Text 91

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 91:

बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानं प्रत्यय इति पर्यायाः॥ ९१ ॥

buddhirupalabdhirjñānaṃ pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ || 91 ||

Text (91):—The words ‘buddhi,’ ‘upalabdhi’ ‘jñāna’ and ‘pratyaya’ are synonymous.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

It has been shown above that ‘distance’ and ‘proximity’ are born of buddhi, and the author now proceeds to consider what this buddhi is.

On this point the theory of the Sāṅkhyas is as follows: A modification of Pradhāna is the inner organ called ‘Mahat’ another name lor which is ‘Citta’; and this same is also called ‘Buddhi’ (1). Through the sense-organs the Buddhi; comes into contact with, and is affected by, the external object:; and thereby it comes to have a peculiar ‘function,’ Which, taking the form of that same object, and being based upon the attribute of sattva, becomes known as ‘jñāna,’ (2). The faculty of consciousness, reflected in the buddhi that has become affected by the form of the object thus approached by the sense-organ, comes to imitate the aforesaid ‘function’ of buddhi; and this imitation comes to he known as ‘upalabdhi’, (apprehension) (3). Says the revered Patañjali (the sentence actually occurs in the Yogabhāṣya of Vyāsa, and not in the Sūtras of Patañjali): “The faculty of the bhoktri [bhoktṛ], the enjeyor, the conscious agent, is modifying, untransferable and

The commentary has a long extract from the text here. appears as if transferred in the modifying object, and comes to perceive or cognise its functioning.” In this passage, the ‘faculty of bhoktri [bhoktṛ]’ is none other than the Self; the ‘modifying object’ is the principle of buddhi; and ‘transferred’ is reflected; and ‘comes to perceive its functioning’ means that being reflected in buddhi, it becomes a mere shadow cast in buddhi, and thereby comes to imitate its functioning; and the objectives of buddhi, in the forms of pleasure or pain, constitutes what is called ‘pratyaya’ (4). Says the same author: “The Puruṣa, though pure, comes to perceive the pratyaya belonging to the buddhi; and while perceiving it, he appears to be identified with it, though in reality he is wholly distinct from it.”

With a view to deny this Sāṅkhya theory, (in which distinction is made between buddhi, upalabdhi, jñāna and pratyaya) the author has said: The words Buddhi &c. The sense is that ‘Buddhi’ is nothing but synonymous with the other words mentioned. The process of cognition put forward by the Sankhya is denied for the simple reason that no such process is ever perceived; That which is in keeping with the acceptance and rejecting of the object, and which, in this, appears to have the character of acquisition and expenditure, is one only (and this is Buddhi) and there is another (Self) i.e: the substratum of this buddhi; it is this latter on whom which there appear activity or cessation from activity, in accordance with the character of the buddhi appearing therein. Both these entities are cognised by ah men, no other process is ever known to take place. As regards the ‘function’ of buddhi postulated by the Sāṅkhya, we ask—Is this ‘function.’ something distinct from buddhi, or absolutely identical with it? Distinct from buddhi it cannot be, because it is held that there is an absolute identity between the ‘function’ and that wherein the function appears. If however it, be absolutely identical with it, then, in as much as buddhi is one only, its functions too, bearing the forms of objects, could not but be one only: and then any idea of three, or ‘four’ &c., with regard to the ‘function’ would be absolutely impossible; specially as there could be no cognition of any distinct forms among them.; and also because what on the Puruṣa, cognises is only that form which is imprinted on buddhi; as has been declared: “Puruṣa is the counter-cogniser of buddhi.” On the other hand, the number of ‘functions’ being many, buddhi also would become many; and this would be opposed to the idea of its singleness. These and many other such like objections against the Sankhya theory may be put forward.