Chapter 2.5 - Pramanas in Vedanta Philosophy

The word Veda means knowledge and the word Vedanta means the end or aim of all knowledge. The aim of Vedanta system of philosophy is to help the philosophers to rid oneself of avidya (nescience or ignorance) which causes him to mistake his personality for his real Self by showing him the true relationship between subject and object. The whole teachings of Vedanta, says Maxmuller, is summed up in the word ‘Brahman’ which comes from the root ‘Brih’ meaning to grow or to evolve. Brahman is that which spontaneously bursts forth as nature and soul. It is the ultimate cause of this universe. Brahman is true and the world is false. The soul is a part of Brahman. In this regard, the phrase ‘Thou art that’^[1] is well-known.

According to Shankara, Brahman is the whole complex of pre-nominal existence and is considered a separate truth as long as the identity of Brahman with the Self is not realized, just as the phantoms of a dream seem to be true until the sleeper awakens. Shankara teaches that the philosopher and his philosophy, the knower and the known, etc., are all nothing but illusions. They are separate things as they seem like mind. But both are mere manifestations of an absolute being of unknowable entity.

Brahman and the Universe being conceived identical as cause and effect, must also be considered that they are being one and the same. The effect must always be hidden in the cause and will attain causality when it begets something new. Based on this, the Vedantin puts forth that they are one and not different from each other.^[2]

The main teaching of Vedanta is that self-realization should be the actual goal of life; that the essence of the Self is the ever existent consciousness and bliss; the Self is free from all qualifications and limitations; the Self is essentially Brahman, supreme consciousness and this Brahman is the absolute, transcendent, reality devoid of all kinds of attributes. But it eternally embodies itself within itself the capacity or power called maya, which is the basis of mind and matter.

The earlier teachers of the Vedanta aimed at the removal of avidya from the minds of their followers. Later teachers insist more on the necessity to get rid of Maya or illusion. The Prakriyas or the different categories in the philosophy of Vedanta are the fundamental rudimentary principles with which its ethics and metaphysics are built up. They take into account both the un-manifest and the manifest-Brahman, maya, ishvara, jiva and the universe. The nature of reality, the characteristic of the phenomenal appearance and the constitution of the individual Self are the subjects of study in Vedantic philosophy.^[3]

The Advaita recognizes all the six pramanas viz., pratyaksha (perception), anumana (inference), upmana (comparison), agama (scripture), arthapathi (presumption), and anupalabhdi (non-apprehension).^[4] The major schools of Vedanta are Advaita (Non dualism), Dvaita (Dualism), Dvaitadvaita (a combination of dualism and non-dualism), Vishishtadvaita (qualified non-dualism), and Shuddhadvaita (pure dualism). Of these, Shankara’s Advaita, Ramanuja’s Vishishtadvaita and Madhva’s Dvaita are the most important. These early aspirants adhere to the view that eternal scripture is the sole means of knowledge (pramana) for what is beyond the scope of sensory perception and inference.

Perception:

For the Advaita Vedantins it is the direct consciousness of objects obtained through the exercise of senses. Here, the sense-organs constitute the karana or the unique cause of perceptual cognition. Perception is the immediate knowledge in which the mental modification is identical with the object and is grasped by the self’s own light.

Anumana:

For Vedantins anumana is made by he notion of vyapti between two things, acting through past impressions (samskara). Vyapti or Universal proposition is the result of an induction by simple enumeration. It rests on the uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence between two things. If one finds two inseparable things with no exception to their relation, one may take them as universally related.

Shabda (verbal testimony):

Shabda or Verbal testimony for Vedanatins envelops sentences or propositions which assert a relation between things free from conundrum.

Comparison:

It is the means of knowledge based on similarity. When one is aware of the similarity between a wild cow and a village cow, the knowledge born from awareness need not stretch to the subjective cow tied in the cowshed. Here, there is no scope for inference. The similarity at the same time sustaining in the viewer’s cow comes into existence only through the knowledge of Upamana or comparison.

Arthapathi:

Arthapathi is a means of knowledge accepted by Mimamsakas and Advaita school of Vedanta. It is the presumption of something from the explanation of a known fact. According to Vedantins, Arthapathi is the presumption of the ground of explanation through the knowledge of what is to be explained. It happens when a perceived fact cannot be explained without some other fact. In such cases one can presuppose or postulate the existence of this other fact even though it is not perceived.

Anupalabdhi:

For Vedantins it is the particular cause i.e., the instrument of the cognition of non-existence which is not generated by any knowledge. For instance, there is no pot on the floor as it is not cognized. It is a means of knowledge through cognition of non-existence. Here negation becomes a means of valid knowledge. It is however a contended issue as several scholars does not consider negation as a valid means. Hence, while some accept it as a separate source of valid means of knowledge, others do not.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Albert schwetzer, Theories of Indian Philosophers, Bhartiya Kala Prakashan, Delhi, 2001, p.172

[2]:

ibid, pp.172-173

[3]:

Swami Sivananda, Vedanta for Beginners, A divine life society publication yoga Vedanta first academy press, Poshivananda Nagar, Tehri Garhwal up, Himalayas, 1996, p.68

[4]:

M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian philosophy, Motilal Banasidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1994, p.357