Text 3-4

Having understood the fact of the knowledge of the six categories being the means of the accomplishment of the desirable end of man, the disciple puts the following question, in order to know the difference among the six categories themselves:—

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 3:

अथ के द्रव्यादयः पदार्थाः किं च तेषां साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं चेति ॥
तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि सामान्यविशेषसंज्ञयोक्तानि नवैवेति । तद्व्यतिरेकेणान्यस्य संज्ञानभिधानात् ॥ ३ ॥

atha ke dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ kiṃ ca teṣāṃ sādharmyaṃ vaidharmyaṃ ceti ||
tatra dravyāṇi pṛthivyaptejovāyvākāśakāladigātmamanāṃsi sāmānyaviśeṣasaṃjñayoktāni navaiveti | tadvyatirekeṇānyasya saṃjñānabhidhānāt || 3 ||

Text (3) Question:—“Which are the categories, ‘substance and the rest’? And what are their ‘similarities and dissimilarities’?”

Answer:—Among these the Substances are—Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether (Ākāśa), Time, Space, Self and Mind. These, mentioned in the sūtra by their general as well as specific names, are nine only; as besides these none other is mentioned by name.—(I-i-5).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

“Which are the categories &c.”—i.e. which are the substances, which the properties, which the actions, and so forth. And in as much as the cognition of the object does not necessarily include the cognition of its qualifications, the further question is added—“What are their similarities &c.” Herein also the particle ‘ca’ has the collective force.

The Text supplies the answer to these questions: Among these—i.e. among substance and the rest—the substances, Earth and the rest, have been mentioned by the sūtra, by their general name of ‘Substance,’ as well as by their specific names, ‘Earth,’ ‘Water,’ &c.

Then there arises the question as to whether these are the only substances, or there are others also; and the Text declares that they are nine only.

Objection:—“The very fact of only nine substances being defined would have shown clearly that there are only nine substances; and hence the addition of ‘nine only,’ appears quite superfluous.”

Reply:—It is not so; as even though only nine would be defined, yet-there would remain the doubt as to whether the omission of others was due to the fact of there being no others, Of to that of their being of no use (though existing). Specially as all that the definition does is to aid ordinary usage by the differentiation of the like from the unlike, and as such it could not establish the non-existence of anything (besides the nine substances): it is for this reason that we have the text restricting the number of substances to ‘nine only.’

This specific mention of things that have been once mentioned by means of a generic term is what in other systems is called ‘Vibhāga’ (Division), or ‘Nirdeśa’ (Indication).

Question.—“How is it known that there are only nine Substances?”

Answer.—As besides these none other is mentioned by name.—That is to say, besides these nine, the great Ṛṣi, Kaṇāda, who was giving out his teaching with regard to all things, has not mentioned (in his Sūtra) the name of any other.

Objection:—‘There is a distinct substance in the shape of Darkness (Tamas), which is endowed with the qualities of colour, number, dimension, isolation, distance, proximity, conjunction and disjunction.”

To this some people make the following reply:—“If Darkness were a substance, then a person walking in the dark would be obstructed by it; as a substance that has colour and form can never be devoid of touch; and a substance, that is large and is endowed with touch is sure of offering an obstruction. Then again, just as in the case of the Earth-globe, people are cognisant of its constituent parts, so should they also be of those of Darkness.”

This answer is not quite satisfactory; because in the case of the light emitted by a lamp, we find that when certain rays of light are thrown out from it, they give rise, through the force of a certain unseen force, to an unimpeded circle of diffused light, whose constituent parts are not perceived, and which is not perceptible to the touch; and in the same manner would the substance of Darkness be constituted by the atoms of Darkness (and would not be tangible).

For this reason, we offer another reply to the above argument (in favour of Darkness as a distinct substance): Are the atoms of Darkness endowed with touch, or devoid of it? They cannot be regarded as endowed with it, as we never come across any such products of it as would be perceptible by touch. It night be argued that the said atoms do not produce any such substances, because of the absence of an unseen force tending towards such production. But, in that case, it would be equally reasonable to accept Air to have colour; the absence of coloured products of it being explained as being due to the absence of the action of an unseen force favouring such production. Or, we might even assume ail the four effects (Earth, Water, Air and Light) to be produced from a single atom, through the peculiar actions of the unseen force.

It might be argued that, “the existence of atoms is inferable only form their products; and as such being inferred I from them, they cannot differ from these products; specially as there would be no reasonable ground for admitting of such difference.”

But in that case, the atoms of Darkness also being devoid of touch, how could they produce any such substance as Darkness? as it is a fact of common experience that that which is without touch never produces any substances.

Objection:—“When we come across an effect, we naturally assume the existence of a homogenous cause; and it is not right to upset or deny the character of the product to that which is actually seen, simply because of some discrepancy in the nature of its cause.”

Reply:—We do not deny the existence of Darkness; all that we assert is that, in as much as we do not find any productive cause for Darkness as a substance, and as all that we actually see in Darkness is mere blackness, it cannot be regarded as a substance.

Objection: “In that case, Darkness would be cognised as mere absence of light.”

Reply: Not so; because any such mere absence of light could never appear as black, endowed with the positive quality of black colour; while as a matter of fact, even at mid-day we see darkness as black and moving and pervading over things. Then again, in the case of all perception of negation (or absence), we find that it is perceived only when its counterentity is perceived, and then too, through the negation of its contrary, and as qualifying something connected with that counter-entity; and no absence is ever cognised independently by itself. In the case of Darkness on the other hand, we find that at the time that it is cognised, there is no cognition of anything else as its counter-entity; nor is its cognition in the form of a negation. Consequently it cannot be regarded as the mere absence of light.

Nor can its perception be regarded as one of light only; as it is always outwardly cognised as ‘darkness’ and ‘shadow’, and black in colour (which can never apply to light which is by its very nature white). For these reasons, we must regard darkness as a particular colour (or form) which pervades on all sides, when there is no light. And during the day too, the blackness that is perceived is that enclosed above the eye-ball—as we shall explain later on.

In a case where the absence of light occupies a fixed position, the blackness attaching to that place is cognised as ‘shadow.’ It is for this reason that we have ideas of long, skort, large and small with reference to shadows; as that which is cognised is the blackness extending over the place (and as such capable of being spoken of as ‘long’ &c.)

In case darkness be regarded as mere absence (of light), it would be impossible to explain the application of such positive epithets with regard to it. It is with a view to this that we Lave the declaration—“Experienced people do not regard darkness as mere absence of light; specially as the Purāṇas have spoken of the blackness of shadow, as a qualification of the earth. Then again, in regard to shadows, we find that it follows in the wake of the body (casting the shadow), and appears as distant and near large and small, moving and standing,—all which would not be possible unless it were a positive entity.” It would also be difficult to explain the fact of the shadow being mistaken as a black snake; and so also would be the notion of ‘moving’, which is caused by the cognition of colour; in places where there happens to be an absence of light, the idea of motion is due to the moving of the substance that shuts off the light (and casts the shadow).

Similarly the ideas of Distance, Proximity, &c. in connection with Darkness may he explained away (without necessitating the assumption of an independent substance).

In this perception of Darkness, which is a particular form manifested by the absence of light, the perceptive potency must be regarded as resting in the eye independent of the action of any external light; as such perception is always found to be concomitant with such an organ; just in the same way as you regard the. absence of light as the cause (of the perception of Darkness).

Objection: “Such a theory would be contrary to the Sūtra which declares that darkness must be regarded as the absence of light, because of the difference in the manifestation of its substance, quality and action”

Reply: There is no contradiction; as Darkness has been spoken of (in the Sūtra) as the ‘absence of light’ simply because it is only in the absence of light that it is perceived.

(Mere difference in the number of qualities cannot justify the admission of darkness as a distinct substance by itself; as) God also being endowed with buddhi, is accepted as ‘self’; and the self with six qualities (i.e the supreme Self) is not regarded as wholly distinct from the self with fourteen qualities (i.e. the human self); as any such distinction would be unreasonable in view of the released human self (which having become merged in the supreme Self has only six qualities).

Notes.

Kumārila and his followers maintain Darkness (Tamas) to be a distinct substance. They argue that the most general and accurate differentia of Substances is that they are endowed with some properties and have some sort of action; and this definition applies to Darkness, which being black has the distinct quality of colour, and mores, thus having a definite action. It cannot be included in any of the nine substances accepted by the Vaiśeṣika. Vaiśeṣika writers in general regard Darkness as mere absence of light, and base their rejection of the Mīmāṃsaka theory on the ground that if Darkness had any real colour it would require Light for its manifestation. This objection though very plausible on the surface loses its force when we come to look into the matter a little deeper, and find that no Darkness can be perceived unless there is light somewhere to set it off. But it is true that the Eye does not need the aid of light in the perception of darkness. That is the reason why our Commentator has declared it to be a positive quality, perceptible by the eye independently of the aid of light. The Prabhākaras bold that Darkness is the absence of the knowledge of light. Some extremists have gone to the length of denying Light as a substance and holding it to be an absence of Darkness, which latter they accept as a substance. Some people have put forward śakti ‘Force’ as a distinct substance (Vide Nyāyamuktāvalī).