Text 101

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 101:

लिङ्गं पुनः |
यदनुमेयेन सम्बद्धं प्रसिद्धं च तदन्विते |
तदभावे च नास्त्येव तल्लिङ्गमनुमापकम् ||
विपरीतमतो यत् स्यादेकेन द्वितयेन वा |
विरुद्धासिद्धसन्दिग्धमलिङ्गम् काश्यपो'ब्रवीत् ॥ १०१ ॥

liṅgaṃ punaḥ |
yadanumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite |
tadabhāve ca nāstyeva talliṅgamanumāpakam ||
viparītamato yat syādekena dvitayena vā |
viruddhāsiddhasandigdhamaliṅgam kāśyapo'bravīt || 101 ||

Text (101):—The liṅga is that which is related to the object to be inferred, and is known to exist in that which is connected with that object, not existing in that wherein that is not present, such a liṅga is the means of inference.—(IX-ii-1).

That which is otherwise than this, being devoid of either one or both of these characteristics, is either ‘contradictory,’ or ‘unknown’ or ‘doubtful’; and is not a liṅga; so said Kāśyapa.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The ‘object to be inferred’ is that object which is qualified by the property meant to be proved (by the inference) as existing therein. ‘Which is related to’ means which exists in. Just as the liṅga existing in a part of the vipakṣa (that wherein the Probandum is known to be absent) is called ‘vipakṣavṛtti’ (existing in the vipakṣa) so, in the same manner, that which exists in a part of the pakṣa (the subject of the inference) is said to be ‘related to the object to be inferred.’

Objection: “If it be so, then, the reason involved in the argument—‘the four kinds of atoms are transient, because of their being odorous.’—Even though partially unknown (odour not being present in any atom except those of Earth), will have to be regarded as true reason (because of odour existing in a part of the pakṣa, ‘four atoms’).”

Reply: Not so; because of dissimilarity; that is to say, a vipakṣa is that which forms an object (substratum) of the exclusion of the sādhya (the factor to be proved by the inference), and the sādhana (the Reason or Probans); and this exclusion is possible, not from the atoms taken collectively, but from each of f them singly; and hence it is each of the four atoms to which be-longs the character of vipakṣa. The pakṣa on the other hand, is that where in the arguer wishes to establish the existence of the property to be proved. In the case of the argument in question, what the arguer wishes to prove is the transient character, not of the Earth-atom alone, but of all the four atoms; and thus, all the four atoms collectively having the character of the pakṣa, the ‘partially unknown’ reason becomes excluded in the same way as the ‘unknown,’ because. the former also is not related to the ‘object to be inferred.’

‘Is known to exist in that which is connected with that object.’—by ‘that object’ here is meant the property that has to be proved by the inference; and the clause thus means ‘that which is known as existing in the sapakṣa, which is the object possessed of the property sought to he proved.’ This qualification is meant to exclude such reasons as are viruddha and asādhāraṇa (faults of reasoning explained below).

‘Not existing in that wherein that is not present’—here also the latter ‘that’ refers to the property to be proved; and the clause means that it may not be existing even in a part of it; and hence the anaikāntika reason is excluded.

‘Such liṅga is the means of inference’—i.e. it is the means of knowing the object to be inferred.

Having described the liṅga, the author proceeds to describe the liṅgābhāsa, the ‘semblance of reason,’ the ‘false or invalid reason,’—‘That which is otherwise than this’—i.e. That reason which is devoid of one or both of the characteristics pointed out before, and is thus either ‘contradictory,’ ‘unknown’ or ‘doubtful,’ has been described by the son of Kaśyapa as ‘aliṅga,’—i.e., not a means of obtaining a right knowledge of the object to be inferred; as the ‘unknown ‘reason does not exist in that object; the anaikāntika or ‘Doubtful’ reason is not wholly preclusive of the contradictory of the substratum of that object; hence these two fallacious reasons are precluded by the first qualification of liṅga (in the above definition); and as for the ‘contradictory’ reason, it does not exist in the sapakṣa, the substratum of the object to be inferred; nor is it preclusive of its contradictory; and hence it is precluded by the second qualification in the definition.