Text 38: Of Fire

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 38:

तेजस्त्वाभिसम्बन्धात् तेजः । रूपस्पर्शसङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसम्योगविभागपरत्वापरत्वद्रवत्वसंस्कारवत् । पूर्ववदेषां सिद्धिः । तत्र शुक्लं भास्वरं च रूपम् । उष्ण एव स्पर्शः । तदपि द्विविधमणुकार्यभावात् । कार्यं च शरीरादित्रयम् । शरीरमयोनिजमादित्यलोके । पार्थिवावयवोपष्टम्भाच्चोपभोगसमर्थम् । इन्द्रियम्सर्वप्राणिनां रूपव्यंजकमन्यावयवानभिभूतैस्तेजोऽवयवैरारब्धं चक्षुः । विषयसंज्ञकं चतुर्विधम् । भौमं दिव्यमुदर्यमाकरजं च । तत्र भौमं काष्ठेन्धनप्रभवमूर्ध्वज्वलनस्वभावं पचनदहनस्वेदनादिसमर्थं दिव्यमबिन्धनं सौरविद्युदादि भुक्तस्याहारस्य रसादिपरिणामार्थमुदर्यं आकरजं च सुवर्णादि । तत्र सम्युक्तसमवायाद्रसाद्युपलब्धिरिति ॥ ३८ ॥

tejastvābhisambandhāt tejaḥ | rūpasparśasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasamyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvadravatvasaṃskāravat | pūrvavadeṣāṃ siddhiḥ | tatra śuklaṃ bhāsvaraṃ ca rūpam | uṣṇa eva sparśaḥ | tadapi dvividhamaṇukāryabhāvāt | kāryaṃ ca śarīrāditrayam | śarīramayonijamādityaloke | pārthivāvayavopaṣṭambhāccopabhogasamartham | indriyamsarvaprāṇināṃ rūpavyaṃjakamanyāvayavānabhibhūtaistejo'vayavairārabdhaṃ cakṣuḥ | viṣayasaṃjñakaṃ caturvidham | bhaumaṃ divyamudaryamākarajaṃ ca | tatra bhaumaṃ kāṣṭhendhanaprabhavamūrdhvajvalanasvabhāvaṃ pacanadahanasvedanādisamarthaṃ divyamabindhanaṃ sauravidyudādi bhuktasyāhārasya rasādipariṇāmārthamudaryaṃ ākarajaṃ ca suvarṇādi | tatra samyuktasamavāyādrasādyupalabdhiriti || 38 ||

Text (38).—Fire is that which. belongs to the class of ‘Fire.’ It is endowed with—Colour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance, Proximity, Fluidity, and Faculty.

The fact of these belonging to Fire is to be shewn, as before, to be indicated in the Sūtras. Its colour is white and brilliant. Its touch is hot only. (II-i-3, 7; IV-i-ii; V-ii-8; II-ii-4; V-i-17).

This also is twofold, in the form of the atom and the products. These products are threefold, in the shape of the Body &c., (IV-i-1 to 5; VII-i-20, 21; IV-ii-1).

The Body of fire is such only as is not born of the womb, existing in the regions of the Sun (Āditya); and it is made capable of experience by the admixture of earth-molecules. (IV-ii-6 to 11).

The Sense-organ is the Eye which makes colour, perceptible, by all living beings, and which is made up of fire-molecules unaffected by the molecules of any other substance. (VIII-ii-6).

This object is fourfold: Earthly, Heavenly, Stomachic (organic) and Mineral. The Earthly fire is that which consists of Flames produced by wooden fuels, and is capable of accomplishing cooking, burning, softening (according to the Kandalī) sweating &c. The Heavenly Fire is that which is produced by watery fuel, and exists in the form of the Sun, the Lightning and the like. The Stomachic Fire is that which brings about the digestion of the food that is eaten. The Mineral Fire exists in the form of Gold and other metals. (IV-ii-1; V-ii-13).

The experience of taste &c. in these minerals belongs to another substance compounded with ths Fire-molecules.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Fire is &c.—To be explained as before. Like the generic character of ‘Fire’, the eleven qualities,, colour &c. also, are its distinctive features. The mention of these in the Sūtras may be shown as before, in the case of Earth and Water. For instance, we have the sūtra—“Fire also is endowed with Colour and Touch.” As for Number and the rest, the same Sūtra points out these as belonging to Fire and Earth &c.

The colour of Fire is white and brilliant. The white colour belongs to Earth and Water also; but in these latter it is not brilliant; that is to say, a colour bright enough to be self-luminous belongs to Fire alone; hence it serves as the distinctive feature of this latter. The red or yellow colour that is sometimes seen in Fire must he regarded as being, due to certain extraneous conditions; as it is only the white colour that is seen in all cases of Fire; as we find in the case of the light of a lamp, and hat emitted by the Sun and the Moon.

Its Touch is hot only. The Touch of Earth, Water and Air is ‘neither-hot-nor-cold,’ ‘cold’ and ‘neither-hot-nor-cold’ respectively; while that of Fire is ‘hot’ only, which serves as its distinguishing feature.

Like Earth and Water, Fire also is twofold, in the shape of the Atom and its Products. The Product is threefold—in the form of Body, Sense-organ and Object. The Fiery body is such as is not born from the womb, and is known to exist in the Regions of the Sun only.

Objection: “Fire being of a burning nature, any body made of it would be like a mass of fire, and as such, incapable of any business operations; and hence it could not be the substratum of any experiences.”

In reply to this we have the statement that it is by reason of the admixture of Earth-molecules that the molecules of Fire bring about the Fiery Body; and the body could not be a mass of Fire pure and simple.

The Sense-organ that helps to make colour perceptible to all living beings is made up of Fire molecules. In support of the theory that colour is rendered perceptible only by this particular product of Fire, and not by any other products of Fire,—we have the following reasons: This sense-organ is made up of such Fire-molecules as are not affected by the particles of any other substance; i.e. in this organ of vision, the Firemolecules do not have their potency weakened by the admixture of any heterogenous molecules of Earth or Water; and hence having an origin peculiar to itself, it is this organ alone that is capable of manifesting colour; and that nothing else is produced in the same manner, being a well recognised fact, must be attributed to an unseen (superphysical) force; and its proof lies in the fact of the character of the products themselves. Then, the fact of the sense of vision being fiery in its nature must be inferred from the fact of its manifesting colour alone from among other qualities,—like the lamp. This organ of vision is without any manifested colour or touch; and it is for this reason that it does not burn its physical substrate, and is itself not seen (for want of a perceptible colour).

The Object of Fire is fourfold—the Earthly &c. The particle ‘tatra’ means ‘from among these.’

The Earthly is that which is produced from such Earthly things as the fuel of wood,—fire not being produced without some such substratum. ‘Wood’ includes grasses &c. also, in as much as these also are found to be productive of fire. This Earthly Fire has the nature of flaming upwards; it is capable of accomplishing the actions of cooking, sweating, softening &c. The action of ‘cooking’ consists in bringing about properties (or conditions) not present in the thing before; and ‘sweating’ or ‘softening’ consists in the destroying of the hardness of things. ‘Etc.’ includes such other actions as ‘producing cracks.’ This points out the useful actions accomplished by Fire.

The Heavenly Fire is that which is produced from watery fuel; and exists in the form of the Sun, the lightning, the meteor and the like.

The Stomachic or Organic Fire serves the purpose of digesting the food that is eaten; that is to say, it tends to change the food into the condition of certain juices, excreta and other substances.

The Mineral Fire is found in the form of Gold &c. The fact of Gold &c. being fiery in their nature is proved by scriptures. The argument in favour of this view has already been shown. (Com. Page 26.)

Question: “Gold &c. being fiery, (and as such having a hot touch and being devoid of Odour and Taste), how is it that they are found to have odours and tastes, and to have a touch that is neither hot nor cold?”

Answer: By reason of the unseen agency of the destiny of the experiencing persons, Gold &c. are produced in the solidifiable’ form, endowed with a touch that is neither hot nor cold—by reason of the admixture of particles of Earth; and the taste &c. that are perceived belong to these Earth-particles.

Objection: “We cannot admit of the declaration that Gold has no manifested touch &c., as there are no Substances apart from the colour, touch &c. that are perceived (i.e. the qualities are the only real entities, and there is no such thing as a substance independent of the qualities perceived). Consequently, in the case of the Gold we cannot admit of the existence of any unseen and untouched particles of Fire, or any other thing, except that of the yellow colour and the particular Touch and as such Gold cannot be regarded as Fiery in its nature.”

Reply: It is not so; because in ordinary experience, we find the same colour (of whiteness) and other qualities existing in various substrata, in the shape of the ‘pillar,’ the ‘jar’ and the like; and if there were no Substance apart from the qualities, what would constitute these various substrata of the same qualities? That is to say, We have the notions—‘this is a pillar’, ‘this is a jar’—that pertain to the different shape of each of the things

cognised, without any (necessary) idea of their colour &c.,—the character of being coloured &c. belonging equally to ail objects.

Objections “The different cognitions that we have with regard to each object is due to the difference in the previous ideas or impressions that we may have in our mind, with regard to the material masses observed (and hence the cognitions must be admitted, in all cases, to be of the same colour, and the notion of the difference in substrata must be regarded as being due to the previous impressions in the mind of the observer.)”

Reply: In that case the different cognitions that we have of the various colours &c. may also be attributed to the differences in the previous ideas that we may have; and as such we might deny the existence of the different colours &c. (admitting the existence of only one colour, explaining the variety of colour—perception as being due to existing impressions in the observer’s mind.) [ And this would lead us to Idealism pure and simple.]

Objections "If no such tiling, as the Blue colour f.i., had a real existence in the external world, then the ideas or impressions of these would depend, for their appearance, solely upon their own series (santāna, which is endless); and as such it would not be possible for these impressions to appear at certain times only and not at all times; and hence if the differentiation of Blue &c. depended upon these impressions only, then it would not be possible for these colours to be perceived at certain times (i.e. the impressions having a continuous existence, the perception of Blue would also be continuous); and in as much as we do not find this to be the case in ordinary experience, the differences of Blue &c. cannot be regarded as due to those Impressions; and it is for this reason that we postulate a variety of colours.”

Reply: In the case of the different cognitions with regard to the pillar &c. also, if they did not depend upon some object having an existence in the external world,—there would be no possiblity of their appearing at certain times only; and hence with regard to each object we should assume a particular material form apart from, the qualities of colour &c., which would be the instigating cause of the impressions in connection with each objective mass perceived. It is thus alone that we could explain the fact of a single object being perceived by means of the two actions of seeing and touching (both these actions applying to the said shape). This would be impossible if an object consisted solely of colour and its other properties; as each of these would be perceptible by a distinct sense-organ (and we would in such cases have the idea of two ‘objects’, as there would be nothing in the shape of a material object that could be amenable to a combined perception by two or more sense-operations). Then again, as a matter of fact, Colour and the other similar qualities belonging to the atoms, would be supersensuous; and as for you there is no objective mass (‘independent of the atoms with the said colour &c), what could be the object of the said seeing and touching?

Objection: “Though each atom by itself is supersensuous, yet, when there is a certain operation of the mind in connection with the sense-organs, the atoms are rendered capable (of accomplishing certain purposes); and then they become amenable to sense-perception.”

Reply: This could not be; because the becoming capable cannot set aside the inherent subtile (imperceptible) character of the atoms; and if the mere becoming capable could make a thing perceptible by the senses, then the operation of the mind and the sense-organs themselves would also become perceptible (as these also are made capable of serving some useful purpose, and it is a universally admitted fact that the sense-organs themselves are imperceptible, being extremely subtile in their character, and only nominally material).

Objection: “Though atoms individually are subtile and imperceptible, yet when they aggregate together, then they acquire a certain degree of grossness, like a mass of hair (each singly being invisible); And as they become visible, they appear as one only.”

Reply: Does the gross form become actually produced in these many atoms, at the time you speak of? Or, is it as in the case of hair, the grossness being only imposed upon the aggregate, and not existing in reality? If it is produced in the atoms themselves, then that aggregate gross form would be what is regarded as the composite ‘substance’ (apart from the qualities that may belong to them.) While if it be not really existent in them, but be perceived only as imposed upon them, then such a perception could only be a misconception. But then, every misconception must have a counterpart reality somewhere in existence; consequently it would be necessary for you to admit of the real existence of eveṇ a single gross objective mass somewhere. This reality of grossness could not belong to an Idea; as we do not find any such idea appearing as that ‘I am gross;’ and secondly because in that case there would be no gross object that could be perceived in common by more than one person (the idea of each person belonging to him and him alone).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that there is a single gross substance (and it is not a mere collection of qualities): because the object is always perceived as having the same gross form (while its qualities are adventitious and variable); and because it is found to operate towards the accomplishment of definite useful purposes (which could not be done by mere qualities). And thus the existence of the material Substance (independently of the qualities of colour &c.) is established.

Objection: “It is only when a cognition is not subsequently followed by a notion to the contrary, that it is accepted as true, and the object cognised regarded as having a real existence; in the case of the composite Substance, however, we find its cognition followed by a contrary notion:—viz. ‘when the hand is shaken, the body related to it does not shake, and when the leg is shaken the body is not found to shake; and (if the

Body were a composite whole made up of the hand &c.) then one and the same body would have two contradictory conditions (of shaking and not shaking) (and so the notion of the composite apart from the constituent atoms and qualities must be regarded as a misconception).”

Reply: This is not right; as there is no such hard and fast rule as that when the band shakes the body must also shake; as a matter of fact, we find that when there is cause for the shaking of the hand only, it is the hand alone that shakes, and not the body, for the simple reason that there is no cause for the shaking of this latter; and when there is a cause for the shaking of the body also, then this also shakes; where is there a contradiction in this?

Objection “If the body does not move when the hand moves, then there would be an absence of inherent inseparable relationship between them.”

Reply: Not so; because, what is meant by the absence of such relationship is that the two have an existence apart from each other; and not that while the one moves the other does not move; for we find that while the Substance moves the qualities inhering therein do not move (though the relationship between the Substance and its qualities is universally recognised to be inseparable). And as for having an existence apart from each other, this can never be the case with the whole and the part, even though these be totally different from each other. Consequently in the case in question there could be no absence of inseparable relationship.

Another contrary notion that is put forward by the opponent is this:—“In any object, if a part of it happens to be covered up, (and we touch the object), there is no touching of the object wherein the covered up part inheres, while there is a touching of that wherein inheres the uncovered part; and thus (if the object wherein the two parts inhere were a single composite whole) then we would have a teaching and not touching of the same object and at the same time.”

There is not much weight in this objection either; because, the cohering of the part does not make the whole covered up; and the reason for this is that the single whole inheres in its many parts; and as such even when a number of its parts are covered up, if it happens to be touched in the uncovered parts, it also becomes touched through them; specially as it is the same in all its parts.

As for the non-recognition of the gross form of the object, as also the non-perception of the larger number of its component particles,—that is due to the absence of the perception of the aggregations of the several component particles, which perception is the basis of the recognition of the varying degrees of dimension. That is to say, in a ease where a larger number of component particles are covered up, and only a smaller number of them visible, there is no perception of the component whole; as for instance, when a man is immersed in water, with his head above the water, we, seeing the head only, are not said to see the body. Then again, when one part of an object is red, the object is red in that part only, while over the rest of it it is not-red; and thus we find that there is nothing absurd in a single object being both red and not-red. And the reason is simple: redness consists only in a conjunction with reddening materials, while non-redness consists in the absence of such material; and it is quite possible for both of these to belong to the same object (in its parts); as conjunction is not an all-pervading quality (but exists only in parts of objects).

Objection; “There is yet another objection to the idea of the complete whole: The whole could exist in each of the parts either in its complete form or partially only; for certainly, there is no third way. As a matter of fact however, it could not exist in them only partially; as it has no parts of it apart from the component parts themselves. Then, if it existed in each of them in its complete form, then it could not exist in any but a single component particle; as the whole of it being taken up by the conjunction of that single particle, there would be no room for the other particles, specially as the whole has no other form save that which would be existing in that single particle.”

In this connection, we should think over the following points: You declare that a thing can exist either wholly or partially:—well, do you make this declaration as accepted by yourself, or as admitted by your opponent? As for yourself, you the Bauddha do not admit of the existence (or inherence) of a thing in any other thing. While as for your opponent, he does admit of the said total and partial existence; because totality and partiality are not, according to him, the methods of existence; nor are these the basis of the said existence. As a matter of fact, that which exists, does so either by itself, or in the relationship of the container and the contained, with something else; and certainly there can be no absurdity in a single thing having more than one connection; as for instance, we actually find, in the case of an object of variegated colour, the connection or relationship of yellow and the other colours in objects possessed of the blue colour also; nor in this case does the object differ with each distinct colour; and if you did not consider it possible for a single object to have various colours, then it would not be possible for you to have any cognition of the variegated colour. Nor can the fact of the cognition or idea of the object being one only be urged as a ground for the singleness of its colour only; as this would be in direct contradiction to the well-known perception of the variegated colour. And just as in the case of a composite whole, made up of a number of component particles, there is room for other particles, even though the object is connected with one particle, as is perceived by the senses,—so, in the same manner, we also perceive the connection of many particles in a single object of the gross form. As for the declaration that we see the connection of many things in a single object, and not the connection of one with many things,—that is a mere point of difference between the nature of the two; as the factor of the connection of many things (one way or the other) is common to botù cases. Thus then, we have refuted both of the following statements: (1) that “that which is one can exist in a single point of place, as for instance a single colour, and a single composite whole”, and (2) that “that which exists over a number of points in space must be many and diverse,—e.g. the palm fruits contained in a number of vessels, and the composite whole existing over a number of component parts..

Then again, the premiss brought forward by you is incapable of being established either for yourself or for your opponent. As for yourself, you hold that a single Idea, by its very appearance, exists in a number of things, such as the object, the senseorgan, and the operation of the mind. And as for your opponent, he too believes in the fact of a single thread being in conjunction with a number of beads (strung on to it). And in the same manner, the composite whole can very well exist by inherence in a number of component parts,—without, thereby, becoming diverse.

Thus then, the very basis of your objection having fallen off on all sides, the objection itself falls to the ground unsupported; as if there were no composite whole, and the whole world consisted of atoms alone, then there could be no chance of the cognitions of the subject, the common character and the instance (of your inferential argument); and hence the argument would have no existence. Consequently any such argument cannot set aside the existence of the composite whole, which is perceived directly by the senses.

Objection: “This sense-perception may be a misconception, in as much as it is found to be subsequently set aside by a contrary notion.”

Reply: If it were so, then you would fall into the vicious circle of mutual interdependence—the falsity of sense-perception being proved by the presence of the contrary notion; and the correctness of this contrary notion being dependent upon the falsity of the sense-perception. As a matter of fact, the ordinary rule (of being set aside by contrary notions) does not apply to the case of sense-perception, which is independent of all other considerations. Nor is it proper to declare, as false or mistaken a cognition (of sense-perception) which is found to be compatible with the useful functioning of things, which is universally accepted as true, and which is manifest to all people; as in that case, such ordinary sense-cognitions as those of the blue colour would also become false. In this way is our theory freed from the danger of being set aside by any contrary notions.

Though the existence of atoms is only inferred from the grosser products, yet certain usages of the world must be based upon them.

Objection: “[The process of the appearance of gross products has been described by you as beginning with the aggregate of three diads—which would consist, of six atoms.] This simultaneous conjunction of the atom with six atoms would make the atom consist of six parts, (each part being connected with each of the other atoms, and this would do away with the atomic character itself.”

Reply: What do you mean by this ‘simultaneous conjunction’? Does it mean that one atom is produced simultaneously, along with six other atoms? or does it mean that the one atom becomes simultaneously connected with the six atoms? As for simultaneous production, if there be such a production of even an impossible thing, through the simultaneous operation of the productive cause,—what absurdity would there be in this? As for simultaneous conjunction, that too is not incompatible. (1) As the conjunction of substances does not refer to its parts, as even an impartite substance, like Ākāśa has conjunction; and (2) if there were parts also, then the conjunction existing in the final atom only, no conjunction would be perceptible. The conjunction of substances is actually found to lie in the forms of the substances themselves. Such being the case, as in the case of the partite substance, so in that of the impartite atom also, when there would a simultaneous conjunction of a single atom with several others whenever there would be sufficient cause for this; and there would be nothing objectionable in that.

Notes.

Ever since Vaiśeṣika philosophy became known to the western world, it has continued to be laughed at for holding that Gold, and all other metals, are in their very essence, of the nature of Fire. No attempt has yet been made to refute the argument that they put forward in support of this view. Melted gold continues in the molten condition, even on the application of extreme heat; it does not become entirely dissipated, as all other non-fiery things are, by the contact of fire. Even at the present day, in an age of electric arc-lights and furnaces it is not very easy to determine whether the application of any degree of it will entirely dissipate the gold; and it is no wonder that it was regarded as non-dissipating by the philosophers of old. And when once this fact is admitted there can be no escape from the conclusion that gold is fiery in its essence.