Pravṛtti (Action)

Pravṛtti is one of the prameya in Nyāyaśāstra. It is of three kindsspeech, mans and body. Each of which may be sub divided in to two good and bad. Bodily actions which are good are giving, protecting and serving. Bodily actions which are bad are killing, stealing and committing adultery. Vocal actions which are good are speaking the truth, speaking what is useful, speaking what is pleasant and reading sacred books. Bad vocal actions are telling a lie, using harsh language, slandering and indulging in frivolous talk. Good mental actions are compassion, refraining from covetousness and devotion. Bad mental actions are malice, covetousness and skepticism.

According to Naiyāyikas, all living beings enjoy pleasure or pain because of their earlier good or evil deeds. Some unknown factor called adṛṣṭa born of good and evil deeds is what controls the experience of the living being. The intellect also acts according to the rule. There arises the question why the intellectual knowledge does not arise at the same time. In reply, the Naiyāyikas say that the intellect like pleasure and pain born of good and bad deeds of the individual is also the result of some deed. No individual is seen enjoying the fruit of his deeds at the same time. It is the same in the case of the intellect also. Though the earlier deeds cause the intellectual knowledge, it comes in to contact with mind in an order. It is the capability of the instruments that create knowledge. It is known by the soul. The order which is seen in the case of enjoying the pleasure, pain and intellect is a particular property of the instruments. It cannot be said the nature of soul. Great yogins create several bodies so as to enjoy several pleasures in different worlds. Here it is said that they use the minds of the souls which are already released. Hence they become able to enjoy pleasure or pain at the same time. Intellect also is born in them at the same time. Here it is to be noted that though the soul of the yogins is one, the instruments in the form of several minds is used by him to enjoy all at the same time.

When one hears a sound, all the sounds connected with it come in to contact which his ear. Similarly, though several cultures and images dwell in soul, he gets the knowledge of that particular image with which the mind is connected. It remembers only that which is born from a particular culture at a particular time. This is why several remembrances do not arise at the same time. From the above arguments the Naiyāyikas succeed to prove that Buddhi (intellect) is a special quality of soul.

Some schools of thought are of opinion that the knowledge is the property of soul, while desire, hatred, effort, pleasure and pain are the properties of mind. This view is not accepted by the Naiyāyikas, since the soul who is the knower is the abode of desire, hatred, etc. It can be proved by his action and inaction on certain occasions. When a being comes to know that something is favorable, he starts to act toget that object. Similarly, when something is known by him as not favorable he does not act as before. The effort to get something or to give up something is the same in him. From these it is clear that not only knowledge, but desire, hatred, effort, pleasure and pain are all connected with a single being. He, who attains knowledge, possesses desire and acts accordingly. So all these qualities find their support in soul. Thus the Naiyāyikas want to prove that the qualities like desire, hatred etc, cannot be possessed by mind that lacks consciousness. So that which is conscious alone can possess all these properties. When somebody experiences his own soul engaged in action and inaction, he can infer the same happening in the soul of others.

One of the peculiar natures of the Indian Philosophy is that it gives importance not only to the theistic way of thinking but to the atheistic thinking also. Hence their thoughts also are taken for discussion occasionally. Among the atheistic way of thinking, Cārvakas play the important role. According to Cārvakas, that which is visible alone is true. They do not believe in the existence of soul or the life after death. When the Naiyāyikas want to believe the existence of soul on account of its action and inaction for which the desire and hatred are responsible, the Cārvakas say that the action and inaction are seen happening on the body of individuals. So along with the desire and hatred the intellect also can be the property of the body itself and not of a separate soul. The very body of the individuals can be said as their soul. It can be imagined as happening not only in the earthly bodies of the individuals but also in the beings who possess watery, and airy bodies.

In reply to this, the Naiyāyikas show the example of axe etc, which act as an instrument to cut trees and woods. If something can be imagined as the abode of intellect, pleasure and pain, the axe also can be said as having all these properties since the action and inaction are seen in it at times. From this the Naiyāyikas want to prove that the body which acts is only an instrument of soul. From this they want to make it clear that desire, hatred and intellect cannot be said dwelling in instruments like axe, on the ground of its use to cut something. So the reason given by the Cārvakas to prove the abode of desire, hatred etc is proved erroneous. When the earthly bodies are not the abode of feelings, the other bodies made of water, light and air will also be freed from this sort of imagination.

The Cārvakas again raise an objection against the view of the Naiyāyikas. They say that there are different bodies of man, small creatures and gods. Hence the difference in the conception of bodies is the result of action born in the atoms which produce these bodies. So when it is proved that there areactions in the atoms that will continue in the bodies which are formed of such active atoms. So the desire and hatred also can be said the properties of the body. Since the vessels made of mud or sand does not have such a beginning, they do lose action in their final form.

The Naiyāyikas face this argument of Cārvakas by saying that when the desire and hatred are accepted the reasons for actions and inactions, the absence of desire in the vessels like mud makes them isolated from the bodies of the individuals. When things are made with mud, the first action begins in the minute particles of mud by which the pot, etc, are produced finally. So there is no difference in the composition of muddy particle and the human bodies. Though the muddy pots show a beginning in the minute particles before their completion, there is a lack of desire, hatred, effort or even intellect at the final stage. So the second attempt of the Cārvakas to prove the body as the abode of desire, etc, also faces a failure.

Action and inaction tempted by desire and hatred are said the properties of soul. But they become visible not in the soul but on the body. The body tempted by soul engages in action and inaction. But these two properties are not seen pervading the whole body. In the world, we see the objects like fruits having gurutva (heaviness), which make them fall when separated from the trees. There is another quality namely samyoga (conjunction) which prevents the fruit from falling. These types of properties are seen common in all objects. But if intellect, desire, hatred etc, are said the properties of the body the action and inaction should always be in the abode of these properties. But it is seen that the action and inaction of bodies are tempted by another one which is called the soul. Naiyāyikas want to prove that the properties of earth etc., will always be seen pervading in their abode. But the intellect, desires etc, cannot be seen pervading in the earthly objects. Thus they prove that the properties like intellect, desire, hatred etc, are of the soul but not of the earthly organs like bodies.

It is commonly seen that the action or inaction born from desire and hatred do not rest in the soul. The action and inaction dwell in the body which is tempted by soul. It is because of this temptation of the soul that the action and inaction happen in the body. At the same time, one can see that the whole body is not the abode of action and inaction. From this it is clear that the body is not the abode of qualities like desire but only the abode of action born from desire. The body is like an axe which is only an instrument.

It is seen that the quality in the form of gurutva (gravitation) pervades the whole fruits of a tree. At same time, though the falling of fruit is caused of weight, it is stopped from falling, by another quality called samyoga (conjunction). This is the law commonly seen in all substances. It cannot be argued that the knowledge, desire and hatred which tempt the action and inaction should always be in their abode, by law. It is against to our experience. So it is to be assumed that the desire, hatred and effort should be the qualities of the eternal soul. The action and inaction rest in the bodies. If the qualities like intellect, desire etc, were the properties of earth then they would have pervaded the whole body like the quality of weight pervading the body weighed. Moreover, the qualities like intellect are not seen in the earthly objects like pot and cloth.

The Cārvakas say that a liquid that under goes chemical action receives the power of intoxication. Similarly the elements like earth take the form of separate objects on receiving some sort of hidden power. The Naiyāyikas say that this argument of Cārvakas cannot be accepted since behind each production there should be the presence of separate knowers for which there is no evidence. There are numerous atoms in a body which by accepting the abode of intellect, desire and hatred will result as several knowing souls. But there cannot be several souls in a body. Otherwise the whole worldly dealings will be collapsed on account of each soul having its own opinion. So it is doubtless that there will be only one soul in a body.

The Vaiśeṣikas almost accept all the theories of the Nyāya philosophy.but their approach towards certain things definitely bears some difference. In the matter of Pravṛtti (action) they hold the view that both pravṛtti (action) and nivṛtti (inaction) are born from desire and hatred respectively. They use this to prove the existence of another soul.^[1] When someone is seen inaction or turned from it, the Vaiśeṣikas say that the existence of a second soul can be inferred since one can assume the reason behind the action and reaction from his own experience by seeing some action in another one can infer like this -‘this action is born by effort, since it, is an action which is similar to my own action.’ Since the effort is born from soul, the origination of the effort in another man will be a proof for the existence of soul in the other one.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Pravrthinivrthi VS, P. 19