5.3. Dharmakīrti’s Definition of Perception

[Full title: Theory of Perception: Dharmakīrti’s definition of Perception]

Dharmakīrti agrees with Diṅnāga in defining perception as free from mental construction in his work Pramāṇa-vārtika. But he adds the term “abhrānta” to the definition of perception in his work Nyāya-bindu^[1] : “perception is that which is free from conceptual construction and which is non-erroneous.”^[2] The work Nyāya-bindu which is about Buddhist Logic and Epistemology has classified valid knowledge into two kinds, viz. Perception and inference. He maintains the second characteristic of perception is that it should be free from errors. Sensation can be counted as a means of true knowledge on the basis of one condition that is the knowledge generated by the senses does not include an illusion of the senses. However, it appears unnecessary to include this second feature of perception as; it is believed that sense-perception is a kind of right knowledge. Dharmottara the successor of Dharmakīrti says that this definition then indicates “that consistent knowledge, which is direct, is consistent,”^[3] a totally useless repetition of the word consistent by the word non-illusive.

He states that the term “illusion” is equivocal. There are different types of illusions^[4] like transcendental illusion according to which in empirical world all knowledge is a type of illusion, secondly, empirical illusion which influences only some rare cases of wrong knowledge. Empirically knowledge can be true but not transcendentally. For instance: when two people are suffered by the same problem i.e. jaundice due to which everything appears to them as yellow, their knowledge will be similar and true with one another but will not be true for other people.^[5] Their knowledge is similar with one another; however it is limited by the condition of their sense-organs. Same the case is with empirical knowledge; it is also limited by the condition of our sense-organs. If someone would use their supernatural powers i.e. an intelligible intuition which was used by the Buddhas and Boddhisattvas one would realize the nature of everything directly and would become omniscient. But on the other hand one can know the bare apprehension of a thing directly, and then our mind creates the picture of the object which is subjective. Thus, all pictures are illusions at transcendental level; they are far from ultimate realities. According to Dharmottara, in order to show the difference between subjective world and ultimate reality Dharmakīrti has introduced the term “non-illusive” in his definition of perception. According to this interpretation, “nonillusive” indicates non-subjective, non-empirical, ultimate and transcendental reality. Thus, this feature of non-illusive separates sense-perception from the sphere of inference and the operations of the mind which are illusions at transcendental level. This characteristic is almost indicating the same meaning as the first characteristic of perception does i.e. free from conceptual construction. Bare sensation is nonconstructive, so it is true, transcendentally real and non-illusive.

The characteristic of non-illusiveness was also mentioned by Asaṅga, however his intention was not clear, then Diṅnāga dropped this feature after that Dharmakīrti reintroduced it, then again it dropped by his successors and finally Dharmottara clarified everything.

In denying the feature of non-illusiveness, Diṅnāga was having three different reasons. Firstly, an illusive perceptual judgement is always there in illusion. However, judgement does not associated with first part i.e. sensuous of cognition. For instance: when someone thinks of perceiving a moving tree from distance while in reality the tree is not moving, to say “this is a moving tree” is a judgement that involve construction of the mind, not a reflection of senses. Pure sensation does not involve any judgement whether it is right or wrong, because it is free from construction. So, it cannot include illusion at all.

The next reason of Diṅnāga for dropping the characteristic of non-illusiveness is that he wished his epistemology accepted by both the realists who believe in the reality of external things and to the idealists who do not believe in the reality of external things. They both divide the cognition into direct and indirect and also accepted the logical work of judgment. The logical function of judgment is similar to both. Diṅnāga denied Vasubandhu’s definition of perception mentioned in the Vādavidhi, “sense-perception is that knowledge which is produced by the (pure) object itself”^[6] because it could be provided a realistic approach. This is the reason behind Diṅnāga’s idea of dropping the characteristic of non-illusiveness; it could be viewed as excluding Yogācāra’s view for whom all empirical knowledge was a hopeless illusion.

Both agree that pure sensation is non-active and non-constructive. Jinendrabuddhi says,

“Although convinced that there is no possibility of cognizing the external object in its real essence, (Diṅnāga) is desirous so to formulate his view of the problem of the resulting phase in the process of cognition that it should be satisfy both the Realists who maintain the existence of an external world and the idealists who deny it”.^[7]

Kamalaśīla also talked about the same thing; however he speaks of Dharmakīrti’s definition which includes non-illusiveness. He says,

“The term non-illusive, says he must be understood as referring to consistent knowledge, not to that form which is the (ultimate) reality of the object. Because, if it were not so, since, according to the opinion of the Yogācāras, the external objects do not exist at all, the definition which is intended to satisfy both theories would be too narrow, (it would exclude the idealistic view)”.^[8]

Diṅnāga in order to meet the needs of both the Realists and the idealists he rejected the feature of non-illusive or being free from error, and Dharmakīrti, though he reintroduced the characteristic of non-illusive in a way that which did not go against the idealistic view.

The third reason for avoiding the characteristic of non-illusiveness that the term indicates many interpretations and to introduce the term could in his opinion show dangerous and also suicidal to the Buddhist Epistemology (Diṅnāga).

Diṅnāga’s school is established on the basis of distinction between the two means of knowledge. According to it, the senses do not involve judgement. Sense-illusion contains the perception of extended body, because “extension is never a simple reflex”^[9]. The duration of an object will also include under illusion as instantaneous reality equivalent to a simple reflex. There are multiple atoms which are there in unity of a body and its parts will also be an illusion. For instance: at a distance when one perceive one forest instead of the kind of trees of which it is made is an illusion. If these situations are considered as right perceptions then some of the questions may arise like, where is the limit? Why should the perception of moving tree by a person on a bus, of a double moon etc. are alone illusions? “The master (Diṅnāga) has dropped the characteristic of non-illusiveness, says Vācaspatimiśra, since that non-illusiveness is suicidal (for the whole system)”^[10].

Further, Diṅnāga does not reject the idea of illusive or wrong perceptions, but he believed that they must be handled in a separate manner. He holds that just as there are fallacies of inference similarly there are fallacies of perception that keep on the account of the senses, although they are generated by the intellect not by the senses. These are four in number. First is proper illusions, as, superior mirage, they must be a part of the intellect, because it is a kind of mistake by the mind of sunrays of light for water in the desert. Secondly, empirical reality is a transcendental illusion, because it involves mistake of an objectivised image for external reality. Thirdly, inference and its outcome is handled as sense-perception; for instance when a person says “this is smoke, the mark of fire” this statement is mnemic, although it looks like perceptual-judgement. Lastly, our memory and desires are generated by the misunderstanding although they also provided the form of sense-perceptions.

Diṅnāga hence maintains that his perception is pure sensation while the characteristic of non-illusive cannot be a part of pure sensation because pure sensation is neither wrong nor right. But Dharmakīrti thinks different in this regard from his master. He introduces again the feature of non-illusiveness into the definition. For this, he provides some reasons.

According to him, there are two types of illusion one is sense-illusion and second is an illusion of the understanding. These two types of illusion are different from each other. For instance: when a person perceives a rope in place of snake, it is the illusion of understanding and it vanishes as soon as the person come to know that it is rope not snake. While a person perceives a double moon due to eye-disease and he perceives everything double. This is a kind of sense-illusion and this illusion will go on even if he came to know that the moon is not double but single. Secondly, there are hallucinations and dreams where the sights are present with vividness which is the main quality of direct sense-perception but they do not have vagueness and generality which is the main feature of conceptual thought. If we admit that all conceptual construction is an illusion because it involves the mistake of one thing for the other we must come to the inconsistent outcome that dreams are right perceptions, because they do not involve mistake of one another. Hence, Dharmakīrti holds that there are illusions which must be taken into the realm of sensibility and that the feature of being non-illusive is not unnecessary for the definition of sense-perception as a means of valid knowledge.

Dharmottara concludes,

“The causes of illusion are various. They may lie in the external object or in the observer; they may be called forth by a disease of the sense-organ, but they also may be entirely psychical, as the visions of mentally diseased people. But in all cases of illusion the sense-faculties are necessarily involved, they are in an abnormal condition”.^[11]

Hence it is factually correct that senses do not judge, they do not involve any judgement at all whether it is right one or the wrong one. However in an abnormal condition senses can influence the realm of judgement and the lead the understanding in wrong direction.

The conclusion is similar to Kant’s view when he believes that:

“The senses cannot err, because there is in them no judgement at all, whether true or false. Sensibility, if subjected to the understanding as the object on which it exercises its function, is the source of real knowledge, but sensibility, if it influenced the action of the understanding itself and leads it on to a judgment is (can be?) the cause of error”.^[12]

Dharmakīrti disagrees with Diṅnāga with regard to understanding in our cognition. According to Diṅnāga, understanding involves illusion because it creates images of reality in place of direct intuition of it. While for Dharmakīrti intuition is more extended than sensation. He says the variety of direct perception is not only sensation and conception but between direct and indirect cognition. Intelligible intuition is also a way of direct knowledge as sensible intuition and intelligible intuition is there in every sense-perception.

However, there are at least three common points perceived by Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti in their views of perception:

1. Perception is free from conceptual construction,
2. The object of perception is the bare particular (svalakṣaṇa), and
3. This knowledge is self-cognitive (svasaṃvedana).

Dharmakīrti, however, presents some of his own explanations different from those of Diṅnāga. He does not consider all self-cognitive knowledge as certain knowledge as Diṅnāga does. For him, knowledge is valid only when it corresponds with the real object and perception is not free from conceptual construction, but also non-erroneous.

Sva-lakṣaṇa and Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa

Diṅnāga was the first one who mentioned that there are two types of objects i.e. svalakṣaṇa and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa. Sva-lakṣaṇa is cognized by perception and sāmānyalakṣaṇa is cognized by inference. Diṅnāga makes an essential difference between svalakṣaṇa and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa. He says sva-lakṣaṇa is particular and it can never be conceptualized by the intellect by generalizing from many individuals without concern about their particularity. Sva-lakṣaṇa is real and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa is not. Both are not compatible with each other. There is nothing which can have both sva-lakṣaṇa and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa all together.^[13] Due to these differences between two types of prameya there is a fundamental difference between the two means of knowledge (pramāṇa-vyavasthā): pratyakṣa which apprehends sva-lakṣaṇa completely and anumāna which apprehends sāmānya-lakṣaṇa completely.

Further, Dharmakīrti also made a distinction between svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa. For svalakṣaṇa he maintains that it is unique (asadṛśa). Secondly, it has a potency to generate effects (artha-kriyā-śakti). Thirdly, it cannot express by a word (śabdasyāviṣayaḥ). Fourthly, it is comprehensible without relying on other factors such as verbal conventions^[14] while sāmānyalakṣaṇa is common to many things. It has no potency to produce effects. It can be denoted by a word and lastly, it is not comprehensible without relying on other factors such as verbal convention. Diṅnāga was not familiar with the concept of arthakriyā. Dharmakīrti gives detailed explanation to prove that sāmānya is not real and maintains that svalakṣaṇa alone is the object which can be cognized in ultimate manner.

Arthakriyā (Causal Efficiency) as the Real Nature of Svalakṣaṇa

According to Dharmakīrti, “svalakṣaṇa” has the nature of “arthakriyāsakti” (a power to produce an effect). The notion of arthakriyā is unfamiliar to Diṅnāga. However, it plays an important role in Dharmakīrti’s ontology. It is an important criterion to make a distinction between svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa. In Dharmakirti’s ontology, arthakriyā is the essential power of a real thing, (vastu, svalakṣaṇa).

The concept of “arthakriyā” did not originate with Dharmakīrti, it occurs in early Buddhist texts in the sense of “usefulness, beneficial action” (atthasañhita).

Following Buddhist tradition, Dharmakīrti defines a thing as that which is able to perform a function (arthakriyāsamārtha “readiness to do something”).^[15] The real thing is able to produce an effect. We cannot find arthakriyā in sāmānyalakṣaṇa which is not real (avastu), but in svalakṣaṇa which is real (vastu). Real fire (the real nature of fire or svalakṣaṇa), for instance, can cook, burn something, whereas the idea of fire or fireness (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) cannot do as such, it is only a name, word and idea, consequently it is not able to cook and burn anything.

The real object (svalakṣaṇa) consists of practical or causal efficiency. Practical or causal efficiency is the test of reality (ultimate reality). Only svalakṣaṇa has a capacity to arouse the cognition. Only that which is able to produce an effect is a thing that is real in the ultimate sense. The nature of being able to produce an effect is only in the real thing (vastu), not in unreal (avastu) Reality is always causally efficient (arthakriyākāri), therefore, it is dynamic. Causal efficiency means change in shape, and a thing which changes its shape is momentary. The ultimate real nature of thing has the ability to be efficient, and to produce an effect, it is dynamic. An image, on the contrary, which has no ability to produce an effect, is not efficient. Therefore, it is not dynamic.

A real thing is produced under the law of praṭīṭyasamutpāda. Once a thing is produced, it cannot stand outside the network. It, in turn, contributes to the production of further effects. The capacity to produce an effect characterises the concept of reality in classical Buddhist philosophy. Dharmakīrti adopts and systematises this view to defend and explicate Diṅnāga’s system which lacked explicit criteria of reality “arthakriyā kāritva.”^[16]

It appears that in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, “arthakriyā” has been used in two senses in the sense of ontology, the real nature of things (vastu) or svalakṣaṇa as the object of knowledge (pratyakṣa), and in the sense of epistemology, right knowledge is an informative cause of purposive successful activity.

The meaning of arthakriyā in Dharmakīrti’s thought has been explained in the following two ways:

1. In its ontological sense, it means causal efficiency. In this sense, arthakriyā is a criterion of reality.

Dharmakīrti says:

arthakriyāsamārthaṃ yat tat artha paramārthasatya

“That which is able to perform a function exists ultimately”

Only the object which is able to causally produce an effect, is real.

2. In its epistemological sense, arthakriyā means to fulfill a practical purpose. As Dharmakīrti says in Nyāyabindu:

“Since correct (that is valid) cognition is a prerequisite for achieving all human purposes (artha). I shall explain it.”

Valid cognition correctly identifies objects and provides a cognitive basis for our successful activities. Real objects are called artha because they are the aim of practical activities such as cooking and burning. Artha are not objects of theoretical knowledge, but practical objects. They are to be known in terms of whether they affect us positively or negatively.^[17]

Therefore, from the standpoint of Dharmakīrti, what is regarded as “existing” must be able to perform its function, i.e., to produce something. It is what exists in the very present, because what can produce something must produce in the present, then it can be accepted as really existent. It can be said that what is real, must exist now or in the present moment, and because reality is dynamic, constantly changing, and non-static, so it is consistent to regard only the present moment as really existent.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., vol.II, p. 14.

[2]:

Tatra pratyakṣam kalpanā “poḍham abhrāntam. Nyāyabindu I.4. M. Chattopadhyay, Walking Along the Paths of Buddhist Epistemology, p.84.

[3]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit, vol. I, p.153.

[4]:

Ibid.

[5]:

Chattopadhyay, op.cit., pp. 116-117.

[6]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op. cit, vol. I, p.156.

[7]:

Ibid.

[8]:

Ibid., p.157.

[9]:

Ibid.

[10]:

Ibid., p.158.

[11]:

Ibid., p. 160.

[12]:

Ibid.

[13]:

M. Hattori, op.cit., p. 80.

[14]:

M. Hattori, op.cit, p.80.

[15]:

G. B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations, p.66.

[16]:

According to Hattori, the concept of ability to perform a function as a criterion of reality does not appear in Diṅnāga’s work. M. Hattori, op.cit., p. 14.

[17]:

G.B. J. Drefus, op.cit., p.66.