Text 114

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 114:

लिङ्गवचनम् अपदेशः । यदनुमेयेन सहचरितम् तत्समानजातीये सर्वत्र सामान्येन प्रसिद्धं तद्विपरीते च सर्वस्मिन्नसद् एव तल्लिङ्गम् उक्तम् तस्य वचनम् अपदेशः । यथा क्रियावत्त्वाद् गुणवत्त्वाच्च तथा च तदनुमेयेऽस्ति तत्समानजातीये च सर्वस्मिन् गुणवत्त्वम् असार्वस्मिन् क्रियावत्त्वम् । उभयम् अप्येतद् अद्रव्ये नास्त्येव तस्मात् तस्य वचनम् अपदेश इति सिद्धम् ॥ ११४ ॥

liṅgavacanam apadeśaḥ | yadanumeyena sahacaritam tatsamānajātīye sarvatra sāmānyena prasiddhaṃ tadviparīte ca sarvasminnasad eva talliṅgam uktam tasya vacanam apadeśaḥ | yathā kriyāvattvād guṇavattvācca tathā ca tadanumeye'sti tatsamānajātīye ca sarvasmin guṇavattvam asārvasmin kriyāvattvam | ubhayam apyetad adravye nāstyeva tasmāt tasya vacanam apadeśa iti siddham || 114 ||

Text (114):—The ‘Apadeśa’ consists in the statement of the ‘inferential indicative.’ That which is concomitant with the ‘subject’ of inference, being known to be so concomitant at all times, and with all individuals of the class to which the ‘subject’ belongs,—and which, at all times, is never concomitant with the contradictory of that subject,—has been spoken of as the ‘inferential indicative’; and it is the statement or putting forward of this that constitutes ‘apadeśa.’ As for instance (in the same argument) the assertion—‘because wind has an action and is endowed with certain qualities’ Here we find that ‘action’ and ‘quality’ exist in the ‘subject’ (the wind), and the latter in all individuals of the class to which it belongs, and the former not in all of them and both of these are never found in anything that is ‘not substance.’ Hence the statement as to the presence of these in wind constitutes the ‘apadeśa’ (in the argument cited).—(IX.ii.1)

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Of the declaration that ‘wind is a substance,’ the apadeśa consists in the assertion ‘because it has action,’ which puts forward the ‘inferential indicative’; and so also is the mention of ‘presence of qualities,’ which is another ‘inferential indicative.’ The author has cited these two instances, in order to show that the character of ‘hetu,’ ‘reason’ or ‘inferential indicative’ belongs to such a thing as exists only in a part of the sapakṣa (i.e. in the case in question the ‘sapakṣa’ consists of all such substances as are known to be active; and ‘action’ is found Only in a certain part of this class, i.e. all substances are not always active; but action can never exist apart from a substance), as well as to that which pervades over the whole of it (i.e. one quality or another is always present in all substances).

The author shows that the aforesaid definition of the ‘inferential indicative’ applies to the instances cited. ‘Presence of qualities’ belongs to the ‘subject,’ as also to all members of the class ' substance’ to which that subject belongs,’ and which is the ‘sapakṣa’; and ‘presence of action’ while belonging to the subject, belongs only to some members of the class ‘substance’; i.e. to those substances alone that have material bodies; and yet both of these—‘action’ and ‘quality’—are never found in anything that is not a substance, which ‘nonsubstance’ would be the ‘vipakṣa’ (that wherein the inferential indicative is universally acknowledged to be non-existent).

And the patting forward of both of these by means of the assertion—‘because it has action/ or ‘because it has qualities’—constitutes what is known as ‘apadeśa,’ or the Reason for the Declaration, being as it is free from all discrepancies of reasoning.