Text 86: On Dimension (Parimāṇa)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 86:

परिमाणं मानव्यवहारकारणम् । तच्चतुर्विधमणु महद्दीर्घं ह्रस्वं चेति । तत्र महद् द्विविधं नित्यमनित्यम् च । नित्यमाकाशकालदिगात्मसु परममहत्त्वमनित्यं त्र्यणुकादावेव । तथा चाण्वपि द्विविधं नित्यमनित्यं च । नित्यं परमाणुमनस्सु तत् पारिमाण्डलुयम् । अनित्यं द्व्यणुक एव । कुवलयामलकबिल्वादिषु महत्स्वपि तत्प्रकर्षभावाभावमपेक्ष्य भाक्तोऽणुत्वव्यवहारः । दीर्घत्वह्रस्वत्वे चोत्पाद्ये महदणुत्वैकार्थसमवेते । समिदिक्षुवंशादिष्वंजसा दीर्घेष्वपि तत्प्रकर्षभावाभावमपेक्ष्य भाक्तो ह्रस्वत्वव्यवहारः । अनित्यं चतुर्विधमपि संख्यापरिमाणप्रचययोनि । तत्रेश्वरबुद्धिमपेक्ष्योत्पन्ना परमाणुद्व्यणुकेषु बहुत्वसंख्या तैरारब्धे कार्यद्रव्ये त्र्यणुकादिलक्षणे रूपाद्युत्पत्तिसमकालं महत्त्वं दीर्घत्वं च करोति । द्विबहुभिर्महद्भिश्चारब्धे कार्यद्रव्ये कारणमहत्त्वान्येव महत्त्वमारभन्ते न बहुत्वम् । समानसंख्यैश्चारब्धेऽतिशयदर्शनात् । प्रचय तूलपिण्डयोर्वर्तमानः पिण्डारम्भकावयवप्रशिथिलसम्योगानपेक्षमाण इतरेतरपिण्डावयवसम्योगापेक्षो वा द्वितूलके महत्त्वमारभते न बहुत्वमहत्त्वानि । समानसंख्यापलपरिमाणैरारब्धेऽतिशयदर्शनात् । द्वित्वसंख्या चाण्वोर्वर्तमाना द्व्यणुकेऽणुत्वमारभते । महत्त्ववत् त्र्यणुकादौ कारणबहुत्वमहत्त्वसमानजातीयप्रचयेभ्यो दीर्घत्वस्योपत्तिः । अणुत्ववत् द्व्यणुके द्वित्वसंख्यातो ह्रस्वत्वस्योत्पत्तिः । अथ त्र्यणुकादिषु वर्तमानयोर्महत्त्वदीर्घत्वयोः पर्स्परतः को विशेषः द्व्यणुकेषु चाणुत्वह्रस्वत्वयोरिति । तत्रास्ति महत्त्वदीर्घत्वयोः परस्परतो विशेषह् महत्सु दीर्घमानीयतां दीर्घेषु च महदानीयतामिति विशिष्टव्यवहारदर्शनादिति । अणुत्वह्रस्वत्वयोस्तु परस्परतो विशेषस्तद्दर्शिनां प्रत्यक्ष इति । तच्चतुर्विधमपि परिमाणमुत्पाद्यमाश्रयविनाशादेव विनश्यतीति ॥ ८६ ॥

parimāṇaṃ mānavyavahārakāraṇam | taccaturvidhamaṇu mahaddīrghaṃ hrasvaṃ ceti | tatra mahad dvividhaṃ nityamanityam ca | nityamākāśakāladigātmasu paramamahattvamanityaṃ tryaṇukādāveva | tathā cāṇvapi dvividhaṃ nityamanityaṃ ca | nityaṃ paramāṇumanassu tat pārimāṇḍaluyam | anityaṃ dvyaṇuka eva | kuvalayāmalakabilvādiṣu mahatsvapi tatprakarṣabhāvābhāvamapekṣya bhākto'ṇutvavyavahāraḥ | dīrghatvahrasvatve cotpādye mahadaṇutvaikārthasamavete | samidikṣuvaṃśādiṣvaṃjasā dīrgheṣvapi tatprakarṣabhāvābhāvamapekṣya bhākto hrasvatvavyavahāraḥ | anityaṃ caturvidhamapi saṃkhyāparimāṇapracayayoni | tatreśvarabuddhimapekṣyotpannā paramāṇudvyaṇukeṣu bahutvasaṃkhyā tairārabdhe kāryadravye tryaṇukādilakṣaṇe rūpādyutpattisamakālaṃ mahattvaṃ dīrghatvaṃ ca karoti | dvibahubhirmahadbhiścārabdhe kāryadravye kāraṇamahattvānyeva mahattvamārabhante na bahutvam | samānasaṃkhyaiścārabdhe'tiśayadarśanāt | pracaya tūlapiṇḍayorvartamānaḥ piṇḍārambhakāvayavapraśithilasamyogānapekṣamāṇa itaretarapiṇḍāvayavasamyogāpekṣo vā dvitūlake mahattvamārabhate na bahutvamahattvāni | samānasaṃkhyāpalaparimāṇairārabdhe'tiśayadarśanāt | dvitvasaṃkhyā cāṇvorvartamānā dvyaṇuke'ṇutvamārabhate | mahattvavat tryaṇukādau kāraṇabahutvamahattvasamānajātīyapracayebhyo dīrghatvasyopattiḥ | aṇutvavat dvyaṇuke dvitvasaṃkhyāto hrasvatvasyotpattiḥ | atha tryaṇukādiṣu vartamānayormahattvadīrghatvayoḥ parsparataḥ ko viśeṣaḥ dvyaṇukeṣu cāṇutvahrasvatvayoriti | tatrāsti mahattvadīrghatvayoḥ parasparato viśeṣah mahatsu dīrghamānīyatāṃ dīrgheṣu ca mahadānīyatāmiti viśiṣṭavyavahāradarśanāditi | aṇutvahrasvatvayostu parasparato viśeṣastaddarśināṃ pratyakṣa iti | taccaturvidhamapi parimāṇamutpādyamāśrayavināśādeva vinaśyatīti || 86 ||

Text (86).—Dimension is that which forms the basis of all measurement. It is of four kinds: (1) Minute, (2) Large, (3) Long and (4) Short, (vii-i-8,17) The Large again is of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. To the eternal kind belongs the highest extensiveness of the Ākāśa, Space, Time and Self; while the non-eternal exists in the Triad and the rest.—(VII-i-22, 24, 25, 16)

The Minute again is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal. The eternal is that in the Atom, and in the Mind; and this is what is known as ‘Pārimāndalya [Pārimāṇḍalya?]’ (the atomic measure). The non-eternal is the Diad.—(VII-i-11, 13, 17)

Though such things as the Lotus, the myrobalan fruit, the Bel and the like, are spoken of as minute and large, yet the idea of minuteness can be applied to these only- indirectly (or figuratively), being based upon the existence in them of greater or less dimension as compared with something else. Longness and Shortness cohere with such Largeness and Minuteness as are caused. In the case of such things as a piece of fuel, a sugar-cane and the bamboo, even though they are found to be distinctly long, yet they are figuratively spoken of as ‘short,’ in view of their greater or less length as compared with that of something else.—(VII-i-9, 10, 17)

Of the non-eternal Dimensions, all the four (the Long, the Short, the Large and the Small) are caused by (1) Number, (2) Dimension and (3) Aggregation.

(1) The plurality of number appears in the atoms and the diads, according to the will of God; and when these atoms and diads bring about the effects in the shape of the triad and the like, the said plurality creates in these a certain length and largeness, simultaneously with colour and the other qualities. (2) In a case where the created object is caused by two large components, as also when ii is caused by many large components, the largeness of the object is due to largeness of the component parts, and not to their plurality; as even in a case where. the number of the components in two objects is the same, we find a difference in their magnitudes (if there happens to be a difference in the volumes of the components of those objects). (3) As for Aggregation, we have it in the case where two balls of cotton are rolled into a single ball,—where what the Conglomeration produces in this single double ball, is, not plurality and largeness, but largeness only, by means either of conjunctions of the loose particles composing the balls of cotton, or of the mutual conjunction of the particles of one tail with those of the other. We infer this from the fact that even in a case where the number, the largeness (or magnitude) and the dimension of the components of two objects are the same, there is yet a difference in the magnitudes of the objects themselves (i.e. in two objects where the conglomeration of particles is loose and closely compact.)

It is the duality of two atoms which produces the minuteness in the diad. In the triad, its length is produced, just like its largeness, by means of the plurality, the largeness and homogeneous conglomeration, of its material cause (the component molecules). In the Diad. shortness is produced, just like its minuteness, through the duality of number.

Question: “What is the difference between largeness and length as belonging to triads, as also between minuteness and shortness belonging to diads?”

Answer: There is a vast difference between the said largeness and length; as is apparent from the fact that we find people, saying with regard to a large substance—"bring a long thing (and not this large one), and similarly, with regard to the long thing—‘bring the large thing (and not this long one)’—where a clear distinction is made between the two. As for the difference between minuteness and shortness, it is clearly perceptible to those (Yogis) who are capable of directly perceiving them (in the atom and the Diad, which are not perceptible to the ordinary man).

All these four kinds of Dimension are caused; and as such, come to be destroyed on the destruction of their substratum.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author now proceeds to describe Dimension Parimāṇa [parimāṇam] &c., ‘Measurement’ consists in the recognition of the minuteness, largeness, length or shortness of a thing, and in an expression of these qualities by words; the basis of this ‘measurement’ is what is called ‘Dimension.’ By this declaration the author means to assert and prove, by showing its effect, the existence of this quality, for one who would deny its existence. As we have already shown above how an idea or cognition proves the existence of what is cognised, which is its substratum.

Objection: “But how can the words (‘aṇu’ &c.) prove the existence of the quality; for certainly the word ts not of the nature of an object; if it were so, then the uttering of the words ‘food,’ ‘fire’ and ‘sword,’ would lead to the filling, burning and cutting, respectively, of the mouth. Nor can the Word be said to be born of an object; as it is a well known fact that words are produced by the air within the body striking against the throat and other parts of the organ of speech. And certainly, that which is not of the nature of the object, nor is born of it, could never be a Prātipadika, the basic noun denoting a certain object; if it could be so, it would lead to a deal of disorder.”

Reply: The above reasoning is not right; if the word were produced entirely by the inner air striking against the walls of the throat, then its utterance could not even prove the existence of the desire to speak, on the part of the speaker; as it would not originate from any such desire; and this would justify such an assertion as that words do not indicate a desire to speak on the part of the speaker—which would be like the incoherent mumblings of a drunkard.

Objection: “ The desire to speak may be regarded as the remote cause of the word, operating through the striking of the inner air; and as such the word would point to the existence of such a desire.”

Reply: In the same manner would the word also indicate the cognition of the object expressed by the word; as a desire to speak is always proceeded by a perception of the object desired to be spoken of.

Objection: “In the case of a cheat we find that he has a desire to speak of objects which he has never perceived.”

Reply: We find that even though a man may not have the desire to speak of a certain object, yet, through a mistake, he gives utterance to words expressing that same object. This has been well described by the teachers thus: ‘In the case of deluded or mistaken persons we find a word really expressive of one object being used with reference to a totally different object (and the concomitance of desire with utterance is as invariable as that of the utterance and the perception of the object expressed).’

Objection: “It is not possible for words expressive of one object being uttered through a desire to speak of a totally different object. As if there were any such irregularity in the concomitance of a thing with what has been universally recognised as its necessary and invariable cause, then there would be an utter irregularity and disorder in the whole world process. Hence even in the case of the mistaken person, even though the desire to speak of a certain thing (of which he unconsciously speaks) may not be quite perceptible, yet it must be admitted that it does appear quickly, in an indistinct form, resembling the unfelt touch of a passing straw,—this fact being assumed on the strength of the effects perceived.”

Reply: Then in the case of the cheat also, we could assume the perception of the object, on the strength of his desire to speak of it; as we find that unless a man has perceived an object, he has no desire to speak of it.

Objection: “But at the time that he is going to cheat, the person has had no perception of the object.”

Reply: That may be; but it is possible that he may have a remembrance of it; as all that the cheat does is to speak of something that he has perceived before, as something else; and hence his desire to speak of it is distinctly a product of its recollection of it; and through that recollection, it may also be said to be due to his previous perception of that object; and as such there is no want of concomitance between perception and desire to speak.

Even such desire to speak as is due to a wrong perception, is indirectly the product of a correct perception; and perception is always concomitant with the object perceived; hence the existence and utterance of a word must be accepted as proving the existence of the object expressed by it. If it were not so, when a sentence would be heard, the hearer would not have any idea of the objects spoken of thereby; and all that he would be conscious of would be the desire to speak on the part of the speaker; and as this cognition would not serve any useful purpose, all verbal usage would become impossible. Nor would there be any ground for deciding as to the victory or defeat of disputants; as the desire to speak would be equal in both, and as such judged by that contention alone, both would be equally right in their disquisitions.

It has been declared by some that the Dimension is nothing apart from the substance; as so long as the substance is not perceived we have no idea of the Dimension.

But this is not true; because often find that when a substance is seen from a distance, its particular dimension is not known; and hence it is that even a large substance is mistaken for a small one.

Dimension having been thus proved to exist the author now proceeds to describe its various kinds; Tat caturvidham &c. He next points out the way in which it is of four kinds Aṇu &c. The square or other shapes of things are due to the particular arrangements of constituent molecules, and they do not constitute so many different kinds of Dimension.

Objection: “The same may be said of Length &c., also.”

Reply: Not so; because even when we do not perceive the arrangement of the parts of an object at a great distance from us, we do have distinct notions of its Length &c.

Objection: “Well Sir, the dimension of the Diad must be minute; as there is no cause in it of the production of any, larger Dimension; then again the Dimension of the atom must be smaller than that of the Diad,—as the Dimension of the cause is always found to be smaller than that of its effect; and hence the Dimension of the atom must be totally different from that of the Diad. Thus also the Dimension of the Ākāśa, reaching up to the highest upward limit is wholly different from that of the jar and other substances; and then we have the long and short Dimensions; and thus there are Six dimensions (1 Minute atomic, 2 Minute Diadic, 3 Large ordinary, 4 Largest, 5 Long and 6 Short); why then should it be said of four kinds only?

In reply to this the author says: Tatra &c. That is to say, from among these four Dimensions, the Large is of two kinds—Eternal and Transient. The Eternal Large Dimension is that found in Ākāśa, Time, Space and Self; it is this that is called ‘paramamahattva;’ ‘greatest largeness;’ and the Transient. Large Dimension belongs to the Triad and other substances, and not to Ākāśa &c.

As the Large Dimension, so the Minute Dimension also is of two kinds—Eternal and Transient. In both cases the particle ‘ca’ is added with a view to deny the existence of any other kind of Largeness or Minuteness. The eternal Minute Dimension belongs to the Atom and the Minds, as in these there are no causes for either producing or destroying the Dimensions. By ‘Pārimāndalya [Pārimāṇḍalya?]’ is meant the smallest dimension possible. The transient Minute Dimension belongs to the Diad alone, and to nothing else.

The sense of all this is that the Dimension of the atom is only one form of the Minute Dimension, and the ‘Largest Dimension’ is only a form of the Large Dimension. If it were not so then it would not be qualified by the word ‘parama’. The word ‘Mahat’ ‘Large’ is applied to that Dimension which helped by colour, renders its substratum perceptible; and that which is incapable of making its substratum perceptible is the ‘Aṇu’, ‘Minute.’ From this it does not follow that the Triad also is Minute, because it is perceptible; its perceptibility being inferred from the fact of its being made up of material causes, like the jar; in fact it is that composite substance which, though itself perceptible, has its constituent particles such as are not perceptible. As for the Dimension of the Ākāśā, even though it is not perceptible, yet it is ‘Large’; because its extension is larger than that of the Dimension of the Diad (which is the outermost limit of the Minute),—like that of the jar.

Objection: “It has been said above that the transient Minute Dimension belongs to the Diad alone: but this is not quite correct, as we find the lotus, the Āmalaka and the Bel spoken of in terms denoting that one is minuter than the other (which would show that the minute Dimension belongs to these substances also).”

To this the author replies—In the lotus &c.—That is to say, the use of the word ‘minute’ with regard to the Āmalaka must be regarded as secondary, or figurative, being based upon the fact of absence in the Lotus of the Largeness of the Bel. The word ‘bhākta’ is derived from ‘bhakti’, ‘division’ i.e., the ‘possession of something as common between two things;’ hence,

‘Similarity;’ and that which is due to, or based upon mere similarity, is ‘bhākta’ or ‘secondary.’ Similarly the absence of the largeness of the Āmalaka in the Lotus, leads to this latter being spoken of as ‘minute’—this minuteness thus being only comparative. Absolute minuteness (transient) however exists in the Diad alone; and in this, therefore, is a total absence of Largeness. The largeness existing in the Bel is absent in the Āmalaka, and hence the application of the word ‘minute’ to this latter is also only indirect or figurative.

The author next proceeds to show the peculiarities Length and Shortness: Dīrghahrasvatve &c. These two qualities inhere respectively in the same substances as the produced (noneternal) Largeness and Minuteness. That is to say, in a substance where the Largeness is produced, as in the Triad, the Length is also produced; and in a substance wherein Minuteness is produced, we have shortness also produced. Some people say that the atom being a parimandata, it has no Shortness; and that Ākāśa being all-pervading, it has no Length; others hold that like the usage of ‘Extreme Atom’ and ‘Greatest Largeness’, we also find the usage of ‘extreme shortness’ and ‘extreme length’, and hence it must be admitted that the former belongs to the Atom, and the latter to Ākāśa;—the argument being stated thus: Ākáśa is the substratum of Length, because it is the substratum of Largeness, like the pillar &c.; and again, the Atom is the substratum of shortness, because it is the substratum of the minuteness, like the Diad.

Question: “If shortness is co-substrate with produced minuteness, then how is it that we have the quality spoken of as residing in other things?”

Answer: Samit &c. That is to say, though in reality, all such things as the piece of fuel, sugarcane and bamboo &c. are in reality possessed of Length, yet they are spoken of as ‘short’, the epithet being applied to them secondarily, on account of the absence, in the sugarcane, of the lengthy dimension possessed by the bamboo, and so forth; and so also with the piece of wood as compared to the sugarcane. It is only the Diad that is absolutely short; as therein Length, is wholly absent; and hence the sugarcane comes to be spoken of as ‘short’, on account of the absence in it of the length of the bamboo.

Objection: “ Why should not the application of the epithet ‘short’ to these substances be regarded as direct and true?”

It is not so regarded, for the simple reason that that same thing is found to be possessed of Length as compared with something else; and certainly one and the same thing could not in reality, be both long and short.

Objection: “ In that case we might regard the epithet ‘long’ as applied secondarily, and that of ‘short’ as real.”

Reply: We do not find any cause for the production of the usage of ‘long.’

Objection: “Then why should not we regard all usage of ‘short’ as indirect and unreal?”

Reply: Not so; When the principal or direct thing is possible there can be no possibility of the secondary or indirect.

The author now proceeds to show the cause of that Dimension which is produced, not eternal: Anityam [anityam] &c. The four kinds of transient Dimension, viz., Long. Short, Large and Minute—originates from the aggregations of Numbers and Dimensions. He proceeds to explain how they are produced from aggregations of number. The Diad is produced by two atoms; being called ‘two atoms;’ and when three of these Diads combine, the number ‘three,’ made up of the unities inhering in each of the Diads, is produced in them through the intervention of the Divine will; and this number (‘three’) produces, in the Triad, which is a product of three Diads, Largeness and Length, simultaneously with the production of its Colour &c. The word ‘iti’ is added with a view to preclude the cause of the Large Dimension; and the word ‘ādi’ in ‘Tryaṇukādi’ is meant to include the Quarternary and other products.

Question: “How do you know that the Dimension of the Triad &c., has for its immaterial cause, the plurality of number inhering in the component Diads?”

Answer: By seeing that no other cause is possible. For instance, the said dimension could not be brought about by such; qualities of the Diads as Colour, Taste, Odour, Singularity, Separateness, Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity; as all these whenever productive are found to be productive only of like properties; and hence if the minute dimension of the Diads was to produce the Dimension in the Triad, then the Dimension of; this latter also would be minute only and not large; as a Dimension always produces its own like. As a matter of fact; however, we find that the Triad is endowed with largeness; as is evinced by the fact of its being composed of many component particles like the jar. Nor could any effect be produced without an adequate immaterial cause; and we have owned else-ì where that when two products are made up of parts of equal dimensions, if the number of such parts be different in the two, that difference makes a difference in the dimensions of the products; and it is for this reason that in the case in question we regard Number to be the required cause.

We might have regarded the conjunctions of the Diad to be the cause of the Largeness of the Triad; but then too, all that we could say, would be that the conjunction of many component particles is the cause; and thus by distinguishing the known (prāpta) from the unknown, we would arrive at the same conclusion,—that it is manyness or multiplicity that is the cause of the Dimension.

Then again, that number Three which is dependent upon the will of God, could be destroyed, only at the destruction of the unseen potency that holds it intact; and its destruction could not be due to the destruction of its substratum; as the will of God (which is its substratum) is eternal.

The author next proceeds to explain how Largeness is produced out of Largeness: Dvibahubhiḥ &c. In a product produced our of two and many component particles, the Largeness; is produced by the largenesses of the components. Thus then, in a case where the product is made up of two large particles not combining into a single aggregate (but merely combining together), the production of the largeness of that product is by the largenesses of these two component particles; as in this case we have neither plurality of Number nor an Aggregation. In cases however where the product is made up of many component particles, the largeness of the product is due to the largenesses of these particles, and not to the plurality of Number. In a case where made up of an equal number of particles, but the particles in them are minute while those in the other large,—we find a distinct difference in the Dimensions of the two things, and this would not be possible if the Dimensions were due solely to number; as the number of particles in both is exactly the same. But in a case where two things are made up of particles of the same Dimensions, but the number of particles in one is larger than that in the other, and hence there is a distinct difference in their dimensions,—in such cases Number must also be regarded as a cause of Dimension; otherwise the difference would be inapplicable in the case in question. In a case where the products are made up of an equal Number of particles, of the same size, the production of Largeness must be taken as due to both Number and Dimension, as each of these singly has been found to have the power of producing Largeness; and in this latter case we do not perceive any difference in the powers of the two, both being found to be equally capable of producing the largeness. This is the explanation offered by some people; others hold that Dimension alone is the cause; as long as we can find an homogeneous cause for an effect, it is not right to accept a heterogeneous cause.

The author next proceeds to explain Aggregation: ‘Pracaya’ or ‘Aggregation’ is a peculiar kind of loose conjunction or combination, giving rise to particular products. When two lumps of cotton go to make up a single Double Lump, it is an aggregation that is present; it stands in need of productive conjunctions or contacts in both of the original lumps, or of the mutual intercontacts among the component particles of both those lumps; and by means of these the said aggregation produces the largeness in the Double Lump. In a case where the contact of the two lumps is itself loose, and the contacts of their respective component particles are also loose, then, on the two lumps producing a product, we find a dimension greater than that of the substance that might be produced by the firm contacts of the two lumps with their component particles also in close adhesion; and in this case theta cause of the largeness produced lies in the loose contact of the two lumps as depending upon the loose combination of the component particles of those lumps. In a case however where the contact of the two lumps is loose, and the mutual contacts of the component particles are also loose,—but the constituents of the lumps are not loose,—then, in that case, in the substance produced out. of these two lumps, we find a largeness greater than that the substance produced by a firm contact of the two lumps which too have their component particles in close adhesion; and this leads us to conclude that in such cases the cause of the largeness lies in the loose contact of the lumps depending upon the mutual contacts of the component particles of both.

Question: “How is it that in the instances just cited you do not accept the Largeness to be due to Plurality and Largeness, which have been proved above to have the power of producing it?”

Answer: It cannot be due to any Pluralities or Largenessess. That is to say, in a case where the cognition of a particular dimension is recognised as being due to Aggregation, we cannot regard Plurality and Largeness as the cause—and the reason for this lies in the fact of there being a difference of diṃensions in two things made up of equal numbers of component particles of equal dimensions and weights. If Number were the only cause, then there would be no difference between two things, both of which are made up of equal number of component particles, even though the compact of particles in one were looser than that in the other (but as a matter of fact this latter circumstance is found to make a difference, as the number in both would be exactly the same. Similarly if Largeness were the sole cause, then there would be no difference between two things made up of equally large particles, even though these latter were more compact than those in the other. As a matter of fact however, in both these cases, we do find a difference; and from that we conclude that in such cases neither Number nor Largeness is the cause.

In certain cases we find that one thing is made up of nonaggregated minute particles, and another is made up of aggregated large particles; and the cause of the difference in the largeness or bulk of these two must be regarded as due to both Largeness and Aggregation. Then again, in a case where one thing is made of certain aggregated particles, and another is made of large number of equally large particles but non-aggregated, we find an excess of bulk in that produced out of a large number of aggregated particles; and the cause of this is Number, as well as Aggregation. In a case where one thing is made up of a lesser number of non-aggregated minute particles, and the other of a large number of aggregated bulky particles, the difference in bulk must be attributed to all the three causes—Number, Largeness and Aggregation.

Some people think that in the case of substances capable of being weighed by means of a balance, the production of the bulk in the product is due to the weight-measures inhering in the cause, and not to the Large Dimension. And it is in view of this theory that the author has denied the causal potency of this ‘weight-measure’, in the case of aggregated products. Properly speaking, in accordance with the author’s view, no such causal potency ever belongs to weight measures.

It is the number ‘Duality’ inhering in the two atoms that produces ‘minuteness’ in the Diad. Some people hold that the Dimension of the Diad is produced by the Dimensions of the component atoms. But if such were the case then the Diad too would be as ‘minute’ or ‘atomic’ as the atom itself,—an argument we had brought forward before and which we repeat in the present connection. There is yet another reason, based upon the fact of the unproductive character of the Dimension of an eternal substance. That is to say, the Dimension of the atom cannot be productive of anything,—because it is the dimension of an eternal substance, like the dimension of Ākāśa,—or, because it is a minute dimension, like the dimension of Mind.

The author proves the production of Length—Mahattvavat. i.e. Just as Largeness or Bulk is produced by the plurality of component particles, from the homogeneous bulk of the cause, and by Aggregation,—so also is Length, which in all these points is similar to Bulk.

Aṇutvavat &c. That is to say, the shortness of the Diad also has got the number ‘Duality’ for its non-material cause.

Question: “How is it that from a single cause there come about diverse effects?”

Answer: It is due to the difference in the unseen potencies which are auxilliary to all causal operations.

An objection is raised, based upon the conception that Length is only a particular kind of Bulk or Largeness, and so too is shortness a mere form of Minuteness.

The reply given to this is—Tatrāsti &c. If there were no difference between Length and Largeness, then we could have no such specification with regard to a ‘long’ thing, as that ‘being a large long thing;’ as we do not specify a coloured substance as, ‘coloured’. As a matter of fact however, we do have such| specification with regard to long things; and hence the two cannot but be regarded as distinct.

Objection: “The dimension of a substance pervades all over it; and hence it would not be possible for one and the same substance to have two dimensions (largeness and length).”

Reply: There is no incongruity in such existence of two unlike dimensions.

Objection: “But even though the sub-class ‘blue’ differs from the sub-class ‘yellow,’ yet we do not find these two inhering in the same substance.”

Reply: Those qualities whose co-existence we have never seen, may be regarded as never co-existing; but in the case of ‘Largeness’ and ‘Length’ all men are conscious of their coexistence, which, for this very reason cannot be denied.

Then as for the Minuteness and Shortness of diads, these are directly perceptible to the yogis. In the case of our own perceptions, we are able to perceive the difference between what we indirectly or secondarily speak of as ‘Minute’ and ‘Short’; and from this we conclude that these must differ in the primary usage also.

All these four kinds of Dimension are destroyed only by the destruction of their substratum, and by nothing else. The word ‘utpādya’ ‘producible’ in the text is meant to exclude the minutest atom, the extreme short, the extreme long,. and the extreme large.

Objection: “As a matter of fact, Minuteness and Largeness, and Length and Shortness, are brought about relatively to each other (i.e. they are only relative qualities); and they have no absolute reality.”

Reply: As a matter of fact we find that the Dimension of an object is measured by various such measures as the cubit and the like, even when taken by itself, and also when taken in comparison with the dimension of another object; and we do not perceive any difference in the two cases; and if it were only relative, there could be no idea of Dimension in the previous case. Then the use of comparison lies in this that, when two dimensions are cognised on the cognition of their substrate, then alone can it be ascertained whether one is greater or less than the other, which could not be done until the two were brought together and compared.