Text 102

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 102:

यदनुमेयेनार्थेन देशविशेषे कालविशेषे वा सहचरितम् अनुमेयधर्मान्विते चान्यत्र सर्वस्मिन्नेकदेशे वा प्रसिद्धम् अनुमेयविपरीते च सर्वस्मिन् प्रमाणतो'सद् एव तदप्रसिद्धार्थस्यानुमापकम् लिङ्गम् भवतीति ॥ १०२ ॥

yadanumeyenārthena deśaviśeṣe kālaviśeṣe vā sahacaritam anumeyadharmānvite cānyatra sarvasminnekadeśe vā prasiddham anumeyaviparīte ca sarvasmin pramāṇato'sad eva tadaprasiddhārthasyānumāpakam liṅgam bhavatīti || 102 ||

Text (102)—(1) That which is concomitant, either in time or place, with the ‘object to be inferred,’—2 which is known io exist either in the whole or in a part of something endowed with the property of the inferred’,—and (3) which is authoritatively known to be non-existing in the whole of that which is contrary to the ‘object to be inferred’,—serves to bring about the inference of the unknown object, and it is ‘liṅga’ (Inferential Indicative).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author proceeds to explain the above verses. (1) That which is concomitant or related with the object to be inferred,—i.e., the object possessed of the property to be proved,—in regard to particular points of time and place; (2) which is known, by the right means of knowledge, to exist in another object (the sapakṣa) which is endowed with the property of the inferred, either in the whole of it or in a part of it only, and (3) which is known also to be non-existent in an object which is contrary to that to be proved,—i.e., that which is the substratum of the negation of that object;—such, a thing becomes the liṅga, serving to bring about the inferential knowledge of the unknown object as possessing the property to be proved.

‘Concomitant either in time or place’—This has been added with a view to show that the liṅga brings about the inferential knowledge of the ‘property to be proved’ as belonging to the ‘object to be proved,’ in regard to only that point of time and. place with regard to which the invariable concomitance of that property with the object put forward as the corroborating instance may have been shown.

In the whole or in a part, &c.’—This is added with a view to show that the character of the true Reason belongs to that which extends over a part of the sapakṣa (the object known to possess, the property to be proved), as much as to that pervading over the whole of it.

‘Non-existing in the, whole &c.’—This is added for the purpose of showing that the character of the true Reason cannot belong to that which exists in a part of the vipakṣa (the object wherein the property to be proved is found to be non-existing); in as much as to that existing over, the whole of it.

Certain irresponsible babblers assert as follows: “For the due accomplishment of the means of right knowledge (Inference), it is not necessary that we should perceive or recognise an instance of dissimilarity (that is a ease of the Reason not existing in the vipakṣa); because (even without the recognition of any actual instance), it would be enough if we were to say simply, that ‘where this (the property to be proved) is not, that (the reason) is not,’—which would suffice to show that the exclusion of the property to be proved is a sure indicative of the exclusion of the Reason. To this effect they quote the following: ‘For this reason an instance of similarity is not necessary as a basis in this connection; as even in the absence of this the cognition may be obtained by the assertion that in the absence of this that does not exist.”

With a view to deny this, the author says—‘authoritatively’—i.e., that which is really recognised by the due means of cognition, and not by mere words, as not existing in the contrary of the ‘inferred,’ is the liṅga. Mere words,, without due-authority, would be available in all cases; and hence if conclusions were to be drawn on the strength of mere verbal assertion, then there could be no difference between the true and the fallacious Reason.

Objection: The above definition of liṅga is too wide as it applies to such fallacious reasons also as the ‘Prakaraṇasama’ and the ‘Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa’ (see below).

To this some people make the following reply. These two fallacious reasons are actually included in the ‘anaikāntika’ (Doubtful) Reason; because the Prakaraṇasama reason exists in such an object with the property to be proved as is liable to being doubted to be a vipakṣa; and the Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa exists in that which is absolutely recognised as the vipakṣa.

For instance, the ‘Prakaraṇasama’ reason is that which gives rise to the idea of the context ‘prakaraṇa’ which is that which is introduced (prakriyate); i.e., the pakṣka (subject) and the vipakṣa (its contrary); and giving rise to ideas of these, the ‘prakaraṇasama’ reason, when put forward for the purpose of getting at a certain and definite conclusion, cannot lead to any such conclusion, as it affords ideas of the subject as well as its contradictory; and as such, it could not lead to any conclusion one way or the other. E.g., in the case of the reasonings: (a) ‘sound is eternal because we do not perceive in it any transient property,’ and (b) ‘Sound is transient, because we do not perceive any eternal quality in it,’—we find that the non-perception of eternal and transient properties in sound having given rise to a doubt as to its eternality or non-eternality, there was a consideration of the question; as the perception of any of the two classes of properties would have decided the question one way or the other, and there would be no consideration or discussion over the matter. The ‘non-perception of eternal properties’ is put forward as a reason for infering its non-eternality; and the ‘non-perception of non-eternal properties’ as proving its ‘eternality.’ And so long as the one supersedes and suppresses the other it cannot lead to the requisite conclusion; as the other is an obstacle to such a conclusion. And thus while a contrary reason is possible, the subject cannot get to any one (eka) definite end {anta); and this is only an instance of the ‘Anaikāntika’ reason, from which therefore the ‘Prakaraṇasama’ cannot be regarded as different. In the same manner the Kālātayāpadiṣṭa [Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa?] also is only a form of the ‘Anaikāntika’—as ‘causedness’[?] exists in Fire which is the vipikṣa having been perceptibly known to be possessed of heat (see below, under ‘Kālātayāpadiṣṭa [Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa?]’).

The above explanation however is not satisfactory. If the indicative or inferential potency of the Reason lies only in the fact of its existing in the sapakṣa and not existing in the vipakṣa, while it pervades over the whole of the pakṣa,— then there might be the possibility of an opposition or contradiction in the object possessing the property to be proved; but even then, the ‘prakaraṇasama’ reason, by its very power, could not but prove what it is meant to prove. If it is unable to prove it, by reason of the suspicion of its contradiction, then the Reason cannot be rightly considered sufficiently indicative solely by reason of the three facts (of its existing in the sapakṣa &c. &c.). And it would be necessary to lay down another necessary condition for the Reason—viz. that it should be (asatpratipakṣa, ‘without opposition or contradiction’; as so long as there is contradiction, the Reason is not a true Reason, and when there is no contradiction, then it is a Reason. The same may be said with regard to the ‘kālātyāyāpadiṣṭa [kālātyayāpadiṣṭa?]’ reason also. If the three facts mentioned were the only conditions of the true Reason, then where would be the ‘anaikāntika’ character of the Reason in the argument—‘Fire is not hot, because it is caused’ (as the Reason fulfills the three conditions)? If it be urged that even though the Fire is caused, it cannot be believed to be not hot, because of its being directly perceived to be hot,—then, the Reason in question could prove its conclusion when there would be no opposition of direct sensuous cognition, and never in the presence of such opposition; and as such it would be necessary to lay down another condition for the true Reason—that it should have its objective such as is not set aside or negatived (by a superior means of knowledge).

For these reasons, we proceed to meet the objection in a different manner: ‘Pakṣa’ (subject) is only another name for ‘sādhya’ (object to be proved); and a sāḍhya is that which is fit to be proved, which deserves proof or reason; that for which an opposition or contradiction is possible cannot deserve proof; and a thing cannot have two contradictory characters. Hence the possibility of opposition must be regarded as a property of that which is not Pakṣa. In the same manner that which is contrary to direct sensuous perception &c. cannot be Pakṣa; because being known in one form (by means of sensuous cognition) it can never deserve to be proved to have another (contrary) form Hence we conclude that the ‘prakaraṇasama’ and the ‘kālātyayāpadiṣṭa’ reasons have been both excluded by the qualification. ‘that which is related to the object to be proved;’ as both those reasons are based upon something that has merely a false semblance of the character of the ‘object to be proved.’

Objection: “Thus too the definition becomes defective, being too narrow. The Reason is of three kinds—(1) the anvayī, universal affirmative, (2) the vyatirekī, universal negative, and (3) the anvayavyatirekī, affirmative-negative. As an instance of (1) we have—‘The viśeṣa is nameable, because it is knowable, like the Sāmānya; in this all things,, existing or, not existing, besides the pakṣa (viśeṣa) is sapakṣa; as whoever the cogniser, and whatever the means of cognition, there is nothing that is either unknowable or unnameable; that which is unnameable and unknowable for every man, is in absolute nonentity, like the ‘horns of the horse’; and any such thing could not be either sapakṣa or vipakṣa, as it could have.no character at all; anything that exists however would be the sapakṣa; and as the Reason could not exist in anything that would not lie sapakṣa, the definition that ‘that which does not exist in its abhāva’ would be too narrow; as in the case of the argument in question, no negation would be possible; and as such the Reason would not fulfil the condition ‘tadabhāve nāsti’ and hence would cease to be sufficiently inferentially indicative.”

Reply: It is not so; as the Reason does not fail to fulfil, the condition of affirmation (laid down in the former half of; the definition). In the case of the existence of one thing being inferred from the existence of another, the Reason lies in affirmation (positive existence); and such a Reason can be set aside only by the cognition of an instance contravening this affirmation. In the case of the argument in question we find an ‘affirmation’ (positive co-existence) between ‘knowability’ and ‘nameability’; as the one is always found where the other exists.

We have never met with any case where this invariable concomitance is found to be wanting; in fact no such case is ever suspected; as whichsoever case of a failure here is called up, or meant to be pot forward by the opponent, is always found to have both nameability and knowability. Nor is there any difference; it is only when there is a vipakṣa that the absence of failure of concomitance (i. e. non-existence in the Vipakṣa) can be regarded as the condition of the Reason, and not when there is absolutely no vipakṣa; hence knowability is a sure indicative of nameability.

As an instance of the (2) vyatirekī, Inference, we have—‘the living body is endowed with the self, because it has life &c.’ In this case every thing besides the pakṣa is the vipakṣa; and the Reason is a true one; because of the absence of any connection (of the reason) with the absence (of the pakṣa). In all such substances as the jar and the like; we have found the absence of life concomitant with the living body; and the cognition of this non-presence (of the absence of life; indicates and leads to the inference of the non-presence of the absence of self (which latter absence is concomitant with the absence of life).

Objection: “If a thing is not known, then its negation or absence also is not known; as a negation always pertains to some previous affirmation; and the self is something that has nowhere been known; under the circumstances, how can we ever be cognisant of its absence in the jar and other things?”

Reply. This argument is not right; because the opponent, who holds that all things are devoid of the self, is certainly cognisant of its absence in the jar also; then as for ourselves, we have found that the self has the due causal efficiency with regard to such effects as Buddhi &c., only in living bodies; and hence finding the effect, buddhi &c., absent in the jar, we naturally conclude the absence in it of the self which is capable of producing those effects; just as the absence of smoke leads to the inference, in certain circumstances, of the absence of fire capable of producing smoke.

Objection: “If such be the case, then the self also is well known to exist in living bodies, as there can be no cognition of the relationship without the cognition of the member bearing that relationship; and thus there would be no need for the vyatirekī inference in question; as when an action has been duly accomplished, any means for accomplishing that action, appearing subsequently, ceases to have the character of the means.”[4]

Reply. Not so; as though the self is fully known by us, it is not known to the opponent, for whom it becomes necessary to prove it by means of reasons.

Objection: “ Nor is there any such restriction as that it is only the non-failure of affirmation, and not the non-failure of negation, that can prove a conclusion. Consequently in as much as the negation also has the character of the Reason, the definition—‘known to exist in that which is endowed with it’—becomes too narrow.”

In reply to this, some people assert that the definition includes the purely affirmative as well as the purely negative Inference, by reason of both being equally known and accepted in the same system of philosophy. Ochers explain the definition, taking the various qualifications in it in different combinations; pointing out that the qualification ‘that which is related to the object to be inferred and is known to exist io that endowed with it’ applies to the affirmative Inference; while ‘that which is related to the object to be inferred and does not exist in its contrary’ applies to the negative Inference; and the whole definition applies to the Affirmative-Negative Inference. The character of ‘proving what is to be proved’ applies to all the three kinds of Inference; and it serves as the common definition of all Inference, just as of all means of right knowledge the common definition is laid down as ‘that which affords the cognition of the true object.’