Brahma-Sūtra 2.1.4

English of translation of Brahmasutra 2.1.4 by Roma Bose:

“(There is) no (having Brahman as the cause) on its part, on account of difference, (its) being so (is known) from the text.”

Nimbārka’s commentary (Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha):

We object^[1] to your view on the ground of reason. The world has not Brahman as its material cause “on account of difference”. And the difference is to be known also “from the text”, viz. ‘He became knowledge and non-knowledge’ (Taittirīya-upaniṣad 2.6^[2]).

Śrīnivāsa’s commentary (Vedānta-kaustubha)

Thus, the objection based on Smṛtis has been disposed of by the preceding two sections. Now, the objection based on reasoning is being disposed of.

It has been stated under the aphorism: ‘From whom (arise) its origin and the rest’ (Brahma-sūtra 1.1.2) that it (viz. the world) has Brahman for its material cause. The prima facie objector objects to it on the ground of reason thus: ‘no’. This world has not Brahman for its material cause. Why? “On account of difference.” That is, Brahman possesses the attributes of sentience, non-grossness, infinity, purity, and the rest, while the world possesses just the opposite attributes of non-sentience, grossness and so on,—on account of such a dissimilarity between the two. Whatever is different from something has not that for its material cause, just as the pot, which is different from the ether, has not the ether as its material cause; just as the pot, the dish and the rest, which are different from the potter, have not the potter as their material cause.

If it be objected. It is found that the attributes of a material cause recur in its effects as well. Similarly, in the case under discussion, too, Brahman is the material cause; and the universe, His effect, consisting of sentient beings like men, animals and the rest, must be similar to Him. Hence the reason (viz.: “On account of difference”) does not hold good,—

(We reply) No, because that there do exist the attributes of non-sentience, grossness and the rest in the effect, viz.: in stones, wood and the rest, is known from the evidence of direct perception.

If it be objected: It is possible to imagine that there is sentience in them, too, though unmanifest; hence there is no difference.

(We reply:) No, because it is unreasonable to take what is known through direct perception to be otherwise on the ground of mere imagination.

The difference is known “from the text” as well,—this is stated by the phrase: “its being so”, i.e. “its being so”, or its difference, is known “from the text” as well, i.e. from the following texts: ‘He became Knowledge and non-knowledge’ (Taittirīya-upaniṣad 2.6), ‘On the same tree, a person, immersed, grieves for his impotence, bewildered’ (Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad 3.1.2; Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad 4.7), ‘And the soul, which is without the Lord, is bound, because of being an enjoyer’ (Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad 1.8) and so on.

Comparative views of Baladeva:

Interpretation absolutely different. He takes this sūtra as forming one adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with demonstrating the eternity and infallibility of the Veda. He thus does not take this sūtra as representing a prima facie view. Thus, this sūtra means,—according to him,—‘(The Veda is) not (unauthoritative like the Sāṃkhya and the rest), on account of (its) difference (from them), (i.e. because it is a non-human origin unlike the Sāṃkhya and the rest); (its) being so (i.e. its eternity) (is known) from the text’.^[3]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Correct reading: ‘pratyavatiṣṭhate’ which is translated here. Vide [Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series] ed., p. 24 and Brindaban ed., p. 378.

[2]:

Quoted by Śaṅkara Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha.

[3]:

Govinda-bhāṣya 2.1.4, p. 18, Chap. 2.