Chapter 2.4 - Pramanas in Purva Mimamsa

The word Mimamsa literally means the revered thought and was originally applied to the interpretation of Vedic rituals which commanded the highest reverence. Jaimini was the founder of this system that accepts the Veda as the final authority on all questions. It provides a comprehensive method for interpreting and understanding the underlying meaning of the Veda. Mimamsa deals with the earlier portion of the Vedas and is therefore called Purvamimamsa and also Karmamimamsa.^[1]

Purvamimamsa regards the Vedas as eternal, authorless and of infallible authority. The aim of the Mimamsa is to supply principles according to which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted and to provide philosophical justification for the views contained therein. The ideal of the earlier Mimamsaka was the attainment of heaven (svarga). Eventually this school was divided into two groups: the school founded by Prabhakara and the one founded by Kumarila Bhatta.

Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as apprehension (anubhuti). As against to this Kumarila defines it as apprehension of an object which is produced by causes free from defects and which is not contradicted by subsequent knowledge. Valid cognition therefore must fulfill four conditions. First it must not arise from defective causes (karanadosharahita); second it must be free contradiction. It must be self-consistent and should not be set aside by subsequent knowledge (badhakajnanarahita); third it must apprehend an object which has not already been apprehended. Novelty is an essential feature of knowledge (agrihitagrahi);fourth it must truly represent the object. (yathartha)^[2]

Prabhakara and Kumarila both believe that the goal of human life is liberation. Jaimini regards knowledge itself as pramana or means of knowledge and admits three pramanas-perception, inference and testimony.^[3] Prabhakara adds two more -comparison and implication. Kumarila further adds non-apprehension Prabhakara and Kumarila regard knowledge itself as pramana or means of knowledge.

Prabhakara and Kumarila recognize two kinds of knowledge; immediate knowledge that arises from the contact of the senses with a real object through meditation of the mind and mediate. Perception is regarded as immediate knowledge by both. They both admit two stages in perception-Indeterminate and determinate. Prabhakara defines perception as direct apprehension. Against this, Kumarila defines it as direct knowledge produced by the proper contact of the sense organs with the presented object, which is free from defects. Mimamsa broadly agrees with Nyaya in its view of perception.

Inference in the Mimamsa generally agrees with that of the Nyaya. However, the Mimamsa recognizes only three members of a syllogism, either the first three or the last three.

The Mimamsa view of comparison or upamana differs from the Nyaya view. According to Nyaya, comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word. It is the knowledge of similarity of an unknown object like wild cow with known object like a cow. The Mimamsaka refutes this account of comparison. He postulates the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild one. The knowledge derived will be: ‘the remembered cow is like the perceived wild one’ (gavayasadrisi gauh). It is the cow possessed of similarity with the wild cow which is known by comparison.^[4]

Sabdapramana (verbal testimony) is regarded with great esteem in Mimamsa philosophy. Testimony here is verbal authority. It consists in true knowledge of objects derived from the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. Kumarila divides verbal testimony into personal (paurusheya) and impersonal (apaurusheya). The former is the speech or words of a trustworthy person aptavakya; whereas the latter is concurrent with the words of Veda (Vedavakya). Kumarila maintains that verbal testimony is distinct from inference. Word though cognizable, at times may reveal its sense through inference also. But in the case of a sentence, there is no other way to cognize its meaning than verbal cognition.^[5]

Presumption (arthapathi):

Presumption (arthapathi) is accepted by the Mimamsakas a means of knowledge. It is the supposition of something unseen (adrishta). It is to avoid contradiction which would be involved in accepting cognition of an object by any one of the six means of valid knowledge. Kumarila gives instance of presumption based upon sense cognition, inference, verbal testimony, knowledge by similarity etc.

The next means of knowledge recognized by Kumarila is nonexistence (abhava). It is the only mode of knowledge to establish the existence of a thing where the other five means of knowledge fail.^[6] He observes that negation cannot be perceived since there exists no sense-object relationship.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Chandradhar Sharma, Critical survey of Indian philosophy, p.211

[2]:

ibid, p.212

[3]:

ibid, p.218

[4]:

ibid, p.219

[5]:

Arbid Kumar Jha, Dr., Nyaya Philosophy, Epistemology and Education, Standard publication, New Delhi, 2005, p.52

[6]:

ibid, p.53