Verse 880

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

न स तस्य च शब्दस्य युक्तो योगो न तत्कृते ।
प्रत्यये सति भात्यर्थो रूपबोधे तथा रसः ॥ ८८० ॥

na sa tasya ca śabdasya yukto yogo na tatkṛte |
pratyaye sati bhātyartho rūpabodhe tathā rasaḥ || 880 ||

It is not right that there should be any connection between the specific individuality and the word; nor does the thing appear in the cognition brought about by the word; just as taste does not appear in the cognition of colour.—(880)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

“Even if the idea is not so clear and distinct, why cannot Specific Individuality form the denotation of the word?”:—[see verse 880 above]

The argument may be thus formulated.—When a thing does not appear in the cognition brought about by a certain other thing, it cannot form the denotation of that;—for instance, Taste in the cognition brought about by Colour;—Specific Individuality does not appear in the cognition brought about by Words;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider term (which implies the absence of the narrower term).—The Proof annulling the conclusion of the other party consists in the anomaly pointed out here. For instance, when a Word is said to be denotative of a certain thing, all that is meant is that it brings about the cognition of that thing,—nothing else; and a cognition cannot be said to be of that thing whose form does not appear in it at all; if it did, it would lead to an absurdity. Nor can one and the same thing have two forms—one distinct and the other indistinct,—by virtue of which the indistinct form could be the one denoted by Words;

because one is incompatible with two; and it has been shown thatngs existing at different times are mutually incompatible.—(880)

The Naiyāyikas declare as follows:—“The Individual, the Configuration and the Universal,—all these constitute the Denotation of the Word—(Nyāyasūtra, 2. 2. 63).—The term ‘padārtha’ here stands for the ‘artha’, denotative, ‘padasya’, of the Word.—The term ‘Individual’ stands for Substances, Qualities, Actions and Ultimate Differentia; this has been defined in the Sūtra—The Individual consists of particular Qualities, Actions and Substances (Nyāyasūtra, 2. 2. 64). The meaning of the Sūtra, according to the author of the Vārtika (Uddyotakara), is as follows—‘Differentia’ is that which is differentiated; ‘guṇaviśeṣa’ is that which is differentiated from Qualities, i.e. Action. This same term ‘guṇaviśeṣa’ taken a second time is meant to be an Ekaśeṣa Compound,—standing for Quality; the term ‘viśeṣa’ ‘particular’, in this case is meant to exclude the Configuration, which is essentially a form of Conjunction, and Conjunction is included under the category of ‘Quality’; hence if the qualifying epithet ‘particular’ were not there, Configuration also would become included; and yet this is not meant to be included under the ‘Individual’, as it has been mentioned by a separate word.—The term ‘āśraya’, ‘Receptacle’, in the Sūtra stands for Substance; Substance being the receptacle or substratum of the said particular Qualities and Actions. This Substance has been indicated by the Sūtra wherefrom the term ‘tat’ has been eliminated. The compound ‘Guṇaviśeṣāśrayaḥ’ therefore has to be expounded as—‘Guṇaviśeṣāḥ (Particular Qualities)—Guṇaviśeṣāḥ (Actions)—Tadāśrayaḥ (Substances) This is a collective copulative Compound, and yet the Neuter ending has not been used as the use of the particular gender depends upon the whim of people. Thus the sense of the Sūtra comes to be this: ‘That which is guṇaviśeṣāśraya is the Individual, also called Mūrti, Composite’. When the name ‘mūrti’ ‘composite’ is applied to substance, it is to be taken. locatively—as ‘that wherein component parts adhere’; when it is applied to Colour, etc., it is to be taken nominatively, in the sense of ‘those that adhere—inhere—in substances’; as for the term ‘vyakti’, it is applied to Substances accusatively and to Colour, etc. instrumentally.—According to the author of the Bhāṣya (Vātsyāyana) however, the Sūtra is to be taken exactly as it stands—‘That which is the receptacle of distinctive qualities is the Individual, and that also is the material Body’, Thus it has been said that—That Substance which is the receptacle of the particular qualities,—Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch,—and also of Gravity, Fluidity, Solidity, Faculty, and also of the non-pervasive Dimension,—is called ‘mūrti’, ‘composite body’, on account of its being made up of component parts.—The term ‘ākṛti’, ‘Configuration’, denotes the contact of the limbs of living beings, in the shape of Hands, etc. along with their components, Fingers, etc. Says the Sūtra (Nyāya, 2. 2. 65)—‘Configuration is that which indicates the universal and its characteristics’; on this the Bhāṣya says—‘That should be known as Configuration which serves to indicate the Universal and the characteristic features of the Universal. This Configuration is nothing apart from the definite arrangement of the parts of an object and the components of those parts’.—The term ‘arrangement’ stands for a particular form of contact; and the term ‘definite’ serves to exclude artificial contacts.—The ‘characteristic features of the Universal’ consist of the limbs of living beings,—the Head, the Hand and so forth,—as it is by these that the Universal (or genus) ‘Cow’ and the like is indicated. In some cases, the genus is manifested directly by the Configuration; e.g. when the genus ‘Cow’ becomes manifested on the perception of the exact shape of the Head, Legs, etc.; in some cases it is manifested by the characteristics of the genus; e.g. when the genus ‘Cow’ is manifested by the Homs and other such limbs which are perceived severally. Thus it is that the Configuration becomes the indicative of the genus and of the characteristics of the genus.—The term ‘Jāti’ ‘Genus’, denotes that entity which is called ‘Sāmānya’, Universal, which is the basis of the comprehensive names and notions of things. Hence the next Sūtra (Nyāya, 2. 2. 66)—‘Jāti, Universal, is the basis of comprehensive cognitions’; that is to say, the Universal is the source from which comprehensive notions arise.”