Chapter 9.3k - Refutation of Injunction in Śravaṇa

Lastly, Appaya Dīkṣita tried to refute any injunction in śravaṇa. He presented the views of the followers of Vācaspati Miśra—the author of ‘Bhāmati ’ on Śāṃkarabhāṣya, in this regard. The followers of Bhāmati say that the word ‘śrotavya’ in the sentence, ‘ātmā vā are...’ denotes knowledge. According to them ‘manana’ and ‘nididhyāsana’ also denote knowledge. These three words do not denote any activity or function. The object of this knowledge is soul. This knowledge is obtained from sacred treatise and from the teaching of a teacher. So, śravaṇa does not mean any action like consideration. The relation between soul and śravaṇa is ‘viṣaya-viṣayi-sambandha.’ Here ‘viṣaya’ means the object of knowledge and ‘viṣayin’ means the knowledge on that object. But if ‘śravaṇa’ means an action in the form of consideration, then the soul can not be its object. Because the inactive soul does not have any relation with the act of consideration. So, the soul can not be the object of the act of śravaṇa in the form of consideration. But it is also true that the soul is regarded as the object of ‘manana’ (reflection) and ‘nididhyāsana’ (meditation). So, it must be the object of śravaṇa also, for if a sentence conveys two different meanings, it causes the fallacy of splitting of sentence. According to this theory, ‘manana’ is not an activity, but it is one kind of knowledge in the form of inferential knowledge. The ‘Vārtika’ also says that manana i.e. reasoning is mentioned in the śruti to make its meaning firmly established. This reasoning is not contradictory to Veda. The object of this reasoning is the entity indicated by the word ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’. This reasoning is nothing but an inferential knowledge.

Nididhyāsana is also one kind of knowledge. Because after the very śravaṇavidhi, the mother Veda herself says,

“ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānena”.^[1]

In another place Veda declares,

“Ātmani khalvare dṛste śrute mate vijñāta idaṃ sarvaṃ viditam.”^[2]

In these two places ‘nididhyāsana’ is declared as ‘vijñāna’ (knowledge). So, if ‘manana’ and ‘nididhyāsana’ refer to knowledge, then the word ‘śravaṇa’ used in the same sentence, must also indicate knowledge, but not any action.

If ‘śravaṇa’ does not express any action, then it is unnecessary to admit any injunction in ‘śravaṇa’. In the section IX. 3.10 of this thesis, it was mentioned and discussed that knowledge depends on its object. It is not subject to any person or any injunction. So, the knowledge of identity of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul or Brahman, is not also subject to any injunction. Though there are Liṅ suffixes or ‘tavya’ etc. expressing the potential mood in the sentences like ‘ātmānaṃ paśyet’ (One should know the soul), ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ...’ etc., yet these suffixes become fruitless as the sharpness of a razor used on a stone becomes fruitless. The reason behind this is that these suffixes are used to express knowledge which is not a matter of effort of a person. The object of the knowledge of the sentences, ‘ātmānaṃ paśyet’ etc. is Brahman which is obtained at all times. Brahman can not be rejected or it can not be accepted. Thus the possibility of injunction in the knowledge regarding soul is refuted by

Śaṃkarācārya is his commentary. Then he questioned about the utility of the sentences. ‘ātmā vā...’ etc. which appear like injunctions.

He himself gave the answer,

“svābhāvikapravṛttiviṣayavimukhīkarṇārthāni iti brūmaḥ”^[3]

(We say that these sentences are for turning away [the striver] from the object of natural inclination).

Śaṃkara explained this sentence in this way:

A person of outward attitude may wish,

‘May there be good fortune to me and may not there be any evil or misfortune to me’.

But he does not get the absolute or supreme object of human being (ātyantikapuruṣārtha). The sentences ‘ātmā vā...’ etc. dissuade that person who wants the supreme object of human life, from natural inclination. By following these instructions he is dissuaded from the natural inclination to colour, taste, smell etc. Those sentences create a flow of mental disposition in that person about his individual soul (pratyagātman) and engage him in the means of knowledge, like śravaṇa, manana etc.^[4]

So, the sentences like ‘ātmā vā...’ are not ‘vidhis’, but they are ‘vidhicchāyas’ (appearing like injunctions) according to Śaṃkara.

If śravaṇa is not regarded as knowledge and if it is regarded as an activity of consideration of Vedānta, then it will only eradicate the obstructing factors like errors, doubts etc. regarding the purport of Vedānta. But it will not eradicate sins or it will not produce the knowledge of Brahman. The eradication of errors etc. is a perceptible result of śravaṇa. It is known from our worldly life. So, it is meaningless to admit apūrvavidhi in śravaṇa for getting an invisible result. There is no other means of brahmjñāna, obtained alternatively or collectively with śravaṇa, manana and ‘nididhyāsana’. So, there is not niyamavidhi or parisaṃkhyāvidhi in śravaṇa etc. Consequently, none of the three injunctions can be traced in śravaṇa.

Though there is not any injunction in consideration or discussion of Vedanta, yet the very gurūpasadanavidhi (‘tadvijñānārthaṃ sa gurum evābhigacchet”^[5]) will produce the knowledge of soul by the help of discussion subject to a teacher. Because it is illogical to postulate an invisible result when there is a visible result. Not only that, the consideration of a person made by his own effort is also eliminated by the gurūpasadanavidhi. So it is meaningless to admit niyamavidhi in śravaṇa for the prevention of one’s own effort with reference to brahmjñāna.

In the absence of the adhyayanavidhi, the gurūpasadanavidhi can not be regarded for ‘akṣaraprāpti ’ (learning by heart according to the pronunciation of a teacher). So, the later injunction will not wait for the study under a teacher. But it will wait for consideration. For this reason, niyamavidhi is accepted in the adhyayanavidhi.

Objection: The gurūpasadanavidhi is a subservient injunction to the śravaṇavidhi. At first, a person listens to “śrotavyo mantavyaḥ...”. Then for the fulfilment of this injunction, he goes to a teacher. So the gurūpasada-navidhi can not exist in the absence of śravaṇavidhi.

Reply: Going to a teacher (gurūpasadana) is a part of acquiring knowledge as discussion. So, gurūpasadanavidhi is subsidiary to adhyayana-vidhi. Moreover, if it is asked, ‘What will a person do after going to a teacher for attaining the brahmajñāna ?’, then the answer will be ‘discussion under the teacher.’ It is established by our worldly experience. We need not take shelter to the śravaṇavidhi to explain the answer of this question.

Objection: If the injunction in gurūpasadana is accepted as independent of discussion, then the reading from the written manuscript is prohibited by the very gurūpasadanavidhi. So, it is fruitless to admit niyamavidhi in ‘svādhyāho dhyetavyaḥ’.

Reply: It is not known from the gurūpasadanavidhi or from any other injunction that learning of the Vedānta must be performed under a teacher. So, niyamavidhi is meaningful in adhyayana (study).

Objection: For the eradication of delusion a person may engage himself in any sacred treatise which establishes dualism. The upaniṣadic sentences are also discussed in the schools of philosophy which establish dualism. So, niyamavidhi must be accepted in the consideration of Vedānta.

Reply: It can not be said. Because the dualistic treatise itself causes delusion regarding the purport of Vedānta. So, it can not eradicate delusion. As a result of this, the niyamavidhi can not be acknowledged in śravaṇa because of the absence of any other means to be prohibited.

Objection: One may mistakenly think that the dualistic philosophy eradicates delusion regarding the puport of Vedānta. He may engage himself in that philosophy prompted by that thinking. To prevent this means of dualistic philosophy obtained by mistake, niyamavidhi is to be accepted in śravaṇa.

Reply: It is not also true. Because the person having no respect to ‘advaitaśāstra’ may mistakenly think that the śravaṇavākya also enjoins the consideration about the soul possessed of qualities. He can not be restrained from his activities even by hundred injunctions.

Objection: Let parisaṃkhyāvidhi be accepted to prevent the actions other than the consideration of Vedānta.

Reply: This objection also does not stand. Who is to be prevented? A house-holder or an ascetic? A house-holder can not restrain himself from other actions. Many duties are enjoined by many vedic sentences for a house-holder. He can not reject them following only the śravaṇavidhi.

With regard to an ascetic, the other actions had been prevented by the vedic sentence,

“brahmasaṃstho’mṛtatvam eti ”^[6]

(The person firmly established in Brahman attains immortality).

This sentence also enjoins renunciation for the person who wants salvation. So, the śravaṇavidhi depends on this sentence of Chāndogyopaniṣad. So, it is unnecessary to prevent actions other than consideration with the help of śravaṇavidhi. Accepting parisaṃkhyāvidhi in śravaṇa results in profitless repetition of the same matter (piṣṭapeṣaṇa).

Objection: Though injunction is impossible in consideration, yet niyamavidhi must be accepted with regard to the subject of consideration i.e. Vedānta. If consideration is to be performed, then it must be performed about Vedānta only. By this regulation, the essays composed in vernacular languages regarding the theory of Brahman, can be prevented.

Reply: That prevention can be made by the proximity of Vedānta. The person who has acquired the general knowledge about Brahman through the study of the Veda with its six organs, wants to have particular knowledge about Brahman. He wants to wipe out his doubts regarding Brahman. Then he starts discussion with his teacher. Now, what will be the subject of his discussion? This question arises in his mind. At that time, the theory of Vedānta which just has been read by that person arises in his mind. This is the proximity. Then he starts consideration as his duty and the reading of compositions composed in vernacular languages (bhāṣāprabandha) is automatically prevented. Moreover, it is known from the adhyayanavidhi that the knowledge obtained from the study of the Veda under the guidance of a teacher, results in salvation. So, the ‘bhāṣāprabandha’ is not obtained with regard to Brahman.

Objection: Then why did the commentator admit injunction in śravaṇa, manana and vididhyāsana denoted respectively by the words pāṇḍitya, bālya and mauna ?

Reply: This question also does not stand. Because it is proved from our worldly experience that consideration leads to the pure knowledge about the subject of consideration. Manana means memorising the arguments which establish the object. Nididhyāsana means the practice of the mental disposition identified with the object. So, these manana and nididhyāsana eradicate the obstdacles of the knowledge of object. So, there is no injunction in śravaṇa etc. But the sentence ‘ātmā vā...’ is used as injunction to increase the interest of a person in śravaṇa etc. in the manner of eulogy. As there is no injunction in śravaṇa etc., the discussion of the brahma-kāṇda or jñānakāṇḍa is obtained from the very adhyayanavidhi as the discussion of the karmakāṇḍa of Veda.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad—2.4.5.

[2]:

Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad—4.5.6.

[3]:

Śāṃkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra—1.1.4.

[4]:

Śāṃkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra—1.1.4.

[5]:

Muṇdakopaniṣad—1.2.12.

[6]:

Chāndogyopaniṣad—2.23.1.