Sūtra 9.2.4 (Sound or word cannot produce cognition of its sense or meaning)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 9.2.4:

हेतुरपदेशो लिङ्गं प्रमाणं करणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् ॥ ९.२.४ ॥

heturapadeśo liṅgaṃ pramāṇaṃ karaṇamityanarthāntaram || 9.2.4 ||

hetuḥ—reason; apadeśaḥ—description; Sound. liṅgaṃ—mark; pramāṇaṃ—proof; karaṇaṃ—instrument; iti—these; an-artha-antaraṃ—not different things.

4. Reason, Description, Mark, Proof, Instrument—these are not antonyms.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

It may be asked, how sound (or word) could be a mark of illation, when its difference from the mark appears from its possessing the nature of an apadeśa or a description. Anticipating this, he says:

[Read sūtra 9.2.4 above]

‘Apadeśa’ means sound (or word), according to its derivation that by it objects are referred to, i.e., affirmed or described. And it is really a synonym of hetu, reason, and liṅga, mark. ‘Pramāṇa’ means the instrument of true cognition in the manner of the inferential mark. In like manner, the word ‘karaṇaṃ’ also is equivalent to the mark itself which is the instrument (Parana) of inferential cognition. For the operation of karaṇa or the instrument is two-fold: Some karaṇa operates or exercises its function under or subject to contact or contiguity, and some karaṇa exercises its function on the strength of inseparable existence. Sound (or word), on the contrary, has neither contact nor inseparable existence with the object or meaning; hence, how can it lead to the object?

Objection.—It leads to the object with the help of arbitrament or according to direction.

Answer.—It cannot do so, for arbitrament or direction is with, reference to the meaning of words, and not to their connection.

Objection.—There may be arbitrament or direction with reference to that also.

Answer.—No, for that connection being of a manifold nature, it is impossible that it could be the object of reference by arbitrament or direction.

Objection.—But it is'from the force of arbitrament or direction in the case of (words and) meaning that the meaning of a sentence also becomes manifest.

Answer.—This is not the case, as there would be then over extension or undue application of the principle, if something is brought forward or called up by arbitrament or direction with regard to something else.

Objection.—Invariable antecedence or pervasion of connection in this case will be that of connection as recalled by sound.

Answer.—If it be so, then, by that admission, inference itself finds admittance on the strength of invariable antecedence or pervasion. Arbitrament or direction also, if it implied mere intention or desire, would be unduly applied or too wide.

Objection.—But the desire of Īśvara, God, cannot be said to be too wide.

Answer.—Yes, it may be so, inasmuch as even in the absence of divine will, the words, river or Gaṅgā (Granges), etc., suggest or call up the ideas of the bank, etc.

This is enough of over-forwardness in a logician.—4.