Sūtra 1.7

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 1.7:

प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि ॥ १.७ ॥

pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni || 1.7 ||

7. Right notions are perception, inference, and testimony.

The Rajamartanda commentary by King Bhoja:

[English translation of the 11th century commentary by Bhoja called the Rājamārtaṇḍa]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Here the author of the Institute has not given a separate definition of what right notion is, that being very well known, and it being made evident by the description of its different forms. In fact the real definition of right notion is that whereby is produced unquestionable knowledge.

“Perception” (pratyakṣa) is that function of the thinking principle by which it acquires, through the medium of the senses brought in connexion with external objects having common and peculiar characteristics, a knowledge of the most important peculiar characteristic.

“Inference” (anumāna) is the conviction produced by a previous knowledge of the necessary relation between a characteristic and that which bears it.

A trustworthy word is “testimony,” (āgama).

Notes and Extracts

[Notes and comparative extracts from other commentaries on the Yogasūtra]

[Pramāṇa means right notion, as also the means of acquiring that right notion, i.e., evidence, and hence the two meanings are often confounded. As a function of the thinking principle it is right notion, and not evidence. The Yoga system follows the Sāṅkhya in admitting only three means of right notion, and in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā they are said to comprise every mode of demonstration. The Naiyāyikas, however, reckon four kinds, viz., preception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (śabā). The Vedāntis follow this latter, and the Mīmāṃsakas recognise six, viz., perception (pratyakṣa), presumption (arthāpatti) proportion (sambhara), privation (abhāva), comprehension (pratibha) and oral communication (aitihya).

The word used for perception is pratyakṣa, which means “that which is seen,” but it implies knowledge acquired through any one of the five organs of sense, or, as Reid defines perception, “evidence which we have of external objects by our senses.” For testimony Patañjali gives āgama, which means the Vedas, but the commentator has generalised it by giving for its synonym āptavacana “reliable words”; it is the declaration of one who knows the truth of that which he affirms, and whose authority may be relied upon. The scriptures, as revealed knowledge, naturally come at the head of testimony].

Having thus described the function of right notion the author speaks of Misconception.