Chapter 3.3d - The Theory of Satkāryavāda (the doctrine of causality)

The problem of causality [i.e., satkārya] has a prominent place in Indian thought. In Sāṅkhya, Prakṛti is the upādānakāraṇa of this universe.^[1] Pariṇāma is that process by which the unmanifested Prakṛti becomes transformed into this manifested state of the objects of experience. This involves the problem of causality or the relation between cause and effect. The theory that the effect exists beforehand in its cause is one of the central features of the Sāṅkhya System. This theory of causality of Sāṅkhya is called pariṇāmavāda or ‘satkāryavāda’, which establishes that both cause and effect are existent and that effect is not a non-entity, which has become an entity by the operation of the cause.

The Vedāntins hold that all effects are an illusory imagination from the existent and not themselves really existent. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the nonexistent is produced from the existent. But according to Sāṅkhya the existent is produced from the existent.^[2] The modern conception of the functional interpretation of the change that it is not material things that change, but the patterns of change and relations are foreshadowed the above traditional Indian thoughts on the theory of causality [i.e., satkārya-vāda]. In asking whether this new conception has been foreshadowed traditional Indian thoughts the suggestive possibilities latent in the purely functional view of causality recommended in the Buddhist doctrine of ‘pratityāsamutpāda’ is not left out. The doctrine bids to seek not material things that change, but patterns of change and relations.

According to Sāṅkhya the effect pre-exist in the cause. Vācaspati Miśra in his Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī elaborates the cause-effect relationship with ample evidence that was covertly suggested by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the Sāṅkhyakārikā The Sāṅkhya offers the following arguments to prove the pre-existence of the effect in the cause.

Asadakaraṇāt

This is the first argument of this theory, that what is non-existent can never be made existent (asadakaraṇāt). Vācaspati Miśra explicates the theory thus: if the effect were really non-existent, no agency whatever could bring it about any more than a thousand craftsmen could turn blue into yellow or extract oil from sand. Oil is getting from sesame because the oil was existing in the sesame.^[3] Thus pariṇāma is the manifestation of something already existing. All that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation of the pre-existing effect.

Upādānagrahaṇāt

A particular effect can be produced out of a particular material cause (upādānagrahaṇāt). A jar can be produced out of clay only: cloth can be produced out of threads only: curd can be produced out of milk only. There is a law that particular causes can produce particular effects (upādānaniyamāt). This proves that the effects are pre-existent in their causes in a latent condition. If they are nonexistent in their causes, the causes will be devoid of specified powers to produce non-existent specific effects. If they are admitted to have specific powers, these powers are nothing but the latent condition (anāgatāvasthā) of the specific effects. The effects are pre-existent in their causes prior to their operation, since they are related to their material causes. The cause produces the effect when it is related to it. No relation can exist between the existent cause and the non-existent effect. Hence the effect must be existent.^[4]

Sarvasambhavābhāvāt

If the effect unrelated to the cause could be produced, then every effect would arise from every cause. But every effect does not arise from every cause (sarvasambhavābhāvāt). So the effect is pre-existent in the cause, and the cause produces the effect when it is related to the effect: a non-existent effect unrelated to the cause; only an existent effect related to the cause can be produced by an existing cause related to the effect.

Śaktasya Śakyakaraṇāt

The efficient cause can produce only that effect for which it is efficient (śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt). The author of Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī vivifies this idea taking the former example from a different view. The oil is produced out of sesame because sesame is efficient to produce oil. But the soil is not efficient to produce oil. So oil cannot be produced out of the soil.This is also a limitation. This limit is in the form that only what is competent to produce that effect can produce it and that something produce only what is capable of being produced by that something as the cause so there is special ‘capacity’ in the cause for which capacity the effect is the object.^[5]

Kāraṇabhāvāt

The effect pre-exists in the cause, since it is identical in nature with its cause (kāraṇabhāvāt). The effect is not different from the cause. The cause is existent. The effect, therefore, cannot be non-existent. There can be no identity between an entity and a non-entity.

The effect is existent in the cause; because what is non-existent can never be brought into existent; because a determinate relation subsists between the material cause and its effect; because all effects are not produced in all places, at all times; because a competent cause only can produce an effect for which it is competent; and because the effect possesses the nature of the cause.^[6] Vācaspati Miśra even quotes from Bhagavat Gītā to establish his argument in proving Satkāryavāda.^[7]

As a preliminary to the establishment of the acclaimed Sāṅkhya theory, i.e., satkāryavāda, Vācaspati Miśra presents the different views of other systems with regard to the nature of effect as follows;

1) The Bauddha view of the effect being an entity arising from non-entity.^[8]

2) The Advaitavedānta view of the whole series of effect being a mere illusory evolution out of a single entity, and not real entities in themselves.^[9]

3) The Nyāyā and Vaiśeṣika view of the effect being a non-entity arising from entity.^[10]

4) The Sāṅkhya view of the effect being an entity arising from an entity.^[11]

Thus presenting the various views on causation Vācaspati Miśra refutes other theories one by one.

As regards the Buddha theory that, the existent effect emanates from the non-existent cause. Though it is true that products like ‘sprout’ and the ‘jar’ are found to be produced after the destruction of the seed and clay-lump, yet the causal efficiency cannot be attributed to destruction, which is pure negation. It can belong only to positive entities in the shape of the constituent particles of the seed and the clay lump. If positive entity were produced out of mere negation, then, in as much as such negation of things would be easily available everywhere, it would involve the absurd contingency of all things being produced at all places and at all times.^[12] Vācaspati Miśra refutes the Advaita Vedānta theory of causation as follows. The belief in the existence of the phenomenal world cannot be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence. Hence the effect cannot be regarded as a mere illusory evolution from a single real entity.^[13]

The Nyāyā and vaiśeṣika views are criticized by pointing out the above mentioned five proofs which were quoted to establish the Sāṅkhya view. First of all no instance of the manifestation of what is non-existence is got. What is non-existence is never found to be either manifested or produced. Then, there could be no relation between cause and effect; every effect would arise from every cause without restriction. But one’s experience is that there is some relationship between cause and effect because the efficient cause can produce only that effect for which it is efficient. Lastly, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is also the cause of existence. The effect also, is of the same essence as the cause that also is existent.^[14] Thus, refuting the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view, Vācaspati Miśra establishes Satkāryavāda.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 15 and 16

[2]:

Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 9

[3]:

Ibid

[4]:

Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p.5

[5]:

Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 9

[6]:

Ibid

[7]:

"nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ" iti|| Ibid

[8]:

’asataḥ sat jāyate’ iti| Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 8

[9]:

ekasya sato vivartaḥ kāryajātaṃ na vastu sat| Ibid

[10]:

'sataḥ asat jāyate' iti| Ibid

[11]:

'sataḥ sat jāyate' iti vṛddhāḥ|| Ibid

[12]:

"abhāvāttu bhāvotpattvau, tasya sarvatra sulabhatvāt, sarvadā sarvakāryotpādaprasaṅga ityādi nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkāyāmasmābhiḥ pratipāditam||"
Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī on Sāṅkhyakārikā 9

[13]:

prapañcapratyayaścāsati bādhake na śakyo mithyeti vaditum iti|| Ibid

[14]:

Ibid