Sūtra 8.1.1 (Cognition explained by allusion to III.i.2, 18)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 8.1.1:

द्रव्येषु ज्ञानं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ८.१.१ ॥

dravyeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam || 8.1.1 ||

dravyeṣu—among substances; jñānaṃ—knowledge, Cognition; vyākhyātaṃ—explained.

1. Cognition (has been) explained among Substance.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

The order of enumeration was violated in favour of the curiosity of the disciples. The author now adopts the order of enumeration. Therein the examination of understanding is the subject of the eighth book. Understanding has been already mentioned for the purpose of proof of the Soul. By recalling it, he says:

[Read sūtra 8.1.1 above]

By the term, “Among substances,” the author implies the third book, as the the container by the contained. The meaning is that cognition, jñāna, has been explained by the two aphorisms, namely, “The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of (the existence of) an object different from the senses and their objects” (III. i. 2), and “That (i.e., knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false mark)” (III. i. 18).

Now in the kindred system (i.e., the Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama), under the defination of understanding, there has been made a declaration of synonyms, namely, “Understanding, Apprehension, Cognition, Intuition—these are synonyms,” (Nyāya-Sūtra, I.i.15), for the purpose of demolishing the Sāṅkhya doctrine. For the Sāṅkhyas maintain a difference in meaning of the terms, Understanding, etc. Thus Prakṛti, Matter, is the state of equilibrium of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, the principles of purity, passion and darkness, or the principles of illumination, evolution, and involution, respectively. Prakṛti is one, and one only, while Puruṣas, Spirits, are divided to infinity. They are seated, in the cave (i.e., retired, unaffected, indifferent spectators), eternal, immutable, and characterised, by eternal consciousness. They are called lame, as it is not their nature to undergo modification or transformation, while Prakṛti is said to be blind, being stupid or insensate. When there arises in Prakṛti a desire for the enjoyment of sensuous objects, or a desire to see the difference between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, at that moment Prakṛti is modified, or transforms, under the influence or osculation of Puruṣa. And its first transformations Buddhi, Understanding, a particular form of the inner sense. Understanding it is that is called the principle of Mahat, the great one; accordingly it has been said, “The great one evolves from Prakṛti.” And this understanding is pure or stainless like a mirror. And that particular transformation of it, which takes the form of an object in such shapes as “It is a water-pot,” “It is a cloth,” etc., through the channel of the external senses, is called cognition, jñāna, and faculty, vṛtti. Apprehension, upalabdhi, is the same as a kind of abhimāna, egoity or self-consciousness, in the form of “I know,” which arises in consequence of the non-perception or non-apprehension of the distinctness or difference of Puruṣa which is consciousness, by cognition present in transparent or pure understanding. Pratyaya, Intuition, is that particular transformation of understanding itself, which takes the form of pleasure, pain, etc., through the channel of the senses alone, in consequence of the contact of garland, sandalwood, and other objects of sense. Hence it is that cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, reminiscence, virtue, and vice are, all of them, particular transformations of understanding, and being present in Prakṛti itself, in subtle forms or in minute proportions, appear and disappear, according to difference of circumstances; while Puruṣa is as free from adhesion or affinity or attachment as a lotus-leaf, but casts its shadow in the understanding. This theory which the Sāṅkhyas hold is thrown away by the proof indicated in the above declaration of (these terms as) synonyms. Thus, if the term, understanding, be derived in the instrumental sense, viz., as that by which a thing is understood, then it comes to be nothing else than the mind. Nor is the mind an object of perception, whereas understanding is surely cognizable by perception in the form of “I understand.”, Nor are cognition, etc., the properties of the internal sense, inasmuch as they are proved to exist only as being the properties of an agent. For the manifestation of “1 know,” “I intuit,” “I apprehend,” takes place as having community of substratum with I-ness or egoity. If they reply that this phenomenon is abhimāna or conceit, we rejoin that it cannot be so, since there is no obstruction to its being real. It cannot be contended that such obstruction is supplied by the very characteristic of the Puruṣa as being seated in the cave, that is to say, by its not being the receptacle of adventitious properties or changes; for, we would then reply that eternality is compatible with the nature of being the substratum of adventitious modes. For that which possesses a property and the property are not one and the same reality, so that the production and destruction of the property should themselves be the production and destruction of the substratum of the property. It is only he, then, who is conscious, that also understands, cognises, apprehends, and intuits. Hence the hypothesis of distinct entities (e.g., Soul and understanding) is not reasonable. This is the point.—1.