Sūtra 2.30

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 2.30:

अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः ॥ २.३० ॥

ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ || 2.30 ||

tatra—there, ahiṃsā—Abstinence from injury, satya—veracity, asteya—abstinence from theft. brahmacarya—continence, aparigraha—Abstinence from avariciousness, all these, yamaḥ—are the restraints.

30. Of these the restraints are: Abstinence from injury (ahiṃsā); Veracity; Abstinence from theft; Continence; Abstinence from avariciousness.—81.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Of these, abstinence from injury is the not causing of pain to any living creature in any way at any time. The restraints and observances that follow have their origin in it. They are meant to achieve it. They are taught with the object of teaching it. They are taken up with the object of rendering the light of its appearance purer. And so it has been said—As the Brāhmaṇa goes on undertaking many a vow of restraint and observance, he goes on turning away from the sins committed on account of forgetfulness, and having their origin in injury caused to others (hiṃsā); and by so doing he goes on rendering the Ahiṃsā itself purer and purer.

Veracity consists in word and thought being in accord with facts. Speech and mind corresponds to what has been seen, heard and inferred as such. Speech is uttered for the purpose of transferring one’s knowledge to another. It can only be said to have been employed for the good of others and not for their injury, if it is not deceptive, confused or barren in knowledge. If, however, it proves to be injurious to living beings even though uttered as such, it is not truth; it is a sin only. By this outward appearance, this is a facsimile of virtue, and one gets into painful darkness. Therefore, let every one examine well and then utter truth for the benefit of all living beings.

Theft is the making one’s own unlawfully of things belonging to others. Abstinence from theft consists in the absence of the desire thereof.

Continence is the restraint of the hidden power, the power of generation.

Absence of avariciousness is the non-appropriation of things not one’s own, consequent upon seeing the defects of attachment and of the injury caused by the collection, preservation and destruction of goods. These are the restraints.—81.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

Having enumerated the accessories of Yoga as the restraints and observances, &c., now he enumerates the restraints by introducing the aphorism ‘Of these abstinence from injury, &c.’ The restraints are abstinence from injury, &c. Now describes abstinence from injury as an accessory of Yoga:—‘Not causing of pain, &c.’ Qualifies such Ahiṃsā: ‘The restraints and observances that follow, &c.’

‘Have their origin in it’:—the other restraintsand observances when performed without observing the vow of causing no pain are, as it were, not performed; because in that case they are quite useless. The practice is resorted to only for the purpose of achieving Ahiṃsā.

If Ahiṃsā is the root of all those that follow, how is it that they are meant for achieving it? For this reason he says:—‘They are taught with the object of teaching it.’ The meaning is that achievement here refers to knowledge, not to birth.

Let that be. But if the following restraints and observances are for the purpose of giving a knowledge of Ahiṃsā, then they are of no use; because that knowledge is obtained from the other sources. For this reason he says:—‘For the purpose of rendering the light of its appearance purer.’ The meaning is that if the following ones are not practised, Ahiṃsā would remain impure on account of the existence of untruth, &c.

He mentions the concurrence of the Āgamis [Āgamas?] with this ‘And so it has been said.’

Now he describes the nature of truth:—‘Word and thought being in accord with facts.’ Next he describes the nature of the facts ‘What has been heard, seen and inferred as such.’

Otherwise it would not be truth. He describes this with reasoning. Speech is uttered with the object of transferring one’s thoughts to another; that is, for the purpose of creating in the other minds a knowledge similar to the knowledge existing in the mind of the speaker. For this reason, if it is not deceptive, &c. For example, Yudhiṣṭhira was questioned by Droṇācārya with reference to the death of his son “My dear, your wealth is truth, is Aśvatthāmā dead”? His answer was, “It is true that Aśvatthāmā is dead,” but he thought at the time of the death of Aśvatthāmā, the elephant, and not the son of Droṇa. This was merely a reply in the terms of the question. It did not transfer to the mind of Droṇa what was in the mind of Yudhiṣṭhira. The knowledge in Yudhiṣṭhira’s mind was that the elephant was dead, and this he had obtained by the sense of his sight. The knowledge, however, that was transferred to the mind of Droṇa was that his son was dead. This is deceptive knowledge.

‘Confused speeches’ is that which is born from confusion. The contusion may exist at the time of speaking, or, at the time of ascertaining the object of knowledge.

Barren in knowledge is that which carries no information. As, for example, the knowledge of barbarians carries no impression of the objects of knowledge to the mind. It also means the speech which may be objectless. Such speech is not desirable to utter. In this case, even though the knowledge of the speaker is transferred to the mind of the hearer, yet it is not as it were transferred, because it is useless.

Such speech also must be uttered for the good of others. If not so uttered, it is only the semblance of truth, not truth. For this reason he says:—‘It can only be said to be employed, &c.’

‘If, however, it proves injurious to living beings, &c.’ Take, for example, the case of a man who has taken the vow of truth, being asked by a gang of robbers if the caravan they be in pursuit of had passed that way. He has seen it passing that way and says so. This utterance of his, even though technically truth, is not so in reality, as it tends to the injury of others. The rest is easy.

He now describes theft, because the abstinence from any act depends upon the understanding of the nature of the act. ‘Theft is the making of things, &c.’ The object is to indicate the general by the particular.

Inasmuch as the functioning of speech and body depends upon the mind, the mental modification is mentioned here as the principal factor:—‘Absence of the desire thereof.’

Next he describes the nature of continence:—‘The restraint of the hidden power:’ The words “hidden power,” are used to signify that the mere non-use of the organ is not continence. The desire of seeing and speaking to women and embracing them as the. seats of Cupid is also incontinence. The meaning is that the other sensations tending towards that are also to be checked.

He describes the nature of abstinence from avariciousness ‘Absence of avariciousness, &c.’ Here the defect of attachment has been described. Attachment increases in consequence of the repetition of enjoyment, as also the deftness of the powers in their functioning.

The defect of injury also has been described. No enjoyment is possible without causing injury to others.

Absence of avariciousness is the not making one’s own of objects, inasmuch as their possession originates in undesirable means if they are not sanctioned by the Sāstras and are obtainable without effort even; and because there is evil done even in the preservation of possessions, that are obtained even in accordance with the Śāstras.—30.