7.1. Sense Perception (Indriya Pratyakṣa)

It is defined as the knowledge of an object which comes into existence with the help of sense organs and which is devoid of conceptual element. The cognition of sense perception relies on the senses alone.^[1] A thing is cognised by the cogniser with the help of his sense-organs. In this kind, the knowledge gained by cogniser is free from any kind of imagination. After the sense-perception one initiates to ponder that such a kind of thing, e.g., “a patch of red colour” was saw by his/her, a specific type of picture about that object begins to emerge but such picture had not emerged at first moment of perception. The stage of first apprehension which is antecedent to the subsequent stage of imagination is called “sense-perception”. Thus, sense perception is always particular and devoid of all the features of space, time and nature which the mind forces upon it after it has been cognised by the sense. Some particular is considered as senseperception. It is indetermined because when our understanding tries to initiates to surround it within its classes and provides it a name, it vanishes because of momentary and particular in nature.

Regarding the sense perception Stcherbatsky says:

“The salient feature of sense perception is that it is not constructive. It is followed by the construction of the image, but it is itself non-constructive.”^[2]

According to Stcherbatsky, another feature of sense perception is non-illusiveness which is not mentioned by Diṅnāga. In order to explain why Diṅnāga dropped the characteristic of non-illusiveness of sense perception, Stcherbatsky presents three considerations: (1) illusion always contains an illusive perceptual judgment while sense perception or pure sensation does not contain any judgment, whether right or wrong, because it is nonconceptual. Therefore, Diṅnāga’s definition of perception itself implies its characteristic of non-illusiveness; (2) Diṅnāga wanted his logic to be acceptable to both the Realists and the Idealists; (3) Diṅnāga thought that the introduction of the term non-illusiveness may prove dangerous and even suicidal to the whole system because it admits of many interpretations.^[3]

Stcherbatsky also refers dual aim of Diṅnāga through the latter’s discussion of sense perception:

“1) To distinguish this source of knowledge from other means of cognition, and
2) To distinguish the Buddhist conception of it from the conflicting views of other schools.”^[4]

Matilal goes further in saying that sense perception, according to Diṅnāga is not only the much-coveted epistemologist’s foundation, but more importantly it is the knowledge par excellence.^[5]

Sense-perception has five types:

1. Visual sense-perception: when someone apprehends an object with the medium of eyes i.e. the perception of colour.

2. Auditory sense-perception: when one apprehends an object with the medium of ears i.e. the hearing of any sound.

3. Olfactory sense-perception: when one apprehends an object with the help of nose, e.g. the smelling of fragrance of flower.

4. Flavorous sense-perception: when one apprehends an object with the medium of tongue, e.g. tasting of dishes.

5. Tactile sense-perception: when one apprehends an object with the medium of ears e.g. to touch or feel an object with hand or any other body part.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit, vol. I, pp. 148-149.

[2]:

Ibid., p.149.

[3]:

Ibid., pp. 155-157.

[4]:

Ibid., p. 148.

[5]:

B. K. Matilal, The Character of Logic in India, p. 89.