Chapter 3.1 - Definition and Nature of Anumana (Inference)

Anumana literally means a knowledge that follows some other knowledge. The object of inference is some fact which follows another because of a universal relationship between the two. But it is indicated by what is perceived in it. Anumana as a pramana is therefore the source of knowing through the medium of a sign or mark about a thing which has a certain character. It helps one to know the character of a thing. To say for instance, fire is at times apprehended through inference due to its connection with smoke.

Anumana (Inference) is used to derive anumiti (inferential cognition) and hence it is the instrument of inferential cognition (anumiti; karana).

Anumana in Nyaya system is ‘the knowledge of object derived not by direct observation, but by means of the knowledge of a linga or sign and that is connected with the inferred object by a universal relationship called vyapti.’^[1] Among the other schools while Vaisheshikas consider Anumana as a knowledge deriving from the perception of linga or sign.^[2] Buddhists observe it going from the perception of that which is inseparably connected to another thing.^[3] Jains on the other hand hold it as a method of knowing an unperceived object through the perception of a sign and the recollection of its invariable concomitance with the object.⁷

According to Jayanta, Anumana is the instrument of the knowledge of an unperceived probandum through the apprehension of a probans with fivefold characteristic together with the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between the two.

Jayanta makes it clear that the direct cause of inference is the perception of linga. Though the perception of universal relation is not its immediate cause, it exerts its influence through memory. Reason is the instrument of inferential knowledge. It cannot establish the object to be proved if its similarity with the example is not recognized.

Anumana is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. Invariable concomitance is the nerve of inference. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called pakshadharmata. The invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called vyapti. The knowledge of pakshadharmata as qualified by vyapti is called paramarsha. Inference is thus defined as knowledge arising through paramarsha that is the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor (pakshadharmata) and is invariably associated with the major vyapti.

Inference thus contains three key terms of syllogism viz., minor, major and middle. In Nyaya they are called as paksha, sadhya and hetu respectively. The paksha is known to be the minor term or the subject of the inferential reasoning. Subject here means any individual or class of individual of whom one wants to prove something. Sadhya on the other hand is the object of inference. It is the character of the subject (paksha) which is obscure though but is indicated by some sign present in it. It is that character of the minor which is wanted to be proved through inferential reasoning.

Middle term called linga serves to know the unperceived one. It is referred to as the base of our knowledge of the sadhya and hence it is also named as the hetu. The paksha on the other hand is connected to sadhya through their common relation to the hetu or middle term which has the following five characteristics viz., pakshasattva, sapakshasattva, vipakshasattva, abadhitavishayattva and asatpratipakshattva.

The foremost is considered to be the character of the subject (paksha) where the middle term is connected to the minor term. For example the hill is smoky (s is m)

Sapakshasattva indicates the presence in all positive instance in which the major exists. In this regard, the middle term must be distributive and correlated to the major. For instance all smoky objects are fiery (m is p).

Vipakshasattva specifies its absence in all negative instances in which the major is absent. For example; whatever is not fiery is not smoky.

Abadhitavishayattva is the inconsistency of its object. The middle term must not aim at establishing such an absurd and contradictory object as the coolness of fire or the circleness of a circle.

Asatpratipakshattva is the absence of antithetical acting reasons leading to negative reasons and wrong conclusions. For a valid Inference the middle term should require all the five characteristics mentioned above.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyayamanjairi, (Nyayamanjari), p.109

[2]:

Padarthadharmasamgraha (Padartha Dharmasangraha), p.99

[3]:

S.C.Chatterjee, Nyaya theory of Knowledge, Bharatiya kala prakashan, Delhi, p.234⁷ ibid., 234