Manas (Mind)

According to Naiyāyikas, Manas or Mind is the single form of an atom. It unites with the outward sensual organs in order. It is the reason why all types of knowledge do not arise at the same time. This also is a proof for the difference between the intellect and the act of knowing. The appearance and disappearing of knowledge takes place because of these. Since the intellect and the act of knowing are different, one does not get the knowledge of a particular thing when the mind is absorbed in some other thing. The outward sensual organs become capable of receiving the knowledge by the contact of manas. The intellect which is the support of actions has no actions for itself. So the role of mind is very important in receiving knowledge.

According to Mīmāṃsakas, manas or mind is all pervading, but not an atom. Since the mind possesses such a quality it will not have any action. Mind is, according to them, always connected with the sensual organs. The reason for not receiving all types of knowledge at the same time is due to the atomic nature of mind.Eye receives the knowledge of objects both far and near, at the same time. But the objects behind the wall cannot be received by the eye since the rays which carry the form of objects would not travel through opaque objects.

According to the Naiyāyikas, Manas or Mind is not all pervading. It is in the form of an atom. It is already proved that mind is an inner instrument and it is eternal. The mind is one and its action of receiving knowledge is different. The knowledge born through eyes, the knowledge born through nose, the knowledge of form, the knowledge of smell, etc, prove the above fact. If the action and the activator are the same the above said difference will not exist. Moreover, according to the Naiyāyaikas, the knower is soul and not the mind.

The Sāṅkhyas say that the action of mind is knowledge. When the organs like eye, nose, etc, are related with the concerned objects, the knowledge sometimes is not seen raised due to the absorption of mind in some other objects. This view of Sāṅkhyas is refuted by Naiyāyikas by saying that man alone knows and not the inner instrument. He who knows alone is absorbed in other objects also. The mind is not the knower, but the soul. Mind may or may not unite with sensual organs. But it has nothing to do with the desire of soul which alone knows things.

The opponents do not accept the internal organ as one different from the actions. According to them, though the actions are different they all produce a single feeling. When there is no difference with the internal organ, the action also cannot differ. When objects of different colors are brought before a white jewel, the feeling of different colors is got from it. Likewise, the different types of knowledge born through eyes, nose, etc., are the same since there is no differencebetween the inner organ and the actionsof receiving.

The Naiyāyika’s do not agree with this. They say that there is no proper reason why the jewel shows different colors when different objects are brought before that. The question is whether the difference is caused of the difference in the jewel or not. If the difference is seen differently existing from the jewel, the example given will be a false one. If the jewel is not different from different types of colors then how this feeling of difference arise in it. Thus the Naiyāyikas try to prove that the mind is one and it is different from its actions of knowledge.

Knowledge of different objects is bornthrough different organs. Sāṅkhyas find the knowledge as one irrespective of the difference felt. But Naiyāyikas do not find this view of Sāṅkhyas correct. There is difference in the knowledge acquired by the tongue and nose. So the difference is real. Knowledge of different objects is received by the external organs in order. The knowledge thus acquired perishes at the third moment.So the difference in knowledge is as real as the smell entirely different from the taste. According to the Naiyāyikas, the soul, the receiver of knowledge, is one.

The Bauddhas’‘kṣaṇikavāda’ drew attention of scholars. According to them, the knowledge, the object of knowledge and the receiver of knowledge are different. They view Sāṅkhyas in a different way. According to the Bauddhas, since all things undergo a destruction at the next moment, the jewel which reflects the objects would also be differentat the next moment. The objects placed in front of a jewel would also undergo a change at the next moment. The different colours like green, red, blue, etc., which getreflected in the white jewel, cannot be taken as a proof for the different kinds of knowledge unless the jewel is stable. The view of Śāṅkhyas may be correct. But an unstable jewel, changing at each moment would not be an example for a single ‘whole’knowledge. Though the momentariness of objects is not visible it can be guessed by the growth of organs. According to the Bauddhas, that which survives would be momentary.^[1] The jewel resembles the body. The difference that occurs in both the body and the jewel is real, but not visible. The Bauddhas are of opinion thatthe objects undergodestruction at every moment giving birth to new objects of the kind.

The Naiyāyikas refute the above ideas by saying that there is no solid proof to determine the momentariness of the objects. It cannot be proved either by perception or inference. There is no proper authority to say that each object is different at the next moment. People deal with different objects as they are visible to them. One can consider those objects as unstable if they are seen changing at each moment. At the same time, an object which is seen not different from the previous moment cannot, at any way, be considered unstable. The growth or loss is not seen in objects like rock, sand, etc., by which their stability cannot be questioned. In the case of jewel also neither growth nor loss is seen happening. So, in order to prove the argument of others wrong, the Bauddhas should not depend on a new theory of ‘momentariness’. The bitterness tasted in the leaf of a tree should not be bought a proof for its presence in other trees. Hence the momentariness observed in a body cannot be generalized as existing in all such objects in the world.^[2]

The Naiyāyikas further say that the growth of an object is visible when it is born. Similarly, the separation of objects is felt after their destruction. But the Bauddhas believe that all objects undergo destruction at each moment letting the new objects to be born. But there is no reason to believe the momentariness of a body which is but imaginary. When the same object is observed at the next moment, there is no proof for the momentariness of an object. This argument is not accepted by the Bauddhas. They say that when the milk is turned to curd, the milk gets destroyed. But the process lies invisible. Similarly the destruction takes place quite invisible that stands for the momentariness of the object.^[3]

The Naiyāyikas do not agree with this view of Bauddhas. When the milk is turned to curd, the minute particles of milk undergoing a change is cognizable. It causes the origination of curd which is entirely different in taste from milk. Thus the destruction of milk and the origination of curd are decided by inference. But this is not the case with other objects like jewel, etc. They are seen not changing by time. So the momentariness cannotbe taken a natural phenomenon as observed by the Bauddhas.

In this the Vārtikakāra’s commentary needs to be noted. The touch of jewel at times causes a burning feeling, while a sense of chillness is at another time. The hotness of an object is a proof for the presenceof heat and chillness for the want of heat. Two opposite properties felt in an object is a sign for its changing which again will favor only its momentariness. The commentator concludes by observing the mingling of different organs the presence of different organs causing the diversity in feelings representing hot and cold.

Sāṅkhyas explain the cause of change occurring in materials in a different way. While an object undergoes a change it is not destroyed for a new one, as Bauddhas say. But this change occurs in the property of the object which undergoes change. The difference in property makes the object a new one.

This view of Sāṅkhyas is not accepted by Naiyāyikas. They hold the view that an object cannot restore its old form when its properties undergo a change.When curd is formed from milk, the previous arrangements of atoms in milk undergo a change. As a result, the parts of milk undergo a separation and unite in a different method during the formation of curd. It is thus inferred that when a new object comes into existence the old one gets away from scene. Though a pot is formed from sand, a definite change occurs in the part of sand which makes the pot entirely different from the sand. Analyzing the above arguments the author of Nyāyasūtras proclaim his opinion by an Sūtra.^[4] It cannot be said that the destruction and origination of the objects like jewel cannot be said as similar to the formation of curd from milk. There is no special reason to prove these. Also it cannot be compared with the destruction and origination of a pot. When a pot is made or destructed a cause behind it clearly comes to sight. But it is not the case with a jewel. The reason for its destruction or origination is not seen. The argument of the Bauddhas in the case of jewels has no evidence since the destruction and origination in the case of jewels are not visible. A change in milk for curd is clear.

At the same time, the author of Nyāyasūtras accepts the fact that a reason cannot be denied when it can be inferred from the result. If somebodyis aware of the origination and destruction of a jewel the cause behind this also might be made clear. Without proper reason nothing can be accepted or denied.This also should be accepted as an example since the denial of this also is not possible. Moreover, it cannot be said that there is no reason for the origination and destruction of a jewel as in curd which comes from milk. Without a cause nothing will be originated or destroyed. One will be forced to infer the reason for the destruction and origination that happens in the case of milk and curd. Thus from the above arguments, the Naiyāyaikas try to prove that buddhi (intellect) in not stable,but noneternal.

Analyzing the Indian philosophy, one can come to a conclusion that the aim of almost all darśanas was to attain knowledge. When one achieves some kind of knowledge, there is the participation of soul, mind and the sensual organs. So, naturally, the doubt arises to which one of these, the knowledge belongs. The knowledge cannot be the quality of the sensual organs or the objects known through these because the knowledge exists even when the organs or the objects perish. One has the knowledge of the object he has seen. The organs or the objects have nothing to do with this knowledge once it is derived. When one remembers somebody whom he has seen before the object of this knowledge is not before his eyes at that time. If the organ or the object is considered the knower, the above said knowledge cannot arise at their absence. At the same time, the knowledge derived by the contact of organ and object is a different one. Such knowledge will not arise in the absence oforgan or object. But a knowledge produced by remembering something is definitely different from the current knowledge mentioned. Remembrance will not occur if the person who remembers does not exist. According to Nyāya, one cannot remember something which is seen by another. Manas or mind also cannot be considered as the knower. According to Nyāya, mind is also an organ which dwells inside. So when the outward organs cannot be considered the knower of objects, mind also cannot be considered so by the same reason.

Mind is proved to be existing by its peculiar nature of relating with each organ of different types. When the sensual organs and the objects to be received by each organ are present one does not get all types of knowledge at the same time. This is the reason to know that there is the sixth organ namely manas hidden inside. One gets the knowledge of a particular object at a time due to the contact of mind with the concerned organ at that time. If mind is the knower one cannot find a reason why all sorts of knowledge are not attained together. So it is decided that the knower is ātma or soul. He is independent. He has the liberty to accept the knowledge if he likes. So the abode of knowledge is nobody, else than soul. Naturally an instrument is dependent of the knower. If the mind is considered as the abode of knowledge it will lose the quality of an instrument. At the same time, the Naiyāyikas are aware of the fact that the feeling of pleasure and the remembrance are all attained by the help of the inward instrument called manas. In this stage, the mind which is the abode of such knowledge can be named as soul. And the instrument which helps to perceive the involved pain and pleasure is called mind. Thus there is difference only in the name and not in the object.

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, Manas or Mind is vibhu, that is all pervading. The Naiyāyikas say that if the mind is considered all pervading there is the danger of achieving all kinds of knowledge derived from all different types of organs, since the mind always has the contact with all organs. The opponents say that the same problem will arise even when the soul is considered as the abode of knowledge. Soul is also all pervading by which it can get all types of knowledge due to its contract with all types of organs. In reply, the Naiyāyikas say that the above argument will not concede to conclusion since the mind, the instrument of soul as well as the carrier of knowledge does not contact with all organs at the same time. When one gets the knowledge of smell or taste, there is not only the contact of the concerned organs with the concerned objects, but the mind also has a contact with the above said organs which are under action. It happens because the mind is in the form of an atom. It cannot come into contact with several objects at a particular time. So there is no harm in accepting the soul as the abode of knowledge. Moreover, the Naiyāyikas remark that the inference produced by the opponents is not supported by proper reason. Moreover they keep run regarding the role of mind in the process of getting knowledge. Merely saying that the soul, the outward organs and the objects alone are responsible for the knowledge produced is simply stupid. An inference not supported by suitable reason or necessary parts will get denied by itself.

The opponents then doubt about the eternity of knowledge. If soul or Ātma is the abode of knowledge then the knowledge derived will not disappear due to the eternity of its support. The quality will perish due to two reasons. One is when the abode of that quality is destroyed. The other is when a different quality emerges to replace it. The first cannot be the reason since the soul which is called the abode of knowledge is eternal. It does not perish at any time. So the second one should be taken as the reason for the destruction of previous knowledge. The Naiyāyikas say that the quality of knowledge is like sound which undergoes destruction. The first word uttered disappears while using the second one. Similarly the first knowledge also takes leave while the second one appears. All the living beings have the experience that the knowledge acquired by them does not exist for ever. Knowledge, in that sense, is non-eternal. First, one gets the knowledge of a pot. Then he gets a feeling that he has known about the pot. This secondary knowledge destroys the previous one. From this it is inferred that the first born quality of knowledge is destroyed by the second one which acts as an opponent. Thus the Naiyāyikas try to prove that there is no reason to doubt the eternity of knowledge.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge or thought is non eternal, where as soul or Ātma which is the abode of knowledge is eternal. The Naiyāyikas accept three saṃskāras (mental impressions). One among them is bhāvana which is the abode of memories. Almost all experiences create new memories in mind. The mental impressions reproduce these memories at a later period. The opponents raise a doubt regarding this. If the union of soul and mind causes memories, there is no reason resist why all memories being produced at the same time. So when the knowledge is accepted as a quality of soul, there is every possibility of the emerging of several memories at the same time.

The Naiyāyikas, in reply, say that the mental impression formed by a single piece of knowledge unites with a certain field of soul. The soul and the mind unite with that particular field of soul at a particular time. So when the mind unites with the particular field with which the mental impression is connected, the being gets the particular memory appeared in his mind. It is because of this that the danger of several memories appearing at the same time is removed.

Manas or mind dwells inside the body. There it works to produce knowledge. On refuting the argument of the opponents, the Naiyāyikas make it clear that the mind unites with a certain field of soul. The opponents say that it cannot be so since the soul, which is all pervading, has some of its fields inside the body and the rest, outside. Manas are in the form of an atom and it rests inside the body. So there can be no union of mind with that field of soul which is not inside. At the same time, knowledge will not be produced unless the mind unites with the soul. So Naiyāyikas cannot claim that they have found out the reason why all kinds of memories do not born at the same time.

Soul along with body united with mind is said as life. This union takes place according to its previous deeds. Mind dwells inside the body until death or the end of that life. Even though the soul which is all pervading has got several of its fields outside the body, the mind cannot unite with them at any cause. Since the mind has connection with the fields of the soul inside the body, the objection raised by the opponents needs no reply.

The Naiyāyikas try to find out an answer for the question. They say that there is no evidence to prove that mind does not produce knowledge outside the body. They say that life is nothing but an essence of deeds which always tends to produce effect. There is no union of mind in this essence of deeds. So life cannot be manifested as something like the dwelling of mind inside the body. Hence it cannot be proved that mind dwells inside the body. The man, who remembers, bears a body at the time of his remembering. It is a common truth that soul cannot remember anything without a body. It leads to the conclusion that mind dwells inside the body only. On remembering, the mind with the desire is tempted to the object of remembrance. One remembers something even after a very long time since getting the experience. The man who remembers should essentially have a body of his own. So when the action of remembering takes place, the soul, manas, the remembering of mind along with the effort of soul, the concentration on the object, etc, takes place. All these actions take place for remembering. The union of mind with soul is said responsible for the effort of carrying the body and temptation. If the mind, as the opponents say, goes out of the body, the effort of carrying the body will cease. As a result, the body due to its weight will fall on the ground. From this they make clear that the two types of efforts are resulted by the union of mind and soul. So the opponents cannot say that the mind does not reside inside the body.

The opponents do not agree, with this argument of the Naiyāyikas. They say that the body does not an even if the mind goes beyond it. It is because the mind or manas is having a high speed. By which it can come again to the body even after its union with outside. So the mind, if needed, can have the union with the external field of soul. There is another possibility of its producing an effort essential for supporting the body before going out of it. So there is no chance of falling the body since it is supported better earlier. The mind cans simultaneously do two works of remembering and supporting the body due to its extraordinary speed. The opponents claim that they have succeeded in their argument of proving the possibility of mind dwelling beyond the body also. The Naiyāyikas do not agree with this argument of the opponents. They say that there is no law which can bind the period of remembering.^[5] One can remember a thing which is experienced by him before. Some experiences are remembered quickly while others with much time. In the case of delayed remembering, the remembered, at first, desires to remember something. Then the mind visualizes several things at the same time. Among them, the particular object is tried to be remembered, after ignoring the others. From this phenomenon, it is clear that the mind takes much time as far as the delayed remembering takes place. So the argument of the opponents, who say that mind travels with a high speed, cannot be true.

The Naiyāyikas, further say that the mind cannot remember something without depending on body. The bodily experience of pleasure or pain depends on mind and soul. So the contact of mind and soul with the body is essential for the remembering that takes place depending on them. The soul, the knower of things, gets the experience of pleasure or pain in the body. So the soul cannot have the knowledge of pleasure or pain if the mind to be united goes beyond the body. If it is argued that the soul can experience anything united with mind, though gone beyond the body, then the body will have no role in obtaining knowledge.

A group of the Naiyāyikas try to prove the same thing in a different manner. According to them, there will be no contact of soul with mind beyond the body. Such a contact can happen under three conditions. The soul should tempt the mind to remember something. In such a case, the soul should have the knowledge of the object to be remembered while tempting. So the remembering already takes place without the effort of mind. The soul who is the knower just passes its experience to the mind. So the contact between soul and mind beyond the body cannot take place for the sake of remembering. From this argument they try to prove that the soul cannot knowingly tempt the mind to remember something.

It cannot be said that the soul unites with a mind accidentally. No contact takes place accidentally. Thus the second condition is also proved not existing. In order to accept a contact between soul and mind beyond the body, the mind should be accepted as the knower. But according to the Naiyāyikas, the knower is soul and not mind.

Soul possesses a quality called bhāvana(apprehension) which results in remembering. So there is no meaning in the contact of mind with apprehension for the sake of a new remembrance. The soul though possesses a desire to remember something, it remembers only after a long time. In other words, remembering does not happen all at a sudden. The mind cannot be said the abode of knowledge since the soul alone is the knower. Thus some scholars of Nyāya philosophy try to deny the contact of soul with mind beyond the body.

The Naiyāyikas find fault with this argument. They say that sometimes mind will have a contact with the organs accidentally. A man enjoying a dance will realize the pain, immediately on his foot while hurt by any worm. This will not happen unless the mind unites with the organ.No arguments affect the law that there is adṛṣṭa (some unknown truth) dwelling in the soul, born out of one’s own good or evil deeds that begets pleasure or pain accordingly. What the Naiyāyikas want to prove here is that the contact of mind is essential for remembering also. So the argument of a group of Naiyāyikas who deny the accidental contact of mind is proved false.

On analysing several facts connected to the role of mind in remembering, the reasons why several things are not remembered simultaneously attract the attention of the philosophers. Possessing a mind with a desire to remember is one of the reasons for remembering. Though there are nineteen such reasons for the sake of remembering they are not active at the same time which prevents the danger of emerging several thoughts at the same time.

The opponents find fault with this argument also. Though there is an order for the production of knowledge due to the contact of mind and soul, at times people have the experience of knowledge emerging directly from the intellect. Similarly, though there are several such reasons favouring one’s remembering, there is the possibility of some remembering occuring without any reason. So the danger of several remembrances occurring at the same time cannot be ignored.

In reply the Naiyāyikas say that there is an order in the reasons of remembrances. Though the reasons are oblivious they are inferred by the order kept in the remembrances which are apparent in nature. So it is proved that a knowledge born of intellect is also depended on the contact of soul and mind, which is further depended on adṛṣṭa which is unknown. So the knowledge born of intellect is also having a reason and an order. According to the Naiyāyikas, nothing happens without a reason.

In the matter of Manas (mind) the Vaiśeṣikas hold a view similar to the Naiyāyikas. Though there is contact between the soul, sensual organs and the objects, the knowledge does not always evolve. The origination of knowledge depends on another element. It is called Manas or mind. They use the phenomenon to prove the existence of soul. Mind is an instrument to acquire knowledge. It has a specific form of atom. Mind tempted by the soul retreats from some object and gets mingled with another one. Mind is connected with Ātma or soul. The contact of mind with sense organ, sense organ with object is inevitable forgetting some sort of knowledge.

The Vaiśeṣikas, here raise a question if the mind is all pervading it will have contact with all organs at the same time. As a result always there will be only one type of knowledge being born from all objects. The Mīmāṃsakas say in reply that inspite of the minds all pervading nature different types of knowledge are evolved due to the difference inherent in the nature of objects.

The Vaiśeṣikas refute this idea of the Mīmāṃsakas. They say that the objects to be known cannot cause a difference in knowledge. Otherwise, there is the possibility of occurring struggle between the knowledge derived by the eye and tongue. There is definitely a gap between each knowledge caused of different things, but the unique apprehension involved at times is not true, but shows the ability of mind in detecting the gap in between knowledge. The Vaiśeṣikas conclude that mamas are in the form of an atom by which one does not get several knowledge at a particular time.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Baudhadarsana-yat sat ksanikam—-Indian Philosophy, P 20

[2]:

Niyamehatvabhavadhyadhadarsanamabhyanunja/22/ Nyāya Darśana, P 388.

[3]:

Kseeravinasekarananupalabdhivat/13/ Nyāya Darśana-Pg-389.

[4]:

Kvachidvinasakaranaanupalabthehekvacichobdheranekantaha/2/ Nyāya Sūtra-Pg-392

[5]:

Nyāya Darśana p-404