by E. B. Cowell | 1882 | 102,190 words | ISBN-13: 9788174791962
The Sarva-darsana-samgraha (English translation) of Madhava Acharya is a compendium of different philosophical schools of Hindu thought and Pancadasi, an important text in the Advaita Vedanta tradition. Full title: Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha or Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha: Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy (author Mādhava Ācārya)...
Whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to know the means of such escape,—learns that the knowledge of the Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such passages as these (Śvetāśvatara Upan. vi. 20)—
"When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,
"Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of Śiva."
"By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated meditation,—
"By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the highest union (yoga)."
Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the knowledge of the vyāpti (or universal proposition), and the knowledge of the vyāpti follows the right understanding of the categories,—hence the saint Kaṇāda establishes the six categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now, therefore, we shall explain duty."
In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first āhnika he defines those which possess "genus" (jāti), in the second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." In the similarly divided second book he discusses "substance," giving in the first āhnika the characteristics of the five elements, and in the second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the first āhnika, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first āhnika, and the former in the second. In the fifth book he investigates action; in the first āhnika he considers action as connected with the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he examines merit and demerit as revealed in Śruti; in the first āhnika he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, &c., in the second the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book he discusses quality and intimate relation; in the first āhnika he considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception, and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of inference.
The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation," "definition," and "investigation." "But," it may be objected, "ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method fourfold, not threefold?" We demur to this, because "division" is really included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and intimate relation are the only six positive categories,—this is an example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this definite order of the categories?" we answer as follows:—Since "substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the categories, we enounce this first; next "quality," since it resides in its generic character in all substances [though different substances have different qualities]; then "action," as it agrees with "substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality;" then "generality," as residing in these three; then "particularity," inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation;" lastly, "intimate relation" itself; such is the principle of arrangement.
If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since 'non-existence' is also one?" we answer: Because we wish to speak of the six as positive categories, i.e., as being the objects of conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number 'only six'? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not? If it is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it? and still more so, if it is not thoroughly ascertained? What sensible man, pray, spends his strength in denying that a mouse has horns? Thus your definite number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we cannot admit; if darkness, &c., are allowed to form certainly a seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite number) deny it to be one of the six positive categories,—and if others attempt to include "capacity," "number," &c., which we allow to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a seventh category. But enough of this long discussion.
Substantiality, &c. (dravyatvādi), i.e., the genera of substance, quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance, quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (dravyatva) is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the (eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal, and does not exist with intimate relation in smell.
The genus of quality (guṇatva) is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause. The genus of action (karmatva) is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything eternal. Generality (or genus, sāmānya) is that which is found in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the counter-entity to emergent non-existence. Particularity (viśeṣa) exists with intimate relation, but it is destitute of generality, which stops mutual non-existence. Intimate relation (samavāya) is that connection which itself has not intimate relation. Such are the definitions of the six categories.
Substance is ninefold,—earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The genera of earth, &c. (pṛthivītva), are the definitions of the first four. The genus of earth is that generality which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same subject with colour produced by baking.
The genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and sea. The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon and gold. The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the skin.
As ether, space, and time, from their being single, cannot be subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is found in the same subject with the non-eternal (janya) special quality which is not produced by contact.
Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the mediate cause of that idea of remoteness (paratva) which is not found with intimate relation in space; while space is that pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is not time. The general terms ātmatva and manastva are the respective definitions of soul (ātman) and mind (manas). The general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found with intimate relation in that which is without form (amūrtta). The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any substance. There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned directly in Kaṇāda's Sūtras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word "and," viz., gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty, merit, demerit, and sound. Their respective genera (rūpatva, &c.) are their several definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.
"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going: revolution, evacuating, &c., being included under "going." The genus of throwing upwards, &c., will be their respective definitions. The genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the definitions of throwing downwards, &c. Generality (or genus) is twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and action; substance, &c., are non-extensive. The definition of generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation cannot be divided,—in the former case in consequence of the infinite number of separate particularities, in the latter from intimate relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.
There is a popular proverb—
"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction produced by disjunction,—he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true Vaiśeṣika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the production of duality, &c.
There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object; thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the distinguishing perception apekṣābuddhi [by which we apprehend "this is one," "this is one," &c.]; then the production of duality, dvitva (in the object); then the knowledge of the abstract genus of duality (dvitvatva); then the knowledge of the quality duality as it exists in the two things; then imagination (saṃskāra).
But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, &c., being thus produced from apekṣābuddhi? The great doctor (Udayana) maintained that apekṣābuddhi must be the producer of duality, &c., because duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we cannot hold apekṣābuddhi as the cause only of its being known [and therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being produced], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however, maintain the same opinion by a different argument; duality, &c., cannot be held to be made known (jñāpya) by that non-eternal apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (i.e., apekṣābuddhi), because these are qualities which reside in a plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual] just as "severalty" does [and, therefore, as apekṣābuddhi is not their jñāpaka, it must be their janaka].
Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From apekṣābuddhi arises, simultaneously with the production of duality (dvitva), the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity; next from the knowledge of the genus of duality (dvitvatva) arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the destruction of apekṣābuddhi; next from the destruction of apekṣābuddhi arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of imagination (saṃskāra), the destruction of the knowledge of the quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the knowledge of the substances.
The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another, and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be found in the following argument; these knowledges themselves which are the subjects of the discussion are successively destroyed by the rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary duration. I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its abiding-place (the two things); but where you have this separate action taking place simultaneously with the rise of apekṣābuddhi, there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united influence of both.
Apekṣābuddhi is to be considered as that operation of the mind which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (i.e., destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.
Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the destruction of the compound of two atoms (the dvyaṇuka), another compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, &c. In the course of this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First, the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of steps commencing with the contact of fire; secondly, from the conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black, &c., in the single atom; thirdly, from another conjunction of fire arises the production of red, &c., in the atom; fourthly, from conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action in the atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly, there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms; ninthly, from the qualities, &c., of the causes (i.e., the atoms) are produced colour, &c., the qualities of the effect (i.e., the dvyaṇuka). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The other two series, that of the ten and that of the eleven moments, are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if we hold (with the Vaiśeṣikas) that the baking process takes place in the atoms of the jar. The Naiyāyikas, however, maintain that the baking process takes place in the jar.
"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,—that produced by the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause [i.e., the place]. We will first describe the former kind.
It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the [material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect [i.e., in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and, again, when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary with it, but has already taken place. For just as we never see smoke without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space, without there having previously been the origination of that disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot was brought into being. Therefore the action of breaking in the parts produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the disjunction from the point of space; next, this disjunction of one part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction of the pot, according to the principle, cessante causâ cessat effectus. The pot being thus destroyed, that disjunction, which resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half, initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to produce it.
But the second kind is as follows:—As action which arises in the hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact, initiates a disjunction from the points of space in which the original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand produces an effect in relation to any points of space, it initiates also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and the non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect] and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of the body, but the points of space being not a cause]. This second disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we must accept the view—that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause which causes the second disjunction of the body and the points of space.
But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated (p. 147) as to existence being denied of darkness, &c., is surely unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different opinions maintained on this point,—thus (a.) the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins hold that darkness is a substance; (b.) Śrīdhara Ācārya holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus darkness will be a quality]; (c.) some of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (d.) the Naiyāyikas, &c., hold that it is the absence of light." In reply, we assert that as for the first alleged opinion (a.) it is quite out of the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible alternatives; for if darkness is a substance, it must either be one of the nine well-known substances, earth, &c., or some different one. But it cannot be any one of the nine, since, under whichever one you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of qualities"], and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different substance from the nine. But you may ask, "How can you say that darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed of the dark blue of the tamāla blossom?" We reply, that this is merely an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But enough of this onslaught on ancient sages. (b.) Hence it follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some substratum to receive it; and again, we cannot conceive the eye as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause, the external light. Nor can we accept that it is an impression independent of the eye [i.e., produced by the internal sense, mind], because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain that "absence or non-existence (abhāva) is incapable of being expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we do use such phrases as tenebræ oriuntur, darkness cannot be a mere non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse, destruction, inattention, &c. [and yet we all know that men do speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all are cases of abhāva]. (c.) Hence darkness cannot be the absence of the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that that organ which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is the mind which perceives cognitions]. Hence we conclude that the fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the qualities of existence, for we all see that the quality happiness is attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert that "this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an object possessing colour, as we see in the case of a jar's absence," because by the very rule on which you rely, viz., that that on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence. Nor need our opponent retort that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and this will require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides, else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased." Hence, having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kaṇāda uttered his aphorism [as an ipse dixit to settle the question]: "Dravya-guṇa-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmyād abhāvas tamas" (Vaiś. Sūt. v. 2, 19), "Darkness is really non-existence, since it is dissimilar to the production of substances, qualities, or actions." The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness is perceived by the eye [without light, whereas all substances, if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the eye to be visible].
Non-existence (abhāva) is considered to be the seventh category, as established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that which, itself not having intimate relation, is not intimate relation; and this is twofold, "relative non-existence" and "reciprocal non-existence."
The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and "absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without any beginning, is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence which abides in its own counter-entity; "reciprocal non-existence" is that which, being different from "absolute," has yet no defined limit [i.e., no terminus ad quem nor terminus a quo, as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].
If you raise the objection that "'reciprocal non-existence' is really the same as 'absolute non-existence,'" we reply that this is indeed to lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence" is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air." Nor need you here raise the objection that "abhāva can never be a means of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his summum bonum, in the form of final beatitude, which is only another term for the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the category of abhāva].
E. B. C.
Footnotes and references:
The Vaiśeshikas are called Aulūkyāḥ in Hemacandra's Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi; in the Vāyu-purāṇa (quoted in Aufrecht's Catal. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, Ulūka, and Vatsa are called the sons of Śiva.
He is here called by his synonym Kaṇabhakṣa.
It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact, &c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul, and the three causes.
For this extract from the old bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, see Colebrooke's Essays (new edition), vol. i. p. 285.
Cf. Bhāṣā-pariccheda, śloka 14.
"Particularity" (viśeṣa) resides by "intimate relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.
This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "duality" and "conjunction."
This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "existence" (sattā), which is the summum genus, to which substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.
Existence (sattā) is the genus of dravya, guṇa, and kriyâ. Dravya alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and disjunction. Some qualities (as saṃyoga, rūpa, &c.) may be mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the essence of guṇa, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.
As all karmas are transitory, karmatva is only found in the anitya. I correct in p. 105, line 20, nityā-samavetatva; this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library.
I.e., it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility, however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore, the former clause of the definition is added.
"Particularity" (whence the name Vaiśeṣika) is not "individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"—but it is the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth, water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the ne plus ultra, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated viśeṣa as "ultimate difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul has viśeṣa.
Mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva) exists between two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;" but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.
"Samavāyasambandābhāvāt samavāyo na jātiḥ," Siddh. Mukt. (Saṃyoga being a guṇa has guṇatva existing in it with intimate relation).
The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union with fire" (Bhāṣā-pariccheda, sl. 103, 104).
The organ of touch is an aërial integument.—Colebrooke.
Sound is twofold,—"produced from contact," as the first sound, and "produced from sound," as the second. Janya is added to exclude God's knowledge, while saṃyogājanya excludes the soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind and the senses, &c.
The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time with some body, &c., existing in time,—this latter is the intimate cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, read adhikaraṇaṃ.
Paratva being of two kinds, daiśika and kālika.
Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the last, however, is not pervading but atomic.
The three other padārthas, beside soul, which are amūrtta,—time, ether, and space,—are not genera.
All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial, i.e., they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things themselves—each being one; and they only become two, &c., by our choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.
Saṃskāra is here the idea conceived by the mind—created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)
Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.
Every cause must be either jñāpaka or janaka; apekṣābuddhi, not being the former, must be the latter.
Apekṣābuddhi apprehends "this is one," "this is one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of these, but in both together.
The Vaiśeṣikas held that the jīvātman and space are each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion has not. Dr. Röer, in his version of the Bhāṣā-Pariccheda, has mistranslated an important Sūtra which bears on this point. It is said in Sūtra 26—
——athākāśaśarīriṇam, avyāpyavṛttiḥ kṣaṇiko viśeṣa-guṇa iṣyate,
The author here mentions two other causes of the destruction of dvitva besides that already given in p. 152, l. 14 (apekṣābuddhi-nāśa), viz., āśrayanāśa, and the united action of both:—
|3.||Dvitvotpatti and akatva-jñāna-nāśa|||||Avayava-saṃyoga-nāśa|||||Avayava-vibhāga.|
|4.||Dvitvatvajñāna|||||Dvitvādhārasya (i.e., avayavinaḥ) nāśaḥ|||||Avayava-saṃyoga-nāśa.|
|5.||Dvitvaguṇa-buddhi and apekṣābuddhi-nāśa|||||Dvitva-nāśa (i.e., of avayavin).|||||Ādhāra-nāśa (of avayavin).|
|6.||Dvitva-nāśa and dravya-buddhi|||||.......|||||Dvitva-nāśa.|
The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the course of the six steps of ekatvajñāna, &c., one of the two parts is itself divided either at the first or the second moment. In the first case, the dvitva of the whole is destroyed in the fifth moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding dvitvādhāra-nāśa, or, as Mādhava calls it, āśrayanivṛtti. In the second case, the nāśa arrives at the same moment simultaneously by both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united action of two causes, apekṣābuddhi-nāśa and ādhāra-nāśa. Any kriyā which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would be unimportant, as the nāśa of the dvitva of the whole would take place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and in this way it would be too late to affect that result.
I.e., from the destruction of apekṣābuddhi follows the destruction of dvitva; but the other destructions previously described were followed by some production,—thus the knowledge of dvitvatva arose from the destruction of ekatvajñāna, &c. (cf. Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.
From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another; thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black (or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two atoms.
I.e., a kind of initiative tendency.
These are explained at full length in the Siddhānta Muktāvalī, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have—1. the destruction of the dvyaṇuka and simultaneously a disjunction from the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the destruction of the black colour in the dvyaṇuka, and the simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the dvyaṇuka with that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.
The Vaiśeṣikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old black jar is destroyed, its several compounds of two atoms, &c., being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds, eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of the Nyāya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes not the jar but its colour, &c.,—it is still the same jar, only it is red, not black.
In p. 109, line 14, I read gagaṇavibhāgakartṛtvasya.
The Siddhānta Muktāvalī, p. 112, describes the series of steps:—1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5. by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the pot.
The original has a plural vibhāgān, i.e., disjunctions from the several points.
I.e., the disjunction of the hand and the points of space.
The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā.
For dravyādi read pṛthivyādi.
I am not sure that it would not be better to read viddhavevidhayā, rewounding the wounded, instead of vṛddhavīvadhayā.
Unless you see the rope you cannot mistake it for a serpent.
In p. 110, last line, read 'bhāve.
Read in p. 110, last line, anavadhānādishu. Vidhipratyaya properly means an imperative or potential affix implying "command;" but the pandit takes vidhi here as bhāvabodhaka-kriyā. It has that meaning in Kāvya-prakāśa, V. (p. 114, l. 1).
The mind perceives āloka-jñāna, therefore it would perceive its absence, i.e., darkness, but this last is perceived by the eye.
I.e., light possesses colour, and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark.
Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation is the dhvaṃsābhāva, or "emergent non-existence."
The reading pratyayavedyatvena seems supported by p. 110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have, therefore, ventured hesitatingly to read pratyakṣavedyatvena, and would refer to the commentary (Vaiś. Sūt. p. 250),
"yadi hi nīla-rūpavan nīlaṃ rūpam eva vā tamaḥ syāt,
vāhyālokapragraham antareṇa cakṣuṣā na gṛhyeta."
Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.
"Relative non-existence" (saṃsargābhāva) is the negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is "absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent," and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.
I.e., the absolute absence of the jar is found in the jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the spot of ground,—it is the jāti ghaṭatva which resides in the jar.
The opposite is "there is colour in the air."