Text 156: On Viśeṣa

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 156:

अथ विशेषपदार्थनिरूपणम् । अन्तेषु भवा अन्त्याः स्वाश्रयविशेषकत्वाद् विशेषाः । विनाशारम्भरहितेषु नित्यद्रव्येष्वण्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनस्सु प्रतिद्रव्यम् एकैकशो वर्तमानाः अत्यन्तव्यावृत्तिबुद्धिहेतवः । यथास्मदीनां गवादिष्वश्वादिभ्यस्तुल्याकृतिगुणक्रियावयवसम्योगनिमित्ता प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिर्दृष्टा गौः शुक्लः शीघ्रगतिः पीनककुद्मान् महाघण्ट इति । तथास्मद्विशिष्टानां योगिनां नित्येषु तुल्याकृतिगुणक्रियेषु परमाणुषु मुक्तात्ममनस्सु च अन्यनिमित्तासम्भवाद् येभ्यो निमित्तेभ्यः प्रत्याधारं विलक्षणोऽयं विलक्षणोऽयम् इति प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः देशकालविप्रकर्षे च परमाणौ स एवायम् इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानं च भवति तेऽन्त्या विशेषाः । यदि पुनरन्त्यविशेषम् अन्तरेण योगिनां योगजाद् धर्मात् प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः प्रत्यभिज्ञानं च स्यात् ततः किं स्यान् नैवं भवति । यथा न योगजाद् धर्माद् अशुक्ले शुक्लप्रत्ययः संजायते अत्यन्तादृष्टे च प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् । यदि स्यान् मिथ्या भवेत् तथेहाप्यन्त्यविशेषम् अन्तरेण योगिनां न योगजाद् धर्मात् प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः प्रत्यभिज्ञानं वा भवितुम् अर्हति । अथान्त्यविशेषेष्विव परमाणुषु कस्मान् न स्वतः प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः कल्प्यते इति चेन् न तादात्म्यात् । इहातदात्मकेष्वन्यनिमित्तः प्रत्ययो भवति यथा घटादिषु प्रदीपात् न तु प्रदीपे प्रदीपान्तरात् । यथा गवाश्वमांसादीनां स्वत एवाशुचित्वं तद्योगाद् अन्येषां तथेहापि तादात्म्याद् अन्त्यविशेषेषु स्वत एव प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः तद्योगात् परमाण्वादिष्विति ।। इति प्रशस्तपादभाष्ये विशेषपदार्थः समाप्तः ॥ १५६ ॥

atha viśeṣapadārthanirūpaṇam | anteṣu bhavā antyāḥ svāśrayaviśeṣakatvād viśeṣāḥ | vināśārambharahiteṣu nityadravyeṣvaṇvākāśakāladigātmamanassu pratidravyam ekaikaśo vartamānāḥ atyantavyāvṛttibuddhihetavaḥ | yathāsmadīnāṃ gavādiṣvaśvādibhyastulyākṛtiguṇakriyāvayavasamyoganimittā pratyayavyāvṛttirdṛṣṭā gauḥ śuklaḥ śīghragatiḥ pīnakakudmān mahāghaṇṭa iti | tathāsmadviśiṣṭānāṃ yogināṃ nityeṣu tulyākṛtiguṇakriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātmamanassu ca anyanimittāsambhavād yebhyo nimittebhyaḥ pratyādhāraṃ vilakṣaṇo'yaṃ vilakṣaṇo'yam iti pratyayavyāvṛttiḥ deśakālaviprakarṣe ca paramāṇau sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānaṃ ca bhavati te'ntyā viśeṣāḥ | yadi punarantyaviśeṣam antareṇa yogināṃ yogajād dharmāt pratyayavyāvṛttiḥ pratyabhijñānaṃ ca syāt tataḥ kiṃ syān naivaṃ bhavati | yathā na yogajād dharmād aśukle śuklapratyayaḥ saṃjāyate atyantādṛṣṭe ca pratyabhijñānam | yadi syān mithyā bhavet tathehāpyantyaviśeṣam antareṇa yogināṃ na yogajād dharmāt pratyayavyāvṛttiḥ pratyabhijñānaṃ vā bhavitum arhati | athāntyaviśeṣeṣviva paramāṇuṣu kasmān na svataḥ pratyayavyāvṛttiḥ kalpyate iti cen na tādātmyāt | ihātadātmakeṣvanyanimittaḥ pratyayo bhavati yathā ghaṭādiṣu pradīpāt na tu pradīpe pradīpāntarāt | yathā gavāśvamāṃsādīnāṃ svata evāśucitvaṃ tadyogād anyeṣāṃ tathehāpi tādātmyād antyaviśeṣeṣu svata eva pratyayavyāvṛttiḥ tadyogāt paramāṇvādiṣviti || iti praśastapādabhāṣye viśeṣapadārthaḥ samāptaḥ || 156 ||

Text (156): Individualities are the ultimate (i.e., final) specificatives or differentiatives of their substrates. They reside in such beginningless and indestructible eternal substances, as the Atoms, Ākāśa, Time, Space, Soul and Mind,—inhering in their entirety in each of these, and serving as the basis of absolute differentiation or specification. Just as we have with regard to the Bull as distinguished from the Horse, certain distinct cognitions—such f.i. as, (1) that it is a ‘bull,’ which is a cognition based upon its having the shape of other bulls, (2) that it is ‘white,’ which is based upon a quality, (3) that it is ‘running swiftly’, which is based upon action (4)that it has a ‘fat hump,’ which is based upon ‘constituent parts’ and (5) that it carries a ‘large bell’, which is based upon conjunction; so have the Yogis, who are possessed of powers that we do not possess, distinct cognitions based upon similar shapes, similar qualities and similar actions—with regard to the eternal atoms, the liberated souls and minds; and as in this case no other cause is possible, those causes by reason whereof they have such distinct cognitions.—as that ‘this is a peculiar substance,’ ‘that a peculiar soul,’ and so forth,—and which also lead to the recognition of one atom as being the same that was perceived at a different time and place,—are what we call the ‘ultimate Individualities.’

Objection: “What would be the harm, if even in the absence of such ‘Individualities,’ Yogis could have, by the help of merits born of Yogic practices, the said distinct cognitions and recognitions?”

Reply: This could never be; just as the merits born of Yoga could never bring about the cognition of whiteness where there is no whiteness, or the recognition of that which has never been perceived; in fact if there were any such, they could only be false; exactly in the same manner, without the ‘ultimate individualities’ in question, the Yogis could not, by the helps of the merits of Yoga alone, have the distinct cognitions or recognitions referred to above.

Objection: “Why cannot you assume a self-differentiation in the atoms themselves, as you do in the ‘Individualities’?”

Reply: The atoms themselves could not be the cause of these distinct cognitions; because of all atoms having the same nature; that is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the cognitions that a certain, thing brings about are with regard to things other than itself; e.g, the lamp brings about the cognition of the jar; and certainly one lamp is never rendered cognisable by another lamp. And just as the flesh of the cow and the horse are unclean by themselves, and other things become unclean by coming in contact with them,—so in the case in question, the ‘ultimate Individualities,’ though of the same nature, are differentiated by themselves, and the atom &c., become differentiated by reason of their contact with these ‘individualities’ (I-ii-6).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Reverence to the Wearer of Five Faces who ia free from five-foldness, and who is the ordainer of the four cycles of time, the four sciences and the four castes!

The eternal substances are called ‘anta’ ‘end’ or ‘ultimate,’ because they continue to exist at the end of (after) all productions and destructions; and the ‘specific individualities’ inhere in these eternal substances and they are called ‘viśeṣa’ or ‘specific,’ because they serve to specify or differentiate their substrates from all other things. This the author proceeds to explain—They reside in such beginningless and indestructible &c., &c. This expression, serves to explain what is meant by the word ‘antya’, ‘ultimate’ The expression, ‘serving as the bases &c’ explains what is meant by the individualities being differentiatives of their ‘substrates.’ Inhering in their entirety &c.—that is, in each substance there is only one distinct ‘Individuality; in as much as the differentiation of one substance is accomplished by a single ‘individuality,’ there would be no need for assuming any more of such ‘Individualities.’ How this is the distinguishing feature of ‘Individualities’ we have explained before.

As the putting forward of the definition of these individualties would be right only after their existence has been proved, the author proceeds to prove their existence.................................... Just as we have distinct cognitions with regard to individual cows &c., so would those people who are capable of perceiving the atom &c., be sure to have distinct cognitions with regard to these; as only thus could the existence of individual atoms be possible. The mere difference among the individuals could not be the cause of these distinct cognitions; as though we may see an individual object, we may not have a definite cognition with regard to it; as we find in the case of the post which, when seen, is not definitely recognised as a post. The distinct cognitions in question could not be possible without some cause, and we find no other ground or cause available, in as much as the shapes, qualities and action are the same in all; hence that which serves as the cause or ground of the distinct cognitions of the atom &c., is what we call ‘specific individuality.’ Then again, atoms are often recognised to be the same even though seen at different times and places and that they are thus recognised is proved by the fact of their belonging to certain communities, and possessing certain ‘individualities’,—just like such ordinary objects as the jar and the like. No recognition of a previously perceived substance would be possible unless it possessed some ‘specific individuality hence we conclude that the cause or ground for the distinct cognitions in question, lies in the form of the ‘specific individuality’.

An objection is raised: “The Yogis have the perception of super-sensuous things, by reason of certain merits acquired by yoga; and by the Same powers they could have the distinct cognitions and recognitions of atoms &c., even without the ‘individualities’.”

Reply:—This cannot be;.................................... The perception of supersensuous things also by force of yogic powers is not without some cause.

Objection: “Why cannot you assume &c., &c. The Individualities could not be possessed of further individualities; as that would land us in a regressus ad infinitum; and hence, just as distinct cognitions, by Yogis, of the individualities are possible even without their possessing other individualities,—so could the Yogis have in the case of atoms also by themselves; what then is the use of assuming any individualities at all?”

Reply: Not so;..................because one thing tends to bring about the cognition of something different from itself; e.g. the jar, &c., which are not of the nature of Light, are illumined and rendered perceptible by the lamp, which is of the nature of Light; and one lamp is not illumined by another; every lamp being self-luminous. Just as the flesh of the cow &c., &c., &c. The touch of these unclean things brings impurity to the man touching them. The distinct cognitions of the atoms, which are distinct and possessed of certain common properties, are possible only by reason of certain ‘individualities’, and not by themselves.

In each of the eternal substances, possessing certain properties in common, there inhere certain individualities which serve to differentiate them.