5. History of the Indian views on Nature of Pratyakṣa

All the Indian thinkers are unanimous in regarding perception as a reliable and valid source of knowledge, but there are different of opinions with regard to its nature. The main difference between these schools is distinction between two types of cognition, nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and savikalpaka (determinate), it has been debated as to whether perception is to be considered as nirvikalpaka only or savikalpaka only or both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka.

Sāṃkhya View

The founder of Sāṃkhya School is Kapila. The others thinkers of this school who made great contribution to this system are Iśvarakṛṣṇa, Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu. The Sāṃkhya is a system of dualistic realism. It accepts two ultimate realities: purusa and prakṛti. The main aim of this system is knowledge of reality in order to overcome the suffering of this world.

In the Sāṃkhyasūtra, perception is defined as “that discernment which being in conjunction of an object portrays the form thereof.”^[1] In Sāṃkhyakārikā, the term perception is not used. In place of perception the term “dṛṣṭa” has been used. The term dṛṣṭa is important for covering some cases like “I am sad”, “I am angry”, and these phrases do not need the help of sense organs and manas. So, the word pratyakṣa is not relevant in these cases. The reason is our experience is neither mediate nor sensuous. It is immediate. Moreover, perception does not cover the experience of inner phenomena. The word “perception” only used to indicates a small part of immediate experience.

The Sāṃhyakārikā (a work of Iśvarakṛṣṇa) explains the dṛṣṭa as the determinate knowledge in terms of all objects is a perception. This definition is unique. By elaborating, the definition of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, Vācaspati maintains that perception is a modification that takes place in the mind which provides definite cognition of objects, affected by the sense object contact. According to him, external things are perceived by the self, by the help of intellect, ego, mind and the senses. When an object excites the senses, the manas arranges the sense impressions into a percept, the ego refers it to the self and the intellect forms the concept.^[2]

According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the word knowledge means the modification in the intellect. The intellect contacts with the object with the help of sense organ and takes the form of that object. This is known as perception. As per J. Prasad, this definition has two distinct features: firstly, it involves both act and product. Secondly, perception is the form of object which is perceived. It does not perceive the object itself. So, Sāṃkhya’s nature of knowledge involves both act and result.

The Sāṃkhya like Nyāya accept two stages of perception: nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate). For them, both these stages are valid and also necessary. Nirvikalpa is the perception which arises firstly when our senses come into contact with the objects. It is immediate, simple and pure cognition of an object. On the other hand, Determinate Perception is the cognition of an object with its qualities and properties. Vācaspti Miśra defines indeterminate perception as “Ālocanajñānam”^[3] –as per this definition, indeterminate perception does not make distinction between the essential parts of an object i.e. particular and universal. He defines determinate perception as “Adhyavasāya”^[4]. According to him, the functioning of mind is determinate perception. Here, Sāṃkhya’s view is different from Nyāya’s view of determinate perception. According to Nyāya, at this stage of mind, bare sensation is turned into determinate perception while for Sāṃkhya at this stage of intellect, determinate knowledge comes into existence.

Thus, perception in this way relies on firstly, contact between the external sense organs and the object. Secondly, between the internal sense organ and the object, there is a double contact of external sense organ with the object, and at the same time internal sense organ with the object, when the object is completely visible or when one feels it internally (desire, anger, fear etc.). For instance: when one sees a dangerous animal like bear in front of him, in this case the function of the internal organs and the external sense takes place at the same time.

Mīmāṃsā View

Jaimini is the founder of this system. The aim of this school is to help ritualism. It has deep faith in ritualism. Ritualism here basically deals with existence of a self that exist after death and enjoys the fruit of actions in heaven. The other philosophers of this school who developed this system are Kumārila Bhatta, and Prabhākara. The system believes in the authority of Vedas.

Prabhākara states that the direct and immediate apprehension of something is known as perception. According to him, perception is “sākṣāt pratītiḥ pratyakṣam”.^[5] As per this definition, three factors i.e. the object, the subject, and knowledge are included in the process of perception. This process is known as “tripuṭipratyakṣavāda”.^[6] The direct apprehension of the subject can be tested by the fact that no knowledge of an object is possible without the subject (self). In every act of cognition phrase like “I know” indicates the fact that the consciousness is present. The self, the object and the knowledge are manifested in every process of knowledge directly; the self and the object always depend on the revealers whereas knowledge is self-revealed. In other words, the knowledge reveals the self and the object for its own revelation. There is no need of other knowledge for revelation.

Perception for Prabhakāra is different from other means of knowledge in the sense that perception is direct knowledge of a thing which is not dependent of its relations with other things like other sources of knowledge perceive things in their connection to other things. For Kumārila, “perception is a knowledge which is the result of the right functioning of the sense organs with reference to their objects.”^[7] Jaimini defines perception is the knowledge of the object which is produced in the self. It includes sense object contact. According to Jaimini, perception perceives merely those things that are existed. It does not perceive super sensuous moral.

The process of perception in Mīmāṃsā is similar as the Nyāya system: Firstly, the self communicates with the manas, then the manas communicates with the sense-organs and the sense-organs communicates with the objects. The communication of the sense-organs with the things is impossible, if the manas first will not communicate with sense-organs, again the communication between sense-organs and manas is impossible, if the self first will not communicate with the manas. Thus, the manas sense contact and self-manas contact are presupposed by sense-object contact. Further, Like Nyāya, Mīmāṃsāka accepts two stages of perception. According to it, when we perceive an object, at first there occurs a bare sensation of that object when we only know that the object is, but have not understood what it is. This immediate knowledge of an object is known as nirvikalpa perception and when we know the meaning of the object with the help of our past knowledge and understand what the object is. This knowledge is savikalpa perception. For instance: when we pass the judgments like “this is a table”, “this is a car” etc. Thus, perception is completed by these two modes; it provides us a true knowledge of the object. Though, in the first stage of perception we know the object from the outside whereas in the second stage we understand the object implicitly. The difference between Nyāya and Mīmāṃsa is according to Nyāya, the perception whether it is determinate or indeterminate does not provide any fruitful purpose whereas, for Mīmāṃsaka, the stages of perception, whether it is determinate or indeterminate is the ground of activity for children, adults, animals whose mental growth is not perfect. In determinate perception, the subject perceives the pure object.^[8] Further, the classification of perception in Mīmāṃsa is same as in Nyāya. They also accept ordinary and extra ordinary perception as kinds of perception.

Grammarian’s View

According to Grammarians and Jainas, all perceptions are savikalpaka because their character is predicative and their form is verbalized. They maintain that all cognition whether it is perceptual or non perceptual, has to be both propositional as well as sentential. In other words, they state that the epistemic content and the linguistic form are not separable, and all propositions are invariably linguistic in form. There is speech thinking instead of pure thinking.

According to Bhartṛhari, a Grammarian philosopher,

“There is no thought-content without a language form and always thought-content is inextricably interspersed with language form. If the unfailing form of language had been lost to the thought-content, thought itself would have been lost in oblivion. Thought has a form because it is formed in language.”^[9]

From this it shows that all cognitions including perceptual are at once both judgmental and verbal (savikalpaka).

On the basis of the forgoing analysis of the Buddhist and non-Buddhist positions on the nature of perception, it may conclude that the Buddhist position consistently and unambiguously put forth by Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, and so on as follows:

1. Perception is not conceptual or determinate (savikalpaka) because it is determined by the object, which is free from all characterizations.

2. Perceptual cognition can never be both indeterminate (perceptual) as well as determinate (conceptual) because perceptual and conceptual are mutually exclusive. A conceptual can never be perceptual and vice versa. It does not mean that there is no connection between perceptual cognition and conceptual cognition. Perceptual cognition being a non conceptual may give rise to conceptual cognition and thus may become preconceptual. But a cognition is always perceptual only insofar as it is non conceptual and ceases to be so the moment it leads to conceptualization.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

M. Biswas, Sāṃkhya-Yoga Epistemology, p. 117.

[2]:

V. Misra, Indian Logic., pp.78-79.

[3]:

Ibid., p. 134.

[4]:

M. Biswas, Op.cit., p.134

[5]:

C. D. Sharma, op. cit., p.224.

[6]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op. cit., p.89.

[7]:

Ibid.

[8]:

C. D. Sharma, op. cit., p. 219.

[9]:

S.R. Bhatt & A. Mehrotra, op.cit., p.37.