.

Sambhava, Comprehension or Sub-sumption, also is merely a form of inference. For, the examples of it are: A droṇa (a standard measure)-does not exceed a khāri (one khāri = 4 droṇas); an āḍhaka does not exceed a droṇa (one droṇa = 4 āḍhakas); a hundred does not not exceed a thousand; etc. Here a khāri contains a droṇa, being constituted by it. One thing being constituted by another thing, the former is possessed of the latter by means of the latter, as a water-pot is possessed of its components. Other instances should be similarly understood. That learning is probable in a Brāhmaṇa (because Brāhmaṇas as a class are learned), that valour is probable in a Kṣatriya (because Kṣatriyas as a class are valiant), etc., on the other hand, do not at all become means of proof, inasmuch as they do not produce certainty.

Abhāva, Non-existence or Privation, also is not a different form of evidence; for, being similar to the inference of the cause by means of the effect, the inference of the non-existence of the cause by means of the non-existence of the effect, is included within inference itself, as pervasion or universal concomitance is the ground of such inference by means of non-existence.

The Bhaṭṭas (Prabhākara and other Mīmāṃsakas'), however, maintain that the evidence which causes the apprehension of non-existence in the ground, etc., (e.g., The water-pot does not exist on the ground), is called non perception. Now, this evidence or proof is in some cases included in perception, and in other cases, inference, inasmuch as non-existence is apprehended by the eye, etc., themselves. For, it cannot be said that the senses are exhausted just in the apprehension of the substratum (of non-existence, e.g., the ground), since their function continues up to the apprehension of non-existence.

Aitihya, Tradition, is a succession of sayings of which the authors are not known. Itiha—this collection of expletives appears in the narration of past events. The state of being such narration of past events is called aitihya, traditional saying. If it is not impeded in its meaning, then, coming under the class of verbal cognition, it is a made of inference. For example, In this Banyan tree there dwells a Yakṣa There is a Gaurī (a Buddhistic Spirit) in the madhūka tree (Bassia latifolia) etc. Now, if the traditional sayings come from the mouth of trustworthy persons, then they are as has been already declared; if they do not come from the mouth of trustworthy persons, then they are no evidence at all.

Accordingly it is established that proof or evidence is of two kinds only, perception and inference.—5.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

Sambhava or Probability is cognition dependent upon a plurality of concomitances; e.g., learning is probable in a Brāhmaṇa, a hundred is probably contained in a thousand.

Note.—The construction put by Jayanārāyaṇa upon the word, Saṃbhava is explicitly rejected by Śaṅkara Miśra. In the lexicon Medinī also we find that the meaning of the word is Ādheyasya ādhārānatiriktatvāṃ, i.e.) the state of what is contained not exceeding that which contains it, or, simply, the relation of the part not being greater than the whole.