Vaisheshika-sutra with Commentary

by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165

The Vaisheshika-sutra 1.1.8, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 8 (‘resemblances of substance, attribute, and action’) contained in Chapter 1—Of Substance, Attribute, and Action—of Book I (of the predicables).

Sūtra 1.1.8 (Resemblances of Substance, Attribute, and Action)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 1.1.8:

सदनित्यं द्रव्यवत् कार्यं कारणं सामान्यविशेषवदिति द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामविशेषः ॥ १.१.८ ॥

sadanityaṃ dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣavaditi dravyaguṇakarmaṇāmaviśeṣaḥ || 1.1.8 ||

sat—existent; anityam—non-eternal; dravyavat—containing substance; kāryam—effect; kāraṇam—cause; sāmānya-viśeṣavat—being both Genus and Species; iti—this; dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām—of Substance, Attribute, and Action; aviśeṣaḥ—resemblance.

8. The Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action lies in this that they are existent and non-eternal, have Substance as their combinative cause, are effect as well as cause, and are both Genus and Species.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

After the enumeration of Substance, etc., he begins the topic of the Resemblance of the three. He states the Resemblance of the three even before the enumeration of the other three Predicables, Genus, etc., inasmuch as it is expected first of all by the disciples, because the Resemblance of the three, Substance, etc., is favourable to the knowledge of reality.—[Read sūtra 1.1.8 above]

In the presence of the word ‘viśeṣa’ the word ‘aviśeṣa’ denotes Resemblance. ‘Sat’ connotes the quality of being the object of the perception and name in the form of that which is existent, because all the three have fitness for existence. ‘Anitya connotes the quality of that which tends towards an n iḷiilation. Although it is not common to the ultimate atoms, etc., still it is intended to denote the possession of the upādhi or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function or nature of that which tends towards annihilation. ‘Dravyavat’ means that which contains substance as its combinative cause. This too is not present in the ultimate atoms, etc. Therefore the intention is to denote the possession of the upādhi. or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which contains substance as its combinative cause. ‘Kārya’ is intended to denote the possession of the upādhi or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which is the counter-opposite of antecedent non-existence for potential existence). ‘Kāraṇa’ indicates the possession of the upādhi or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which belongs to the class of constant (Mill’s invariable and unconditional) antecedents of all effects except knowledge. Thus the definition is not too wide so as to include the Soul which is the object of Self-intuition, as a cause of Self-intuition, or to extend to the generic quality of being a cow. etc; nor is it too narrow so as to exclude the ultimate atoms (lit., perfect spheres) which are not causes. ‘Sāmānayaviśeṣavat,’ moans the possession of those characteristics which though they are genera, still are species inasmuch as they serve to differentiate themselves severally, e.g., Substanceless, Attributeness, Actionness, etc. It cannot be said that causality is too wide, because from “Give a cow,” “A cow should not be touched with the feet” and other texts of the Veda it appears that class or kind (jāti) also is a cause of virtue and vice; for a class has the sole use of limitation.

This aphorism is illustrative. It should be observed that the Resemblance of the three lies also in their being capable of being denoted by words having the meaning inherent in them.

If it is said that the characteristics of being effects and non-eternality belong to those only which have causes, and that this is their Resemblance as laid down by Professor I’raśastadeva in “And causality (appears) elsewhere than in the perfect spheres (ultimate atoms),” then according to the aphorism it cannot be specified by the possession of the upādhi or condition which distinguishes predicables.

The characteristics of being the causes of Attributes and also the effects of Attributes belong to the three except the eternal Substances.—8.

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