Sūtra 3.52

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 3.52:

जातिलक्षणदेशैर् अन्यतानवच्छेदात् तुल्ययोस् ततः प्रतिपत्तिः ॥ ३.५२ ॥

jātilakṣaṇadeśair anyatānavacchedāt tulyayos tataḥ pratipattiḥ || 3.52 ||

jāti—genus. lakṣaṇa—differentia. deśa—position in space by all these, anyatā—by separateness. anavacchedāt—there being no distinction. tulyayoḥ—of two similars. tataḥ—thereby. pratipattiḥ—the distinction.

52. Two-similars are thereby distinguished when not separately distinguishable by genus, differentia and position-in-space.—158.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Its sphere is defined:—‘Two similars are thereby distinguished, when not separately distinguishable by genus, differentia and position in space.’ When position and secondary qualities are the same, the genus causes distinction between two similars. Thus ‘This is a cow,’ ‘This is a mare.’ When position and genus are common, the secondary quality causes distinction, as is the case with a black-eyed cow and an auspicious cow. Between two emblic fruits in which the genus and secondary qualities are the same, difference of position causes distinction.

This is anterior and this is posterior. When, however, the anterior emblic fruit moves on to the position of the posterior one in space, at a time when the seer may be looking elsewhere, the position becoming the same, it can no longer cause distinction (as to which it was originally), the anterior or the posterior? In the knowledge of truth, however, there should be no doubt. Hence has it been said, ‘They are thereby distinguished.’ It means, by discriminative knowledge How? The space correlated to the moment of time of the anterior emblic fruit, is different from the space correlated to the moment of time of the posterior emblic fruit. And the emblic fruits are separate in the sequential notions of the movements in time correlated to their distinct positions in space. The sequential notion of space correlated to another moment of time is the means of their distinction.

As in this case, so in the case of atoms which have community of genus, secondary quality and position in space. By discovering the yet unknown correlation of every atomic position in space to a different moment of time, the sequential notion of such a position in space for the anterior atom becomes distinct from such a position in space for the distinction of atoms, on the analogy of this illustration. The powerful Yogī knows this distinction by the correlated moment.

Others however say:—It is the last peculiarities (the viśeṣa of the vaiśeṣikas) that cause the notion of distinction. Even there the distinction is the difference of space and secondary quality and the difference of form, distance and genus. The distinction on account of the moment of time can, however, be grasped by the intellect of a Yogī alone.

As has been said by Vārṣagaṇya:—‘On account of the absence of the difference of form, intervening space and genus, there is no separation in the root.’—158.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

Although this knowledge born of discrimination has all existences for the sphere of its operation, as will be shown further, still being very subtle, one particular sphere is first defined:—‘Two similars are thereby distinguished, when not separately distinguishable by genus, differentia and position.’ For ordinary men the difference of genus is the cause of the knowledge of distinction. When genus such as the characteristic of a cow is the same; when also space, such as presence in the east, &c., is the same; then the distinction of the black-eyed and the auspicious is the other means of distinction. In two emblic fruits the genus of emblic fruit is the same, the differentiae of roundness, &c., are the same. The difference of space, however, is another means of distinction. When, however, some one desirous of testing the knowledge of the Yogī, takes the anterior fruit when he has his attention turned towards something, and places it in the spot previously occupied by the other fruit, having removed the other fruit from there or having concealed it, then the space also becomes the same, and it can no longer be decided that this is the former and this is the latter. The ordinary wise man who is clever in the use of the three means of knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the two under such circumstances. The knowledge of realities, however, should be free from doubt. It is not proper that a Yogī who is possessed of discriminative knowledge should remain doubtful. Hence has the author of the aphorism said:—‘Are thereby distinguished, &c.’

Explains ‘thereby.’ It means by discriminative knowledge. The question now is: How can knowledge born by Saṃyama over moments and their succession distinguish an emblic fruit from another which is the same with reference to genus, secondary quality and position in space? The Commentator gives the answer:—‘The space correlated to the moment of time of the anterior emblic fruit, is different from the space correlated to the moment of time of the posterior emblic fruit? ‘The space correlated to the moment of time of the anterior emblic fruit, means the space which coincides with the one moment of time of the anterior emblic fruit; or in other words, the change which has no interval between itself and the one moment of time. It is different from the position in space correlated to the moment of time of the posterior fruit, from the un-interrupted change of the posterior fruit.

Let there be the difference of positions in space; but how does it affect the distinction of the fruit? For this reason he says:—‘And the emblic fruits are separate in the sequential notions of their moments of time correlated to their positions in space. The moment of time that is correlated to the distinct position in space of the emblic fruit, is that portion of time which is indicated by the change of anteriority and posteriority in its own position in space. The notion of this moment of time correlated to its distinct position means the knowledge thereof. It is by this knowledge that the fruits are distinguished. The performer of Saṃyama know’s that the two emblic fruits are different, by the knowledge of their becoming characterized by a moment of time correlated to the change of anteriority and posteriority, in a position other than that in which the changes of anteriority and posteriority in a moment of time existed formerly. Now although the former place has been changed, the Saṃyama is performed with reference to the moment of time correlated to the present changed position of the same object, qualified by the change of position in space different from the former one. By the performance of this Saṃyama direct knowledge is obtained of the change in time in the other position. For this reason it has been said:—‘The sequential notion of the moment of time correlated to another position in space, becomes the cause of their distinction.’

Now ho says that by the analogy of this very illustration, the same sort of distinction should be believed as existing among atoms, on the authority of a Yogī who alone can conceive of the distinction. ‘On the analogy of this illustration, &c.’

‘Others however say’:—(he cites their opinion) ‘it is the last, &c.’ The Vaiśeṣikas say that there are certain ultimate peculiarities which are manifest in the permanent substances. It is thus argued. The Yogīs who are absolutely free do not distinguish between objects whose genus, position in space and secondary qualities are the same, and in which there is no interval; and cannot specify either by pointing out mutual differences or by defining their realities. There must, therefore, be some ultimate peculiarity (viśeṣa): and it is that, that they make out to be the differentiating quality of permanent substances, such as atoms, &c.

He refutes this theory:—‘Even there, &c.’ Genus, space and secondary quality have been illustrated. Form is a manifestation of arrangement along certain lines. Thus having removed a thing whose parts are beautifully arranged, another object whose parts arc ugly in arrangement, is placed in the same position when the seer is otherwise employed. In this case the knowledge of distinction is obtained by the difference of arrangement.

Or, form may mean the body. It is by relation to the body that the selves whether in evolution or free are distinguished by means of the action of the elements, such as it may be. Thus when the notion of distinction is caused anywhere by other means, it is not necessary to posit a differentia in the shape of ultimate peculiarity (antya viśeṣa), as the cause of the distinction. This is similar to the case of the Dvīpas of Kuśa and Puṣkara in their aspect of planes of space.

Inasmuch as it has been said that the differences of genus, position and time, &c., are known by the intellect of the ordinary man, it is said that the difference of moment of time (kṣaṇa) is known by the intellect of the Yogī alone. The word ‘alone’ signifies the difference of the moment of time, not that of the intellect of the Yogī. It is inferred that the distinction between released Puruṣas also is known by the intellect of the Yogī by their relation to the body moving in the elements (bhūtacara).

The teacher thought that in the case of those who do not possess the means of distinction, there are no distinctions in the case of the Pradhāna. Therefore, he said:—‘Although destroyed with reference to those whose objects have been gained, it is not destroyed with reference to others, being common to the others.’

He says this:—‘On account of the absence of form, &c.’ The meaning is that the universe has difference indicated by the causes mentioned. But there is no distinction in the root, the Pradhāna.—52.