Text 118

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 118:

निदर्शनेऽनुमेयसामान्येन सह दृष्टस्य्स लिङ्गसामान्यस्यानुमेयेऽन्वानयनम् अनुसन्धानम् । अनुमेयधर्मात्रत्वेनाभितं लिङ्गसामान्यम् अनुपलब्धशक्तिकं निदर्शने साध्यधर्मसामान्येन सह दृष्टम् अनुमेये येन वचनेनानुसन्धीयते तदनुसन्धानम् । तथा च वायुः क्रियावान् इति । अनुमेयाभावे च तस्यासत्त्वम् उपलभ्य न च तथा वायुर्निष्क्रिय इति ॥ ११८ ॥

nidarśane'numeyasāmānyena saha dṛṣṭasysa liṅgasāmānyasyānumeye'nvānayanam anusandhānam | anumeyadharmātratvenābhitaṃ liṅgasāmānyam anupalabdhaśaktikaṃ nidarśane sādhyadharmasāmānyena saha dṛṣṭam anumeye yena vacanenānusandhīyate tadanusandhānam | tathā ca vāyuḥ kriyāvān iti | anumeyābhāve ca tasyāsattvam upalabhya na ca tathā vāyurniṣkriya iti || 118 ||

Text (118): The reiteration, of the concomitance of theft ‘Indicative’ in general with the ‘Subject,’ after the former has been perceived, in the ‘Instance,’ along with the ‘Subject’ in general,—constituted the Ānusandhāna [Anusandhāna?]. That is to say, the ‘Indicative’ in general is put forward (in the, Premiss)^ as a qualification of the ‘Subject,’ and not as having any potencies; and in the ‘Instance,’ it is pointed out as perceived along with the qualification of the Sādhya ‘(object of Inference) in general; and the statement that reiterates fact of its existence in the ‘Subject,’ is what is called the ‘Anūsandhāna’ (the Minor Premise.) E.g., in the same argument, the statement that ‘Air is mobile’; and also the statement that ‘the Air is not immobile’ which follows from the recognition of the fact of the ‘indicative’ not being concomitant with the absence of the ‘subject’.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The Nidarśana literally is that statement wherein is shown (‘nidarśyate’) the ascertained concomitance of the sādhya (the object of Inference) and the sādhana (the Inferential Indicative the Hetu); it is this ‘Instance’ that has been described above; and the statement that points out the existence, in the ‘subject’ as qualified by the sādhya, of the hetu or (the indicative) in general, which latter has been found in the Instance to be concomitant with the ‘subject’ in general,—is called the ‘Anusandhāna,’ in view of the fact that it reiterates or recalls (anusandhīyate) the existence, in the pakṣa (‘subject’), of the hetu (‘Indicative’) which has been shown in the Instance to be invariably concomitant with the sādhya (the ‘object’).

The author proceeds to explain his own meaning: That is to say &c.,. after the Pratijñā (Declaration of the Conclusion) we had the statement of the ‘Indicative’ and the latter statement served the purpose of showing that it existed in the ‘Subject’ as apart from all other things, and as such had the character of the ‘hetu;’ and it said nothing as to its existence in the ‘subject’ as its qualification. The power of the ‘Indicative’ to prove the ‘sādhya’ consists in its negative and positive invariable concoṃitance, as also in the fact of its qualifying the ‘subject;’ and this latter fact is not expressed either by the Pratijñā (the Declaration of the Conclusion) or by the statement of the ‘Reason;’ and thus the ‘Reason’ has not its necessary potency fully established; so that in the Instance it is pointed out as concomitant with the general qualifications of the sādhya; and after that it has to be shown again to exist in the ‘Subject;’ and the statement that does this is called the ‘Anusandhāna.’

The sense of all this may be thus explained: Words are used by one person for the sake of another person; and hence their use would follow the bent of the desires and wants of the person to whom they are addressed. And when this person has heard the sādhya, ‘ what has to be proved,’ (put forward in the Declaration), he wants to learn the sādhana, the ‘Reason’—‘by what this is proved;’ and he can not yet want to know the potency or capability of the Reason; as a desire for the knowledge of the capabilities of a thing can arise only after the thing itself has become known. When this desire has been evinced, the other person mentions the ‘Reason, (in the ‘apadeśa’); but this statement merely mentions the Reason, and does not say anything as to its subsisting as a qualification in the ‘Subject;’ for the simple reason that the same word could not signify two things (the mere form of the Reason, as also the fact of its subsisting in the Subject). When the person knows the Reason, there arises in his mind a desire to know its capabilities; and upon his evincing this desire,—in as much as a due cognition of the sādhya would not be possible without the recognition of its invariable concomitance, this concomitance is expressed by means of the vyāptivacana, (the statement of invariable concomitance), between the sādhya and the hetu, put forward in the ‘Instance’; and the capability of the ‘Reason’ being thus known, the man next wishes to know if the Reason, endowed with this capability subsists in the ‘subject.’ After the ‘Instance’ has been cited, it becomes necessary to recognise the fact of the ‘Reason’ subsisting in and qualifying the ‘Subject’; and it is in the Upanaya or Anusandhāna, the ‘Minor Premiss,’ that this fact is put forward.

Objection: “The fact of the Reason subsisting in the Subject is implied by its very capability of being put forward as a ‘Reason’; as a Reason subsisting io another substratum (and not in the Subject) would not prove anything, and as such be no ‘Reason’ at all.”

Reply: For the matter of that the mere capability of the Reason to be put forward as such also implies the ‘invariable concomitance,’ the ‘major Premiss;’ as anything not so concomitant cannot be a true ‘Reason’; hence in accordance with your reasoning, it would not be necessary to put forward the ‘Instance’ either.

Objection: “It is quite possible for the Asādhāraṇa Indicative to be put forward, through some misconception, as the ‘Reason’; and hence the mere fact of an indicative having been put forward as such would not necessarily imply the necessary ‘invariable concomitance’; and hence it is necessary for this latter to be put forward by means of the ‘Instance.’”

Reply: We often find that even when the Indicative does not subsist in the ‘Subject.’ it is put forward, by mistake, as a ‘Reason’; and hence the mere fact of the Reason being put forward does not necessarily imply its subsistence in the ‘Subject;’ consequently it becomes necessary to point out that the ‘Indicative’ cited in the ‘Instance’ does subsist in the ‘Subject’; and to this end the statement of the ‘Anusandhāna becomes necessary.

Objection: “We often find that the ‘Asiddha’ or ‘Unknown’ Indicative is, through some misconception, put forward in the ‘Anusandhāna’ also; and as such, how could this absolutely prove the fact of the Indicative subsisting in the ‘Subject.’?”

Reply: So far as that is concerned, we find the ‘Asiddha’ Indicative often put forward, through some mistake, as being ‘invariably concomitant’; and under the circumstances, how could the mere ‘statement of invariable concomitance’ absolutely prove that there is a real concomitance?

Objection: “The ‘concomitance’ is ascertained, in the ‘Instance,’ in accordance with the means of knowledge affording the cognition of the ‘Major Premiss’; and it is not ascertained by the mere ‘statement’ (of this Premiss); as mere statement could be made with regard to any thing and every thing (and as such it could not prove anything.”

Reply: In the case of the ‘Anusandhāna’ also, the fact of the Reason subsisting in the ‘Subject’ would be ascertained in accordance with the means of knowledge affording the cognition of the ‘Minor Premiss’; and not by the mere statement pi the premiss.

Objection: “But the integrity of the means of knowledge affording the cognition of the Minor Premiss is duly kept up by the mere fact of the putting forward of the ‘Reason’ not being otherwise explicable or possible.”

Reply: In the same manner the integrity of the ‘means of knowledge’ affording the cognition of the Major Premiss’ would be preserved by the same fact of the putting forward of the ‘Reason’ not being otherwise explicable.

Objection: “In as much as the Statement of the Reason is for a totally different purpose, it has not the capability of putting forward or indicating the ‘invariable concomitance’ (Major Premiss; and hence it is that this putting forward is done by means of the ‘Instance.’”

Reply: If it be so, then in the case in question please apply the same course of reasoning; and there is no need for making unnecessary assumptions.

Objection: “All right; let there be the Anusandhāna but, in that case the putting forward of the Reason would be absolutely useless.”

Reply: Not so; if there is no ‘Statement of the Reason, there can be no idea of the ‘Indicative’ as proving the conclusion (and hence having the character of the true ‘Reason’) and as such there being no possibility of any desire on the part of the enquirer to learn of its capabilities, there would be no room for the putting forward of the ‘Instance’ &c. Says the NyāyaBhāṣya: ‘ When the Reason does not exist Whose indicative character would be shown?’

The Author cites an instance of the ‘Anusandhāna’: ‘E.g. in the same argument &c.’ Having cited the instance of the positive ‘Anusandhāna,’ he cites one of the negative ‘Anusandhāna’—‘Also the statement &c’