Sūtra 8.1.2 (Soul, Mind, Ether, Time, Space, Air and Ultimate Atoms...)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 8.1.2:

तत्रात्मा मनश्चाप्रत्यक्षे ॥ ८.१.२ ॥

tatrātmā manaścāpratyakṣe || 8.1.2 ||

tatra—therein, among substances; ātma—soul; manas—mind; ca—and others, eg, Ether, Time, Space, Air and Ultimate Atoms; a-pratyakṣe—non-perceptible, not objects of perception.

2. Among Substances, the Soul, the Mind and other ara not objects of perception.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

[Full title: Soul, Mind, Ether, Time, Space, Air and Ultimate Atoms are not (ordinarily) perceptible]

This cognition, again, is two-fold, Vidyā, Science or true knowledge and A-vidyā, Nescience or false knowledge. Vidyā is of four kinds, characterised by perception, inference, memory and testimony. A-Vidyā also has four kinds characterised by doubt, error or mistake, dream, and uncertainty or indecision or non-finality. Among the above four kinds of true knowledge, that which is inferential, is not produced by the senses. Why this is so, is explained here.

[Read sūtra 8.1.2 above]

The word, soul, in the aphorism denotes the soul of another or one’s own soul. That even one’s own soul is not an object of perception, has been already declared, inasmuch as the casual mental intuition of the I, ahaṃ, in one’s own soul, is repudiated by such intuitions “I am fair,” “I am thin,” “I have long arms, etc. (where the I has reference to the body). The word, “ca,” extends the application of the predicate to the substances, namely, ether, time, space, air, and ultimate atoms. Sense-born cognition again is of two degrees, being that of the omniscient and that of the non-omniscient. That of the omniscient is the cognition of such and such complements of objects by means of the proximity or presentation (or reaching upto ordinarily super-sensuous objects) characterised by virtue or merit springing from Yoga (i.e., inhibition of the activity of the internal organ, the mind, and consequent freedom of the all-pervading soul, in other words, the steadiness of the mind in the soul. Vide v.ii.16 above) Thus ultimate atoms fall within its sphere, (or are objects of perception), being demonstrable, nameable, and existent.

Objection.—Since there is no material or data of such cognition, how can this be the case? Magnitude also is a cause of sense-perception, but ultimate atoms do not possess magnitude. The possession of colour, again is the cause of visual perception, but space, etc., do not possess colour. How then can there be perception in these cases?

Answer.—The objection does not stand, for such omniscience is possible by means of the mind alone as an auxiliary to the virtue or merit born of Yoga, or by means of the eye and other senses under the favourable influence of such mind. For the virtue or merit produced by Yoga is of inconceivable efficacy, and does not stand in need of any other auxiliary.

“The man whose omniscience is the subject of controversy, is not omniscient, because he is a man like myself,”—such reasonings, however, are inapplicable, since they are void of argument which would render impossible the proposition of the other side (maintaining the existence of omniscience in the man in question), as is the case with the reasoning, “A follower of Prabhākara (a writer of the Mīmāṃsā school) is not versed in Mīmāṃsā, because he is a man like myself.”

Perception of the non-omniscient, again, is two-fold, discriminative and non-discriminative Discriminative cognition, according to Dharmakīrti and Diṅnāga and others of the Bauddha school, is not certain knowledge or proof. Thus they argue: Such cognition owes its manifestation or apparent reality to connection with words. But the connection of an object with a word, a name, is not possible, that there should be such intuition, coloured with a name, as it were, as “A water-pot,” or “A piece of cloth.” Nor is jāti, the universal, really existent or objectively real, that the being distinguished with the possession of it should be apprehended in objects by the sense. Nor is possible connection of the existent characterised by itself with that which is non-existent. Nor is the non-existent within the cognizance of senses. Therefore, discrimination (ālocana) is produced by the senses, and while in the process of being produced, and leading to corresponding objects, by the power of the discrimination, discriminative cognition is called perception and also proof. (To this the commentator gives the reply.) Now, while discriminative cognition may be objectively unreal, because it owes its manifestation or apparent reality to connection with words, it may be at the same time real, because it is the product of contact of sense and object. Hence it is doubtful that discriminative cognition is unreal. Moreover, the being distinguished with the possession of a name may very well be a possible object in visual cognition, its appearance in consciousness being possible form presentation by memory, as is the case with the perception “Fragrant sandalwood.” Or, it may be, the being distinguished with the possession of a name does not come to light in perceptual cognition, and there is only recollection of the name, which as soon as it is recollected serves to. distinguish its corresponding object, like the recollection of the counter-opposite in the case of the cognition of nonexistence. Also it has been proved that jāti, the universal or class, ect., are immanent in objects or entities, Hence, discriminative or modified cognition also is perception, inasmuch as it is produced from contact of senses and objects.

Objection.—Non-discriminative, or unmodified, cognition neither excites to activity, nor is an object of current use. What then is the proof of its existence?

Answer.—The proof is discriminative, or modified, cognition itself, for, this is a specialized cognition, or the cognition of a thing as possessing, and being accordingly distinguished by, something else. Nor can it be produced without the cognition of that which is possessed and serves to distinguish or individualize, that is the distinctive element. For it has been ascertained above that the cause of specialized cognition is cognition of that which serves to specialize, contact of sense and that which is going to be specialized, and non-apprehension of non-connection of both.—2.

Commentary: The Bhāṣya of Candrakānta:

(English translation of Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra’s Bhāṣya called the Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya from the 19th century)

Among substances, Self, Mind, and Ether are not objects of perception.