Text 93

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 93:

तस्याः सत्यप्यनेकविधत्वे समासतो द्वे विधे विद्या चाविद्या चेति | तत्राविद्या चतुर्विधा संशयविपर्ययानध्यवसायस्वप्नलक्षणा ॥ ९३ ॥

tasyāḥ satyapyanekavidhatve samāsato dve vidhe vidyā cāvidyā ceti | tatrāvidyā caturvidhā saṃśayaviparyayānadhyavasāyasvapnalakṣaṇā || 93 ||

Text (93):—Though there are many kinds of buddhi, yet briefly it is of two kinds, in the form of vidyā ‘knowledge’ and avidyā ‘non-knowledge’ or ‘Ignorance.’ Of these avidyā is of four kinds, in the shape of (1) saṃśāya, ‘doubt’ (2) viparyaya ‘misconception.’ (3) anadhyavasāya, ‘indefinite or indistinct cognition’ and (4) Svapna ‘dream.’

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Though there are as many buddhis as there are objects in the world, yet it may briefly be said to be of two kinds. Vidyā or knowledge is a cognition of the nature of a definite idea free from all doubts and discrepancies (lite ally, not rejected as false); and avidyā is of the opposite character. As on the present occasion the author has got only to show the two kinds of buddhi, he proceeds to describe avidyā first though it was the last to be mentioned.

This avidyā is of four kinds, in the forms of Doubt &c.

Objection: “It is not quite right to limit the number to four only; as we have a well-known form of avidyā in the form of tarkajñāna, ‘suppositional or argumentative cognition or idea,’ appearing between Doubt and Certain cognition. For instance, some people hold that the Self is liable to production while others hold that it is not producible; and between these two contradictory views, there arises the doubt as to whether the Self is liable to production, or not; and then there comes in a cognition in the argumentative form in some such way as this—if the Self were liable to production, then it could not be subject to the cycle of births and rebirths, which consists in the connection and disconnection of the Self with many bodies, one after the other; nor would it be capable of final deliverance from that cycle; while, on the other hand, if it were not liable to production, then being the one cogniser it would be open 'to the cycle of births and also capable of final deliverance; and hence the Seif cannot but be regarded as incapable of production. As for the purpose to be served by such suppositional cognition, it is none other than the knowledge of truth; because the premiss that leads to the true conclusion is rendered as much futile by a doubt to the contrary as by a distinct contradictory cognition; for the simple reason that no object has two forms (as appear in all doubts). This has been thus declared by the revered Bhatta (Kumārila): “So long as there is even the hundredth part of suspicion with regard to the truthfulness of the contrary proposition, how can there be any conclusive strength in that premiss?’ Thus then having, by the previous argument, set aside the producibility of the Self, and having ascertained its non-producibility, when the person comes to ponder over the subject, he finds the course of inference free from all contravening agencies; and it is then that the inferential process becomes duly operative. Thus then Tarka or argumentation leads to the knowledge of truth, through the due pondering over of the nature of things concerned; and as for the means of knowledge its end is served only by the aid of the argumentation which embodies the procedure leading to the final result in the shape of the knowledge, in Which the means of knowledge comes in as the means; as an axe even though extremely sharp-edged, is not capable of cutting a wood, when held strongly in the hand, of a person not wishing to cut by it; as has been well said—‘there is no instrument, either in the case of ordinary actions or in that of vedic ones, which does not stand in need of the help accorded by the procedure.’ Then again, if Argumentation be not admitted to exist, then it would be equally proper to reject ‘prasaṅga’—which consists in the bringing about of something undesirable for the opposing disputant; as in reality, this too does not differ in nature from Tarka or Argumentation. And yet the Vaiśeṣikas also admit of Prasaṅga, when they assert that Prasaṅga is not a proper premiss or hetu, because it is open to the fallacies of Āśrayāsiddhi and the like.

To the above we make the following reply: what is this Tarka? Does it consist of the cognition of the negation of the opponent’s proposition? or of the likelihood of one’s own proposition? In the former case, it would be of the nature of true cognition (and as such not a fifth mind of Avidyā); because if the cognition that, ‘if the cogniser were transient then there would be no possibility of the metempsychosis or deliverance,’ were not of the nature of ‘true cognition,’ then it would not establish the negation of the opponent’s view; as any cognition that is not itself true cannot serve any purpose; and so in this case it would be wholly imperative; as there would not he any discrimination of the nature of things. If however the negation of the opponent’s view be regarded to be established by it, then it cannot but be ‘true cognition’; and as such would come under one of the kinds of ‘true cognition,’ in the form of ‘sense-perception’ and the rest; as apart from these there is nothing that can bring about any conviction. All this will have to be admitted by you, however much against your wish it may be. As for Prasaṅga, it consists in the putting forward of a contradiction involved (in the opponent’s proposition); and this is nothing else save the bringing up of an authoritative proof, contrary to that view. Then we ask—what is Tarka save this contrary proof, and the words giving expression to this proof?

If, on the other hand, Tarka be held to consist in the putting forward of the likelihood of one’s own view of the case, then,—we ask, what would be the cause of the production or appearance of this? A proof supporting one’s own view cannot be this cause, as no such proof is operative at the time; for if the proof were to operate after the nature of things has been duly discriminated by means of Tarka.—and then if that same proof were to be the cause of this Tarka,—we would have a distinct case of mutual inter-dependence.

Objection: “When the negation of the opponent’s view has been cognised, then there appears the cognition of the likelihood of one’s own view; and as such the former cognition may well be regarded as the cause of the latter.”

Reply: In that case, this would be nothing more or less than an inference based upon the negation of the opponents view; as between two contradictions, the negation or absence of one is invariably concommitant with the presence of another.

Objection: “It would have been so if we had a definite cognition of the Self having any one of the two characters; as it is however, there is no definite cognition; nor is it of the nature of a Doubt; as it does not partake of both possibilities; hence having moved one step forward from Doubt, and yet not having reached the stage of Definite Cognition, the idea of likelihood must be accepted as something wholly distinct from either; it is for this reason that we find people saying—‘thus do I argue or think.’”

Reply: It is not so, because wherever, on account of natural possibilities, there is a definite cognition of the negation of the opponent’s view, we have proof of one or other of the two contending views; where however we have a notion of the likelihood of the opposite view, there is no proof or authority for the other view. When the intelligent person, having this concomitance in view, comes to recognise the negation of the opposite view, he is led to think that the Self is non-producible; and then he comes to recognise the natural possibilities of the thing concerned (i.e., the Self) as the proof of that idea of his; and this is nothing but a case of inference. Thus then, the recognition of the natural possibilities of things aiding the process of the proof, it comes to be regarded as the cause of the operation of that proof; if it were not so, then, the cognitions of mere likelihood would be absolutely useless; as not being of the nature of the definite cognition, it could not aid either in any accomplishment or in any perception; and as for the discrimination of the nature of the thing, it is accomplished by the negativing proof which proves the negation of the opposite view.

Others hold that Tarka is only one kind of ‘Doubt’; as in that also there is no certain or definite cognition.