1. The concept of Reality in Early Buddhism

Vedic Scholars till the time of the Buddha is divided into three ideological groups. The first group belongs to traditionalists for whom Vedas are the most authentic and divine source of knowledge. The second group belongs to the thought of the Araṇyakas and Early Upaniṣadas for whom not only scriptures but reasoning and metaphysical postulation are the source of ultimate truth. The last group belongs to the middle and late Upaniṣadas for whom scriptures and reason as sources of knowledge are insufficient. Rather for them, by continuous practice of meditation one can have a personal and direct experience of reality. The division in terms of the above three groups can be exemplified by following strands of schools. The Brahmins who hold the authority of the Vedas are come under the category of first group. The metaphysicians of the early Upaniṣadas, the sceptics, the materialists, and a master of Ājīvakas come under the category of second group. Some scholars of the middle and late Upaniṣadas, some of the Ājīvakas, the Jainas and the materialists fall into the category of third group. It is the third variety which was hold by the Buddha. He emphasises on intuitive knowledge which is the true mirror of reality.

The Buddhist notion of reality (satya) originated in the Pāli Tipiṭaka.^[1] There are two conceptions of reality in the Pāli Abhidhammapiṭaka, which are as follows:

1. Paramārthasatya (absolute reality) is the truth by ultimate analysis. It signifies ultimate truth in its real nature (svabhāva). The ultimate truth is consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasika), matter (rūpa), Nirvāṇa etc.

2. Saṃvṛtisatya (conventional truth) is the truth in the sense of the empirical world. The conventional world is the world of communication in day to day life. Man, chair, river, roads, trees, etc., are real in the sense of conventional truth, but they are not truth in the sense of the ultimate reality.

The evidence of the distinction between paramārthasatya and saṃvṛtisatya can be found in the Pāli Suttantapiṭaka. However, these two words are not used in this canon, but their meanings appear familiar in the Pāli suttantapiṭaka.

In Saṃyuttanikāya of the Pāli Suttantapiṭaka, it is mentioned:

“Oh! Māra (lord of evil) how you can regard the combination of five aggregates (pañcakkhandha) as “being (satta)” since there is not being (satta); there are only five aggregates. Just as the term “ear” is used to call owing to the composition of various instruments. In the same manner, because the aggregates are there, the concept “living-being (satta)” exists.”^[2]

“When Arhat who understands the concept of conventional world says that I am speaking or he is speaking to me, etc. He only says for the sake of conventional truth.”^[3]

“They are conventional; language, words and concepts, the Buddha (Tathāgato) uses to speak, but does not cling.”^[4]

All these passages declare that the difference between Paramārthasatya and Saṃvṛtisatya are familiar in the Pāli Suttantapiṭaka.

The above phrases of the Buddha show that the true nature of all things as aniccatā (impermanence), dukkhatā (suffering), and anattatā (selflessness), it is experienced by Arhats (the monks who are wise and free from all kinds of imagination). Arhats understand the law of dependent origination. They understand that what is called a person or puggala is nothing, but an aggregate of pañcakkhandha (the five aggregates). These aggregates are also impermanent. The Arhats being aware of the impermanence of all things, they use the ordinary language for communication to other people, but they do not bind to them.

The Buddha had acknowledged that ordinary language is necessary which is refer to conventional truths, but he mentioned that one should not enslaved by these conventional truths.

The three characteristics of existence (Tri-laḳṣaṇa) impermanence, suffering and Noself are associated with one another because according to Buddha, everything in this world is impermanent and that which is impermanent is subject to suffering and whatever is impermanent and suffering is also without self. So, these three are related to each other and once we understand that existence is characterized by impermanence, suffering, and not-self, we eliminate our attachment to existence. Once we eliminate our attachment to existence, we can attain the bliss of Nirvāṇa. The notions of dukkhatā (suffering) and anattatā (selflessness) of all things determine the characteristics of Buddha’s doctrine known as anattavāda (theory of selflessness). The notion of aniccatā (impermanence) of all things determines the characteristics of the Buddha’s doctrine called khaṇikavāda (theory of momentariness). In reality, the Buddha’s teachings are pragmatic instead of purely theoretical.

The doctrine of Tri-laḳṣaṇa plays an important role in our daily life. When we understand that all things are impermanent, transitory, are full of suffering and are without self, and when our understanding of these truths is not only intellectual but by study and by practicing meditation they become part of our immediate experience. By understanding the theory of Tri-laḳṣaṇa, we will have freed ourselves from the fundamental problems that imprison us within the cycle of birth and death-the error of seeing objects as permanent, the error of seeing objects as pleasant and the error of seeing things as self. When these errors are removed, wisdom arises. And when wisdom arises one can attain peace and the bliss of Nirvāṇa.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Aṅguttaranikāya. Aṭṭhakathā, 1/100. As presented in DB., pp.87-88; Aṅguttaranikāya. Aṭṭhakathā. I. (The Pāli Text Society), 95.

[2]:

“Kimi nu sattoti paceceti māra diṭṭhigataṃ nu te Suddhasankhārapunjo yaṃ nayitha sattupalabbhati Yathā hi aṅgasambhāra hoti saddo ratho iti evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti sattoti sammati.” Saṃyuttanikāya Sagāthavagga, (Vol.15, Bangkok), 554.

[3]:

“Yo hoti bhikkhu arahaṃ katāvī Khīnāsavo antimadehadhāri ahaṃ vadantīpi so vadeyya loke samaññāṃ kusalo viditvā vohāramatiena so vohāreyyāti.” Saṃyuttanikāya Sagathavagga. (Vol. 15, Bangkok), 65.

[4]:

“Imā kho lokasamaññā lokaniruttiyo lokavohārā lokapaññattiyo yāhi tathāgato voharati aparāmasantoti”. Dīghanikāya Silakhadhavagga. (Vol.9, Bangkok) 312.