Text 119

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 119:

अनुमेयत्वेनोद्दिष्टे चानिश्चिते च परेषां निश्चयापादनार्थं प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं प्रप्त्याम्नायः । प्रतिपाद्यत्वेनोद्दिष्टे चानिश्चिते च परेषां हेत्वादिभिरवयवैराहितशक्तीनां परिसमाप्तेन वाक्येन निश्चयापादनार्थं प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं प्रत्यामनायः । तस्माद् द्रव्यम् एवेति  । न ह्येतस्मिन् न सति परेषाम् अवयवानां समस्तानां व्यस्तानां वा तदर्थवाचकत्वम् अस्ति गम्यमानार्थत्वाद् इति चेन् न अतिप्रसङ्गात् । तथाहि प्रतिज्ञानन्तरं हेतुमात्राभिधानं कर्तव्यं विदुषामन्वयव्यतिरेकस्मरणात् तदर्थावगतिर्भविष्यतीति तस्माद् अत्रैवार्थपरिसमाप्तिः । कथम् अनित्यः शब्द इत्यनेनानिश्चितानित्यत्वमात्रविशिष्टः शब्दः कथ्यते प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वाद् इत्यनेनानित्यत्वसाधनधर्ममात्रम् अभिधीयते । इह यत् प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकं तदनित्यं दृष्टं यथा घट इत्यनेन साध्यसामान्येन साधनसामान्यस्यानुगाममात्रम् उच्यते । नित्यम् अप्रयत्नानन्तरीयकं दृष्टं यथाकाशम् इत्यनेन साध्याभावेन साधनस्यासत्त्वं प्रदर्श्यते । तथा च प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकः शब्दो दृष्टो न च तथाकाशवद् अप्रयत्नानन्तरीयकः शब्द इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां दृष्टसामर्थ्यस्य साधनसामान्यस्य शब्देऽनुसन्धानं गम्यते तस्माद् अनित्यः शब्द त्यनेनानित्य एव शब्द इति प्रतिपिपादयिषितार्थपरिसमाप्तिर्गम्यते तस्मात् पञ्चावयवेनैव वाक्येन परेषां स्वनिश्चितार्थप्र्तिपादनं क्रियते इत्येतत् परार्थानुमानं सिद्धम् इति ॥ ११९ ॥

anumeyatvenoddiṣṭe cāniścite ca pareṣāṃ niścayāpādanārthaṃ pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṃ praptyāmnāyaḥ | pratipādyatvenoddiṣṭe cāniścite ca pareṣāṃ hetvādibhiravayavairāhitaśaktīnāṃ parisamāptena vākyena niścayāpādanārthaṃ pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṃ pratyāmanāyaḥ | tasmād dravyam eveti | na hyetasmin na sati pareṣām avayavānāṃ samastānāṃ vyastānāṃ vā tadarthavācakatvam asti gamyamānārthatvād iti cen na atiprasaṅgāt | tathāhi pratijñānantaraṃ hetumātrābhidhānaṃ kartavyaṃ viduṣāmanvayavyatirekasmaraṇāt tadarthāvagatirbhaviṣyatīti tasmād atraivārthaparisamāptiḥ | katham anityaḥ śabda ityanenāniścitānityatvamātraviśiṣṭaḥ śabdaḥ kathyate prayatnānantarīyakatvād ityanenānityatvasādhanadharmamātram abhidhīyate | iha yat prayatnānantarīyakaṃ tadanityaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathā ghaṭa ityanena sādhyasāmānyena sādhanasāmānyasyānugāmamātram ucyate | nityam aprayatnānantarīyakaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathākāśam ityanena sādhyābhāvena sādhanasyāsattvaṃ pradarśyate | tathā ca prayatnānantarīyakaḥ śabdo dṛṣṭo na ca tathākāśavad aprayatnānantarīyakaḥ śabda ityanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ dṛṣṭasāmarthyasya sādhanasāmānyasya śabde'nusandhānaṃ gamyate tasmād anityaḥ śabda tyanenānitya eva śabda iti pratipipādayiṣitārthaparisamāptirgamyate tasmāt pañcāvayavenaiva vākyena pareṣāṃ svaniścitārthaprtipādanaṃ kriyate ityetat parārthānumānaṃ siddham iti || 119 ||

Text (119):—The ‘subject’ having been mentioned as the object of Inference, and yet not being fully ascertained as such, we have a reiteration of the Conclusion (Pratijñā) for the purpose of bringing about certainty in the mind of the other person; and this Reiteration is called the ‘Pratyāmnāya.’ That is to say, something is at first pointed out as to be proved; and when it is not known quite for a certainty to be such as is wanted to be proved, then—for the sake of such persons as have acquired the faculty of recognising the truth, by means of the ‘Reason’ and other aforesaid ‘Factors’ of the syllogism,—we have a reiteration of the conclusion; and this is what is called the ‘Pratyāmnāya.’ E.g. (in the same argument) the statement ‘therefore Air is a substance.’

As long as this reassertion is not made, none of the other ‘Factors’ either individually or collectively has the power to express what is meant to be expressed by it.

Objection: “But what is expressed by it may certainly be implied by the other members.”

Reply: No so; as if it were so, then we would have many undesirable irregularities. As, (if we were to depend upon implications), then after stating the conclusion (in the Pratijñā) it would be necessary to assert the ‘Reason’ only; as the learned are sure to remember the necessary ‘invariable concomitance’ {sought to be put forward in the ‘Instance’), and thence to deduce the necessary premisses and conclusions.

For these reasons the argument must be regarded as ending with the ‘Pratyāmnāya’ (or ‘Nigamana’).

Question: ‘How so?’

Answer: For instance, in the first place we have the ‘statement of the conclusion' in the form—‘Sound is evanescent,’—wherein we have only ‘sound’ mentioned as having the uncertain qualification of ‘evanescence’; secondly we have the statement of the ‘Reason’ in the form—‘because it always follows from effort,’—wherein we have the mere mention of a property calculated to prove the ‘evanescence’; thirdly we have the ‘statement of the Instance’ in the form—‘in the world all that is found to follow from effort is also found to be evanescent, as the jar’—wherein we have merely the mention of the concomitance of the ‘Reason’ (‘following from effort’) with the ‘Object of Inference’ (‘evanescence’) in general; and similarly we may have the ‘statement of the negative Instance’ in the form—‘the eternal is never found to follow from any effort, as the Ākāça,’—wherein is pointed out the absence of the ‘Reason’ in the absence of the ‘object’; fourthly we have the statement of the ‘Anusandhāna’ in the two forms of affirmation and negation—‘sound is found to follow from effort’ and ‘sound is not found like Ākāśa to be independent of effort,’—wherein we have the reiteration of the ‘Reason’ in general, whose powers have been ascertained by means of affirmation and negation, in ‘sound’; and then alone fifthly and lastly have we the certain conclusion (the Pratyāmnāya’) in the form—‘therefore sound must be evanescent.’ And thus we find that it is only in this way that we find the last ‘member’ affording the desired final conclusion; and hence we find that it is only by means of the ‘five-membered’ argament that something known for certain by the speaker can be proved to another person.

Such then, is the Inference ‘for the sake of others.’—(IX-i-1, 2.)

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author proceeds to describe the ‘Pratyāmnāya.’ The statement of the ‘Pratijñā’ having pointed out the ‘property or character of the Sādhya,’ as the thing whose existence in the Subject is to be proved by the members of the argument,—the presence of this Sādhya in the Subject remains uncertain, until it is reiterated as subsisting in the ‘Subject and this reiteration is what is called Pratyāmnāya,—the word meaning literally that statement whereby there is a repeated mention (of the sādhya) And this ‘reiteration’ of something already mentioned before is for the purpose of bringing about a certainty in the mind of the other person. That is to say, in putting forward an argument we state merely the ‘object of Inference’ the ‘sādhya, as subsisting in the ‘subject;’ but there cannot yet be any certainty with regard to the subsistence; as the mere statement of the conclusion does not prove it; but when the ‘Reason’ has been stated, and the capabilities of the Reason duly pointed out (in the ‘Instance,’ the ‘major premiss, a certainty as to the conclusion is brought about by means of the ‘Pratyāmnāya and herein lies its usefulness. That is what the author means by the explanation—‘that is to say &c.’ At the beginning of the argument the person to whom it is addressed is not convinced of the subsistence of the ‘object’ in the ‘subject;’ but when the threefold potentiality of the ‘Reason’ has been shown to him by means of the three ‘members’—the ‘Reason,’ the ‘Instance’ or ‘major premiss’ and the ‘Anusandhāna’ or the ‘minor premiss’—and this is followed by the ‘reiteration’ of the ‘object’ now become real, along with its apprehension and potentialities,—the argument becomes complete in all its details, and thus brings about the desired conviction. It is for the purpose of bringing about this conviction that we have the reiteration of the conclusion. The example of this is—“therefore Air is a substance as closing the argument referred to in connection with the members.”

In answer to the question—“When the conclusion is proved by the ‘Reason’ and the other three ‘members,’ what is the use of the ‘Pratyāmnāya’?—the author says; ‘as long as this reassertion is not made &c. That is to say, everyone of the three ‘members,’ Prātijñā and the rest, is complete and rests within itself; and until the Pratyāmnāya is pot forward; they do not combine towards the indicating of any single idea; for the simple reason that each of them has a distinct sphere of its own; when however, the Pratyāmnāya has been stated, there is in the mind of the listener a feeling of necessity of connection, whereby he tends to combine all the ‘members,’ which, thus coming into the relationship of mutual subserviency, are enabled to indicate the one conclusion wanted; and thus the Pratyāmnāya must be regarded as a necessary factor in every inferential argument.”

Another objection is put forward: “What is expressed by, the Pratyāmnāya might be implied by the other ‘members’. That is to say, the accessory details in the ‘Inference for the sake of another’ are the same as those in that for one’s own sake; and the only difference is that in the case of the latter the whole argument is recalled to the mind by the person himself, while in that of the former, it has to be made intelligible to the other person; and for ourselves we find the conclusion to be duly indicated and proved by the comprehension of the potentialities of the Reason; and for another person also this alone should be sufficient to indicate the conclusion; and the statement of the argument has its sole end in the pointing out of the ‘Indicative’ (as the Reason); and it has already been shown that the ‘Indicative’ as subsisting in, and being invariably concomitant with, the ‘Subject,’ is put forward by the ‘Reason’ and the other three ‘members’; and this being enough for the due comprehension of the conclusion, there remains nothing to be done by the ‘nigamana’ or Pratyāmnāya.”

The author replies to the above objection: ‘Not so &c.’ What the argument does is to point out merely the potentiality of the Indicative and not the Object: but its potentiality does not consist merely in ‘invariable concomitance’ and ‘subsistence in the Subject’; as even when these two characters are present, we find—in the case of the ‘Prakaraṇasama’ and ‘Kālātyāyapadiṣṭa [Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa?]’ Reason—that it does not prove the conclusion; the ‘potentiality’ in addition to the aforesaid two characters, must also consist in its ‘being such as (1) has not its cognition set aside by a more valid means of knowledge, and (2) has no equally valid Reason to the contrary; and so long as the presence of these two characters is not duly proved, there always remains the suspicion of there being a Reason to the contrary; and so long as this suspicion remains, even though the Reason may be shown to subsist in the Subject, there would be no conviction with regard to the desired conclusion; and it is for this reason that the Pratyāmnāya is put forward by way of indicating the absence of any ‘reasons to the contrary and when the absence thereof has been proved, it follows that the Reason is free from the fallacies of ‘Prakaraṇasama’ and Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa;’ and then it is that the Reason, whose potentialities have been mentioned before, comes to establish the conclusion; and thus is the usefulness of the ‘Pratyāmnāya’ established.

As what the author means to controvert is the view that the ‘potentiality of the reason,’ even though not explicitly mentioned, would be implied,—it becomes necessary for him to support his view by examples. And to this end be declares that, as soon as the ‘Reason’ will have been put forward after the Pratijñā, the learned would at once, without any further statements, remember the ‘invariable concomitance,’ and therefrom deduce the necessary conclusion. That is to say, the ‘Inference for the sake of another person’ is not put forward for the person who already knows what is to be proved; as for a such person the argument would be absolutely useless; then again, it is not possible for us to know how much of the matter is known, and how much not known, to the person to whom we address the argument; as the state of the mind of one person can hardly be known to another. Nor too could each argument be framed in accordance with the capacity of each person to whom it may be addressed; as each person may be possessed of peculiar capacities. Consequently when a man should want to convince another person, it becomes necessary for him to put forward as many statements as would establish the indicative validity of the Reason in the natural course of things; and he should not mind the idiosyncracies of the person whom he may seek to convince. Thus has this been declared: ‘A fact is to be put forward to be proved only in the form that it is known to exist in, and not in accordance with the ideas entertained about it by the persons to whom it may be addressed; as who could ever properly follow the bent of the mistaken ideas of the thing entertained by others?’

The author now sums up the whole subject: ‘For these reasons &c.’ That is to say, as it is only when the Pratyāmnāya has been stated that the full significance of the ‘Reason’ incomprehended, the argument must be regarded as fully comprehended only after that statement. Or, we may construe the sentence thus: Inasmuch as without the statement of the Pratyāmnāya there is no recognition of the absence of reasons to the contrary, the thing—i.e. the full significance of the ‘Reason’—must be regarded as ending with that statement.

Having described each of the ‘members’ separately, the author proceeds, by means of a question, to show their nature collectively: ‘How &c.’ The question as to sound being evanescent or otherwise having arisen, there comes in the mere statement of the ‘conclusion’—‘sound is evanescent’—which speaks of sound as qualified by the as yet uncertain character of evanescence. Then there arises, on the part of the enquirer a desire to know the ‘reason’ for this conclusion; and to satisfy this want we have the statement of the ‘reason’—‘because it follows after effort,’ i.e. ‘not existing before the effort to utter it, it comes into existence after this effort has been put forth;’ and in this what is pointed out is only a property that would prove the evanescence. What is meant by this ‘only’ is that this statement says nothing, either as to the fact of the ‘Reason’ subsisting in the ‘subject’ sound, or as to its ‘invariable concomitance’ with ‘evanescence.’ When the enquirer has learnt the ‘reason,’ he wishes to learn in what way that reason indicates the conclusion; and in order to satisfy this wish we put forward the ‘Instance’ in this form—‘in this world, everything that has been seen to follow after an effort has also been found to be evanescent,’—which points out the mere fact of a general concomitance between the ‘thing to be proved’ (evanescence) and the ‘reason here the word ‘mere’ is meant to indicate that the ‘instance’ says nothing beyond the general concomitance. Side by side with this we have the negative ‘Instance,’—‘all that is eternal is never found to be brought about by an effort,’—which shows that wherever the ‘thing to be proved’ is absent the ‘Reason’ is also absent. After this, the enquirer says—‘well, I understand that anything following after an effort is evanescent, but I do not yet know whether or not the character put forward belongs to sound and in answer to this, we have the statement of the Anusandhāna,’—‘Sound is a thing that follows after an effort that is to say, just as the jar follows after effort, so does Sound also; and Sound is not like Ākāśa which is not the effect of any effort; and this Anusandhāna serves the purpose of indicating the fact of the subsistence in Sound, of the character of being produced from, effort the negative and positive concomitances of which character have been pointed out before, Even after all this, the enquirer might reason thus: “In the case of the Instance, ‘all that is produced is not hot, e.g. the jar,’ we find that even though some sort of an external invariable concomitance is possible, yet a fiery substance, though produced, cannot be regarded as not-hot, because of such a conclusion being contrary to other means of right knowledge; and in the same manner, it may be that though there may be such an external invariable concomitance as that, ‘whatever follows after an effort is evanescent, yet it may be that Sound, though following after an effort, may not be evanescent, in view of arguments to the contrary.’ In answer to this suspicion of a contrary reasoning and conclusion,—a suspicion that would shake the indicative character of the ‘reason,’—it becomes necessary to reiterate, by means of the Pratyāmnāya, the conclusion that, ‘Sound is evanescent;’ which means that, ‘in as much as there is no means of knowledge indicating the eternality of sound, it must be regarded as evanescent.’

Thus then, what the Pratyāmnāya does is to point out the ground for believing in the absence of any valid means of cognising the contrary of the conclusion,—this being done by its precluding all possibility of a contrary conclusion. And when this absence has been pointed out, and proved, all suspicion to the contrary is set aside; and the ‘Reason,’ whose invariable concomitance has been shown before, being summed up as subsisting in the ‘Subject,’ leads the enquirer, through the valid means of cognising the necessary concomitance, to a full recognition of the conclusion, free from all doubts and uncertainties; and he does not want anything more for the purpose of being convinced. And thus it is by means of the ‘Pratyāmnāya’ that we get at the finale of the conclusion desired to be proved —viz., ‘Sound is evanescent.’

The Sādhyavākyārthavādīs [Sādhyavākya-arthavādins] explain the usefulness of the Pratyāmnāya in the following manner: “The ‘producedness’ of Sound is of a totally different character from the ‘producedness’ of the jar; hence finding that the ‘producedness’ of the jar is pervaded by or invariably concomitant with, ‘evanescence,’ one may be bewildered as to whether, by analogy, the same might be the case with Sound also; and oven when to such a bewildered person it has been shown that the ‘indicative’ (‘producedness’) subsists in the ‘Subject’ (‘Sound’), and that it is invariably concomitant with ‘evanescence,’—he is not sufficiently convinced of the conclusion that ‘Sound is evanescent’; hence to this end is put forward the ‘Prātyāmnāya [Pratyāmnāya?]—‘Therefore (tasmāt) sound is evanescent’; wherein the pronoun ‘tasmāt’ serves the purpose of reminding the enquirer of the means of cognising the invariable concomitance previously cognised in a general way, and also of proving the required ‘evanescence of Sound’ Thus then, the sense of the Pratyāmnāya comes to be that because the fact of producedness being accompanied by evanescence cognised before did not refer to the producedness of any particular thing, but to producedness in general, therefore being produced, Sound is evanescent.”

In accordance with this view the Minor Premiss itself serves to set aside the fallacies of Prakaraṇasama and Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa; as the very character of the true ‘Minor Premiss’ consists in its being free from satpratipakṣa and Bādha.

Others again hold that the word ‘tasmāt’ (in the Pratyāmnāya) has a threefold signification, its full implication being thus stated: (1) Because all that is produced is found to be evanescent, (2) because sound is produced and (3) because there is no possibility of ‘contrary reasons’ or ‘negation,’—therefore on account of its producedness, Sound is evancesent.”

The author sums up the whole section: ‘For these reasons &c.’ That is to say. in as much as it is only when all the five ‘members’ have been put forward that there is a full recognition of the potentialities of the ‘Reason,’ tending to due conviction with regard to the conclusion,—and as nothing more is needed for this purpose,—it follows that a desired conclusion is proved by us by putting forward an argument composed of ‘five members,’ neither more nor less; and thus it becomes proved that the ‘Inferential argument for the sake of another person’ consists of the statement of the aforesaid five ‘members.’

There are some people who hold that ‘Sense-perception’ is the only means of right knowledge; and hence deny this character to ‘Inference.’ To these people we put the following question: Does the character of the valid means of knowledge belong to the single sensuous perception that is experienced at the particular time, or does it belong to all sensuous perceptions? The said validity could not belong to the one perception only, as there can be no reason for denying the validity of other perceptions brought about by similar means and under similar circumstances. If then, validity be attributed to all sensuous perceptions, the past and the future, as well as that experienced by other persons,—then we should like to know how the validity of all these come to be recognised.

“We regard all these perceptions to be valid because we find them to be exactly similar in kind to our own perception, of whose validity we are fully convinced.”

By this you admit the evidential authority of Inferences with regard to the nature of things [That is to say, the reasoning. ‘The perception of another person is valid because it is of the same kind as our own perception is purely inferential].

The evidential authority of Inference may also be proved by putting forward the following alternatives: For whom is the validity of Sense-perception sought to be established—’ for one who already knows it and admits it? Or for one who does not know and admit it? It cannot be for the former; as in his case the proving is not needed. Then as for one who does not know it, how do you come to know the ignorance of another person? Certainly it is not cognisable by means of any sense-organ.

“We infer his ignorance from his declarations.”

Then you admit the evidential authority of the inference of effect (from its cause). [The man’s acting in a certain manner is taken as the effect of his ignorance, which is thus inferred from its effect].

Then again, by, what means do you seek to prove that Inference is not a -valid means of knowledge?^[1] As for Sense-perception it has always a positive entity for its objective and is hence always of an affirmative character; and as such it could not prove the negation or absence of Inference as a means of knowledge.

“We conclude that it is not a means of cognition, simply because we do not perceive it.”

In that case you admit the authority of Inferences based upon Non-perception. All this has been thus summed up by the Bauddhas: ‘The existence of another means of knowledge, is proved by.—(1) its similarity to another means of knowledge universally recognised, (2) the fact of our being cognisant of other people’s ideas and cognitions and (3) by negation also at times.’ That is to say, for these three reasons, it must be admitted that apart from ‘Sense-perception’ there is a distinct means of knowledge, in the shape of Inference, based upon the¹ nature of things,’ on ‘Effects’ and on ‘Non-perception.’

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

The printed reeding is evidently wrong: ‘Aumānam pramāṇam &c.,’ does not give any sense.