Text 113

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 113:

अवयवाः पुनः प्रतिज्ञापदेशनिदर्शनानुसन्धानप्रत्याम्नायाः । तत्रानुमेयोद्देशोऽविरोधी प्रतिज्ञा । प्रतिपिपादयिषितधर्मविशिष्टस्य धर्मिणोपदेशविषयम् आपादयितुम् उद्देशमात्रं प्रतिज्ञा । यथा द्रव्यं वायुरिति । अविरोधिग्रहणात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्युपगतस्वशास्त्रस्ववचनविरोधिनो निरस्ता भवन्ति । यथाऽनुष्णोऽग्निरिति प्रत्यक्षविरोधी घनम् अम्बरम् इत्यनुमानविरोधी ब्राह्मणेन सुरा पेयेत्यागमविरोधी वैशेषिकस्य सत्कार्यम् इतिब्रुवतः स्वशास्त्रविरोधी न शब्दोऽर्थप्रत्यायक इति स्ववचनविरोधी ॥ ११३ ॥

avayavāḥ punaḥ pratijñāpadeśanidarśanānusandhānapratyāmnāyāḥ | tatrānumeyoddeśo'virodhī pratijñā | pratipipādayiṣitadharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇopadeśaviṣayam āpādayitum uddeśamātraṃ pratijñā | yathā dravyaṃ vāyuriti | avirodhigrahaṇāt pratyakṣānumānābhyupagatasvaśāstrasvavacanavirodhino nirastā bhavanti | yathā'nuṣṇo'gniriti pratyakṣavirodhī ghanam ambaram ityanumānavirodhī brāhmaṇena surā peyetyāgamavirodhī vaiśeṣikasya satkāryam itibruvataḥ svaśāstravirodhī na śabdo'rthapratyāyaka iti svavacanavirodhī || 113 ||

Teat (113): These members are—(1) Pratijñā, ‘Declaration,’ Proposition to be proved (2) Apadeśa, Statement of the inferential indicative or ‘middle term’ (3) Nidarśana, ‘Statement of the Major Premiss,’ (4) Anusandhāna, ‘Statement of the Minor Premiss,’ and (5) Pratyāmnāya, ‘Reiteration of the Conclusion’.

Of these (1) the Conclusion is the statement of what is to be proved by means of the inference, and which is not incompatible with facts. That is to say, it consists in the mere statement of the ‘subject’ endowed with the property sought to be proved, with a view to point out the substratum of the ‘indicative.’ As an example of this we have the proposition ‘Wind is a substance.’—(IX-ii-1).

The qualification ‘not incompatible, &c.’ serves the purpose of excluding such propositions as may be contrary to (1) Sense-cognition, (2) Inference, (3) Scriptures regarded as trustworthy by the speaker, (4) that which would involve a self-contradiction,; e. g. the proposition ‘Fire is not hot,’ would be contrary, to sense-cognition (1); (2) that ‘ākāśa’ is dense would be contrary to Inference; (3) that ‘the Brāhmaṇa ought to drink wine’ would be ‘contrary to scriptures’; and that ‘the effect is ever existing’ would, for the Vaiśeṣika, be contrary to his own theory; and (4) that ‘word is not expressive’ would involve a self-contradiction.—(III-i-15).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The word ‘punaḥ’ is put in simply by way of ornamentation of speech. Having named the ‘members’ he states the definition of the ‘conclusion,’ and then proceeds to explain that definition. The object which is qualified by the property sought to be proved, is the ‘object to be inferred,’ also called the ‘pakṣa,’ ‘subject’ or ‘Minor term and the mere statement of this, without the mention of any reasoning, is what is called ‘Pratijñā,’ ‘Conclusion.’ As has been declared by the learned—‘the statement constitutes the pratijñā, and its subject is the ‘pakṣa.’

Objection: “If mere statement of the proposition, without any reasonings, were the pratijñā, then as it would not in any way contribute towards the proving of what is to be proved, it should not deserve being mentioned in the statement of an inferential argument; as say the Bauddhas: ‘The hetu or the inferential indicative, is that which indicates what is capable (of being indicated); and the assertion of the minor term, being incapable (of proving anything), is not capable of proving what is to be proved, even indirectly by the mere mention of what is sought to be proved.”

In view of this objection the author has added—‘apadeśaviṣayam &c.’ the ‘apadeśa’ is the hetu, the inferential indicative, the ‘middle’ term; and the conclusion is stated for the purpose of making the ‘minor’ term the subject, the substratum of the ‘middle’ term; as wherever that middle term may be used for the purpose of proving what is to be proved, it is always known to exist in the ‘subject’ of the conclusion. Further, as the ‘inferential indicative’ is invariably found to inhere in a certain ‘subject,’ until this subject is mentioned, the ‘indicative,’ being without substratum, would not be operative; and the indicative being inoperative, what is sought to be proved could not be proved; hence in as much as the Pratijñā serves the purpose of pointing out the ‘subject,’ it helps by bringing up that which is the substratum of the ‘indicative;’ and thus by supplying the substratum for the ‘indicative,’ it makes this latter operative, and thus becomes a necessary accessory towards the proving of what is sought to be proved. To this effect, the Nyāyabhāṣya says: ‘If there were no pratijñā, the indicative &c. being without substratum would not be operative.’

Objection: “The substratum of the ‘indicative’ is learnt from the Upanaya (and hence the statement of the Pratijñā cannot be a necessary factor.)”

Reply:—This is not right; as until there is a statement of the Pratijñā, the Upanaya also is inoperative. What the Upanaya does is to point out the capability of the ‘indicative’ to qualify the ‘subject;’ and the person seeking knowledge does not, in the very first instance, require the ‘indicative’ (or the means of proof); but in as much as it is the most important factor in what is to be proved, when this latter is sought after, the ‘indicative’ also is sought after for the purpose of proving it; and the capability of this indicative is sought after at the end of all; and hence it becomes necessary first of all to put forward the statement of what is to be proved; and the capability of the indicative does not come to be mentioned first; as at that time it is not wanted.

Qbjection:—“The assertion of the ‘subject’ being qualified by the property sought to be proved is self-contradictory; as that which is not yet known (and is sought to be learnt by means of the Inference) cannot serve as a qualification.”

Reply:—True; that which is not known cannot be as qualification; but the ‘property to be proved’ is already known as existing in (qualifying) the Sapakṣa (the arrow in the case in question); and it is put forward in the Pratijñā with a view to point out the fact of its qualifying the ‘subject,’ to the person who denies Such qualification. It is for this reason that this ‘subject’ has the real character of the ‘pakṣa,’ the ‘minor’ term; specially as even though by itself it is already well known, yet as it is not so well known as qualified by the property sought to be proved, it becomes capable of being pointed out in that character (i.e. as qualified by that property). Thus too have we the fact of the ‘indicative’ feeing a property of the ‘subject.’ For instance, (in the case of the argument ‘Word is evanescent because it is caused)’ if it were mere evanescence by itself (and not as qualifying, word) that was sought to be proved, then the ‘causedness’ qualifying the word could not be a property of the ‘subject’; while this discrepancy ceases when the ‘evanescence’ of the word is made the object of to be proved. This has been thus stated by the great teachers: ‘This consists in both—the indicative and the indicated; without either of the two, it would be the indicated) and not the indicative.’

An instance of Prātijñā is next cited: ‘Wind is substance’;—in this we have the statement of the conclusion in the above form, wherein wind is spoken of as qualified by the character of ‘substance,’ which is sought to be proved for the benefit of one who, while knowing the wind, does not know that it is a substance.

He proceeds to explain the sense of the qualification ‘avirodhi,’ ‘not incompatible’ &c. That which the debater wishes to prove is the ‘sādhya’; and it often happens that by mistake he may often wish to prove something that may be contrary to well-recognised facts of sense-perception; and hence if the Prātijñā were defined only as the particular statement of what is to be proved,’ then the character of ‘Pratijñā’ would apply even to such statements as would be contrary to well-recognised facts of sense-perception &c.; as a matter of fact however no such statement can ever be a Pratijñā; because such a statement would be impossible to prove; and it is with a view to preclude such statements that the author has added the qualification in question. And thus the definition of Pratijñā. comes to be that it is the statement of such object to be proved by inference as is not incompatible with well-recognised facts of sense-prcception &c.; and when any object to be thus proved is not found to be so compatible then its statement is not Pratijñā.

The sense of all this is that the character of the real sādhya does not depend upon the mere whim of the debater it belongs only to that which deserves proof; and that alone is the ‘pakṣa’ the ‘subject’ or the ‘minor term’ and others are only false pakṣas.

Examples of incompatibility with facts of sense-perception fl &c:—(1) ‘Fire is not hot’—‘not hot’ means a negation of heat; and what is negatived is that which is known, and not what is absolutely unknown; as a matter of fact however heat can not be found anywhere else except in fire; and the cognition fl of heat in fire is not inferential; as when there is no sensuous cognition, Inference is not operative. And if what is known fl by sensuous cognition is sought to be negatived by an inference fl which can be based only upon a fact of sense-perception, then such an inference, being opposed to the fact of Sense-perception, would be set aside by it; because of the objective having been taken up by the sensuous cognition.

Question:—“What do you mean by the objective being taken up.”

Answer:—What is meant by the objective of Inference having been taken up by the sensuous cognition is that this latter indicates the object in a manner contrary to that indicated by the former.

Question:—“What happens to the Inference when its objective has been thus taken up?”

Answer:—It cannot appear at all. That is to say, when the sensuous cognition, which appears before any inference on the subject, being of a character that does not make it negatived or mistaken,—has pointed out the heat of the fire,—and this heat being thus taken up by this Sensuous Cognition, there can be no correct cognition of the absence of heat in it. Any ‘reason’ that may be brought forward in support of such a ‘conclusion’ will be set aside by the very fact of its being brought forward to support such an absurd conclusion being incapable of bringing about any rightful cognition thereof, on account of its incompatibility with sensuous cognition; As has been declared—‘In a case of opposition between sensuous and inferential cognitions, there can be no room for the latter; as before the very foundation of the latter came into existence, the objective is taken up by the former.’

Objection:—“As there is mutual contradiction between the said Negativing (of Inference) on the one hand, and the invariable concomitance (on which the Inference is based) on the other—that which is invariably concomitant cannot have any negation (cannot be negatived).”

Reply:—If by ‘invariable concomitance’ here you mean the tripartite character of the argument, then it is not impossible for it to be negatived; as for instance, we find in the argument—‘fire is not hot, because it is caused.’ If however you mean ‘invariable concomitance’ to consist in that tripartite argument whose objective is not negatived; and to hold that invariable concomitance is not negatived,—then we quite agree with you. But it is for the purpose of indicating the fact of the objective not being negatived that the author has added the qualification of compatibility with facts of sense-cognition &c.

Question:—“To what does incompatibility with sense-cogntion &c. pertain? Does it pertain to the ‘subject’ or to the ‘reason’? It cannot pertain to the ‘subject;’ as this always retains its character; nor can it pertain to the ‘reason’; as the ‘reason’ is always capable of proving its own objective; and as for other objectives, ail things would be equally incompetent. So the incongruousness must pertain to the propounder of the argument; as it is he who brings forward the. Reason for proving something that does not form its objective.”

Answer:—If the ‘incongruity’ be meant to consist in—(1) the absence of the capability of being cognised of the fact put forward in the conclusion to be proved, (2) in the propounding of the argument in support thereof, and (3) the absence of capability (to prove),—then it would apply to the objective (i. e. the ‘subject’—to which the first form of the incongruity would apply) and to the instrument (i.e. the ‘Reason.’ to which the third form would apply) (as well as to the propounder who would be amenable to the second form).

That ‘Ākāśa is dense’ would be contrary to Inference: that very means of knowledge whereby Ākāśa is cognised always proves its eternality and nonpartite character; hence to assert that it has its constituents densely packed would be contrary to the Inference pertaining to the very form of the ‘subject.’

That the Brāhmaṇa should drink wine would be contrary to scriptures. The meaning of this proposition would be that wine-drinking by the Brāhmaṇa is not sinful. In support of this conclusion ‘milk’ would be brought forward as the corroborative ‘instance.’ And the non-sinful character of milk-drinking is cognisable by means of the scriptures consisting of Śrutis and Smṛtis; and hence the same scriptures that would prove the non-sinful character of milk-drinking would also prove the sinful character of wine-drinking; and thus the declaration of the propriety of wine-drinking for the Brāhmaṇa would be contrary to the means of knowledge pertaining to the instance; brought forward in its support.

If the Vaiśeṣika were to make the declaration that the effect exists before it is produced by the danse, he would be contradicting his own philosophical tenets. The Vaiśeṣika engages in ail discussions, resting upon the authority of the Vaiśeṣilca philosophy. And if he were to make the above declaration, it would be contrary to the Vaiśeṣika theory that prior to its production by the cause the effect has no existence.

That the word is not expressive would involve a self-contradiction. If the word is not expressive of meaning, then it would be impossible to make use of any words to express the idea that wards are not expressive. If such words are used to this effect, then by this very use would the expressiveness of words become admitted; and hence the said declaration would be self-contradictory.

Objection: “The ‘scripture ‘being nothing more than the statement of truths cognised by means of sensuous and inferential cognitions, a contradiction of it would only be a contradiction of sensuous and inferential cognitions and the expressiveness of words being only an inference based upon concomitance (of the word and the meaning expressed by it), a negation of this expressiveness would only be a contradiction of Inference; and such being the case, why should the author have made separate mention of the contradiction of ‘scriptures’ and ‘self-assertion’?”

Reply: Scriptures are often found to be based upon mere semblance of truth; as we find in the case of the scriptures of the Buddha and others. And if the Buddha were to declare that all things are not momentary, what he would be contradicting would be his own scriptures, and not any truth (of perception or inference). As for one’s own assertion that too may some times be based upon an untruth; and hence its contradiction need not necessarily involve a contradiction of, truths (of perception or inference).