Text 19

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 19:

सामान्यादीनाम् त्रयाणां स्वात्मसत्त्वं बुद्धिलक्षणत्वमकार्यत्वमकारणत्वमसामान्यविशेषवत्त्वं नित्यत्वमर्थशब्दानभिधेयत्वम् चेति ॥ १९ ॥

sāmānyādīnām trayāṇāṃ svātmasattvaṃ buddhilakṣaṇatvamakāryatvamakāraṇatvamasāmānyaviśeṣavattvaṃ nityatvamarthaśabdānabhidheyatvam ceti || 19 ||

Text (19): The three beginning with Generality have the character—of having their sole being within themselves, having Buddhi or the Cognitive Faculty as their sole indicator, of not being an effect, of not being the cause, of having no particular generalities, of being eternal, and of not being expressible by the word ‘artha.’—(I-ii-10, 12, 14, 16, 3; VII-ii-26).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The existence of Generality, Individuality and Inherence, lies in their own individual specific forms, and not in any relationship to any such generic entity as ‘Being.’ What is meant by this is that these three categories have the common character of being devoid of any generalities. This is accepted because of the absence of any notions to the contrary. Nor can there be any such Generality as ‘Being’ in Generality itself, as the consequences of such a postulate would be very undesirable (as the presence of a Generality in Generality would lead to an unnecessary regressus ad infinitum, an endless series of Generalities.)

In the case of Individualities (Ultimate Individualities) also, if we had any Generality applying to them, in as much as there would always be a doubt as to the particular Generality to which a number of Individualities with similar properties would belong, it would be necessary to follow up the series of Individualities, step by step; and this would lead us to an endless series of these individualities.

So also in the case of Inherence, if we accepted any such Generality as ‘Being’ applying to it, we would have to postulate another relation of inherence by which the Inherence would be related to that Being; and so on and on it would be necessary to postulate Inherences ad infinitum, which would be far from desirable.

In the case of the classes ‘Gotva’ and the like, the connection of ‘Being’ naturally ceases, on the cessation of the connection of these classes with any sub-classes under them; as any connection with ‘Being’ would only form part of a connection with these sub-classes.

Question: “If what is said above is true, then, how is it that with regard to Generality &c., we have the notions of ‘Being’ (sattā) [i.e. How do you account for the notion that the Generality exists?]”

Answer: This notion is due to the fact of sattā (‘Being’) being imposed upon them, through their common character of having their existence in themselves.

“Well, in that case, the imposition would be a false one.”

Certainly; who says it is not so? Any notion of singleness with regard to a number of distinct things cannot but be false. What is not false, is the perception of the form of the thing; as this is always real.

“In that case, even in the case of Substance &c. we might take the inclusive generic notions of singleness as being due to an unreal imposition of Being.”

That cannot be; as we cannot accept a thing to be indirectly imposed, when we find it applying directly; nor can this connection with ‘Being’ be said to apply directly to the case of Generality &c. (and indirectly to the case of Substance); as we have distinct notions to the contrary precluding such a connection; while there are no such preclusive notions in the case of Substance &c.

Having Buddhi as their sole indicator: i. e. their only proof lies in the Intellect; that is to say in a matter of dispute as to whether or not Generality &c. exist, our only criterion lies in the Intellect; whereas for the existence of Substance and the rest, we would have other grounds for our belief—in the shape of the effects brought about by these, for instance.

Some people explain ‘buddhilakṣaṇa’ as that these are cognised by means of Buddhi alone. But this is not right; as Substance and the rest are also cognised by means of Buddhi; and as such this could not be a point of dissimilarity between Generality &c. on the one hand and Substance and the rest on the other.

Not being an effect—i.e. having an existence indèpen-dently of any causes. This character, in the case of Generality, is recognised, like invariable concomitance, by means of senseperception itself,—which perceives the existence of that Generality, before, after and also during the continuance of the Individual,—which is also found to help in the non-perception of any cause,—and which is aided by a faculty or tendency of the mind brought about by the frequent perception of the said facts. Inherence also is recognised as a non-effect, because with regard to it we have no notions as to its appearing before, or after, or along with (the thing related to it). If the Inherence of the cloth were possible before the cloth, then, in as much as one member of the relationship (viz. the cloth) would not be existing at the time, wherein could the relationship (viz. Inherence) abide? If it were to be produced along with the cloth, then, in that case, the cloth would lose the character of being the substrate of that relationship (of Inherence). If it appeared after the cloth, then too the cloth would not be its substrate. Nor would it do for the effect (Inherence) to be without a substrate. For these reasons, it must be admitted that Inherence is not caused. As for the Individualities, their non-causedness is proved by the argument that they are uncaused, because they are entities other than Substances, Qualities and Actions,—like Generality and Inherence.

Not being the cause: i.e. they never appear as either material or non-material causes. This negation does not apply to the Instrumental cause, as Generality &c. are accepted to be the Instrumental causes of Buddhi (Cognition).

Having no particular Generalities i. e. having no Subclasses. There is no further Generality in the case of Generality itself; as the acceptance of any such would lead to an endless number of Generalities. Then as for Individuality and Inherence, we have already shown how there can be no generalities of these.

Question: “ In that case how is it that we have the single inclusive notion of ‘Generality,’ applying to all Generalities?”

Answer: This notion is due to the fact of the inherence, in one Generality, of many individuals,—a fact which is quite extraneous to the real character of a Generality.

The use too of the word ‘one’ with reference to Individualities is due to the possibility of every thing being capable of giving rise to notions of exclusion.

Etcrnality.—Indestructibility. This too, in the case of Generality is ascertained, like invariable concomittance, by pure sense-perception, which is found to function frequently with regard to the presence of the generality among a number of appearing and disappearing individual things. As for Inherence, its eternality is inferred from the presence of its effects everywhere, and also from the fact of its being uncaused.

Not being expressible by the word ‘artha’—i.e. by the word as used technically in the Vaiśeṣika system.

Notes:

“Buddhilakṣaṇatva”—The ‘buddhi’ here meant are the notions of exclusions and inclusion. (Kiraṇāvalī).

It will be noted that the author makes a distinction between ‘Astitva’, ‘Sattāsambandha’ and ‘Svātmasattva,’ He says that ‘Astitva’ belongs to all the six categories (Text. 2); ‘Sattāsambandha’ to Substance, Quality and Action only (Text. 15); and ‘Svātmasattva’ to Generality, Individuality and Inherence. The difference is not very easy of comprehension. Udayanācārya in his Kiraṇāvalī says that, (1) ‘Astitva’ consists in the capability of being cognised as a positive entity by itself,—not being dependent upon the cognition of the counter-entity; for instance, a negative entity, the absence of the jar, can only be cognised as the negative of the jar; (2) ‘Sattāsambandha’ consists in the subsistence of ‘being’ by the relation of inherence; and (3) ‘Svātmasatva’ is existence by itself, self-sufficient existence, not dependent upon the subsistence of ‘Being.’

This distinction appears to be merely verbal, Śaṅkara Miśra is a little more clear, in his Upaskāra: ‘Sattāsambandha’ be explains as destructibility, capability of producing products out of its own material, producibility. From this it would seem that—(1) ‘Astitva’ is what we man by ‘existence’ in general—this naturally belongs to ail the six categories; (2) ‘Sattāsambandha’ is that existence which is due to the presence of the Generality of ‘being,’ induced by some other cause, and liable to destruction,—this by its very nature can belong to only such of the categories as are transient; and these as we know are Substance, Quality and Action; (3) ‘Svātmasattva’ is self-sufficient existence, independent of all other things,—and this can belong only to the eternal categories.