7.2. Mental Perception (Manasa Pratyakṣa)

By the theory of perception given by Diṅnāga, he has destroyed unity of knowledge and created difference between perception and understanding. In his theory an important question arises that what is the link between understanding and perception. If there is no link between them then perception will have no meaning and also understanding will not free from illusion. If the reality is unattainable to understanding it cannot share any good to human beings; again if the world is not real, nothing good comes out of it. So there appear defects in Diṅnaga’s theory of knowledge and perception. But Diṅnāga resolves this issue by linking perception with understanding in his theory of mental perception.

In the process of sense perception, firstly a person has sensations which are created by an object and at the next instant the person have a mental sensation which indicates that there is something in our knowledge. Hence, in the same stream of cognition there are two subsequent moments of sensation. First bare sensation and secondly, sensations produced by the help of mind, i.e. mental sensations. They are like cause and effect to one another. When there are no pure sensations, there can be no mental sensations. There is something common between pure sensation and mental sensation. Firstly, they are related to homogenous group^[1] as they are different moments of same cognition and secondly, they are related to heterogeneous group^[2] as pure sensation is the product of the senses, while the mental sensations are product of the mind. In contemporary psychology,^[3] the mental sensation may be described as the moment of “attention” where after the first moment of the object the mind is focused on the particular object. For instance: when someone goes to a park and sees a rose flower there. Firstly, the view of rose flower will visual to the eye which is the visual sense organ, and afterwards his mental focus will be aroused and he will try to find what the object is and then he tries to express this concept into words that “this is a rose flower”. This second moment of his perception is known as mental sensation which is also known as “intelligible intuition”. This intelligible intuition occurs when there is presence of the object in one’s perception. One is enlightened,^[4] omniscient beings if he is able to have an intelligible intuition without the presence of the object. Only the Buddhas have the capacity of intelligible intuition without having the presence of an object. In the epistemological terminology, it may call as direct, unique moment but it does not have the feature of being intelligible, in the sense that it is non-intelligible and hence it is not imaginable and utterable at first level. Therefore, one can say that it is half intelligible which works as intermediate between pure sensation and pure conception.

The Definition of Mental Perception

Mental Perception is the inner knowledge which is free from construction and conception and which one possesses about the feelings of the object.^[5] The Mental sensation arises after the moment of pure sensation. It follows the first moment of sense cognition which is thus its immediately preceding homogenous cause.

From the definition mentioned above it is clear that there are two consecutive moments in same stream of cognition, first is pure sensation and second is mental sensation. The moment of pure sensation is called direct and immediate knowledge. Thus the second moment of mental sensation is also a kind of direct knowledge. Since, it is a part of the same stream of cognition, so it is not same as intuitive knowledge of saint, which assumes many streams of cognition at the same time.^[6]

There are some objections with regard to the theory of mental perception: Firstly, the mental perception is not a new knowledge as it cognizes what has been already cognized by the pure sensation. Secondly, if mental perception cognizes a new thing, then the person with disabilities like deaf and blind will equally be able to cognizing objects through mental perception though they do not have physical sense-organs. Thirdly, mental sensation is only an abstract idea. The objections have been answered by Buddhist logicians. According to Buddhist logicians, it is not right to say that mental sensation cognizes what has already been cognized by sense perception because the objects of the two are different. Further the objects are momentary in nature, so they cannot stay even for two moments. Thus, the cognition of an already cognized object does not take place. Secondly, mental perception consistently pursues the knowledge generated by pure sensation and pure sensation is the cause of mental sensation, the deaf and the blind that do not have sense-organs cannot have the perception of sound and sight respectively. Thirdly, to answer the third objection that both sense perception and mental perception are equally the same is also not holdable, as mental perception cognizes a new object which is different from the object of sense-perception. It starts working when the senses have ceased to work. If one holds that both sense perception and mental perception are same one would have no pure sensation relying entirely upon the senses and as a result it would not be easy to distinction between pure sensation and mental sensation. Fourthly, the objection that the mental perception is an abstract idea is contrary to experience because it shines clearly as a sensation.

The next objection have been raised against the mental perception is that it is not produced by the senses that it is purely internal, because its work starts when the senses have stopped to function. Thus the object of mental perception is an internal fact. Vācaspati Miśra answers this argument by saying that it is not founded well. Mental perception does not rely upon the second moment of sensation which immediately follows the first moment of pure sensation which is produced the object. In the Nyāyabinduṭīkatīppaṇī^[7] there is another argument with regard to the definition of mental perception. If mental sensation and pure sensation are different from one another than this must be showed by positive facts like by experiment or observation. To answer this argument Dharmottara quotes Buddhavacana according to which colour is apprehended in two ways, by the sense of vision and by the internal sense evoked by the external one.

Dharmakīrti says—

“If we maintain that mental sensation apprehends what has already been apprehended, it will lose its validity as a means of right cognition because it does not apprehend a new object, which has not been known till the moment; if on the other hand we maintain that it apprehends entirely new thing which was not apprehended by the senses till that moment, we will to the absurd position that there will be no blind and deaf persons even in absence of outer senseorgans they will be able to apprehend colour and sound with the help of mental organ. Hence the only correct view regarding mental cognition is that it apprehends the next moment which immediately follows the preceding moment of pure sensation”.^[8]

Is Mental Sensation Momentary?

According to Buddhists, that which is real is momentary.^[9] Jam Yan tshadpa explains this with the help of an argument why he holds that mental perception is momentary, some absurd results will come out and which will shake the foundation of critical philosophy which is relied on the distinction between sensation and understanding. One will have a clear picture which is forces by the simple reflex of the object when the mental perception continues for longer and there will be no illusion and all knowledge will be valid. Thus, there will be no scope of judgements like “this is not right”. As a result, each one of us will become omniscient, and able to apprehend all the truth. But such an assumption is not guaranteed by experience, as in reality one have wrong knowledge, wrong judgement, illusions like to see snake in place of rope which are completely opposite to the qualities of omniscient.^[10] Thus, it is necessary to hold that mental sensation is momentary. This view of tshadpa is maintained by Dharmakīrti, who believes that perception including mental sensation only cognizes simple reflexes. It does not give any particular knowledge of any object.

Kinds of Mental Sensation

With regard to the five sense-organs, mental perception is also classified into five groups^[11] -

1. Mental Perception apprehending colours and lines;
2. Mental Perception apprehending sounds;
3. Olfactory Mental Perception;
4. Flavorous Mental Perception;
5. Tactile Mental Perception.

Theories of Mental Perception

Diṅnāga’s theory of Mental Perception which works as a link between two things which are not similar i.e. pure sensation and empirical knowledge is challenged. The question arised: “How does one come to know that mental perception is the second moment which is the succeeding moment of pure sensation? How can one show that when pure sensation is there, there are no mental sensations? What would happen if one assumes the existence of pure sensation and mental sensation at the same time? In order to solve this problem four explanations have been given.

As a result four theories are established. They are—

1. Substitute theory of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara;
2. Alternation theory of Prajñākara Gupta;
3. Simultaneity theory by Śaṅkarānanda;
4. Admixture theory by Jñānagarbha.^[12]

Substitute Theory

As per this theory, there are two worlds of knowledge which are completely different and heterogeneous in nature. The first world is the world of sensation where one gets the direct knowledge of the external things with the help of senses, and the second world is the world of understanding which provides shape to the indefinite knowledge generated by external thing by passing such judgements, e.g. “this is a table” etc. while perceiving an object at the first moment one have the sight of reality by the senseorgans which arises directly from the particular thing. In the next moment when the sense-organs stopped to work one feels that he has seen something; and at the next moment some pictures arises and one comes to know what actually was perceived.^[13] According to Dharmottara, this second moment of perception is intelligible intuition. The presence of intelligible intuition was first suggested by Diṅnāga who had developed that sensation and understanding are different means of knowledge. Dharmakīrti in his seven treatises developed this concept and Dharmottara provided it a final shape.^[14]

The theory of mental perception as a connecting link between sensation and understanding has been criticised by the realists of Mīmāṃsa and Nyāya and also by the Buddhists. According to realists, if we believe that mental perception is a joining link between two heterogeneous worlds of sensation and understanding what is the harm if it is believed that a fly can be combined with a cow with the help of a donkey? Further, what is the proof that the mental perception is not there at the time of pure sensation? And they have separate existence?

Dharmottara answers this objection by saying it is not a matter of logic. One cannot prove it by empirical methods. If one does not believe in its existence, the whole system which is based on distinction between sensation and understanding will destroy. He mentions Dharmakīrti’s view who believes that with the help of a real experiment in introspection one can experience its existence. However, it is an essential requirement of all empirical knowledge but it cannot be proved by empirical methods. It is purely transcendental.

Alternation Theory

This theory is developed by Prajñākara Gupta.^[15] As per this theory, In the process of perception, the first moment of sense perception starts functioning where the senses come in contact with external things, a simple reflex emerges, and it is a bare sensation. At the next level a mental sensation originates, hence the process of perception proceeds. This theory targeted by some objections. First, if we hold that sense organs and the mind are alternately arising, we will not be capable of cognize the object by our senses, as both moments i.e. pure sensation and mental sensation will be muddled up.

Secondly, there will be no continuous cognition of the object. According to Dharmakīrti we may say “if a thing would be apprehended in turns, we would not have the experience of its continuous contemplation”.^[16]

Admixture Theory

This theory is attributed to Jñānagarbha. He is the author of the

Satyadvayabibhaṅgakārikā and its vṛtti. Śāntarakṣita wrote a commentary on it known as “Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga-pañjikā”. According to him, mental perception is pure intuition and thus homogenous to pure sensation. While on the other hand mental perception is intelligible intuition thus similar to understanding. Hence the water tight division of knowledge between sense perception and understanding is repaired. He rejects the theory that in the process of perception there is pure sensation at first moment and mental sensation at the next moment when the pure sensation has stopped to function.

He asks a question:

“What is the guarantee that our two moments of cognition are entirely exclusive to each other? Why should we not maintain that every sense perception has the element of mental sensation also, due to existence of which we feel something like the object perceived?”^[17]

To this theory a question may ask: how is it possible to hold two different types of sensation coming from the same sense organ at the same time?

He answers:

“Although two homogenous sensations cannot arise at the same time from the same sense-organ but two different sensations of different senses can exist without evolving any contradiction.”^[18]

It is almost correct to hold that it does not exist because of its being not cognized separately. It can be proved that mental perception exists when in the consecutive moment, the image of the thing that “it is blue” arises, and it is similar with mental perception. If there would have been no intermediate link between pure sensation and understanding, one would not have been able to have a constructed picture of the blue patch which follows immediately in its way. Further a mental perception that “this is blue” can come into being only out of something similar to it, which means mental sensation and not from that thing which is dissimilar to it, i.e. pure sensation. For instance: when a thing e.g. cow is perceived by a person called Devadatta, it cannot evoke its judgement in another person called Yajñadatta, which is completely dissimilar to the former. It can arise its judgement only in Devadatta. To hold the argument that there is no difference between sensation and the constructed mental image is not good. A man who has normal sight can identify the difference between mental feeling of a thing and the constructed mental picture of that thing.^[19]

Dharmottara does not agree with the above theory. Some objections raised by him are: first that the constructed mental picture must come out of something which is similar to it, so one must accept that mental sensation exists, has no validity in our daily life. Secondly, unless one’s consciousness is engaged in a visual perception of some particular thing, one can have no mental image.

How is it possible to have two different types of sensations:

“One sensuous and the other mental from the same very object at the same very moment? We can have experience of mental feeling only when the visual organ has ceased to function”.^[20]

Thus a constructed picture can be arised from a pure simple reflex which is dissimilar to it, and the mental perception belongs to same stream of cognition.

Dharmottara quotes the view of Dharmakīrti who says,

“When one simple reflex is apprehended, the other features will also be apprehended, they will appear by the force of a conscious germ and also by the force of memory which has its own function to achieve”.^[21]

The Simultaneity Theory

The theory is developed by Śaṃkarānanda. As per theory there are three things which are always there in the process of perception.

They are—

1. Pure sensation;
2. Mental sensation;
3. Self-consciousness.

When one perceives an object i.e. cow at this moment pure sensation arises. In the second moment, mental sensation arises where one feels that there is some object i.e. cow in our field of knowledge along with the pure sensation caused by outer sense. The moment of mental sensation which comes after the pure sensation is the first moment of mental perception and the pure sensation running simultaneously with it is the second moment of pure sensation. Hence the same stream of both pure sensation and mental sensation proceeds until the end of the perceptual process.

Śaksya Pandita promotes the opinion of Śaṃkarānanda by saying that:

“Both the alternation theory as well as the substitute theory contains contradiction. This is the only theory by which the principle of homogenous causation can be saved and the unity of knowledge restored”.^[22]

Some questions have been raised to this theory. There is no valid point in accepting that there are merely three things in a sensuous cognition. Jamyan tshadpa raises a question: Why is it necessary to have three elements in a sensuous cognition i.e. sensation, mental sensation and consciousness? Why should there not be seven elements, i.e. the five elements of sensible qualities, along with the element of sensation and the element of attention or mental sensation?

He supports his criticism by quoting a passage from the commentary of Nyāya-Nidhi,^[23] according to it:

“If we reckon the elements in the object, they will be five, and if we add the elements of sense and of the intellect, it will make seven.”

Further, if we assume that at the time of cognition of an object by our senses, there is another aspect like mental sensation which also cognizes the same thing. Such assumption would be a great mistake on one part and it will go against the Buddhist logic.

Dharmakīrti criticizes the fact that there is an equal participation by all the three components in a procedure of perception at one and the same time. He says:

“Although heterogeneous sensations may arise simultaneously, but only one of them will be always predominant, and thus it will weaken all other elements and will not allow any other of them to appear on the threshold of consciousness”.^[24]

Śāntarakṣita agrees with Dharmakīrti and says a double sensation from two different sourced does not exist. Finally, the theory is completely opposite to all the qualities of mental sensation which have been given by the great scholars i.e. (i) the mental perception succeeds the pure sensation, and (ii) it cognizes the second moment of perception which succeeds the pure sensation and starts functioning when the pure sensation has vanished.

Criticism of the Theory of Mental Perception

Vācaspati Miśra challenges the theory of mental perception. He says that the object of our knowledge is an enduring substance and we know it from our daily experiences. It is one and non-divisible. There is no division of preceding and succeeding moments. For instance: when one meets a relative even after a long time he identifies that his relative is the same person whom he met long time ago.^[25] Thus it is useless to presume that cognition has two factors pure sensation which is followed by a mental perception.

Maṇḍana Miśra also talks about the same thing. According to him the theory of cognition is dependent on the successive moments is unholdable. Because the thing we cognize in our cognition is itself a one united whole and it is not a series of moments which are fleeting. Dr. Satkārya Mukerji also doubts the existence of the mental perception. He says that Mental Perception does not have any epistemological importance.^[26]

Is Mental Perception Transcendental?

Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara maintain that mental perception is the second moment of our cognition. It starts functioning when the sense-perception has ceased to function.

Jñānagarbha and his followers raised some objections to the theory,

“What is the proof that mental sensation does not work simultaneously with pure sensation. Is there some positive proof to decide its existence, or is it a mere assumption like a sky flower or a moving fire brand?”^[27]

Dharmottara answers to this objection that empirically one cannot prove the existence of mental perception. It is not like material things. The existence of material things can be shown but the existence of mental perception cannot be shown. But it does not mean that it does not exist. It cannot be expressed by categories of understanding. It is transcendental not empirical. Dhramakīrti accepts the view of Dharmottara and says that the mental perception cannot be empirically apprehends but can be only mentally realised.^[28] Rgyal-tshab supports the view of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara and says that mental perception cannot be proved empirically, its existence can be proved on dogmatic basis.

He further says,

“Although it is subjected to a critical purification,^[29] by means of reason, perception and inference there is no other (direct) evidence to establish it empirically.”^[30]

Some objections were raised about the transcendental character of mental perception. According to some mental perception is already there is every ordinary person and its existence can be demonstrated by their direct knowledge, because in their introspection they cognize their mental sensation. If it is transcendental, it will not apprehended by introspection.

Jamyan tshadpa rejects this argument and says:

“It is beyond the scope of introspection to have apprehension of everything which is cognised. If the introspection were infallible, and susceptible of everything cognizable, the Cārvākas would have known through their introspection their opponents” power of making inference. But this is not the case. Hence if the “introspection” is not capable of even indicating “inference” which is one of the sources of our knowledge how is it possible for it to apprehend those things which are beyond empirical propositions.”

He says:

“If we maintain that “introspection” can apprehend everything which consciousness contains, it will also apprehend everything which consciousness contains, it will also apprehend the ultimate unreality of the world which is present in every consciousness. If every man with the help of his “introspection” apprehends the ultimate unreality of world, we will reach to an absurd conclusion that every ordinary man is a saint because knowledge of ultimate unreality of the world is possessed by the saint alone who acquires it after many lives” severe meditation”.^[31]

Therefore, the objection of the transcendental character of mental perception is not founded. Stcherbatsky also supports the transcendental nature of mental perception. He says: “the moment of intelligible intuition is not empirically cognisable, because it is a moment. A single moment is always transcendental. It cannot be represented in an image. It is unutterable. But its assumption is urged upon us by whole system which is built upon a radical distinction of the two sources of knowledge.”^[32]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Eka saṃtānāṃtarābhūta samānajātīya. Nyāyabinduṭīkā, p.13.

[2]:

Indriya-jñāna viṣayād anyad viṣayo manovijñānsya. Ibid., p.13.

[3]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit, Vol. I, p. 205.

[4]:

Ibid., p.206.

[5]:

Mānasaṃ cārtharāgādi svasaṃvittir akalpikā. Pramāṇasamuccaya quoted in Pramāṇavārtikālaṃkāra p.303. Cittamapyartharāgādi svasamvinnirvikalpakam. Pramāṇa-samuccaya 1.6. Mānasam apyartharāgādi svarūpasaṃvedanam akalpakatvāt pratyakṣam. Pramāṇavārtikālaṃkāra p.303.

[6]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.161.

[7]:

According to the author of this work, sense perception alone is able to generate determinate interpretative knowledge. The very validity of sense perception comes from the fact that it can perform the function producing conceptual interpretative knowledge. The mental perception has no utility for ordinary people, but it can provide the yogin with immediate knowledge of ultimate truths. S. Mookerjee, op.cit, pp. 314-315.

[8]:

Pūrvānubhūta-grahaṇe mānasasyāpramāṇatā. Adṛṣṭagrahaṇe”ndhāderapi syādartha-darśanam. Pramāṇavārtika 3. 240.

[9]:

Yat sat tat kṣaṇikam.

[10]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit, vol.II, p.332.

[11]:

Ibid., p. 323.

[12]:

C.L. Tripathi, op.cit., p.119.

[13]:

Ibid.

[14]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., vol.I, p.206.

[15]:

This theory is attributed to Prajñākara Gupta. According to Khaidub the attribution of alternation theory to Prajñākara Gupta is based upon a traditional current among scholars. It is not to be found in the translated works in Tibetan nor even in the Alaṃkāra, (Elucidation of the seven Treatises). Rgyal tshab in his commentary of Nyāya-Nidhi which is known as “Vistaraṭīkā” supports the above view of Khaidub.

[16]:

Avicchinnā na bhāseta tatsaṃvittiḥ kramāgrahe. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 257.

[17]:

C.L Tripathi, op.cit., p.121.

[18]:

Ibid, p.122.

[19]:

Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā-ṭippanī p.30. See Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit, vol. II, pp. 315-316.

[20]:

Uparata-vyāpāre cakṣuṣi p.13.

[21]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., vol.II, p. 317.

[22]:

Mine of Logic or Nyāya-Nidhi. Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., vol. II, p.328.

[23]:

Commentary on Nyāya-Nidhi by Rgyal-tshab. Ibid, p. 328.

[24]:

C.L. Tripathi, op.cit., p.124

[25]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., vol. II, p.321.

[26]:

S. Mookerjee, op.cit, p.315.

[27]:

Nyāya-bindu ṭīkā p.14.

[28]:

Pratyakṣam Kalpanāpoḍhaṃ pratyakṣeṇaiva siddhyati. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 123.

[29]:

Threefold method of vicāra or mīmāṃsā (scrunity) is perception, inference and non-contradiction.

[30]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., vol.II, p. 332.

[31]:

Ibid, p.335.

[32]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., vol.I, p.209.