Buddhi (Intellect)

Buddhi or intellect plays a very important role in the science of logic as in all other branches of study. Unlike the Naiyāyikas other thinkers do not consider intellect as a special one. In Nyāya Vaiśeṣika buddhi or cinsciusness in synonymous with intellect and apprehension.^[1] Some identify this with Manas. According to the Vedāntiṃs, the active part of intellect is Manas. So Manas, according to them, becomes a part of intellect. But the Naiyāyikas give separate entity for both buddhi and manas may be, it due to their appearance in mind individually.

While talking about intellect, the Naiyāyikas want to make it clear whether this is eternal or non-eternal. The doubt arises since its untouchable nature is commonly seen in two separate categories among which one is eternal and the other non-eternal. The karma or action which is untouchable has an origin as well as destruction. At the same time, ether is eternal and it has neither origin nor destruction. The untouchable nature, common in ether and action is in Buddhi also. So naturally, the doubt arises as to where this Buddhi is to be included it either with eternal objects on with the non-eternal ones.

In the opinion of some scholars, the above said doubt could not rise. All creatures which can think get the experience of pleasure and pain. Similarly they feel the intellect or thought as non eternal like pleasure and pain. All creatures have the feeling that they knew something, they know something and they would know something. This feeling of past, present and future can arise connected with something only if the thought is non eternal. It has origin and destruction. The thought or knowledge which exists differently in three periods shows its non eternity.

The Naiyāyikas had already proved that the knowledge of perception arises by the interaction of organs and objects. The absence of several thoughts or knowledge at a time is given as a proof for the existence of mind or manas. It also, in other words, proves the non eternity of intellect.

Sāṅkhyas, on the other hand, consider intellect as different from the thoughts which arise from it. According to them, this intellect is antahkaraṇa, an inner instrument. If it is accepted then the thought arising in the form of remembrance, etc., cannot be taken as a proof for the eternity of intellect. According to them, the intellect, the emerging of knowledge and knowledge are different objects. Sāṅkhyas consider the intellect as eternal since there is the recollection of objects which are seen after a long interval of time. If the intellect is non eternal, none can realize the object which is already seen. This phenomenon of realization can be there only if the intellect is eternal. If there are several intellects produced and destructed, none can have a clear recollection of a picture or anything else after a considerable time. This realization of objects already seen or experienced makes the scholars of Sāṅkhya to determine the eternity of intellect.

Naiyāyikas do not agree with this argument of Sāṅkhyas. The aim of this argument is just to know whether the intellect is eternal or not. But when Sāṅkhyas consider “the realization” in support of their argument, a question rises whether the property of realization belongs to the intellect or soul. According to Naiyāyikas, the intellect is merely an instrument of the soul. So the properties of soul as moving and realizing cannot be those of intellect. Knowing, seeing, getting, believing, deciding, etc., are the properties of the soul.

A soul itself realizes an object seen by it before. The soul is considered eternal because of the above said properties of it. If the dead instrument like intellect is identified with soul then the real form of the soul is to be made clear. The uniqueness of the soul can be proved only if the form of it is made clear. If the opponents find the dead intellect as having the quality of knowledge, then they have to make clear the picture of soul. The property and the essence of soul are to be described. What does the soul do with a knowledge possessed by the intellect, the other one? Possessing of knowledge by intellect cannot be a proof for the existence of soul. According to Naiyāyikas, the knowledge cannot be separated from soul. If it is said that the intellect produces knowledge then it goes without saying that knowledge is a quality of soul^[2], not of the dead intellect. When one helps another to attain some kind of knowledge, a clear difference comes in between them. One is the giver and the other is the receptor. Here also the soul who receives the knowledge is different from the intellect which provides the knowledge. Thus the knowledge is not a property of intellect but of soul only.

The opponents try to show that several souls are to be accepted due to separate modes of action. It can be said that a soul absorbs knowledge, someone knows, somebody else is getting and another one is seeing. So there is the danger of accepting several souls. Since all these words of action convey a single sentence the severalty of souls alone becomes doubtful. But Naiyāyikas face this argument by showing two different types of usages familiar in the world. Say the soul is absorbing knowledge, and the intellect knows something. Here also there is difference in their meanings. But two souls cannot be accepted in a body according to the above said argument. The opponents define the intellect “as one by which some thing is known”. According to this the intellect can be identified with Manas or Mind. And the mind is eternal.

Naiyāyikas refute this argument by saying that the mind cannot be eternal (though it be so) merely by the property of realization. This phenomenon takes place because of the uniqueness of the soul that realizes. While proving the duality of eyes, the sage Gautama, in his Nyāyasūtras, presents a new aphorism which reads as savyadṛṣṭasyetareṇapratyabhiṃjānāt.^[3] According to this, the object seen by the left eye does not differ when seen by the right one. Hence there should be a third observer who could alone combine the two observances emerging from two sources. That is the soul the eternity of which is proved by this also.

Sāṃkhyas always find the intellect as a firm one from which the activity of knowing comes out. They find the intellect itself as the support of the activity of knowing. A pot maker, when makes a pot becomes the doer as well as the substratum of the activity of making pot. This shows that the same person can do two roles at a time. Intellect or mind which is an instrument acts as a knower as well as a support of knowledge.

Naiyāyikas do not agree with this argument. If the activity and the support of activity are the same, the process of getting knowledge in array will not happen. Further, he Bauddhas maintains the theory that since the intellect is fixed the knowledge arising from it also will be fixed. Then there is the danger of all kinds of knowledge being fixed. One will get the knowledge of all things at the same time. All these happen would it the activity and the support of activity were the same. The support of activity is intellect and it, being eternal, would automatically make the subject coming out of it also eternal. But nobody gets all kinds of knowledge at the same time.

The Naiyāyikas do not agree with this. If the realization is lost the support of activity will also vanish. This will lead to the destruction of mind. This would happen due to the Sāṅkhyas identification of the intellect and the act of knowing. If they argue that the loss of knowledge would not affect the mind, then it would be equal to say that the intellect and the act of knowing are not the same which would be against in their principle.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Buddhihi upamabdhirnjānamityanarthāntaram. Nyāya Darśana, 1.1.15, p.22, PPBha.p. 171

[2]:

icchādveṣaprayatnasukhadukhanjānāni ātmano lingam. 1.1.10, Nyāya Darśana, p.20

[3]:

Nyāya Darśana, 3.1.7, P. 181