Text 90

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 90:

परत्वमपरत्वं च परापराभिधानप्रत्ययनिमित्तम् । तत् तु द्विविधं दिक्कृतं कालकृतं च । तत्र दिक्कृतं दिग्विशेषप्रत्यायकम् । कालकृतं च वयोभेदप्रत्यायकम् । तत्र दिक्कृतस्योत्पत्तिरभिधीयते । कथम् । एकस्यां दिश्यवस्थितयोः पिण्डयोः सम्युक्तसम्योगबह्वल्पभावे सत्येकस्य द्रष्टुः सन्निकृष्टमवधिं कृत्वा एतस्माद्विप्रकृष्टोऽयमिति परत्वाधारेऽसन्निकृष्टा बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते । ततस्तामपेक्ष्य परेण दिक्प्रदेशेन सम्योगात् परत्वस्योत्पत्तिः । तथा विप्रकृष्टं चावधिं कृत्वा एतस्मात्सन्निकृष्टोयमित्यपरत्वाधारे इतरस्मिन् सन्निकृष्टा बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते । ततस्तामपेक्ष्यापरेण दिक्प्रदेशेन सम्योगादपरत्वस्योत्पत्तिः । कालकृतयोरपि कथम् । वर्तमानकालयोरनियतदिग्देशसम्युक्तयोर्युवस्थविरयो रूढश्मश्रुकार्कश्यबलिपलितादिसान्निध्ये सत्येकस्य द्रष्टुर्युवानमवधिं कृत्वा स्थिविरे विप्रकृष्टा बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते । ततस्तामपेक्ष्य परेण कालप्रदेशेन सम्योगात् परत्वस्योत्पत्तिः । स्थविरं चावधिं कृत्वा यूनि सन्निकृष्टा बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते । ततस्तामपेक्ष्यापरेण कालप्रदेशेन सम्योगादपरत्वस्योत्पत्तिरिति । विनाशस्त्वपेक्षाबुद्धिसम्योगद्रव्यविनाशात् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशात् तावदुत्पन्ने परत्वे यस्मिन् काले सामान्यबुद्धिरुत्पन्ना भवति ततोऽपेक्षाबुद्धेर्विनश्यत्ता सामान्यज्ञानतत्सम्बन्धेभ्यः परत्वगुणबुद्धेरुत्पद्यमानतेत्येकः कालः । ततोऽपेक्षाबुद्धेर्विनाशो गुणबुद्धेश्चोत्पत्तिः ततोऽपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशाद्गुणस्य विनश्यत्ता गुणज्ञानतत्सम्बन्धेभ्यो द्रव्यबुद्धेरुत्पद्यमानतेत्येकः कालः । ततो द्रव्यबुद्धेरुत्पत्तिर्गुणस्य विनाश इति । सम्योगविनाशादपि कथम् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिसमकालमेव परत्वाधारे कर्मोत्पद्यते तेन कर्मणा दिक्पिण्डविभागः क्रियते अपेक्षाबुद्धितः परत्वस्योत्पत्तिरित्येकः कालः । ततः सामान्यबुद्धिएरुत्पत्तिः दिक्पिण्डसम्योगस्य च विनाशः ततो यस्मिन् काले गुणबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तस्मिन्न् एव काले दिक्पिण्डसम्योगविनाशाद्गुणस्य विनाशः । द्रव्यविनाशादपि कथम् । परत्वाधारावयवे कर्मोत्पन्नं यस्मिन्न् एव कालेऽवयवान्तराद्विभागं करोति तस्मिन्न् एव कालेऽपेक्षाबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते ततो विभागाद्यस्मिन्न् एव काले सम्योगविनाशः तस्मिन्न् एव काले परत्वमुत्पद्यते ततः सम्योगविनाशाद् द्रव्यविनाशः तद्विनाशाच्च तदाश्रितस्य गुणस्य विनाशः । द्रव्यापेक्षाबुद्धोर्युगपद्विनाशादपि कथम् । यदा परत्वाधारावयवे कर्मोत्पद्यते तदैवापेक्षाबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते कर्मणा चावयवान्तराद्विभागः क्रियते परत्वस्योत्पत्तिरित्येकः कालः । ततो यस्मिन्न् एव कालेऽवयवविभागाद् द्रव्यारम्भकसम्योगविनाशस्तस्मिन्न् एव काले सामान्यबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तदनन्तरं सम्योगविनाशाद् द्रव्यविनाशः सामान्यबुद्धेश्चापेक्षाबुद्धिविनाश इत्येकः कालः । ततो द्रव्यापेक्षाबुद्धोर्विनाशात् परत्वस्य विनाशः । द्रव्यसम्योगविनाशादपि कथम् । यदा परत्वाधारावयवे कर्मोत्पन्नमवयवान्तराद्विभागं करोति तस्मिन्न् एव काले पिण्डकर्मापेक्षाबुद्धोर्युगपदुत्पत्तिः ततो यस्मिन्न् एव काले परत्वस्योत्पत्तिस्तस्मिन्न् एव काले विभागाद् द्रव्यारम्भकसम्योगविनाशः पिण्डकर्मणा दिक्पिण्डस्य च विभागः क्रियते इत्येकः कालः । ततो यस्मिन्न् एव काले सामान्यबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तस्मिन्न् एव काले द्रव्यारम्भकसम्योगविनाशात् पिण्डविनाशः पिण्डविनाशाच्च पिण्डसम्योगविनाशः ततो गुणबुद्धिसमकालं पिण्डदिक्पिण्डसम्योगविनाशात् परत्वस्य विनाशः । सम्योगापेक्षाबुद्धोर्युगपद्विनाशादपि कथम् । यदा परत्वमुत्पद्यते तदा परत्वाधारे कर्म ततो यस्मिन्न् एव काले परत्वसामान्यबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तस्मिन्न् एव काले पिण्डकर्मणा दिक्पिण्डविभागः क्रियते ततः सामान्यबुद्धितोऽपेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशो विभागाच्च दिक्पिण्डसम्योगविनाश इत्येकः कालः । ततः सम्योगापेक्षाबुद्धिविनाशात् परत्वस्य विनाशः । त्रयाणां समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तकारणानां युगपद्विनाशादपि कथम् । यदापेक्षाबुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तदा पिण्डावयवे कर्म ततो यस्मिन्न् एव काले कर्मणावयवान्तराद्विभागः क्रियतेऽपेक्षाबुद्धेः परत्वस्य चोत्पत्तिस्तस्मिन्न् एव काले पिण्डेऽपि कर्म ततोऽवयवविभागात् पिण्डारम्भकसम्योगविनाशः पिण्डकर्मणा च दिक्पिण्डविभागः क्रियते सामान्यबुद्धेश्चोत्पत्तिरित्येकः कालः । ततः सम्योगविनाशात् पिण्डविनाशः विभागाच्च दिक्पिण्डसम्योगविनाशः सामान्यज्ञानादपेक्षाबुद्धेर्विनाश इत्येतत् सर्वं युगपत् त्रयाणां समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तकारणानां विनाशात् परत्वस्य विनाश इति ॥ ९० ॥

paratvamaparatvaṃ ca parāparābhidhānapratyayanimittam | tat tu dvividhaṃ dikkṛtaṃ kālakṛtaṃ ca | tatra dikkṛtaṃ digviśeṣapratyāyakam | kālakṛtaṃ ca vayobhedapratyāyakam | tatra dikkṛtasyotpattirabhidhīyate | katham | ekasyāṃ diśyavasthitayoḥ piṇḍayoḥ samyuktasamyogabahvalpabhāve satyekasya draṣṭuḥ sannikṛṣṭamavadhiṃ kṛtvā etasmādviprakṛṣṭo'yamiti paratvādhāre'sannikṛṣṭā buddhirutpadyate | tatastāmapekṣya pareṇa dikpradeśena samyogāt paratvasyotpattiḥ | tathā viprakṛṣṭaṃ cāvadhiṃ kṛtvā etasmātsannikṛṣṭoyamityaparatvādhāre itarasmin sannikṛṣṭā buddhirutpadyate | tatastāmapekṣyāpareṇa dikpradeśena samyogādaparatvasyotpattiḥ | kālakṛtayorapi katham | vartamānakālayoraniyatadigdeśasamyuktayoryuvasthavirayo rūḍhaśmaśrukārkaśyabalipalitādisānnidhye satyekasya draṣṭuryuvānamavadhiṃ kṛtvā sthivire viprakṛṣṭā buddhirutpadyate | tatastāmapekṣya pareṇa kālapradeśena samyogāt paratvasyotpattiḥ | sthaviraṃ cāvadhiṃ kṛtvā yūni sannikṛṣṭā buddhirutpadyate | tatastāmapekṣyāpareṇa kālapradeśena samyogādaparatvasyotpattiriti | vināśastvapekṣābuddhisamyogadravyavināśāt | apekṣābuddhivināśāt tāvadutpanne paratve yasmin kāle sāmānyabuddhirutpannā bhavati tato'pekṣābuddhervinaśyattā sāmānyajñānatatsambandhebhyaḥ paratvaguṇabuddherutpadyamānatetyekaḥ kālaḥ | tato'pekṣābuddhervināśo guṇabuddheścotpattiḥ tato'pekṣābuddhivināśādguṇasya vinaśyattā guṇajñānatatsambandhebhyo dravyabuddherutpadyamānatetyekaḥ kālaḥ | tato dravyabuddherutpattirguṇasya vināśa iti | samyogavināśādapi katham | apekṣābuddhisamakālameva paratvādhāre karmotpadyate tena karmaṇā dikpiṇḍavibhāgaḥ kriyate apekṣābuddhitaḥ paratvasyotpattirityekaḥ kālaḥ | tataḥ sāmānyabuddhierutpattiḥ dikpiṇḍasamyogasya ca vināśaḥ tato yasmin kāle guṇabuddhirutpadyate tasminn eva kāle dikpiṇḍasamyogavināśādguṇasya vināśaḥ | dravyavināśādapi katham | paratvādhārāvayave karmotpannaṃ yasminn eva kāle'vayavāntarādvibhāgaṃ karoti tasminn eva kāle'pekṣābuddhirutpadyate tato vibhāgādyasminn eva kāle samyogavināśaḥ tasminn eva kāle paratvamutpadyate tataḥ samyogavināśād dravyavināśaḥ tadvināśācca tadāśritasya guṇasya vināśaḥ | dravyāpekṣābuddhoryugapadvināśādapi katham | yadā paratvādhārāvayave karmotpadyate tadaivāpekṣābuddhirutpadyate karmaṇā cāvayavāntarādvibhāgaḥ kriyate paratvasyotpattirityekaḥ kālaḥ | tato yasminn eva kāle'vayavavibhāgād dravyārambhakasamyogavināśastasminn eva kāle sāmānyabuddhirutpadyate tadanantaraṃ samyogavināśād dravyavināśaḥ sāmānyabuddheścāpekṣābuddhivināśa ityekaḥ kālaḥ | tato dravyāpekṣābuddhorvināśāt paratvasya vināśaḥ | dravyasamyogavināśādapi katham | yadā paratvādhārāvayave karmotpannamavayavāntarādvibhāgaṃ karoti tasminn eva kāle piṇḍakarmāpekṣābuddhoryugapadutpattiḥ tato yasminn eva kāle paratvasyotpattistasminn eva kāle vibhāgād dravyārambhakasamyogavināśaḥ piṇḍakarmaṇā dikpiṇḍasya ca vibhāgaḥ kriyate ityekaḥ kālaḥ | tato yasminn eva kāle sāmānyabuddhirutpadyate tasminn eva kāle dravyārambhakasamyogavināśāt piṇḍavināśaḥ piṇḍavināśācca piṇḍasamyogavināśaḥ tato guṇabuddhisamakālaṃ piṇḍadikpiṇḍasamyogavināśāt paratvasya vināśaḥ | samyogāpekṣābuddhoryugapadvināśādapi katham | yadā paratvamutpadyate tadā paratvādhāre karma tato yasminn eva kāle paratvasāmānyabuddhirutpadyate tasminn eva kāle piṇḍakarmaṇā dikpiṇḍavibhāgaḥ kriyate tataḥ sāmānyabuddhito'pekṣābuddhivināśo vibhāgācca dikpiṇḍasamyogavināśa ityekaḥ kālaḥ | tataḥ samyogāpekṣābuddhivināśāt paratvasya vināśaḥ | trayāṇāṃ samavāyyasamavāyinimittakāraṇānāṃ yugapadvināśādapi katham | yadāpekṣābuddhirutpadyate tadā piṇḍāvayave karma tato yasminn eva kāle karmaṇāvayavāntarādvibhāgaḥ kriyate'pekṣābuddheḥ paratvasya cotpattistasminn eva kāle piṇḍe'pi karma tato'vayavavibhāgāt piṇḍārambhakasamyogavināśaḥ piṇḍakarmaṇā ca dikpiṇḍavibhāgaḥ kriyate sāmānyabuddheścotpattirityekaḥ kālaḥ | tataḥ samyogavināśāt piṇḍavināśaḥ vibhāgācca dikpiṇḍasamyogavināśaḥ sāmānyajñānādapekṣābuddhervināśa ityetat sarvaṃ yugapat trayāṇāṃ samavāyyasamavāyinimittakāraṇānāṃ vināśāt paratvasya vināśa iti || 90 ||

Text (90): Distance and Proximity form the basis of the notions of ‘prior’ and ‘posterior.’ They are of two kinds: (1) Due to space, and (9) Due to time. Those which are due to space afford ideas of particular directions; and those are due to Time affords ideas of aye.

We proceed to explain the production of those due to space; when two things. exist in the same direction (of the seer), then the number of Conjunctions with contacts in the case of one thing would be larger than that in the case of the other; and then judging from the point occupied by the seer, we have with regard to the thing wherein ‘distance,’ would have its substratum, the notion that ‘it is further removed from him;’ and then on the basis of this notion, the contact of the thing with the further point in space, produces the quality of ‘Distance.’ Similarly taking the further removed object as the limit, we have the notion, that ‘this is nearer than that,’ with regard to the nearer object, which is the substratum of ‘Proximity;’ and on the basis of this notion the contact of the thing with the nearer point in space produces the quality of ‘Proximity’?

Question: “How do you apply this process to the Distance and Proximity of time?”

Answer: (It is thus:) when We come across two men, both existing at the present time, though occupying any points in space; though one of them is youthful and another older,—then we ourselves, as observers, find in one of them (the latter) such characteristics as a growing beard, roughness of the skin, wrinkles and a general looseness of skin; and then taking the younger man as the limit (standard of comparison) there arises in us, with regard to the older person, the notion of the other being further removed in time; and on the basis of this notion, the contact of that person with the further point in time produces the Quality of ‘Distance and when we take the older man as the standard we have the notion of his being nearer in time; and on the basis of this notion, the contact of the person with the nearer point in time produces the quality of ‘Proximity.’

The destruction of these is due to tire destructions of (1) ‘Apekṣābuddhi’ (idea of comparison), (2) Conjunction and (3) the Substance. To explain how it follows from the destruction of (1). When the quality of ‘Distance’ has been produced, as soon as there arises a notion of ‘commonality’ (of ‘Distance’), the apekṣābuddhi becomes liable to destruction and the idea of the quality of ‘Distance’ becomes liable to production from the notions of the said commonality and its relationships,—these two liabilities occurring at one point of time. Then there comes the destruction of the apekṣābuddhi, and the production or appearance of the idea of ‘quality’; and from the destruction of the apekṣābuddhi there follows the liability of the quality to destruction; and from the idea of quality and its relationships follows the liability of the idea of ‘substance’ to; production,—all these occupying one point of time. Then we have the appearance of the idea of ‘substance,’ and the destruction of the quality (of ‘distance’).

Question: “In what way does the destruction of this quality follow from the destruction of Conjunction?”

Answer: Simultaneously with the apekṣābuddhi there arises an action in the substratum of the quality of ‘Distance’; that action brings about the disjunction of the object from space; and from the apekṣābuddhi follows the quality of ‘Distance,’ all this occupying one point of time. Then there arises the idea of ‘commonality’; then we have the destruction of the Conjunction of the object and space; and then at the time that there arises the notion of the quality, we have the destruction of the quality (of ‘Distance’) following from the destruction of the Conjunction of the object and space.

Question: “How does the destruction of the qualities in question follow from the destruction of the substance?”

Answer: When an action appears in that part of the substance which is the substratum of the quality of ‘Distance,’ at the very time that this action brings about the disjunction of that part from other parts of the substance, there appears also apekṣābuddhi; and at the time that Conjunction is destroyed by that disjunction, we have the appearance also of ‘Distance’; and then from the destruction of the Conjunction (of its particles) there follows the destruction of the substance; and from the destruction of the substance follows the destruction of the quality (of ‘Distance’) inhering in it.

Question: “How does the destruction of the quality follow simultaneously from, the destructions of the substance and the apekṣābuddhi?”

Answer: When an action appears in that part of the substance which is the substratum, of ‘Distance,’ at that same time apekṣābuddi is produced; the action brings about the disjunction of that part from the other parts; and then we have the appearance of the quality of ‘Distance’;—all this occupying one point of time. Then, at the time that we have the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance following from the disjunction of the.particle there appears the notion of the commonality (of ‘Distance’), and after that from the destruction of Conjunction follows the destruction of the substance; and from the notion of ‘commonality’ follows the destruction of apekṣābuddhi,—all this occupying one point of time. And then from the destruction of the substance and the apekṣābuddhi follows the destruction of the quality of ‘Distance.’

Question: “How does the destruction of the quality follow from the destruction of the substance and Conjunction?”

Answer : When the action, produced in that part of the substance which is the substratum of ‘Distance,’ brings about the disjunction of that part from the other parts of the substance, at that same time there is a simultaneous production of the action of the mass and the Apekṣābuddhi; and then at the time that the quality of ‘Distance’ appears, we have the destruction of the cohesive Conjunction of the substance following from the disjunction of the particles; and the action of the mass brings about the disjunction of it from the mass of space,—all this forming one point (f time: and then, at the time that the idea of ‘commonality’. appears, the mass is destroyed on account of the destruction of the cohesive conjunction of the substance; and from the destruction of the mass follows destruction of the conjunction of the mass; and then simultaneously with the notion of ‘quality,’ we have the destruction of the quality of ‘Distance’ following from the destruction of the conjunction of the mass of substance from the mass of space.

Question: “How does the destruction of the quality follow from the simultaneous destruction of Conjunction and the apekṣābudhhi?”

Answer: When the quality of ‘Distance’ is produced, and then an action in the substance wherein that quality inheres,—then at the time that there appears the notion of the commonality ‘Distance’ the action of the object (wherein ‘Distance’ inheres) brings about its disjunction from space; and then from the notion of commonality follows the destruction of apekṣābuddhi; and the disjunction (of the object and space) brings about the destruction of the conjunction of space and the object—all this forming one point of time. Then from the destruction of the Conjunction and apekṣābuddhi follows the destruction of the quality of ‘Distance.’

Question: “How does the destruction of the quality follow from the simultaneous destruction of its three kinds of causes—the material, the non-material and the efficient?”

Answer: When apekṣābuddhi appears, there follows action in a part of the mass; and then at the time that the action brings about the disjunction of that part from, another part, and we have the appearance of apekṣābuddhi and the quality of ‘Distance,’—at that same time there is an action in the mass; and then the disjunction of the parts brings about the destruction of the cohesive conjunction of the mass; and the action of the mass brings about the disjunction of mass and space, and also the notion of the commonality,—all this forming one point of time. Then the destruction of Conjunction brings about the destruction of the mass; and the disjunction brings about the destruction of the conjunction between space and the mass; and from the notion of commonality follows the destruction of apekṣābuddhi,—a nd thus have we the destruction of the quality of ‘Distance’ following from the simultaneous destruction of its three causes, material, non-material and efficient.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

‘Distance’ forms the basis of the use of the word ‘Distant,’ as also of the idea of ‘distance’; and so also with ‘Proximity.’ The effects of the two are mentioned as evidences of their existence. Though Ākāśa and the conjunction of Ākāśa with the throat, &c., are the cause of the use (utterance) of the words ‘distant’ and ‘near,’—and so also the contact of the soul with the mind is the cause of the idea,—yet the existence of causes other than these is indicated by their peculiarities. That is to say, the causes mentioned are common to all utterance, and all idea, hence for the particular utterance of the words question, and also for the particular ideas of them, there must be more specified causes, as without special causes no special effects would be possible.

The two qualities are put together, because they are dependent upon each other; they are relative qualities.

They are each of two kinds, due to Time and Space. The latter is due to the contact, of the inass of substance with particular points in Space, and the former to the contact of the mass with points in Time. These differences are evidenced by the effects they bring about. The ‘Distance’ due to space produces ideas of distance in space, and the ‘Proximity’ produces those of nearness in space; and similarly ‘Distance’ and ‘Proximity’ due to Time give rise to ideas of distance and proximity in time.

The author proceeds to explain the process of the origination of the quality of ‘Distance’ due to Space.

There is no idea of ‘distant’ or ‘near’ when the two things are on two different sides of the person; hence the author says—‘existing on the same side’—meaning that both of them should be either to the east of him or to the west. In such cases we find that one person is in contact with one point of the earth, this latter is in contact with another point; and that with another; and so on and on, till one of the objects is reached; and so on to the other. Thus then, the number of such contacts with reference to the latter object being more than that of those with regard to the other, when we take the nearer object as the standard, there arises in our mind, an idea of remoteness with reference to the object in regard to which the number of contacts is greater; and it is this object which is to be the substratum of the quality of ‘Distance’ to be produced later. And, on the basis of this idea of remoteness (as the efficient cause), there arises the quality of ‘Distance,’ in the object which is its ‘material’ cause, out of the non-material cause in the shape of the Conjunction with the point in space which has the larger number of the aforesaid contacts. And when we take for the standard the object remote from the observer, the number of contacts with regard whereto is greater, then there arises the idea of ‘nearness’ with regard to the object in connection with which the number of contacts is smaller; and on the basis of this idea of nearness as the efficient cause, there arise, from the non-material cause in the shape of the conjunction with the point in space in connection wherewith the number of contacts is smaller, the quality of ‘Proximity’ in its material cause, the object which is nearer to the observer.

Objection; “The notions of nearness and remoteness being relative, the one depending upon the other, there would be a negation of both.”

Reply: Not so; because we do not admit of any such necessary relativity, as that the notion of one thing as remote is always preceded by that of another as near, or vice versa; what happens is that the notion of remoteness arises on the ascertainment of the fact of the number of place-contacts being greater than in the case of another object; and similarly the notion of nearness arises on the ascertainment of the fact of the number of place-contacts being smaller than in the case of another object; and thus there is no actual interdependence between the two notions.

The production of the two qualities due to Space having been explained, the author proceeds io describe that of those due to Time. Of two things existing at the present time &c. If one or both of the objects did not exist at the time, no ‘Distance’ or ‘Proximity’ would be possible; and hence this specification. Occupying any points in space,—i.e. existing either on the same side or on different sides of the observer. When two persons, one young and another old, are, under the above conditions, observed, and in one of them are found such marks as the growing beard, &c., which are indicative of greater extent of time,—the observer taking for his standard the man in whom the absence of these marks indicates the fact of his having passed through a lesser extent of time, has the notion of remoteness of time with regard to the person with the beard, &c., and on the basis of this notion (as the efficient cause), from the non-material cause in the shape of the conjunction with the point in time which has been in contact with a larger number of the revolutions of the sun, there arises the quality of ‘Distance,’ in that older man who is thus the material cause. Similarly taking the older man as the standard, there arises the notion of nearness with regard to the younger person; and on the basis of this notion, from the non-material cause in the shape of the conjunction with the point of time, which has been in contact with a lesser number of the sun’s revolutions, there arises the quality of ‘Proximity’ in the younger person, who is its material cause.

The greater or less number of contacts with the points of time, in the older and the younger person, is with reference to the series of changes that their bodies are undergoing every moment; and not with reference to them as individual personalities; as the personalities are undergoing changes every moment, and as such could not be regarded as having any contact with more than one point of time

Anything that is brought about by a cause must be liable to destruction; and there could be no destruction without a cause; hence the author proceeds to describe the cause of the destruction of the qualities of ‘Distance’ and ‘Proximity.’—The destruction of these follows from the following seven causes—(1) the destruction of apekṣābuddhi, (2) the destruction of conjunction, (3) the destruction of the substances, (4) the destruction of the substance and apekṣābuddhi, (5) the destruction of the substance and conjunction (6) the destruction of Conjunction and apékkṣābudhhi and (7) the destruction of apekṣābuddhi, conjunction and substance.

(1) To explain the destraction of ‘Distance’ and ‘Proximity’ due to (1). ‘Distance’ having been produced &c. In ‘tataḥ’ the affix ‘tasil’ is used in the sense of the Locative. At this time the apekṣābuddhi becomes ‘liable to destruction’—i.e. comes into touch with its destructive cause. The notion of the quality of ‘Distance’ arises from the community of ‘distance,’ the cognition of this commonality, and the relationship of the quality of ‘distance,’—all this making up one point of time. The notion of the commonality of ‘distance’ is the cause of the destruction of Apekṣābuddhi, and also of the production of the notion of ‘quality’; and hence it is that as soon as it is produced the apekṣābuddhi becomes liable to destruction; then at the moment we have the destruction of apekṣābuddhi, and also the production of the notion of ‘quality’; and from this destruction of apekṣābuddhi the quality becomes liable to destruction. From the quality, the cognition of the quality, and its relationships, the notion of substances becomes liable to production, and this constitutes one point of time. The destruction of apekṣābuddhi is the cause of the destruction, of the quality; and the cognition of ‘quality’ is the cause of the cognition of ‘substance.’ The destruction of apekṣābuddhi and the production of the cognition of ‘quality’ are simultaneous; thence the destructibility of quality and the producibility of the conjunction of substance would also be simultaneous; and then there is the production of the notion of the substances as qualified by the quality of ‘Distance,’ and the destruction of the quality itself.

(2) The destruction due to the destruction of- Conjunction is next described:—Simultaneously with the apekṣābuddhi, there appears an action in the object wheṛein the quality of ‘distance’ inheres; and at the next moment, that action brings about the disjunction of space and that object; and then there appears the apekṣābuddhi and the quality of ‘distance,’—this occupying one point of time. This quality having been thus produced, we have the appearance of the notion of the commonality of ‘Distance;’ and from the aforesaid disjunction there fallows the destruction of the Conjunction of Space and the object:—all this occupying one point of time. Hence at the time that there appears the notion of ‘quality’ from the notion of ‘commonality,’ at that same time we have the destruction of the quality of ‘Distance’ following from the destruction of the conjunction of space and the object, and not from apekṣābuddhi; as this latter also is destroyed at that very time.

(3) The destruction of the qualities by the destruction of the substance is next described:—The ‘substance’ or ‘object’ is the substratum of the forthcoming quality of ‘Distance;’ when in a part of this there arises an action, which brings about its disjunction from another part,—at that same time there appears apekṣābuddhi; and at the time that the disjunction brings about the destruction of the cohesive conjunction of the object, the apekṣābuddhi. brings about the quality of ‘Distance;’ and then from the destruction of Conjunction we have the destruction of the object; and from that the destruction of the quality inhering in it; and that same time we have the destruction of apekṣābuddhi following from the notion of the commonality of ‘Distance’; the destruction of the substratum (i.e. the object) brings about the destruction of the C injunction of Space and the object; and hence these two cannot be the cause of the destruction of the quality in question; as they are concomitant; and coeval with it.

(4) The destruction of the substance and apekṣābuddhi is accepted the cause of the destruction of the quality of ‘Distance;’ as each of these has been found to bring about its destruction elsewhere, and in the particular case cited, as we cannot very well determine to which one of the two the destruction is due, we attribute it to both.

(5) In this case the destruction of apekṣābuddhi cannot be regarded as the cause; as it is only at that very time that it is possible for its destruction to be brought about by the notion of ‘commonality.’

(6) As at this time the substance is not destroyed, its destruction cannot be regarded as the cause.

(7) The substance is the ‘material’ cause; the Conjunction is the ‘non-material’ cause, and the apekṣābuddhi is the ‘efficient’ cause.^[1] All the process herein mentioned come about simultaneously because of the simultaneity of the causal operation that brings them about. And thus it is that the destruction of the three causes brings about the destruction of the quality of ‘Distance.’

All that has been said with regard to the destruction of ‘Distance’ applies equally to the case of the destruction of the quality of ‘Proximity’ also.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The commentary has a long extract from the text here.