Text 117

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 117:

अनेन निदर्शनाभासा निरस्ता भवन्ति । तद्यथा नित्यः शब्दोऽमूरत्वात् यद् अमूर्तं दृष्टं तन् नित्यं यथा परमाणुर्यथा कर्म यथा स्थाली यथा तमः अम्बरवद् इति यद् द्रव्यं तत् क्रियावद् दृष्टम् इति च लिङ्गानुमेयोभयाश्रयासिद्धाननुगतविपरीतानुगताः साधर्म्यनिदर्शनाभासाः । यद् अनित्यं तन् मूरतं दृष्टं यथा कर्म यथा परमाणुर्यथाकाशं यथा तमः घटवत् यन् निष्क्रियं तद् अद्रव्यञ्चेति लिङ्गानुमेयोभयाव्यावृत्ताश्रयासिद्धाव्यावृत्तविपरीतव्यावृत्ता वैधर्म्यनिदर्शनाभासा इति ॥ ११७ ॥

anena nidarśanābhāsā nirastā bhavanti | tadyathā nityaḥ śabdo'mūratvāt yad amūrtaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tan nityaṃ yathā paramāṇuryathā karma yathā sthālī yathā tamaḥ ambaravad iti yad dravyaṃ tat kriyāvad dṛṣṭam iti ca liṅgānumeyobhayāśrayāsiddhānanugataviparītānugatāḥ sādharmyanidarśanābhāsāḥ | yad anityaṃ tan mūrataṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathā karma yathā paramāṇuryathākāśaṃ yathā tamaḥ ghaṭavat yan niṣkriyaṃ tad adravyañceti liṅgānumeyobhayāvyāvṛttāśrayāsiddhāvyāvṛttaviparītavyāvṛttā vaidharmyanidarśanābhāsā iti || 117 ||

Text (117): The above definition of ‘Instance’ sets; aside all false or wrong Instances. For instance, we have the argument—‘Sound is eternal, because it is immaterial’; and in corroboration of this we meet with the ‘Instance’—‘whatever is found to be immaterial is also eternal’,—e.g., (1) the Atom, (2) Action, (3) the Dish, (4) Darkness, (5) like ‘Ākāśa,’ and (6) ‘that which is a substance has always been found to have action or mobility.’ Here we have examples respectively of the six kinds of the ‘false Instance by affirmation:’ viz. (1) the ‘unknown indicative’ (2) the ‘unknown subject’ (3) ‘unknown indicative and subject’ (4) not applying to its own substratum, (5) the unconnected or incoherent, and (6) connected with the contrary.’ Similarly we have—‘that is which is noneternal is material,’—as (1) action,(2) atom (3) ‘like ākāśa,’ (4) darkness, (5) like the jar, (6) ‘that which is immobile is not a substance’—as examples respectively of the six kinds of the ‘false instance by negation by contraries’: viz.: (1) not excluded from the ‘indicative’ (2) not excluded from the ‘subject’ (3) not precluded from both, (4) not applying to its own substratum, (5) Non-preclusive and (5) Precluded from the contrary.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

There are some instances which, though not really corroborating the conclusion, appear as if they were corroborative; and as such they are like Instances; and these ‘false instances’ become excluded by the aforesaid definition of the Instance as no ‘false instance’ can satisfy the conditions therein laid down. In as much as we could neither avow the wrong Instance in our own arguments, nor detect them in those of others, unless we knew the form in which such instances generally crop up, the author proceeds to show some examples of these ‘Sound is eternal, &c.’ Here, in this argument we have examples of six kinds of ‘False Instance’ (1) In the argument ‘Sound is eternal because it is immaterial like the atom,’ we have an example of the Instance not applying to the ‘indicative mark;’ as the ‘atom’ (the Instance) is devoid of ‘immateriality’ (the indicative put forward). (2) In support of the same argument the citing of ‘action’ as the corroborative instance would be an example of the ‘Instance not applying to the Subject;’ as ‘action’ is devoid of ‘eternality.’ (3) The citing of the ‘dish’ as an instance corroborating the same argument would be an example of the ‘instance not applying to either the Indicative or the Object;’ as the ‘dish’ has neither ‘eternality,’ the ‘subject,’ nor ‘immateriality, the ‘indicative.’ (4) The. case of ‘darkness’ cited in the same connection would be- the example of the Instance not applying to its own substratum;’ as in reality there is no such thing as ‘darkness;’ and as such, wherein could the concomitance of the Subject and the Indicative be shown 7 (5) If the Instance were cited in the form like ākāśa (without an accompanying general statement.) It would be an example of the ‘unconnected or incoherent Instance;’ though in ākāśa, there are both ‘eternality’ and ‘immateriality,’ yet all that the arguer says is ‘like Ākāśa,’ and not ‘that whatever is immaterial;’ is eternal; and until the person to whom the argument is addressed, has comprehended the peculiar relationship between the ‘subject’ (eternality) and the ‘inferential indicative’ (immateriality), he could not (from the words ‘like Ākāśa’) recognise the fact of the existence of the two in Ākāśa’; and hence this would be a case of the ‘Unconnected Instance.’ (6) The declaration that ‘whatever is a substance is found to have mobility’ would be an example of the ‘Instance connected with the contrary;’ as in the argument ‘Air is a substance because it is mobile’ we have found all cases of mobility to be pervaded by substantiality; and all pervasion is so constituted that it is restricted to that which, is pervaded, and it does not belong to both the pervader and the pervaded, like Conjunction, which extends equally to both members of the relationship: and the reason for this peculiarity of pervasion lies in the fact that the pervader is not always accompanied by the. pervaded. Even in a case of ‘equal pervasion’—e.g. in the case of ‘non-eternality’and ‘causedness’—where the relation of pervasion is interchangeable (both being of equal extension), though the pervaded also has the character of the pervader, yet the pervasion, in either case, would rest in that which would be represented as the pervaded in that case, and not in that which would be put forward as the pervader; and it is always possible for this latter (as the pervader) to exist where the other (as the pervaded) is absent. This has been thus declared by the Teachers: ‘Though inreality the pervaded is taken up by the character of the pervader, yet the pervader could not prove the pervaded, as it is found in cases of the absence of the latter, and as such would be incompatible.’ Hence the pervasion should always be put forward as resting on the, pervaded—i.e., in the case in question we should have it stated in the form’ that which is mobile is a substance’ (where) ‘mobility’ is the ‘pervaded’ and ‘substantiality’ the pervader)—and not as resting on the pervader,—i.e., in the form ‘that which is a substance is mobile;’ becauserthe pervader ‘substantiality’ is not always accompanied by the pervaded, ‘ mobility.’

The compound ‘liṅgānumeya &c.’=those of which the ‘liṅga’and the rest are ‘asiddha,’ ‘unknown’ or ‘unrecognised.’

The author proceeds to describe the ‘false instances of negation That which is non-eternal, &c. (1) In connection with the argument—‘Sound is eternal because it is immaterial as that which is material, is non-eternal, as action, the citing of, ‘action’ constitutes an example of the ‘Contrary Instance not precluded from the Indicative;’ as Action is not material (2) In regard to the same argument, the citing of ‘atom’ would be an example of the ‘Contrary Instance not precluded from the Subject;’ as the ‘subject’ eternality is not precluded from the Atom (which is eternal). (3) The case of ‘Ākāśa’ would be a ‘contrary instance not precluded from either the Indicative or the Subject;’ as neither ‘immateriality ' nor ‘eternality’ is precluded from Ākāśa. (4) The case of ‘Darkness would be a ‘contrary instance not applying to its own substratum;’ as in reality there is no such thing as ‘Darkness;’ and as such wherein could the preclusion of the ‘Subject' and ‘Indicative’ subsist? (5) The case of the ‘jar’ would be the ‘non-pre-cluded Contrary Instance;’ though in the jar we have the preclusion of both the ‘Subject’ (eternality) and the ‘Indicative’ (Immateriality), yet, as long as the arguer does not accompany the citing of the instance with the general statement—‘that which is non-eternal is material,’—the preclusion of the ‘Subject.’ and the ‘Indicative’ can not be duly comprehended by the person to whom the argument is addressed; and as such the Instance is called ‘non-precluded.’ (6) The statement ‘that which is immobile is not a substance’ is an example of the ‘Contrary Instance precluded from the contrary.’ Just as the ‘Subject’ is the pervader and the ‘Indicative’ the pervaded, so in the same manner is the ‘negation of the Subject’ the pervaded and the ‘negation of the Indicative’ the pervader’, so has been declared—‘the relationship of the pervader and pervaded perceived in two positive things, will be found to be reversed in the case of their negations or contraries.’ In accordance with this law, when we have the argument—‘Air is a substance because it is mobile,’ if we mean to show an instance of the ‘concomitance of contraries’ we should put forward the statement—‘that which is not a substance is iminobile;’ but the instance cited above is not in his form, but in the form—‘that which is immobile is not a substance;’ but as a matter of fact, there is no such invariable concomitance (between; ‘absence of mobility’ and ‘unsubstantially)’ as is implied in this assertion; as we find in the case of Ākāśa that, though it is immobile, yet it is a substance; hence the instance in question is the ‘Contrary Instance precluded from Contraries.’

The compound ‘liṅgānumeya &c.,’ means those of whom the Indicative &c., are not precluded; ‘āśrayāsiddha’ is that of which the substratum, is unknown; and among the. other members we have the Dvandva or the Copulative Compound.