Sūtra 4.33

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 4.33:

पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तेरिति ॥ ४.३३ ॥

puruṣārthaśūnyānāṃ guṇānāṃ pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyaṃ svarūpapratiṣṭhā vā citiśakteriti || 4.33 ||

33. Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of the purpose of soul, or it is the abidance of the thinking power in its own nature.

The Rajamartanda commentary by King Bhoja:

[English translation of the 11th century commentary by Bhoja called the Rājamārtaṇḍa]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

“The regression” (pratiprasava) or the non-productton of change on the completion of the regressive (or refluent) modification of the (three) qualities, on the accomplishment of soul’s (two fold) purpose of experience and emancipation is called “isolation” (kaivalya); or, it is the abidance of the thinking power (soul) solely in its own proper nature, on the cessation of its identification with intellectual functions (or objects).

Notes and Extracts

[Notes and comparative extracts from other commentaries on the Yogasūtra]

[Having described the Yoga in all its details, the author concludes the work by announcing the ultimatum to which it leads. This ultimatum is kaivalya, and it is defined to result on the reabsorption of the triad of qualities in their original cause, on their having done their duty to soul, or on the abidance of the soul in its own nature without any association with the qualities; that is to say, when it has no longer the thinking principle near it to cause its shadow to fall thereon.

The commentator does not explain the word kaivalya. The Pātañjala Bhāṣya, suggests its meaning by saying “when the power of intelligence becomes alone, and remains always after in that state it is kaivalya” (citi-śaktireva kevalā tasyāḥ sadā tathaivāvasthānam kaivalamiti). It is the same goal which the Sāṅkhya assigns to its votaries, but it uses, instead of kaivalya, the word apavarga which, though not radically synonymous, conveys the same idea, that of liberation from the trammels of nature. The Sāṅkhya-kārikā adopts the term kaivalya, and says, “when separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final kaivalya accomplished,” (v. LXVIII). Gauḍapāda contents himself by saying, “kaivalya is the abstract form of kevala,” (kevalabhāvāt kaivalyam). Vācaspati Miśra and Nārāyaṇa take it to mean “exemption from the three kinds of pain,” (duḥkhatraya-vigamam duḥkhavināsam). The lexicographical meaning of kevala is ‘one,’ ‘alone,’ ‘only,’ and in the derivative form it means, ‘oneness,’ ‘singleness,’ ‘solitariness,’ ‘exclusiveness,’ or ‘individuality,’ i. e., deliverance from the association of nature. Cole-brooke translates it into ‘deliverance,’ and Wilson adds ‘liberation.’ Mr. Davies, in his translation, prefers ‘abstraction.’ All these may be resolved into isolation, the word used in my version, the idea being that the soul is freed from all association, material, phenomenal, or noumenal.

The epithets ‘absolute’ (aikāntika) and ‘final’ (ātyantika) used in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā) and the word ‘always,’ (sadā) in Pātañjala Bhāṣya show that this isolation is to last for ever, and no future association of any kind is possible. To quote Mr. Davies, “the soul’s perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of matter has been gained. No new character can be assumed; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, and the actors retire from the stage for ever.”

This eternal quietude of the soul after isolation amounts, in the opinion of M. Cousin, to “nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme;” but where existence forms the primary condition of the theory, nihilism cannot logically and fairly be predicated. The question is, does the soul exist or not after salvation? and since the Yoga, like many other schools of philosophy, both Indian and European, insists that it does, (cf. Sāṅkhya-sūtra I, 45, 46, 47), there is no room left for a charge of negation against it. Professor Wilson, following the Indian exegetes, more correctly explains the case by saying, “it is merely intended as a negation of the soul’s having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings.” Professor Weber, in his ‘History of Indian literature,’ (pp. 238-9), has entirely misrepresented the case. He says, “one very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine—and one which was more and more exclusively developed as time went on—is the Yoga practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained.” To those who have attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious, that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how so well-read a scholar, as the learned professor, could have formed this opinion, unless we believe that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his theory from the Bhagavadgītā, and Purāṇic and Tāntric modifications of Yoga.

Patañjali, like Kapila, rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does not pry into the how and the where the soul abides after the separation. This condition of philosophic abstraction, however, not being satisfactory to worldly-minded people longing for a peaceful hereafter, a necessity arose for the elaboration of a more concretely blissful scheme, and the modifications above noticed were offerred by the Purāṇics to meet the requirement. They devised other forms, but those require no description here.

This completes the work; but Bhoja takes this opportunity to compare the condition of the soul as described in the Yoga with what other systems propose, and thereby to demonstrate its superiority. The first is the Buddhist doctrine of momentary existence.]