Text 7

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 7:

सामान्यम् द्विविधम् परमपरं चानुवृत्तिप्रत्ययकारणम् । तत्र परं सत्ता, महाविषयत्वात् सा चानुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव । द्रव्यत्वाद्यपरमल्पविषयत्वात् । तच्च व्यावृत्तेरपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद्विशेषाख्यामपि लभते ॥ ७ ॥

sāmānyam dvividham paramaparaṃ cānuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam | tatra paraṃ sattā, mahāviṣayatvāt sā cānuvṛttereva hetutvāt sāmānyameva | dravyatvādyaparamalpaviṣayatvāt | tacca vyāvṛtterapi hetutvāt sāmānyaṃ sadviśeṣākhyāmapi labhate || 7 ||

Text (7):—Of Generality, or Community, there are two kinds; the Higher and the Lower; and it serves as the basis of inclusive or comprehensive cognition. The Higher (or Highest) Generality is that of ‘Being’; as it is this that extends over the largest number of things; and also because it is this alone that is a Generality pure and simple, always serving, as it does, as the basis of comprehensive cognitions. The Lower Generalities are ‘Substance’ and the rest, which extend over a limited number of things. These latter, being the basis of inclusive as well as exclusive cognitions, are sometimes regarded as Individualities also.—(I-ii-1 to 5).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author proceeds to explain ‘Generality’ (Sāmānya):—It is of two kinds, the Higher and the Lower. The word ‘ca’ has the restrictive sense, indicating that there are only two kinds. The form or nature of Generality is next explained: It serves as the basis of inclusive cognitions. That is to say that which leads to the inclusion, in one form, of various totally different objects, is ‘Sāmānya’, Generality or Community.

The Highest Generality is put forward as ‘Being’; and the reason for regarding it so is that it extends over and includes a number of things, larger than those included in the Generalities of ‘Substance’ and the rest. Then again, always forming the basis of inclusive cognition, and never that of exclusive cognition (as there is nothing that is not included in ‘Being’), it is ‘Generality’ always; ‘Substance’ and the rest, on the other hand, also serving the purpose of the excluding or differentiating of things other than those in which they themselves inhere, are Generalities, as well as Individualities. But ‘Being’ always serves the purpose of ‘inclusion’; and as such it is always Generality. Though it is true that ‘Being’ differentiates itself from such entities as ‘Generalities’ and the like, yet it cannot, in any case, exclude or differentiate, from these, the things wherein it inheres: as these—Generality &c.—also are often recognised as ‘being’ or having an existence in themselves.

It is with reference to positive entities that Being’ is spoken of as forming the basis of ‘inclusive cognition’; hence even though it serves to exclude non-entities, yet that does not in any way militate against its said character.

Some people maintain that we speak of that alone as ‘being’ which is recognised by the means of cognition, and never of that which is not so recognised; and as such ‘being’ must be regarded as cognisable by means of the ‘means of knowledge’.

But this is not right; as in that case the object in question would have to be regarded as ‘without being’ (i.e. non-existent) before the appearance of the means of cognition; and then, in as much as that which would be non-existent, being like the ‘hare’s born could never be cognised (by any means), there would be an interdependence between ‘being’ and the functioning of the means of cognition (as neither could be in operation without the other); and lastly, in as much as it is only an existing means of cognition that could apprehend (an object), if existence (or being) were regarded to be that which is apprehended by these means of cognition, then we would have to postulate an apprehender for the apprehending means of cognition also; and this would have to go on ad infinitum.

Some people may argue thus: “We do not mean that Being consists in the connection of the means of cognition; what we mean is that it consists in that form of things which is capable of connection with the means of cognition. He also who holds Being to be a Generality, will have to accept the natural form or state of things; as in formless things, as the hare’s horn f.i., Being is not found to inhere. Under the circumstances “we might as well rest with the nature of things; what is the “use of postulating a ‘Being’?”

To this we make the following reply: The nature of each thing being different from that of the rest, how could there be, on that basis alone, any idea inclusive of them all, or any notion of ‘singularity’ with regard to them; specially as we could never comprehend any relationship subsisting among an endless number of things? If you admit of any one factor, such as is common to them all, then that is all that we wish.

Objection: “In the case of the cow we find that one who has seen a cow once, if he happens to see another cow, there appears in his mind an idea which resembles his previous conception of the cow; but in a case where one who has seen the mountain happens to see a grain of mustard, certainly the idea appearing in his mind does not in the least resemble his previous conception of the mountain; consequently, bow could there be any “Generality (such as ‘Being’) in the latter case?”

Reply: In the case of the mountain and the mustard, do you deny all Generality or Community because of the absence of an absolute similarity between the two objects, or of chat of even a partial similarity? if the former, then, you should deny the Generality or genus ‘cow’ also; as in the case of two cows also, there never is an absolute similarity,—one, for instance, being black an I the other of a chequered colour. If you deny even partial similarity between the mountain and the mustard,—then that is scarcely tenable; as all such objects are always recognised as similar, on the ground of their being different from a non-entity. The only difference however is this: in the case of two cows, the idea of their belonging to the same generality or genus comes to the mind quickly, on account of the similarity of many parts of the two bodies; while in the case of the mountain &c., the idea of Generality takes some time to appear,—as the similarities being very slight, the common character is not so easily perceptible; as for instance, when we see a water-jar, it takes some time for us to realise that the earthenware cup belongs to the same class of ‘Clay’ as the jar.

The above sets aside the theory that ‘Being’ consists in the ‘cap ability of doing some action for a definite purpose’ (Arthakriyākāritva). Because that which does not exist having no action, if it were to have an existence on the sole ground of its having an action—in as much as the existence of that action would also depend upon another action, there would be a regressus ad infinitum—and then that would mean the nonexistence of all things.

‘Substance’ and the rest constitute the lower Generality. That is to say, ‘Substance,’ ‘Quality,’ and ‘Action’ are the lower Generalities or classes,—their extensions being smaller in their scop? than that of ‘Being.’ In the same manner, in comparison with ‘Substance,’ ‘Earth’ &c. are the lower classes; and still lower down we have the classes of ‘jar’ and the rest. In comparison with ‘Quality,’ the lower communities are those of ‘Colour’ and the like; and similarly ‘Throwing Upwards’ is lower in comparison with the more general class of ‘Action;’ and so forth.

Some people bring forward the following objection: “As a matter of fact we find that when one perceives fire after having seen water, he is never cognisant of any sameness (or similarity) between the two; and as such we cannot admit of any such class as ‘Substance’ (to which both of them are “held to belong).”

Page 13—Reply: There is not much weight in this argument; as both fire and water are cap idle of being cognised by themselves; and the character of ‘substance’ consists only of this capability of independent coguition. Even in the case of Throwing Upwards &c we recognise them as motion; and it is in this that the coguition of ‘Action’ consists. In the case of Colour &c. also, one, who has subscribed to the convention of naming them, ‘Quality’ cannot escape the conviction that all of them are included in the term ‘Quality’; and this inclusive conviction makes a denial of the class ‘Quality’ an impossibility. The basis of this conviction lies in the due comprehension of the conventional name, as well as the perception of the particular individual quality; just as for the cognition of Brahmana-hood we have a basis in the recognition of the parentage. In the case of this Litter, even though the Brahmana-hood of one born of pure Brahmana parents is interlaced with his very birth, yet it is not perceptible, as any thing particularly distinguishing him form the Kshatriya and the rest,—by means of the senses alone; because the slight difference is not apparent, being lost in the extreme similarity between the two individual bodies (of the Brahmana and the Kshatriya); but when one comes to know, through tradition, of the pure Brahmana parentage to which the person belongs, then the Brahmana-hood comes to be recognised even by the senses (i.e. when one’s parentage is known, whenever he is seen, he is at once seen as a Brāhmaṇa). Similarly it is only a person versed in the science of Generalities who perceives,

by his senses, the several kinds to which the genus belong, which cannot be done by an ordinary person; but that does not prove that there are no different kinds of Generalities; nor can the perception of the learned be denied the character of Perception. Against the recognition of Brahmana-hood. some people bring forward the fact of women being naturally unsteady in their virtue, which would make the parentage of the child open to doubt. But this is not right; as the characters of women being duly guarded by all intelligent persons, it could not be at all difficult to ascertain the parentage. Many are the ways that have been laid down for protecting the chastity of women. We desist from any further profitless discussions and counter-discussions.

These classes of ‘substance’ and the rest, serving the purpose of differentiating their own substrates from those of other classes, come to be known as ‘Individualities’ also, and are not regarded as mere ‘Generalities’ serving as the basis of inclusive cognition alone. The sense of ‘api’ in the Text is that white they are known as ‘Generalities,’ they are known as ‘Individualities’ also. The sense of all this is that the name of ‘Generality’ applies directly to these, as they are all capable of serving as the basis of inclusive cognition, and as such naturally amenable to the definition of ‘Generality’; while the name of ‘Individuality’ applies to them only indirectly (or secondarily, figuratively),—this application being based upon the etymological meaning of the word ‘Viśeṣa’ (‘Individuality,’ or species’)—viz: that which differentiates, or specialises, its substrate from all other things. It may be noted that this etymological meaning applies to the final Individualities or species also.

Notes.

(1) ‘Sāmānya’ is the abstract noun formed from the word ‘Samāna.’ ‘equal’ or ‘similar’; and thus it stands for the property that tends to make certain things to be regarded as ‘Similar’; hence the common characteristic belonging to many individuals. It is for this reason that the word can be rendered only by such words as ‘generality’ or ‘commonality.’ The latter word would, perhaps, have been preferable; but it would be an uncommon word to use; hence we have adopted the word ‘generality.’

(2) Kaṇāda (Sūtra I-ii-3) has declared that Sāmānya is ‘Buddhyapekṣa,’ i.e. it depends upon our conceptions; if we conceive of a certain property as belonging in common to many objects, then it becomes a Sāmānya; while if we think of it only as an individual property, it becomes a Viśeṣa or Specific property.

(3) Sāmānya is that which while being eternal resides in many things, Thus it has come to be used as synonymous to Jāti, commonly rendered as ‘Class or Genus’; but ‘Jāti’ is only one form of Sāmānya which has been called the ‘Akhaṇḍa’, as distinguished from the ‘Sakhaṇḍa,’ Sāmānya. The ‘Sakhaṇḍa Sāmānya is also called ‘upādhi’ which is distinguished from ‘jāti’ in that, while the latter is related to the individual object directly, the former is related to it only indirectly, or through something else.

(4) All common characteristics do not necessarily constitute so many Jātis. The conditions which invalidate a Jāti are said to be these: (a) when the object is one only, it cannot be regarded as a ‘Class’; e. g, ākāśa, (b) mere verbal difference does not constitute difference in class; f.i. ‘Ghatatva [Ghaṭatva?]’ cannot be regarded as a class different from ‘Kalaśatva’ (c) Overlapping cross-division f.i. ‘bhūtatva and ‘mārtatva,’ cannot be accepted as distinct classes, (ci) a Jāti cannot be regarded as constituting another, ‘Jāti’; as that would lead to an endless series of assumptions. F.i. ‘Naratvatva cannot be regarded as a class. (e) Qualities that are by their very nature specific cannot be regarded as a class; as that would be contrary to the nature of things. (f) Want of proper relationship invalidates any such class as ‘Samavāyatva’ as the Samavayus could not bear the relationship that subsists between the class and the individuals. These therefore are not regarded as Jātis but only as upādhis.

(5) The difference between ‘Jāti’ and ‘upādhi’ comes to be that while the latter name may be given to any property that belongs to a number of things, one or many, the former can apply, to only such as belongs to things more than one, and which is eternal. It is thus that while ‘Jāti’ belong to Substances, Qualities and Actions only, ‘Upādhi’ can reside in all the six categories. The Jāti of a thing is natural, inborn and hence eternal: while the Upādhi is adventitious, circumstantial, and hence evanescent.