Text 110

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 110:

अभावोऽप्यनुमानम् एव यथोत्पन्नं कार्यं कारणसद्भावे लिङ्गम् । एवम् अनुत्पन्नं कार्यं कारणासद्भावे लिङ्गम् ॥ ११० ॥

abhāvo'pyanumānam eva yathotpannaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇasadbhāve liṅgam | evam anutpannaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇāsadbhāve liṅgam || 110 ||

Text (110):—Negation also is mere Inference just as the appearance of the effect becomes ‘indicative’ of the existence of the cause, so also does the non-appearance of the effect become ‘indicative’ of the non-existence of the cause.—(IX-ii-5)

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Some people hold that for the cognition of the absence of a thing there is a distinct means in the shape of Negation, which consists in the non-appearance of sense-perception and the four means of knowing the presence of things. With a view to set aaside this view the author says—Negation also is mere Inference. In proof of this assertion he adds: Just as etc. He also who regards Negation as a distnict means of knowledge, does not maintain that the cognition of the absence or non-existence of a thing follows from mere non-appearance of its cognition; as if it were so then, a thing that is at a great distance from the observer (and is not cognised) would come to be cognised as non-existent (there being an absence of its cognition). What he would hold is that, when all causes and conditions of cognising it are present, if there is non-appearance of the due cognition of an object which is cognisable, then its non-cognition would lead to the cognition of its non-existence. There is however no difference in nature between the non-cognition of the cognisable and that of the non-cognisable object; as there are no varying grades of negation; and hence a negation cannot, by itself, like the sense organs, bring about the cognition of anything; what constitutes a difference between the two however is that the noncognition of the cognisable object is never found to fail in its concomitance with the absence or non-existence of that object; whereas the non-cogniíion the non-cognisable object is found to fail in such concomitance; as even when the non-cognisable object, exists, there is non-cognition of it; and it is on account of this difference that it is the non-cognition of the cognisable object, and not that of the non-cognisable object, that brings about the cognition (of the non-existence of the object). And thus negation becomes merely an ‘inferential indicative,’ as it would stand in need of the due recognition of invariable concomitance; if it did not require this invariable concomitance, then there would be nothing to prevent the undesirable contingency that all negation is equally liable to bring about the cognition (of the absence of things; which the opponent cannot admit).

Then again, we find that when an empty spot of earth has been seen by the eye, there comes about the cognition of absence also, in the form that ‘this spot of earth has no jar on it;’ and in this case why should not the cognition of this absence of the jar be regarded as sensuous, just like the cognition of the spot of earth?

Object “The sense-organ is connected only with the positive factor in the conception (i.e. with the spot), which alone is capable of being thus connected.”

Reply: This cannot be accepted until it is proved; all capability is inferred from certain effects; and just as in the case of the existence of objects we find the effect (cognition) regulated by the presence or absence of the operation of the sense-organs, so do we also perceive in the case of that same effect with regard to the non-existence of objects; and hence non-existence also is as capable of being perceived by means of the sense-organs as existence. And the connection also of nonexistence with certain sense-organs might be assumed on the strength of the nature of the effects produced (in the shape of cognition).

Objection: “No non-existence is ever cognised without a substratum; as its action or want of action is always found to be in reference to definite points of place and time, etc., and the operation of the sense-organs pertains to the substratum of the non-existence, and not to the non-existence itself; as shown by the fact of the cognition of non-existence appearing even after the operation of the sense-organ has ceased as for instance it so happens that a man having seen a house goes to another place; and there on being asked by some one as to the presence of Devadatta in the house, he has aroused in his mind, at that moment, the desire to learn the whereabouts of Devadatta; and then having cognised the fact of his non-existence in the house, he replies—‘he is not in the house,’ (and here we find that the non-existence has been cognised while the man is away from the temple, and he has none of his sense-organs in contact with the non-existence). Nor can it be rightly urged that, this non-existence of Devatta in the house had been cognised, indeterminately, at the time that the house was seen; and it is remembered at the subsequent time because the indeterminate cognition of such objects as the jar and the like is all very well, on account of their being in contact with the sense-organs; specially as the forms of these things are independent of all other things; as for non-existence on the other hand, in as much as it is of a negative character, its very form depends upon that of which it is the negation and thus there being no other form for non-existence than the negation of that thing, any comprehension of it is impossible without the comprehension of that thing which is its counter-entity. The only difference between existence and non-existence is that, while the former is cognised as a positive entity by itself, the latter is cognised only as the negation of something else; as has been declared by the author of the Nyāyāvartika.

The difference between existence and non-existence is due to the fact of the former being by itself the cause of its own cognition and non-cognition, and the latter depending upon something else for both; that is to say that which exists is by itself the substratum of the means of cognition, while that which does not exist is so only in the form of the negation of something else.’ If non-existence also were cognised independently by itself, then it would in no way be different from existence; hence there can be no indeterminate cognition of non-existence. Then it has been argued that,—‘in the case cited above, was the cognition one of the house along with Devadatta, or that of the house apart from Devadatta? If the former, then the subsequent recalling could not be of the house alone; and if the latter, then the non-existence (of Devadatta) also will have been already perceived; and as such would only be remembered at the subsequent occasion’ But there is not much in this argument; because even though there be no cognition of the existence or non-existence of Devadatta (in the house), the house by itself could very well be cognised; hence there could be no cognition of the non-existence on the previous occasion; and in the absence of the previous cognition, the subsequent one could not be a case of remembrance. Nor is there any other means of knowledge available at the time. Consequently even though the counter-entity be not in close proximity, when this would she recalled by memory, there would be a cognition of non-existence; and the means of this cognition could only be in the form of the absence of sense-perception and the other four means of knowledge. The cognisability of non-existence by negation having thus been proved in one case, the same reasoning might be applied to all other cases (of the cognition of non-existence); and thus it must be admitted that Negation is a distinct means of knowledge.”

To the above we make the following reply: When the man has gone away from the house to some other place and is questioned as to the existence therein of Devadatta, does he cognise the non-existence of Devadatta at the time of the question, by means of his non-perception at the same time? Or does he cognise his non-existence at the previous time—in the form ‘he did not exist in the house at the time that I saw the house,—by means of bis non-perception there at that time? As ‘for the ‘non-perception at the present time’ (of the questioning), this would not be the ‘non-perception of the perceptible’ (which is regarded as the means of cognising non-existence); because of the house being hidden from view by the intervening space. And as for the non-existence of Devadatta in the house at the time of the question, it would be doubtful; as he might have come into it in the mean time; and as for the previous ‘non-perception,’—which alone could indicate his non-existence on the previous occasion, it could not continue up to the time of the question; as the conditions will have changed in the meantime. And when that ‘non-perception’ is not present at the time of the questioning, it could not bring about any cognition (of present non-existence); nor could it operate through being recalled to memory; as it has never before been cognised. That is to say, ‘non-perception’ is not cognisable by any other means of knowledge, being, as it is, of the nature of ‘non-existence’ or ‘negation’; and if it were to depend upon another ‘non-perception,’ (for its cognition), then there would be an endless series of ‘non-perceptions;’ and it is for this reason that it is maintained that like the sense-organs, ‘non-perception’ also brings about the cognition of its objective without being itself cognised. And such being the case, as it would never be cognised, how could there be any remembrance of it (as all remembrance is based upon a previous cognition)?

Objection: “The non-perception of Devadatta in the house is set aside only by his perception; but the man who has gone away from the house does not have a perception of him (in the house); and hence the previous non-perception would remain. It is true that the conditions of the observer will have changed (since he visited the bouse); but no change of conditions can alter the nature of things.”

Reply: This may be so in the case in question; but in a case where the non-existence of a thing has not been apprehended, on account of there being no remembrance of its counterentity,—and later on that thing, is met with in the place,—then there arises the idea that ‘this thing did not exist here before,’ with regard to its previous non-existence; what explanation will you have of this? As in this case the previous nonperception’ will have been set aside by the later ‘perception.’ Nor will the mere fact of its previous existence enable the ‘nonperception,’ even though non-existent at the subsequent time, to bring about any cognitions; as if this could be possible, then sensuous cognition also would be possible for one whose sense-organs have been destroyed.

Objection: “The presumption to-day does certainly set aside the non-perception of the same day: as for the previous non-perception, that remains; and this would be capable of pointing to the previous non-existence, which would be duly cognised by its means.”

Reply. What a wonderful learning and philosophic insight you display! ‘Non-perception’ is the previous negation of perception; and this is one only, extending up to the time of the appearance of the thing (when the non-perception ceases); and it does not become different with the difference in time, being the same to-day that it was yesterday; and then, who would be the clever person who could assert that the previous non-perception has been set aside, and that of to-day still remains,—an assertion that indicates an extreme nicety of discriminative faculty!

For these reasons then, we cannot understand how nonexistence can be rendered cognisable by negation; and we conclude that on the previous occasion (in the house) the observers apprehended the mere form of non-existence, and then on the subsequent occasion, having gone to the other place, he has the cognition of that same non-existence, following upon the remembrance of its counter-entity (Devadatta); and this would be a case of purely inferential cognition,—the process of inference involved being this: when a thing is such as is capable of being remembered at the remembrance of another thing, if the former is not remembered even though the desire to remember it is present (and the remembrance of the latter thing is also present), then it must follow that it did not exist at the time of the perception of the other thing; as for instance, when the mere place is remembered, there is remembrance of the jar whose non-existence had been previously cognised; and in the case question even though the temple is remembered, we do not remember Devadatta, even though he is quite capable of being remembered, and the desire to remember him is also present; and from thia it follows that he did not exist at the time that the temple was perceived; and this is a case of inference based upon non-rememberance.

Objection: “Of two things perceived together, it so happens that, on account of the impressions of one being stronger than those of the ether, while one is remembered, the other is, not; for instance, when a śloka is learnt, it so happens that when recalling the śloka to the mind, while we distinctly remember one line of it, the other line is not remembered at all; and in this case, one line being remembered, how could there be any inference of non-existence from the fact of the non-remembrance of the other line? Any such inference under the circumstances would not be conclusive.”

Reply: Even when two things may exist together, it may be that, owing to the nature of the causes (leading to perception), while one of them is perceived, there is no perception of the other. How then could the mere perception of the ground prove the non-existence of the jar (as it may be that while the causes for the perception of the former-ate fully operative, these the perception of the latter may not be equally efficient, even though it may be existing all the same)?

Objection: “When two things are related to one and the same cognition (e.g. the ground and the ‘jar’), then, if in any case only one of these happens to be perceived, the non-perception of

the other and not all non-perception—proves that this latter does not exist; e.g. the cognition that apprehends the ground, apprehends also the jar in contact with it; the accessories for the perception of the jar are the same as those for the perception of the ground; hence if the jar existed on the ground, then it would certainly be perceived when the ground is perceived; as the conditions for the perception of both are exactly the same; as a matter of fact however, in the case in question, the jar is not perceived; and hence it follows that it does not exist there; as its non-perception could not be otherwise possible.”

Reply: If it be so, for us then also, of two things related to the same cognition, if one is remembered and the other is not, then this non-remembrance would prove the non-existence of this latter; in the case in question, the conditions of the perception of the house are the same as those for the perception of Devadatta who is its correlative; and similarly the conditions of the remembrance of the house are the same as those of the remembrance of Devadatta; hence in as much as the house and Devadatta would both be related to the same cognition, if Devadatta had existed in the house at the time that the house was perceived, he would certainly have been remembered when the house was remembered; because of the conditions of the remembrance of both being the same; as a matter of fact however we find that he is not remembered; and hence we conclude that be did not exist in the house at the time; as his said nonremembrance, could not be otherwise explained. And this process of reasoning would be exactly similar to your own;

As for the Śloka, for the sake of proper pronunciation its words are read one after the other; and as such they are not connected with one and the same cognition; and those words whose impression may be stronger than that of others would be remembered, while the rest would not; and there would be nothing incongruous in this.

Thus then, even when an object is perceived at the present time, the cognition of its previous non-existence—in the form that ‘it did not exist before,’—is purely inferential, being; based upon the non-remembrance of its existence at the time when the previous existence of its counter-entity is remembered.

Some people hold that the absence of remembrance also is only a form of ‘Negation’ as a means of knowledge. But this view would be opposed to such declarations of the Bhāṣya as—‘Negation is only the absence of the other means of knowledge’ and also to the Vārtika which declares that ‘Negation is that where the five means of knowledge are not operative.’ So here; we drop this subject.

Others again maintain that, “in as much as there is no knowable thing of a negative character, it is not right to enter into any discussion as to the means of knowing it.”

To these people should be put the question—What is the substratum of the notion ‘this is not’? If it has no substratum, then a great lending hand is given to the Mahāyānikas (Bauddhas) who hold all notions to be without substratum. If then, the ground be regarded as the necessary substratum,(of the. notion ‘this is not’) then even when the ground would be studded with thorns, we would have the notion that ‘the thorn is not;’ and this would lead to our fearless passing and repassing over the ground; as there would be nothing to restrain us from; doing so.

Objection: It is with regard to the bare ground that we have the notion ‘it is not’; and as the presence of the thorns would; set aside the bareness of the ground, there could be no suck notion as ‘the thorn is not’; nor could there be any activity in accordance with this notion.”

Reply: Does bareness constitute the very form of the ground, or is it a distinct quality of it? If the former, then it could not be set aside even when the thorn would be cognised; and hence the absurdity of the said notion and activity would remain as before. If it be regarded as a distinct quality, then that would be admitting a distinct objective (as we regard negation to be).

Objection: “It is existence (i.e. an existing thing the ground f.i.) itself that has the two states of being alone, and of being with a second; and it is in the former state that it is known as ‘itself’ or ‘bare and when there is a desire to apprehend the jar &c., that are the counter-entities of the ‘bare’ ground, then the cognition of this bare ground brings about the notions and activities pertaining to the non-existence of these, jar and other things.”

Reply: What denotation of the word ‘alone,’ apart from the ground wherein the jar &c. are non-existent, have you established which you seek to make the substratum of the negative notion ‘it is not’? As a rule, unless there is a peculiarity in the object cognised, there can be no peculiarity in the cognition; not till then can there be any change in the activity of the agent.

Objection: “What we mean by alone is the singleness that is natural to all things.”

Reply. What is this ‘singleness’? Is it the absence of the counter-entity, or the number ‘one’? As for the number ‘one,’ it will remain as long as its substratum exists, and as such would continue to exist even on the occasion of the object being accompanied by a second. If the natural ‘singleness’ be regarded as the absence of the counter-entity,—then the existence of a distinct object of cognition becomes admitted.

Objection: “Even for one who accepts negation as a distinct cognisable thing,—it is the apprehension of the bare ground that becomes the cause of the cognition of negation; as until the ground has been apprehended, there can be no cognition of any negation or non-existence therein. But the cognition that ‘the thorn does not exist’ cannot be due to the apprehension of the ground as devoid of thorns; as if the apprehension of the ground qualified by non-existence were the canse of the cognition of the ‘non-existence,’—then it would come to this: the apprehension of the non-existence (of thorns) would bring aboutṛ the apprehension of the ground as qualified by that non-existence; and the apprehension of the ground as qualified by that non-existence would lead to the apprehension of the non-existence; and thus this latter cognition would become its own cause. For these reasons, it must be admitted even by you that of the ground there is a certain condition of ‘being alone,’ which is independent of all touch with the counter-entity, and which is distinct from ‘negation’ or ‘non-existence’; and that the apprehension of that condition brings about the cognition of non-existence; and it is this that for ns brings about the notion ‘this does not exist’.

Reply: This is not right; as it is the apprehension of the form of the ground itself that is the cause of the cognition of non-existence. Nor would there be any chance of the cognition, of this non-existence even when the ground would be perceived along With something else; as like the apprehension of the ground, the direct contact of non-existence with the sense-organs also is a necessary condition of the cognition of non-existence and when there would be any such thing as thorn and the like on the ground, then, in as much as there would not be nonexistence, there would be no contact of the sense-organs with that non-existence; and hence even though the apprehension of the ground would be there, there would be no cognition of non-existence. As for instance, even though such aids to vision as the eye and the proper amount of light are present, yet a thing that does not exist in the place is never cognised.

Thus the fact of ‘Non-existence’ being a distinct object of cognition has been established.

This ‘Non-existence’ is of four kinds: (1) Prāgabhāva, ‘Previous non-existence,’ (2) Pradhvaṃsābhāva, Destruction, (3) Itaretarābhāva, ‘mutual negation,’ and (4) Atyantābhāva, ‘Absolute non-existence.’

(1) As an instance of ‘Previous non-existence,’ we have the non-existence of the effect in the cause, prior to its being produced. Prior to the appearance of the effect, there is its nonexistence, and this Previous non-existence, even though without beginning, is yet transient; as it is destroyed by the appearance of the effect; as if it were not destroyed then the effect would not be produced.

Question. “What would be the destruction of Previous non-existence!”

Answer: It would consist in the appearance of the effect.

Objection: “In that case, when the object will have ceased to exist, there would be a likelihood of perceiving its ‘Previous non-existence.’”

Reply: Not so; because like the object, its constituent particles also, when operating towards their effects, constitute the ‘destruction’ of the Previous non-existence.

(2) ‘Destruction, Pradhvaṃsābhāva, consists in the falling of of the object from its real nature. And even though this has a beginning, yet it is eternal; as the object (that has under-gone destruction) is never again perceived.

Question: “The ‘beginning’ of a thing consisting in its coming into existence from previous non-existence,—what would be the ‘previous non-existence’ of Destruction?”

Answer: The ‘previous non-existence’ of Destruction would consist in the normal condition of the existence of the object of which it is the destruction. And just as the appearance of an object is the disappearance of its ‘previous non-existence,’ so the appearance of Destruction would constitute the disappearance or cessation of its ‘previous non-existence.’ It would not be right to urge the objection that, “that which is a non-entity, how could there be a ‘non-existence’ of that?”—as no objection can rightly be taken to what is in the nature of things.

(3) The negation of the cow in the horse, and vice versa constitutes ‘mutual negation.’ And this is one and the same everywhere, and is eternal; as even when one object is destroyed, it is recognised just the same in another object,—just like “generality.” That is to say, just as ‘generality’ becomes connected with whatever object may be brought into existence by unseen forces, and its externality belongs to it by its very nature,—just so does ‘mutual negation,’ also; but there is this difference: the generality is cognised on the mere apprehension of the object, whereas the apprehension of the mutual negation of an object stands in need of the cognition of the counter-entity (the correlative); as it is comprehensible only in regard to the form of another thing.

(4) ‘Absolute non-existence’ consists in the negation of what has no existence at all.

Objection: “‘Absolute non-existence’ is nothing other than mutual negation.”

Reply: It is a wonder how you go astray even on a high road! While ‘mutual negation’ consists in the negation of identity between two such things as the cow and the horse, each of whom has a well-known form of its own,—in ‘absolute nonexistence’ we have a negation, not limited by space or time, of something that has no existence at all, and which is only imposed upon the mind; e.g. there is no other object of cognition apart from the six ‘categories;’ and if ‘absolute non-existence' were not admitted, then it would be absolutely impossible to arrive at any such restriction as that ‘there are only six categories.’