6.1. Object of Perception

Diṅnāga maintains that an extreme particular is the object of perception. It is beyond our thoughts. It cannot be characterized by the categories of understanding such as name, action, universal etc. These categories can only be applied to images which are generalised of inferential knowledge. It is away the reach of space and time. It shows first moment. It is unique. It can be cognized only by the senses. It is the transcendental reality and is the reason of our imagination. It provides ground to all our empirical knowledge. It has no adjuncts and is indescribable. According to Dharmakīrti, in a perceptual cognition the perceiver perceives the reality which is “essence in itself” and is free from imagination. It is possible only when the senses of the perceiver are fixed on a specific point, and all the other processes have discontinued. After the cognition of this reality, the imaginative process incites and does categorization on the basis what has been apprehender previously. After that it is followed by conception immediately. Śāntarakṣita says a “unique particular” is the object of perception. It is away from the reach of imagination.

The Abhidharmasūtra also promotes the idea of the essences in themselves.

“A man, who is absorbed in the contemplation of a patch of blue, perceives the blue but he does not know that it is blue; of the object he then knows only object it is”.^[1]

While on the other hand the universal is a generalized image a mere thought-construction, thus it cannot be cognized by the senses. It needs inference as its basis.

Meaning of the Particular

Dharmakīrti explains “particular” as something whose mental picture depends on its nearness and remoteness.^[2] It is the object of cognition which generates a clear flash of consciousness when it is near to the object and a dim one when it is far from the object. All external things are apprehended vividly when at hand and dimly when at a distance. All external things apprehended dimly. This “particular” does not need universal to prove its existence. The particular “fire” does not need of a universal “fire” to prove its existence that “it is fire”. A thing is itself exclusive by nature. Whenever we perceive a particular thing like “fire”, we perceive it as it is different from all the homogenous and heterogeneous things, and as in this cognition we perceive one particular thing with a particular form, which is different from all other things, it naturally shows that “it is fire”.

An important question arises: “Is the reality which appears vivid when at hand and dims when at a distance, reality at all? Does it not have two forms (a dim one and a bright one)? How can it be regarded as unique?”^[3] The author of Tippaṇī maintains that the dim or clear picture of an object for instance of “blue colour”, is not itself ultimate reality. The “essence in itself” is that factor in the cognition of dimness or vividness which is the cause of these two effects.^[4] It is the power which has potency of producing the effect that it is the reality. Our mental pictures created by unique particular are the ground of vividness or dimness. For instance: fire. There is a general concept of “fire”. We cannot believe that all fire is real. The fire which has potency of burning and cooking can call real fire.

Dharmakīrti talks about the “particular” in various senses. Firstly, particular is the “existence as such” (sanmātram). It cannot be divided into the classes of subject and object, “apprehender” and “being apprehended”. Secondly, it is used in the original sense of the particular, the pure ālambana devoid of all mental constructions but not beyond the conception of “apprehender and being apprehended”. According to him, every svalakṣaṇa has arthakriyāsāmarthya (the capacity to perform action). Thirdly, it is used in the sense of every concrete and particular object, because its basis is the svalakṣaṇa, the essence-in-itself.

Indian realists also used the term “viśeṣa” but it is completely different from the viśeṣa or sva-lakṣaṇa of the Buddhist. The realists have used this word in various senses. Firstly, it is indicated as a part of seven categories. An objective reality is a part of it. Secondly, it is indicated as a part of an object along with the universal. An object is considered to have both universal and particular attributes. Uddyotakara maintains that there are three types of objects-sāmānya, viśeṣa and object having both of them. Thirdly, it is indicated as an “individual” in which a universal inheres. For instance: in an individual cow, the universal “cowness” exists. Fourthly, sometimes the word “viśeṣa” is used to denote universals other than sattā i.e. dravyatva etc. As maintained by Praśastapāda, “the universals dravyatva etc. are called primarily sāmānyas inasmuch as they have many individuals, but they are called “viśeṣas” in a secondary sense because they differentiate their substrata from others”.^[5] Lastly, the word “viśeṣa” indicates a special quality of an atom which makes it different from all other atoms.

Diṅnāga explanation of svalakṣaṇa (which means of its own kind) indicates a completely different meaning. Relative terms like a universal and an individual cannot be a part of it as these terms are creation of our language. It cannot be a quality of an object like blueness nor can it be object itself like a table. It is not only devoid of all attributes but also devoid of duration i.e. time and space. It is unique in the sense that everything else in the world is different from it. Being non-durable it is shorn from all other reality of time and of space.^[6] It may simply define as “kṣaṇa” or moment. It is having nothing common with other things as it unique, non-relatable, and selfcharacterised real. It is occurring incessantly under the wheel of pratītyasamutpāda, which is experienced by senses directly. Diṅnāga emphasised on the concept of “particularity” as in the old Vaiśeṣika School did. It may be believed that “the theory of Diṅnāga may perhaps have been partly influenced in its logical aspect by some views entertained in the school of Vaiśeṣikas”.^[7] But this is not the case in real. It was Diṅnāga who first brought difference between the particular and the universal decided the realm of their apprehension. It is Diṅnāga who accepted that there are only means of knowledge, the perception and the inference. To apprehend sva-lakṣaṇa can be done only through perception while sāmānya-lakṣaṇa is apprehended by the inference.^[8]

Particulars as the Object of Perception

Here a question can be arised why the objects of perception are “particulars” alone? The particular has the potency to cause the manifestation of mental picture that is why it is considered as the object of perception. Thus, whatever has potential of evoking mental image is the object of perception. If we receive images from universal objects, they must also be regarded as objects of perception. But this is not the case because “universals” are not capable of evoking pictures. They are themselves mental-constructions. They are associated with words. They are neither existent nor efficient. They are not apprehended at the time of perception and at next level they are constructed by our intellect, the reality being momentary has already disappeared, so they cannot be considered as objects of perception? Further, there are situations when due to defects in sense organs one may have reflexes which are not real, e.g. the illusion of water in desert (mirage). Hence, one cannot say all particular are the object of perception but only that particular which has the potency of generating an effect, and which is compatible with daily human experience. For instance: water is real if it satisfies one’s thirst.

The next question with regard to the particular is why it alone is the ultimate reality? Buddhist replies thus:

Firstly, the universal or the general are non-existent and are not able to produce desired result, so one cannot arise question for its reality. The only option is the particular which serves the purpose and it is the only reality. Secondly, a thing is call real when it is able to produce an effect. If a thing does not fulfil the criterion of “efficiency” it cannot be called real. Only particular is efficient to generate the effect which is desired, so it is real. Thirdly, existent objects have direction of all our purposive actions towards itself. Only particular alone is existent so it is regarded as real.^[9]

Criticism of Sva-lakṣaṇas by Other System of Thoughts

The Buddhist theory of sva-lakṣaṇas is the objects of perception or indeterminate perception has faced much criticism from other system of thoughts i.e. Advaitins,

Naiyāyikas, and Vaiśeṣikas. They have established their own theories regarding objects of indeterminate perception which can be divided into four categories. According to first category, “pure being” (sanmātram) is the object of indeterminate perception. It is “summum genus”.^[10] According to second category, “universal” or sāmanya is the object of perception. According to third category, “vyakti” or “individual” is the object of perception. It is substratum of particulars and universals. According to the last category, “particulars” and “universals” are the objects of indeterminate perception though they both are not related to one another.

In order to solve this problem one needs to examine theories one by one. The first category that says “pure being” is the object of indeterminate perception is maintained by Advaitins. They hold that the objects of perception are not particulars because its knowledge relies on the cognition of its difference from other particulars. This difference is made by understanding and not by perception. Thus, particulars cannot be objects of perception. Further, universal also cannot be objects of perception because they are also made by understanding with the help of common qualities of different particulars. Thus, indeterminate perception does not apprehend particular nor universals. It is “pure being” or “existence” that apprehended by indeterminate perception.

This view of Advaitins refused by realists who believe that only “existence” can never be the object of indeterminate perception as there is a different awareness of particulars in it. Here a question can arise how can its particular be apprehended when indeterminate perception perceived the only being? The existence of an object can never be apprehended except its different particular characters. The Jainas tries to explain universal as the object of perception. The Jainas universal is different from the great universal of Advaitins which is one. The Jainas maintain that universals are many and they are regarded as the object of indeterminate perception. A scholar of Digaṃbar School, Sumati hold that particular is perceived only with the help of universals i.e. “being” etc and is not perceived otherwise. Thus a quality of the universal substantive is the particular. The universal substantive has the potency of being perceived independently. Hence, the universal is the object of non-verbal perception.^[11]

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that Sumati’s view is unholdable. There is distinction between the universal and the particular in indeterminate perception. Thus the universal being different from particulars cannot be the object of indeterminate perception. If one believes that the particular and the universal are not separated and this universal is considered as the object of indeterminate perception, it is not universal. Again, if universal and particular both are not separated, then there is no dualism between them. Thus, neither universal nor particular are the object of indeterminate perception.

According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, an individual or “vyakti” is the object of perception. It is the basis of its generic and specific characters. It is the first awareness of an object which becomes the ground for the objective consciousness that arises afterwards. This awareness is same as the awareness of an infant and a dumb. It has no name. Here one is not conscious about its characters i.e. generic and specific because at this time many things are not there which make it different from other things. The “individual” is a concrete universal.

Kumārila’s view that both the particular and the universal are the characters of the object of indeterminate perception is unholdable. It is wrong to hold that same cognition should perceive the particular individuality as well as the universal. Because the cognition can be either conceptual or non-conceptual.^[12] If cognition is conceptual, it cannot perceive the specific individuality, while if it is “non-conceptual” there is no apprehension of the universal. Further, Kumārila himself holds that the universal is not separable from the individual. If this is the case, the universal cannot be regarded as the object of indeterminate perception which is an individual. Individuals do not pervade over one another, there is no pervasive entity which is there in perception. Thus, the universal cannot be regarded as the object of perception.

The fourth theory is hold by Mimāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. They believe that both the particular and the universal are the object of perception.^[13] The indeterminate perception apprehends the bare character of the particular and the universal (svarūpamātram). There is no difference between the particulars and the universals in this apprehension. It is neither relational nor differentiated cognition of the bare nature of an object. For instance: the perception of a “cow”. In indeterminate perception, both the particular “cow” and the universal cowhood, both parts of the object “cow” are apprehended. Their relation is not perceived at this time. It takes place later on when the processes start their function of constructing the reality into a united whole. In indeterminate perception, the object is experienced as “this is something” not the apprehension of their “what” characters but only it apprehends “this” or “that”.

The realists maintain that after an object of perception what we know about it is already there in the object itself. This is why the realists believe that perception includes both the particulars and the universals however they both are neither related nor differentiated.

Now, here the question can arise:

“If particulars and universals are unrelated and undifferentiated in indeterminate perception, how can they both be apprehended in it?”

Relation and differentiation are the basis of their dual presence, while indeterminate perception is neither relational nor differentiated. Thus, the object of indeterminate perception cannot be both i.e. the particular and the universal. The object of indeterminate perception is either particular or universal. Both cannot be the object of indeterminate perception. Therefore, the realist theory is not consistent. They maintain that indeterminate perception is neither relational nor differentiated and that its object comprises both universals and particulars. This is their inconsistency.

The Buddhist concept of sva-lakṣaṇas that it is the object of perception is a correct theory. Its criticism by Advaitins and realists is due to misunderstanding of the nature of svalakṣaṇas. The individuals or vyaktis of Kumārila is not svalakṣaṇas. They are not simply particulars but they are unique particulars and are not comparable. Selfrevealing sensations are particulars. It is different from the particulars of Nyāya, Vaiśesika and Mīmāṃsa. Their particulars can be categorised and related to understanding while svalakṣaṇas are not categorised. They are similar to sense data of Russell. “Knowledge by acquaintance” is perception and svalakṣaṇas are known by acquaintance. When one is directly aware of anything one have acquaintance. This awareness is without any process of inference. For instance: a table before me I am acquainted with the sensation that show the appearance of my table, e.g. its shape, hardness, colour etc. then one reach to the knowledge of the table which is a “knowledge of description”.

According to Russell,

“There is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the table. All our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths, and the actual thing which is the table is not strictly speaking known to us at all”.^[14]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit, vol. I, p.153.

[2]:

Yasyārthasya saṃnidhānāsaṃnidhānābhyāṃ jñāna-pratibhāsabhedas tatsvalakṣaṇam. Nyāya-bindu 1.13.

[3]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, vol. II, op. cit, p.35.

[4]:

Arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatād astunaḥ. Nyāyabindu 1.15.

[5]:

D.N. Shastri, op.cit, p.312.

[6]:

Ibid, p.343.

[7]:

Th. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., vol. I, p.479.

[8]:

Pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇaṃ hi dvilakṣaṇam. Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.2.

[9]:

C.L. Tripathi, op.cit, p. 151.

[10]:

J.N. Sinha, Indian Psychology: Perception, p. 30.

[11]:

C.L. Tripathi, op.cit, p.152.

[12]:

Vyaktayo nānuyantayanyad anuyāyi na bhāsate. Jñānādi-vyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaraṃ vrajet. Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjika, p.389.

[13]:

D. N. Shastri, op.cit, p.440.

[14]:

B. Russell, The Problem of Philosophy, pp.46-47.