5.2. Diṅnāga’s definition of Perception

[Full title: Theory of Perception: Diṅnāga’s definition of Perception]

Diṅnāga maintains that there are two sources of valid knowledge-Immediate and mediate i.e. Perception and Inference. The sources are two because there are only two kinds of object which can be apprehended. His theory is considered as unique on the basis of the following four things:

1. He identifies perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are only two means of knowledge and refuses to admit analogy (upmāna) and verbal testimony (śabda) as valid sources of knowledge.

2. He defines perception as “free from verbal designation” and does not identify determinate perception (savikalpa pratyakṣa) as a stage of perception.

3. He makes distinction between the object of perception which is the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the object of inference which is the universal (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa).

4. He did not accept the difference between the means and result of cognition which is maintained by Realists.

Diṅnāga defines perception as that form of cognition which is “free from conceptual construction (kalpanā)”.^[1] According to him, an object which in itself cannot be expressible comes to be expressed by a word only when it is associated with a name and other things. Diṅnāga also defines kalpanā as nothing but connecting a name, etc, with an object. He then classifies verbal designation (kalpanā) into five classes: nāman (name), jāti (genus), guṇa (quality), kriyā (action) and dravya (substance), which respectively function in producing yadṛcchā-śabda (proper name denoting only one object), jāti-śabda (word denoting a class or genus), guṇa-śabda (word denoting quality), and kriyā-śabda (word denoting action), and dravya-śabda (word denoting a substance).^[2] The adjective “kalpanā” used by Diṅnāga is enough to exclude inference which he believes that it is associated with conceptual construction (kalpanā). This is also enough to exclude errors from the sphere of perception, because errors may be free from conceptual construction but they are never in harmony with reality. Perception being a source of true knowledge is always in harmony with reality. It presupposes this harmony of fact as a necessary condition. Illusions and errors do not allow verification, which is the only criterion of this harmony. Hence, illusions and errors are not the source of valid knowledge. So, it is believed that definition of pratyakṣa, as offered by Diṅnāga, is self-sufficient.

It is generally believed that Diṅnāga had two aims in his mind while defining pratyakṣa, namely,

1. To show perception is different from inference and so on (anyavyāṿrttyartham) and
2. To show the Buddhist view is different from other systems (vipratipattinirākaraṇārthan)^[3]

Diṅnāga’s rejection of Vasubandhu’s definition of Perception

Diṅnāga does not agree with Vasubandhu’s definition of perception in terms of “tato “rthad”. He believes that it is ambiguous. He maintains perceptual cognition is that which is exclusively caused by the object, there is no guarantee that whether it is free from mental construction or not. He holds that this concept is well defined in “Perception as kalpanāpoḍham”.

It is generally believed that there is no fundamental distinction between Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga’s definition of perception because the similar thing positively expressed by Vasubandhu and negatively by Diṅnāga. They both admit that in perceptual knowledge, there is a kind of complexity of perceptual and conceptual and also a combination of the contribution of the thing and of the knowing mind (citta). Diṅnāga with his definition clears that what we perceive is unique particular, which is bare sensation free from all conceptualisations. It is just what is immediately apprehended by us. Words are common (sāmanya-lakṣaṇa) to many objects and they are not unique (sva-lakṣaṇa). Hence, Diṅnāga in actual sense does not reject the Vasubandhu’s definition of perception but only picks out its implication in understandable terms.^[4]

Perception as different from Erroneous Cognition

It was the objective of Diṅnāga to show perception is different from erroneous cognition, inference, its outcome, memory and desire as they are not perception and also they all are mediate. He maintains in the auto-commentary (sva-vṛtti) erroneous cognition comes into existence through conceptual construction hence it cannot be called as perception. For instance: the apprehension of water in a desert. The apprehension of apparent reality is not true perception but it is only empirical true. Similarly, we cannot call inference and its outcome and so on as perception because they come into being with the help of conceptualization of what earlier has been apprehended.^[5]

Pratyakṣa is called pratyakṣa not prativiṣaya

Perceptual knowledge originates when a thing provides its reflex (pratibhāsa) in the cognizing consciousness by the senses. Here a question can arise that since it is dependent on both then why it is known as pratyakṣa and not prativiṣaya. To this question Diṅnāga replies that sense organs are their main cause that’s why it is called perception while on the other hand the object is a mutual to many cases. So the object is a common cause. Vasubandhu also maintains that perception totally depends on sense organs because when our cognitive sense becomes strong or weak it arises perception which is clear or dim and due to this, sense organs are the main cause of perception.^[6] From this ground, it is clear that Diṅnāga was the first systematic scholar who propounded the theory that perception is purely indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and devoid of all conceptual constructions (kalpanā). He also agrees with the fact that every perception is non-erroneous (abhrāntam) because all errors and illusions are result of conceptual construction. At the nirvikalpa stage, where sense data is pure no error can be arose because those sensation are arose by the object and there can be no error here. Error occurs when mental faculty and sense data work together. This is the reason why Diṅnāga does not use the term “abhrāntam” while defining perception.^[7]

Dual Form of Consciousness

We should pay attention to an important aspect of Diṅnāga’s epistemology in which consciousness itself appears as subject (svābhāsa) and object (viṣayābhāsa).^[8] The appearance or the so-called external object is not independent because it and the cognition of it are found invariably together. In such situation the blue and the cognition of blue are identical. This relation between the subject and its object can be explained by the similes of dream-objects and rope-snake. In the similes if we think the objects of dream and snake have their objective counterparts which are independent of our cognition, we become realists. However, if we consider these objects and snake as the product of consciousness, we belong to idealism. Diṅnāga’s school accepts the later proposal. Thus, according to this school, consciousness and its object are identical. This feature is called the dual form (dvaya-rūpa) of consciousness.^[9]

In the Ālambanaparīkṣā Diṅnāga argues that an object of cognition (ālambana) must fulfil two necessary conditions:

1. The object must be the cause (kāraṇa) of the cognition, and
2. It must possess the same form (ākāra) as that which appears in the cognition.

This means that the object of cognition is nothing than the form of an object that appears in the cognition.^[10]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham, Pramāṇasamuccaya I. 3c. See V.Vanbijlert, op.cit., p.58. M.Hattori, op.cit., p.25.

[2]:

Ibid.

[3]:

S.R. Bhatt & A. Mehrotra, op.cit., p.27.

[4]:

Ibid., p. 28.

[5]:

M. Hattori, op.cit., p.29.

[6]:

Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa, p.145.

[7]:

S.R. Bhatt & A. Mehrotra, op.cit., p.29.

[8]:

Pramāṇasamuccaya I. 9a. See M. Hattori, op.cit., p.28.

[9]:

H.S. Prasad, “Understanding Buddhist Epistemology”, N.H. Samtani and H.S. Prasad (eds.), Amalā Prajñā: Aspects of Buddhist Studies, P.V. Bapat Vol., p. 282.

[10]:

M. Hattori, “Dignāga”, ER (1), IV, pp. 352-353.