Sūtra 2.17

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 2.17:

द्रष्टृदृश्ययोः संयोगो हेयहेतुः ॥ २.१७ ॥

draṣṭṛdṛśyayoḥ saṃyogo heyahetuḥ || 2.17 ||

draṣṭṛ—of the knower, dṛśyayoḥ—and of the knowable, saṃyogaḥ—conjunction. heya—of the avoidable pain. hetūḥ—the cause.

17. The Conjunction of the knower and the knowable is the cause of the avoidable pain.—68.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

The knower is the Puruṣa (the conscious principle) who cognizes the reflection from the Will-to-know by conjunction. The knowable consists of all the characteristics present in the essence of the Will-to-know. This then, the knowable behaves like a magnet. It is useful only when placed here. On account of its capacity of knowability, it becomes the possession of the lord, the Puruṣa, who is of the nature of the power of knowing. It becomes the object of the act of enjoyment, inasmuch as is although by nature independent, it becomes dependent upon another, existing as it does for fulfilling the object of that other. It is different in nature from the power of knowing (consciousness), but puts on that nature by taking it up from another. The eternal conjunction of the power of knowing and the capacity of being known, brought about by the purpose of existence, is the cause of the avoidable pain. And so it has been said:—‘The conjunction therewith is the cause; by giving that up is secured the complete remedy of pain, inasmuch as that is found to be the cause of the removal of the real thing, the cause of pain’. As, for example, the soles of the feet possess the capacity of being pierced, and the thorn possesses the power of piercing. The remedy consists in not putting the foot on the thorn, or putting it with a shoe on. Whoever in the world knows these three things, secures the remedy and does not suffer the pain caused by the prick. By what means? By the power of the three-fold knowledge.

And here, too, it is the quality of the disturbing motion (rajas) that brings about the pain; and it is the quality of the Essence (sattva) which is pained. Why? Because the act of pain must live in an object, and it can, therefore, live in the Objective Essence alone. It cannot live in the unchanging actionless knower of the field. Because consciousness (puruṣa) has the Objective Essence for its field it follows along the lines of the phenomena of the Essence, and when the Objective Essence is pained, the Puruṣa also is pained by reflex action.—68.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

The avoidable pain has been described. Its cause is now discussed. ‘The conjunction of the knower and the knowable is the cause of the avoidable pain.’

Now he describes the nature of the knower:—‘The knower, &c.’ The cognition by conjunction of the reflection from the Will-to-know (buddhi) is the same as the reflection of consciousness into the Will-to-know. This is present even in the Puruṣas who are indifferent (udāsina).

Well, but if this is all, it is the Will-to-know alone that can thus be visible to him, not sound, &c., which are not thus in contact with him (the Puruṣa). For this reason he says:—‘The knowable consists of all the characteristics of the Will-to-be.’ By means of the passage of the senses the Will-to-be transforms as sound, &c. Sound, &c., thus becomes the characteristics Of the knowable. This is the meaning. Well, but it is the Will-to-be that transforms as sound, &c., and thereby puts on these appearances. As to the Puruṣa however, the change takes place in him when his relation with the Will-to-be is perceived. If this relation is not recognized, how can sound, &c., be perceived even though they have entered the essence of the Will-to-be? The knowable cannot be cognized without being in contact with the power of consciousness. For this reason he says:—‘This then, the knowable behaves like, &c.’ We have discussed in the first chapter that the essence of the Will-to-be, being touched by consciousness, takes in the reflection of consciousness on account of its extreme purity, and being thus as it were transformed into consciousness cognizes sound, &c., in sequence. And it is for this reason. that the seer enjoying sound, &c., presented to it by the essence of the Will-to-be having transformed into the sound, &c., becomes the master, and the essence of the Will-to-be standing to it in that relation becomes its possession. This is the essence of the Will-to-be. which possessed of forms behaves as a magnet and becomes a possession of the Puruṣa, who is the lord, as the power of consciousness. Why? Because it becomes the object of the act of cognition in sequence. The cognition in sequence is the experience of the Puruṣa. This means the action of the Puruṣa with the object in view. Becoming the object thereof means becoming enjoyable. It is spoken of as his possession, because it becomes enjoyable by him.

The question again arises that the essence of the Will-to-be being self-illuminated, how can it be the object of cognition? For this reason he says ‘It is different in nature from, &c.’ The essence of the Will-to-be can be self-illuminating only, if it is reality of the nature of consciousness. Its nature, however, is different from that of consciousness, being as it is of the nature of the non-intelligent. It takes up the nature of consciousness by borrowing it from the other. It is for this reason an object of cognition.

The question now is that inasmuch as anything is said to be dependent upon another when something constituting it rests in that other, the Will-to-be cannot be dependent upon the Puruṣa, because nothing that belongs to the Will-to-be rests upon the Puruṣa, who is by nature indifferent. It further follows from this that the Puruṣa can have no action of his own. For this reason the author says:—‘Although independent by nature, it becomes dependent upon another, &c. The purpose of its existence being the fulfilment of the object of another, i.e., of the Puruṣa, it becomes dependent upon that other, i.e, the Puruṣa.

Well then this relation of the power of seeing and the capacity of being seen can either be innate or accidental. If it be innate, then both the related objects must always remain as such. The relation cannot cease to exist, because both of them are indestructible. The relation being thus impossible of cessation, there can never be an end of births and deaths. If it be incidental (naimittika), then because the afflictions, the actions and their potencies are the modifications of the internal organ, they can exist only when the internal organ exists. And the internal organ is brought into existence by means of them. Thus each comes to depend for its existence upon the existence of the other. Inasmuch as there cannot be this eternity of succession in the beginning of creation, the very setting in of evolution thus becomes impossible, and in fact non-existent. And so it has been said:—“Action is brought about by the ‘qualities’ even according to those who believe that the Puruṣa is not the actor. But how can that be brought about? Karma does not exist then? Nor is there untrue knowledge, nor attachment, nor aversion, &c. Nor is the mind born then, nor can any mental modifications exist at all in the case of any one.” To remove this doubt the autlfor says:—‘The eternal conjunction of the power of knowing and the capacity of being known, brought about by the purpose of existence, &c.’

True, the relation is not innate; it is incidental. And although it is thus incidental, it has no beginning, because its existence has been caused by an eternal cause. And this succession of afflictions, actions and potencies is eternal. In each creation they become merged into the Prakṛti together with the internal organ, and manifest again in the beginning of another creation in the same state in which, they were before. The illustration has been mentioned more than oncé before of how certain creatures of the earth are reduced to earth on the cessation of the rains, but come back to life again when the rains return.

Nescience is the cause of the conjunction by antecedence. The fulfilment of the object of the Puruṣa is the cause of keeping it on. It is by virtue of that that the conjunction lasts. For this reason is it said to have been caused by the purpose of the Puruṣa.

“And so it has been said” by Pañcaśikhā:—‘Conjunction with that’ means the conjunction with the Will-to-be (buddhi). It is this conjunction which is the cause of pain. By the cessation of that is secured the absolute remedy of pain. It is implied that pain lives on as long as the conjunction does not cease. The author repeats a well known illustration of the same:—‘As the soles of the feet, &c.’

Well let that be so. But when it is said that the conjunction with the ‘qualities’ is the cause of pain, it becomes admitted that the ‘qualities’ are the pain-givers. Further the action of the verb ‘to pain’ does not terminate in the actor alone, like that of the verb ‘Is’ and others of the same class. There must be another object in its case which is pained. The Puruṣa cannot be the object in which this pain may reside, because the Puruṣa being immutable it cannot possess the nature of being affected by the fruit of action. Therefore, it being necessary for pain that there should be something pained, we infer its non-existence when no object of pain exists, just as we see that no smoke exists when there is no fire. For this reason the author says:—“And here too the quality of essentiality is pained, &c.” It is the qualities which are either the pain-givers or the pained. Of these the Sattva being delicate like the soles of the feet, is pained; the Rajas being sharp is the pain-giver.

The author now puts a question “Why is it the Sattva alone that is pained? and not the Puruṣa.” The answer is:—“On account of the action of pain, &c.”

Well, then, does not the Puruṣa get pain? And further if it is only the non-intelligent Sattva that is pained, what loss is thereby caused to us? For this reason he says:—‘The Puruṣa is pained by reflex action.’—17.